

SOUTH SUDAN REPORT 1992

Consultant to fisherman:

"When is the best time for fishing ?"

Fisherman: "The best time for fishing is when
you get fishing lines."

Education Coordinator, Rumbek District, December 1992:

"On behalf of the illiterate, hunger-
stricken and diseased children of South Sudan and Bahr el
Ghazal in particular, I welcome you into this jungle"

EXTERNAL CHANGES

1. The Government of Sudan, GoS, launched a dry season offensive in March 1992, which recaptured the towns of Pochalla, Pibor, Bor, Torit, Kapoeta, Mongalla, Yirol and Shambe. The Ethiopian government assisted in the recapture of Pochalla. Iran and China have assisted with advice, logistics and armaments. The effect of the offensive was to increase numbers of displaced within the country. The SPLA attacked Juba, causing not only casualties but also retaliation against Southerners suspected of collaboration, including three who worked for USAID and the EC, who were executed.

2. A major raid by supporters of the SPLA's Nasir faction completed the destitution of the Bor and Kongor Dinka, who still had some cattle, even after nine years of war. The resultant diaspora further complicated relief efforts. The split within the SPLA worsened when Garang's deputy, William Nyuon, left and set up the "Unity Forces", claiming that Garang was opposed to reunification. Nyuon's forces then fought Garang's in E. Equatoria.

3. During this fighting in September, four foreigners were murdered, two UN employees, an Interaid nurse and a Norwegian journalist. This shocked the aid agencies, whose security had previously only been threatened by GoS bombings and Toposa highwaymen. It appears that the Garang faction may have been responsible for the murders. The main result has been a reduction in confidence on all sides, despite new operational guidelines. Three UN agencies and twenty three NGOs were operating in May: this has now been reduced to two and fifteen.

4. The UN replaced its chief of operations for OLS and tried to restore lost momentum by recruiting new staff and using its new Department of Humanitarian Affairs to negotiate with GoS and the SPLA. Coordination and policy within OLS have provided the South Sudan programme with as many problems as the situation in the field.

EXPLAN

5. The Government of Kenya introduced its long-awaited NGO registration bill. The Regional Office has submitted an application for registration. Until this is approved, we cannot get a license for a radio frequency or import relief goods duty-free without individual applications.

6. KANU won the general election in Kenya, the stability of which will now depend on relations between the President and the 88 opposition MPs. The Kenyan economy continues to deteriorate, so that telephones, availability of aviation fuel, security and services are all worse than previously. The parallel forex system is complex and we may have to bring in funds on the open market rather than through a bank, in order to obtain a realistic exchange rate.

OBJECTIVES

7. When it started in November 1991, the objectives of the programme were to prepare a strategy, recruit staff and raise funds to assist Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile with relief goods, water and education. The possibility of filling gaps in other agencies' programmes was acknowledged and of giving support to the relief arms of the SPLA. Food and medical aid were specifically excluded, unless circumstances changed radically, because other agencies were already concentrating in these areas and we had doubts about the efficacy of such aid in current circumstances.

8. A country strategy paper was prepared, which set out the basis of a plan to fulfil these objectives. It was judged insufficiently strategic and awaits revision. While this process was underway, the original goal of assistance in rehabilitation of rural production in rebel-held areas of South Sudan began to look less feasible in the face of splits and setbacks for the SPLA. In practice our work took on more and more the character of emergency relief in a war zone.

9. A new objective was added when it became clear that there was a role for SCF both in lobbying for changes to the UN emergency system and in urging a more efficient and better managed UN role in South Sudan. Thus we now have the following objectives:

- i) Non-food, non-medical relief to Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile
- ii) Educational assistance to those areas
- iii) Assistance to other agencies where we have a specific competence otherwise unavailable
- iv) Lobbying, education and information
- v) Support to SRRA and RASS.

PROGRESS

10. A brief summary of staff activities and types of relief supplies delivered is appended to this report. Major interventions were as follows:

- a. Delivery of 36,000 hand tools to Thiet, a little-visited area of Bahr el Ghazal.
 - b. Delivery of seeds, tools and blankets to Pagerau, to victims of tribal raiding in Bahr el Ghazal, who were not served by other agencies.
 - c. Provision of boreholes to unaccompanied minors and Kapoeta Hospital.
 - d. Sending experienced administrators to coordinate Narus Camp and its evacuation to Lokichoggio.
 - e. Provision of textbooks to SKI for Equatoria and to RASS for Upper Nile.
 - f. Provision of blankets and fishing equipment to displaced people in Aguran, Bahr el Ghazal.
 - g. Contribution to agency road maintenance consortium to ensure road route to Bahr el Ghazal remains open.
 - h. Supply of staff and materials to Waat, Upper Nile, to organise a feeding programme for up to 20,000 displaced.
11. Our involvement in Waat came as the result of an urgent appeal from the UN for an NGO to organize supplementary feeding there. The subsequent arrival of MDM caused some difficulties of coordination and communication.

12. We failed to give much help to Bahr el Ghazal in water supply, largely because the GoS recaptured Yirol, which we had hope to use as a forward base. We also failed to make much progress with education, partly because funds were hard to find, partly because SKI's reincarnation IRRES was very jealous of its claimed territory and partly because relief took priority. We have however sent a large number of textbooks to Upper Nile and provided 5 tonnes of UNICEF educational supplies to Bahr el Ghazal.

13. The change in emphasis from restoring the rural economy to emergency relief caused problems insofar as staff were originally recruited for more administrative than emergency roles and finding an appropriate physical base took longer than expected. An immediate objective is therefore to reorganize and re-train staff so that they can provide better support from the new office on the Mombasa Road. We expect to move into this office in February.

QUANTIFY

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Feeding was limited to 400 000

14. The acknowledged need for "capacity building" within the two relief wings of the SPLA, SRRA and RASS, led us to give material assistance to both in the field and to RASS to furnish its Nairobi office. Accountability and reporting still need further strengthening, on all sides. In addition, there are wide gaps between Sudanese and OLS staff in perceptions of relief. This led to our hiring someone from Upper Nile to work there for us to try to bridge such gaps and to a close relationship with the SRRA in the field in Bahr el Ghazal.

15. Lobbying has been done both through the London office and also locally during visits by Jan Eliasson for example, or by informing diplomats and aid officials about what is happening in South Sudan. In addition forty journalists and former British administrators were contacted to encourage them to try to change the British Government's view that we have few interests in the Sudan and little leverage with GoS, at a time when the future for 4-6 million Southerners looks very bleak.

16. A new objective which emerged in the course of the first year's work was to improve the quality of information available to both UN, NGO and Sudanese agencies. The painstaking work undertaken by John Ryle in the course of three visits to Bahr el Ghazal is a model of how relief agencies should inform themselves of the structures of the society they are trying to help. A Nuer-speaking consultant was also sent to Upper Nile to suggest both to RASS and SCF how we might best assist there. These measures are part of the process of trying to use and strengthen rather than subvert the structures of aid recipients.

PLANS FOR 1993.

Relief.

17. With two year funding from Comic Relief and Danish SCF, we have hired a relief coordinator, ordered two four wheel drive trucks and purchased a substantial quantity of fishing equipment for Bahr el Ghazal. We will deliver this and other relief goods such as seeds, cloth, blankets, plastic sheeting and hand tools by road convoys to Bahr el Ghazal, from pre-positioned stocks. We plan to reach northern Bahr el Ghazal by road with food production materials for the first time in the current war this February. Success will depend on the state of the road and the expected GoS offensive.

Quality

18. A tri-partite meeting between UN, SPLA and GoS representatives agreed some new flight destinations in November. We have asked the UN to place a Resident Project Officer in Akon in northern Bahr el Ghazal shortly, with a vehicle and radio. We plan then to put an SCF project officer there to oversee distribution of relief supplies by road, or, if that access is lost, by UN Buffalo flights to Akon. The objective is to provide sufficient food production materials to minimize the need for bulk grain supply.

19. In Upper Nile, we will use our Nuer project officer to enable productive assistance to be given with fishing equipment for Old Fangak and perhaps Ayod, with tools for hand-dug wells and with assistance to the Women's Association. We will establish a base for the Project Officer in Akobo, security permitting. We expect to withdraw from the feeding programme in Waat by March, on the basis that the population will by then have left or been assisted to the point where WFP and MDM can continue without us.

20. We will need to be prepared for further emergency work in feeding programmes or with displaced people, since military action is likely to create more emergencies amongst civilians. We are therefore considering further support to the Relief Coordinator in the form of a second expatriate, as well as a short-term project officer in Bahr el Ghazal.

21. We will use short term consultants in water, veterinary assistance and agriculture to help us develop practical ways of assisting the pastoral peoples of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal to survive the disruption of their security, their trading network, their livestock health and their food supply. In water, for example, we will try to supply tools to allow repair and digging of hand-dug wells, since borehole pump logistics need more peaceful conditions.

Food Aid and Food Production Policy

22. We accept the need for bulk grain supply to destitute people and manage large amounts of such aid in Somalia and Northern Sudan. In Southern Sudan, we leave it to others to do, not ourselves having the infrastructure and logistics. Instead we provide food-production assistance, such as fishing equipment and agricultural tools. We have asked the Regional Food Security Officer to do an evaluation of this policy, with particular reference to what we expect to happen in N. Bahr el Ghazal this year.

Medical Policy

23. We avoid drug supply, PHC training and therapeutic care in the war zone, believing them to be poor value for money. Yet in Waat we have become involved in treatment of children in supplementary feeding, in Bahr el Ghazal we are asked to help combat kala azar and our partner agencies attach great importance to health training. We will involve the Regional Medical Advisor in monitoring our avoidance of this traditional area of SCF expertise.

Education

24. Progress in delivery of materials for schools along with other relief goods is expected, but we await funds for textbook supply for Upper Nile and clarification of plans for education amongst UN and NGO agencies, before we can formulate our own plans more clearly.

Administration and Support

25. Poor communications have meant problems for staff in the field in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. Also the UN radio/Sitor system is not reliable for passing messages outside the UN. We will have to obtain a radio license and set up a system.

26. We have received a considerable amount of support from SCF Uganda with vehicles, radios and logistics for Bahr el Ghazal. We are planning to attach a full-time administrative assistant to the Kampala office to service West Bank supplies to South Sudan.

27. Once staff are settled into the new office, it is expected that the quality of support to the field will improve. Because of the personal and programme risks inherent in operating in a war zone, it is unlikely that we will place any staff in the field for more than three months. Southern Sudan was a difficult place in which to operate before it became a war zone. Now it is doubly stressful and we will continue only to use those with previous experience of Sudan or war zone operations - the Consultant, Relief Coordinator and Programme Officer have all been bombed or shot at in the course of the year.

Financial Control

28. The head office financial reporting system involves budget reports, expenditure approval summaries, income reports, budget input forms, ledger posting reports, and Overseas Dept. monthly reports. We operate in three countries and five currencies. To simplify all this, we must produce our own accounting system, or perhaps modify one from SCF Uganda or Ethiopia, which will give a monthly statement of income and expenditure under our various budget and project headings.

Training

29. Staff training will include a first aid component, as well as assistance with computer use, English, Arabic, accounting and using the new 4WD trucks, as appropriate. Efforts will also be made to improve the quality of understanding amongst collaborating agencies in such areas as feeding policy and food security, where current inexperience has caused wasteful or poorly targeted programmes.

SRRA and RASS

30. We will continue efforts to support both relief wings of the SPLA but will also try to work with the churches and Women's Associations where we can. In order to improve accountability and reporting, we will try to standardise report forms for delivery of relief items. We will also continue to provide supplies to RASS and SRRA staff in the field to assist them in administration.

Lobbying, education and information

31. We will continue to inform journalists and diplomats about the situation in South Sudan, off the record. We will in addition work to maintain the UN momentum for Operation Lifeline Sudan. We operate in South Sudan with the diplomatic protection of the UN, under a tripartite agreement with them, GoS and the SPLA. We cannot operate independently in South Sudan without jeopardising our operations in the North. We also make use of the UN radio and flight systems, though we try not to depend on the UN for materials supply, both to ensure our independence and to minimize delays to programmes. It is therefore important that we are as closely involved as possible with UN policy making with regard to the Sudan.

LESSONS LEARNT

Operating within OLS

32. SCF's operation in South Sudan is not entirely under SCF's control: we have to depend on flight schedules and programmes subject to political and military manipulation, which have to serve a large number of other agencies operating under the Lifeline banner. We have cooperated very successfully with some agencies, whilst finding others quite unprofessional. We have also suffered poor coordination where other agencies have decided to run similar programmes. This unusually difficult environment must be borne in mind when recruiting personnel and planning programmes. Staff with experience in more developed areas of Africa not only have to contend with one of the least developed corners of the continent, they also have to deal with a mass of colleagues from different agencies with different priorities and perceptions.

Logistics versus Culture.

33. Some of our partner agencies seem to view relief as solely a question of access, logistics and distribution. Thus boys used to eating "asida" are given whole grain but no grinding stones; teams of young Western women assess or control the food security of Nilotic cattle-keepers and find traditional societies pay them little heed; few speak the language of the people they work with. Some agencies depend on continuing disasters for continuing funding and do not seem to notice where they are. Short term planning and short term recruiting are justified because of the urgency of emergency. In this environment we have been accused of amassing much information but not doing much. This is because we see a role for SCF in informing policy and explaining needs. The lesson is to be humble in doing it!

POLICY ISSUES FOR SCF

Lobbying, changes in Africa and the role of NGOs.

34. We have discussed in the past organising outside speakers to talk to SCF Africa staff about changes on the continent: could we combine such an occasion with talks from speakers competent to explain the new possibilities within the UN system as well? Could Brian Urqhart discuss Boutros Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" for example?

35. SCF spent one quarter of its income in Sudan last year, more than £24 million. The Horn and E. Africa absorbed 42% of our expenditure, more than £40 million. Like it or not, we now operate on a scale which makes us a force to be reckoned with in Somalia and Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia. We criticise the UN and World Bank for the lack of outside evaluation of their work: is this something we undertake ourselves?

SUMMARY OF SCF SOUTH SUDAN ACTIVITIES, 1992.

Programme Officer

9 months' assessment, planning & field visits;
draft strategy to operate in Upper Nile & Bahr el Ghazal,
in non-food, non-medical relief and education;
support to SRRA & RASS in the field;
project proposals which raised over £1,000,000 funding;
recruited 6 permanent staff, 4 temporary and 3 consulting;
coordination of emergency relief to Thiet, Pagerau, Narus
& Waat, plus textbooks for Upper Nile and SKI;
provision of £35,000 to emergency road repair consortium;
lobbying for better access and strengthening of OLS.

Consultants

John Ryle: advice with strategy; delivery of 36,000 hand
tools to Thiet; assessment of Aguran displaced;
delivery of plastic sheeting, fishing equipment,
blankets, cloth and office supplies to Aguran;
assessments of overall Bahr el Ghazal displacement and
relief needs for UNICEF and SCF.

Sharon Hutchinson: review of Nuer economy, current
conditions in Sobat Valley and potential for SCF help.

Emma Roberts: rapid assessments of Waat.

Temporary Staff

Mark Cutts: delivery of seeds, tools, blankets & salt to
Pagerau displaced; administration of Narus Camp for
"unaccompanied minors" in May; evacuation to Lokichoggio.

Mike Day Thompson: logistic support to Narus; evacuation
of boys to Lokichoggio; support to UNHCR, May/June.

Mike Wilson: convoy attempt to Bahr el Ghazal; road report.

Maureen Rogers: organisation of feeding programmes, Waat.

Permanent Staff (from September 1992)

Neil Turner: assessment of logistics for Bahr el Ghazal;
convoy to Aguran; emergency assessment of Waat.

Patrick Leparleen: procurement, administration & support.

Rachel Kenyi Mogga: office support and book-keeping.

Hussein Mar Nyuot: support to Upper Nile, (from 12/92).

James Waweru Babi and Kamiti Wanaina: convoys & driving.

Future Plans

Educational supplies to Upper Nile & Bahr el Ghazal;
Pre-positioning of relief supplies for rapid response;
Provision of 2x 4WD 7 tonne trucks for rapid response;
Further supply of seeds, tools and fishing equipment;
Further funding of water supplies;
Expansion into agricultural and veterinary assistance.

Actual Expenditure on Relief Supplies, 1992

Item	Est.
1. Boreholes for Kapoeta Hospital and Narus Camp	29,500
2. Textbooks for Upper Nile and for SKI, Equatoria	70,000
3. Hand tools for Bahr el Ghazal, Thiet District	50,000
4. Seeds, tools, blankets, salt for Pagerau	30,000
5. Support to Narus Camp	23,000
6. Sheeting, blankets, fish. equipment, etc Aguran	65,000
7. Emergency repairs, road to Bahr el Ghazal	35,000
8. Supply of food etc. to Waat (£50,000 budgeted)	12,000
Total	<u>314,500</u>

(This represents approx. US \$5,600,000 at 1992 rates.)

Type and amount of Relief Supplies Delivered

Item	Area
1. 12,000 each axes, pangas, hoes	Thiet/Tonj
2. 6 boreholes	Kapoeta/Narus
3. 48,000 textbooks, SKI, Equatoria and RASS,	Upper Nile
4. 2425 blankets, 2,500 kg. salt, 2025 cans of seeds and 2,000 sickles	Pagerau/Yirol
5. Tents, stationery, 150 rolls Monarflex (WVI)	Narus
6. 90 rolls Monarflex, 4,500 blankets, 14750 m. cloth, 150,000 hooks, 10,000	Yomdu & Aguran
rolls fishing twine, stationery, cycles.	
7. 18 t. fast-cooking W-Mix, 100 grinders, office and camping equipment.	Waat

P. E. Winter.

P. E Winter
Programme Officer.
31/12/92.

