THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: A REASSESSMENT

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In light of the bitterness engendered over the past 150 years between the North and South Sudan—especially during the past two decades—the Addis Ababa Agreement signed in February 1972 is indeed a singular event. (For a text of the agreement, see "Agreement Issue" 1972, pp. 18 and 22; full text on pp. 17-26.) Not only did this mark the end of the seventeen-year-old insurgency in the South, but it may well mark the beginning of a new phase in the relationships between the two regions. This is particularly important when it is noted that apparently neither side achieved their declared objectives. There is a need for caution, however. The basis for future relationships, as well as the effectiveness of the post-insurgency reconstruction, rest on the outcome of the eighteen-month interim arrangement, which is a basic part of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The interim arrangement (February 1972-June 1973) provides inter alia for an Interim High Executive Council, whose President and members are appointed by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. In effect, the Council is the "Executive and Cabinet" for the Southern Sudan during this interim period. Additionally, a number of other provisions provide for the establishment of institutions and initiate steps for integrating them into a wider national system. Implicitly, the arrangement assumes an effective relationship between the North and South from which a permanent settlement can evolve. At this time it is not clear what the final result will be. In any case, the results of this temporary arrangement and the effectiveness with which the Interim High Executive Council performs are the key to the future of the Sudan.

The practical issues of a self-governing Southern Sudan within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan may be greater than the immediate problems of the war itself. Indeed, these issues are fundamental to the effective implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The persistence of traditional loyalties reinforced by latent internal suspicions and the colonial heritage may well cause the resurgence of historical antagonisms, destroying the very premises upon which the temporary peace rests. One can argue that seventeen years of bloodshed and bitterness were the fruition of the historical forces in the Sudan and thus cannot

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be understood nor dismissed by signatures on a piece of paper. On the other hand, the Addis Ababa Agreement provides the hope for the future—the alternatives are forbidding.

The purpose of this paper is to review the historical basis of the North-South conflict and their modern manifestations and, in this context, to present an initial assessment of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Complementing this purpose is the intent to stimulate critical evaluation of what may be one of the most forgotten wars in history.

PRE-COLONIAL PERSPECTIVES

From the Turko-Egyptian Conquests in the 1820's until after World War II, the policy pursued in the Sudan created two distinct and separate cultural areas. While the North adapted to the Arabic and Islam culture of Egypt, the South remained a "last frontier" area inhabited by an assortment of tribes characteristic of the areas of Black Africa rather than the Moslem North. Although the conquests, first by the Turko-Egyptians, then by the Mahdi, followed by the British, established a centralized administration, very little was accomplished towards integrating the South with the North. On the other hand, the North achieved a degree of unity and development based on a common cultural base. The South, on the other hand, fought the invaders, never completely succumbing while resisting cultural assimilation. (For excellent historical analyses of these periods, see Hill 1959, Beshir 1968, and Duncan 1957.)

The policy that evolved not only treated the South and North as separate entities, but the language, religion, and economics as well as politics stemmed from different experiences and practices. A rudimentary Christian orientation developed in the South, using the English language as the mode of communication. While links with the Arab world were primarily through Arab slavers, a corrupt bureaucracy, and the army, associations with Europe evolved through Christian missionaries and British administrators—who it might be added were not inclined to favor close ties with the Moslem North.

In addition to perpetuating a separateness, there developed distrust and suspicion between Northerner and Southerner. While the North viewed the South as a forbidding land inhabited by savages, the Southerners viewed the Northerner as an Arab slaver and exploiter intent on complete subjugation of the South into an Islamic State. The effect of the Mahdi revolt was to perpetuate these attitudes. The Mahdi did, however, create a temporary unity against Egyptian rule, but this quickly disappeared into a North-South separateness. Indeed existing institutions in the South were destroyed with little to fill the vacuum except the threat of Mahdi raiders.

...one must regard the Mahdi's invasions as
extended raids which upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and left nothing behind but anarchy and fear....Strong enough to defeat the Negroids but never sufficiently strong to establish their hegemony over them, the Mahdis were compelled to raid again and again not only to maintain their position but also to secure even the most essential supplies. And the only lasting result of these continual raids was the Southerner's hatred and fear of the Northern Sudanese (Collin 1962, pp. 11-12).

The South was left with a tribal system that had been completely disrupted by alien administrators, traders, missionaries, and finally Mahdi invaders.

THE CONDOMINUM AND SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

In 1902, following the defeat of the Mahdi and the reconquest of the Sudan by Egyptian-British forces, the government decided to treat the six Northern provinces of the Sudan and the three Southern provinces as separate problems, albeit only temporary. Although the Condominium relationship rested on a dual control of the Sudan, for all practical purposes it was the British that ruled. The British, viewing the South as an untamed frontier, were primarily concerned with establishing some semblance of law and order as the first priority. Consequently, pacification and "care and maintenance" became the basis for British policy during these initial years—it might be added that this remained generally the case until World War II (Collin 1962, p. 62; see also Report.... 1956, p. 87).

The cultural differences between the regions were fundamental to the British view that the Southern three provinces were distinct and separate from the North and were part of Black Africa. As a result, many British administrators sought to have the South administered as part of Uganda or even possibly Kenya (Collin 1962, p. 75). Attitudes on cultural distinction and the racial affinity with Black Africa are still shared today by many Southern Sudanese.1

Regional separateness was reflected not only in administrative policy but in the quality of the administrative structure. It was the combination of these factors which perpetuated the "communal" basis of the Sudanese society. While in the South, "British administrative officials were, almost without exception, military officers seconded from

1"Ethnically and culturally, the Southern Sudan belongs to Black Africa," in pamphlet of South Sudan Resistance Movement (hereafter SSRM).
the Egyptian army or the King's African Rifles..." (Collin 1971, p. 230), civilians dominated the political structure in the North. The Northern civil servants soon began to look upon the South as a forbidden frontier inhabited by black savages--adapting the superior attitudes of their Moslem subjects. Indeed, the civil servants made little effort to understand the problems of the South and of its people. As a result the Arab Muslim North was governed as a separate and more advanced cultural entity of the Sudan. Ruled by military administrators, the South was treated as an area requiring pacification and, in any case, one that needed protection from the North.

This situation, perpetuated by colonial policy and practice, changed little until after World War II. By that time, whether deliberately or inadvertently, the British had laid the groundwork for two separate communities. In any case, the first two decades of British rule were those in which colonial policy and administration adapted itself to the prevailing regional characteristics, without making major efforts to change it. This became the basis for the Southern Policy.

THE SOUTHERN POLICY

The Southern Policy rested on two major premises. The first premise was based on the distinction between the Southern tribes and the Arab North.

His excellency, the governor general, directs that the main features of the approved policy of the government for the administration of the southern provinces should be restated in simple terms. The policy of the government in the southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs (Said 1965, p. 30).

In this context, the Arabic language and customs, as well as Islam, were considered alien to the Southern environment. The English language and Christianity became official vehicles for the preservation of Southern exclusiveness.

The second premise follows from the first, although it was not as clearly articulated. This rested on an implicit understanding by British administrators in the South that the Southern provinces would eventually be integrated with Uganda. This was not accepted by all the British administrators, since some felt that the unity of Northern Sudan with
Southern Sudan would provide a bridge between Moslem and non-Moslem and between Arab and Black Africans. Admittedly, there was always an ambiguity about British policy in this respect. Aside from dealing with the Southern provinces as separate units, there was no clear direction as to what the British intended, at least until 1947 (Henderson 1965, p. 153).

In conjunction with the closed districts legislation, the Southern Policy effectively closed the South to Northerners, including Northern government officials (Henderson 1965, p. 164). Moreover, there were no national institutions, formal or informal, to allow South Sudanese to develop political experience or channels through which their interests could be pursued at Khartoum--except the British administrator. Moreover, meaningful links with Northerners required a degree of trust and mutual understanding. The Southern Policy not only prevented such links or opportunities but it fostered the existence of a Northern Arab and Islamic culture isolated from a Black African tribal culture. The consequences were obvious. Distrust and misunderstanding became major characteristics of the two regions.

We find evidence that the real trouble in the south is political and not religious....It is unfortunately true that many northern Sudanese, especially in the uneducated class, regard the southerners as an inferior race and the Arab traders in the southern Sudan form no exception to this as the majority of them are uneducated. The traders referred to and often call the southerners Abud and slaves. This practice of calling southerners Abud is widespread throughout the three southern provinces. It is certainly a contemptuous term and is a constant reminder to the southerner of the old days of the slave trade (Report....1956, pp. 6 and 123-124).

Similarly, Southerners were fearful lest the North, with its perceived political shrewdness and relatively advanced institutions, completely subdue the South. These attitudes were reflected in discussions at the Juba Conference, in which Southern Chiefs stressed the danger of close association with the North.

Chief Tete said he wanted to study in the south until he was clever enough to go to the north. One could not begin to do work which one did not understand....Chief Lappanya thought that if representatives were to be sent to a legislative assembly, they should have had previous experience in cultures of their own. It was impossible to send untrained recruits into battle. When the government thought they were sufficiently trained, he would send them into the firing lines....Chief Luath Ajak emphasized the fear of the southerners that a crowd of hungry Gellaba would invade the
south and swamp them and cheat the people
(for details of the Juba Conference, see

Another consequence of the British policy was the localization of
the administration: the creation of a uniquely Southern political system. The British attempted to apply the policy of indirect rule (with mixed
results), ruling through the existing chiefs and recognizing the legiti-
macy of the particular tribal social and cultural environment. An impor-
tant step was the creation of a local Southern military force which
provided a security element divorced from control by Northern authorities. This local military force, the Equatoria Corps, allowed the removal of
the Northern garrison and its traders, and hence destroyed a link with
the North. Consequently "the Equatoria troops became the only permanent
garrison in the southern Sudan until the mutiny in August, 1955" (Beshir
1968, p. 38).

The policy of exclusion and separateness pursued by the British
made it difficult for Northerners to develop any realistic appreciation
and understanding of the Southerner and his problems. At the same time,
it deprived the South of any meaningful advantage it could have gained
from the economic progress and institution-building that was going on in
the North.

By 1940 the policy had achieved great success. Moslem influence was completely eliminated and the three southern provinces became, to all
intents and purposes, a separate unit closed to northern Sudanese and widely opened to the British, Greeks and missionaries of all nations
(Said 1965, p. 135).

THE NEW SOUTHERN POLICY

During World War II, there was a concerted drive by the British
to create councils in the Sudan at both national and local levels. This
attempt at some decentralization of political power led to the appoint-
ment of a group, the Sudan Administrative Conference, to consider closer
association between the Sudanese and their administration. Two major
consequences emerged.

The first was a change in British policy. In a statement announc-
ing a new Southern Policy, the civil secretary in 1947, J. W. Robertson,
declared:

We should now work on the assumption that the
Sudan as at present constituted with possibly
minor boundary adjustments will remain one:
and we should therefore restate our southern policy and do so publicly as follows: the policy of the Sudan government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combined so far as can be foreseen at the present time to render them inexplicably bound for future development to the middle eastern and Arabicized northern Sudan (Said 1965, pp. 164-165).

It is useful to point out several factors regarding this policy change. In 1946 Britain was negotiating with Egypt over the revisions of the 1936 Treaty for Alliance. One of the demands of the Egyptians was that Sudan be an integral part of Egyptian territory and that sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan be recognized. Needless to say, this created tensions and fear both in the Sudan and in British administrative circles. The British feared for the ability of a Sudan divided between North and South to resist Egyptian pressures, while a number of Southerners, of course, could not conceive of Egyptian control of the Sudan, remembering their past history. Additionally, a number of British administrators were beginning to question the political and economic ability of a Southern Sudan to exist by itself apart from the North. Perhaps one could also say that even with the exclusion and separateness policy over the past two generations, the Southern Sudan had developed a relationship with the North that was lacking with surrounding territories. As a result, there was a growing conviction that the only viable course of action was an integrated Sudan including both North and South. These considerations had much to do with a revised Southern policy.

The second consequence of the Sudan Administrative Conference was the attempt at establishing national institutions. In this respect the Juba Conference which opened in June 1947 was to establish a legislative assembly representing both North and South and, it might be added, for the first time to take steps to politically integrate the regions. Six British officials, six Northern Sudanese and fifteen Southerners were in attendance. Although there was considerable debate, at times heated and reflecting marked disagreement, the conference decided to accept the terms of the new legislative assembly in which both Northerners and Southerners would participate. (For a detailed discussion of the Conference, see Said 1965, pp. 46-71.)

A number of factors emerged from the Juba Conference. However, one stands out--there was agreement on the need for political unity between the North and South, while at the same time it became clear that there existed widespread mistrust and fear of Northern intentions by the Southern members.

The new legislative assembly was to govern for a united North and South under a centralized Sudanese government. This did not alleviate the fears of the South, nor did it change the insistence upon safeguards
for Southern interests. Indeed, according to the Anya Nya,

The south was never consulted in this matter. But to give that impression, the British convened a conference at Juba at which it was made clear to southern representatives that unless they agreed to proposals to unite north and south under one legislative assembly, they would have no say in the future government of the Sudan. Thirteen southerners were appointed to the ninety-five member legislative assembly when it opened in 1948 (SSHM; see also Oduho and Deng 1963, p. 21).

On the other hand, one source notes that Southern representatives at the Juba Conference decided "out of their own free will to throw in their lot with their northern fellow countrymen" (Said 1965, p. 72).

In any case, there is some agreement that during the period from the inauguration of the legislative assembly until the time of self-rule in 1953, there was a visible degree of development in the South while bonds of unity increased between North and South (see, for example, Beshir 1966, pp. 66 and 68, and Henderson 1965, p. 171).

**SELF-RULE AND INDEPENDENCE**

On February 12, 1953 Britain and Egypt agreed to liquidate the condominium and to give self-rule to the Sudan as the initial step towards complete independence. To the dismay of the Southerners, no special provisions regarding their interests were included. As a matter of fact, major Northern Sudanese political parties who had gone to Egypt to negotiate the agreement did not have Southern representation (Oduho and Deng 1963, p. 21). A rather curious oversight given the purpose of the legislative assembly! In all fairness, however, it should be noted that there were no Southern political parties at the time. In fact, institution-building in the South had not progressed to a point where any particular group could claim to represent Southern interests. On the other hand, one could argue that with the political unity that was to have been engendered during the period of the legislative assembly, Northern parties had made little attempt to develop a representative Southern voice in the party system.

In preparation for the first parliamentary elections under the self-rule agreement, a Southern Party was formed in 1953. The Southern Party had the same aim as the Umma party; that is, they opposed unity with Egypt and called for independence of the Sudan. On the other hand, the National Unionist Party (NUP) was in favor of unity with Egypt. The NUP later changed its platform to pro-independence. The NUP won a small
majority over all other parties in the first parliament. "Twenty-two southern members, roughly a quarter of the House of Representatives, were returned. Twelve were southern party, six were NUP and four were independent" (Henderson 1965, p. 172).

In mid-1954 there occurred a series of political events and conflicts which ultimately led to the tragic events of 1955. Umma and Southern Party politicians (now renamed the Liberal Party) paid a visit to the Southern Sudan. In a number of meetings they seriously criticized the government in Khartoum under the NUP. On the other hand, members of the NUP in the South charged the Umma party with treasonable conduct and reminded everyone that members of the Umma party were descendants of slave traders, bitter enemies of the Southerner. These political accusations mixed with wild campaign promises renewed the mistrust and fear of the Southerner regarding the Northern politician and the Khartoum government.

To further exacerbate the situation, in October 1954 names of senior civil servants appointed to Southern posts were announced. Only four Southerners were given posts as assistant district commissioners. There were no Southerners appointed to the most senior positions.

The choice was disappointing to many a southerner since the list included none of them. The list simply could not include any southerner since none of them was qualified and experienced enough for these posts. The blame for that, however, does not rest with northerners; it rests with those responsible for training and educating southerners—the missionaries or the administration (Said 1965, p. 74).

The reaction in the South was predictable. Some Southern members of the NUP resigned and joined the Liberal Party. Additionally, it caused the Liberal Party to convene a conference in Juba where demands were made for federal status. At the same time, appeals were made to Southerners to prepare for sacrifices (Said 1965, p. 173).

To counteract the move for federalism and the increasing disenchantment, the prime minister of the Sudan and several NUP politicians toured the South. However, feelings were so high that they were booed and criticized wherever they went. The Southerner's mistrust had been rekindled to such a point that it appeared little could be accomplished by either Southern or Northern politicians to ease the tensions. It was this environment that led to the mutiny of the Equatoria Corps in August 1955.
The mutiny grew directly out of demonstrations in Mizara in Equatoria for higher wages. The demonstration got out of hand and looting began. A handful of Equatoria Corps soldiers, attempting to control the demonstration, opened fire, killing four and wounding two.

The need for Southern soldiers to fire on Southerners created much dissatisfaction and affected the morale of the Equatoria Corps. In what appeared to be a panic reaction to reports of mutiny in the Southern corps, Khartoum attempted to move members of the Equatoria Corps out of the Southern provinces and replace them with Northern garrisons. Refusing to comply with these orders, the Equatoria Corps mutinied, shot their officers, and massacred Northern men, women, and children. According to one source,

Official known fatal casualties of the whole revolt were 336 northerners and 75 southerners excluding those killed at Mizara in July but including an estimated 55 drowned in the Kinyeti River during a panic exodus from Torit on the night of 18 August (Henderson 1965, p. 178).

Upon reoccupying the town of Torit, Equatoria, where the mutiny took place, Northern soldiers found the town deserted. Mutineers and civilians had disappeared into the bush, to eventually become the core of the resistance movement. (For a detailed examination of these events, see Report...1956.) The Southern liberation movement traces its growth from this period.

A commission of inquiry, convened to determine the cause of the disturbances and to recommend new policy, concluded that the cause of the disturbance could not be attached to any single event but was primarily political in nature. The commission stated that

the Sudan should be one unit on the basis of the decisions arrived at during the Juba conference in June, 1947, but this did not mean north per se had claims to the south. Since the southern Sudanese benefitted very little from the Sudanization, they found little or no difference between conditions previously; and independence for them was regarded as merely a change of masters. We feel that the southern Sudanese by finding themselves holding secondary positions in the government of their country had a genuine grievance (Report...1956, p. 117).
Indeed, the whole tone of the report supports the notion that the mutiny stemmed from years of mistrust and fear of the North by the South. Furthermore, many Southerners felt that since the Sudan was now a single unit, Northern domination would be complete and that for the Southerner it was simply another form of alien rule. "To the Southerners the attainment of independence in which they did not play any major part was no more than a change of British domination for that of the northern Sudanese" (Hason 1967, p. 505).

Northerners had little idea of the environment in the South, human or physical. To many Northerners, the South represented a "last frontier." Indeed some Northerners would have welcomed separation from the South. However, Northern politicians, in the main, would have difficulty justifying an independent South in light of the historic ties between the regions, the nationalistic sentiment associated with a unified Sudan, and the underlying attitudes of national leaders which militated against territorial change. Nationalism in the Sudan has been historically centered in the North. Resting on the presumed superiority of Islamic and Arab-ized culture, the North viewed association with Black Africa as secondary (and inferior) to ties with Egypt and the lands to the North (Al-Rahin). Yet it was the same nationalism that would find little solace in the ability of an "inferior" community to create an independent territory in what was heretofore controlled by the Islamic community.

Although initial Southern resistance in the post-condominium period began in 1955 with the mutiny, organizations to channel this resistance movement did not come about until early 1962. In fact, there appeared to be no concerted overall resistance organization in the South until 1970. Even at this date, it is difficult to assess the resistance movement because of the lack of information, a degree of contradictory information, and the fragmentary character of the movement.3

The Sudan declared independence in January 1956. Southern MP's took part in the motion for independence on the assumption that the assembly would consider federation between North and South. However, these promises were not kept. Indeed, independence brought with it persecution and jail for many Southerners, as the new government embarked on a campaign to silence Southern opposition (Oduho and Deng 1963, pp. 33-34; see also Africa 1972, pp. 46-47).

In November 1958 the Sudanese army under the command of General

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2 See, for example, Grass Curtain 1970 in which "political leaders of the Nile Provisional Government in Southern Sudan have invited Anya-Nya armed forces to take over the reins of government."

3 See Enahora 1972, pp. 12-18, for a succinct analysis of African resistance movements. It is interesting to note, however, that the author does not mention the war in the Southern Sudan. He does note the fragmentary character of many Black African resistance movements.
Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime and established military rule. One result of the military rule was to cut off Southern access to parliamentary institution and Northern politicians. "When the parliamentary system disappeared, and political parties were suppressed, the advocates of compulsion and integration of the north and south by force of arms had the upper hand" (Beshir 1968, p. 80). In this respect, measures were instituted to suppress any political opposition in all of the Sudan. The regime passed a State of Emergency Regulation and Defense of Sudan Act of 1958. These acts provided for unlimited detention without trial of those suspected of treason towards the state and allowed military courts to try civil cases while increasing punishment for a wide range of activities considered hostile to the government or government's reputation (Kilner 1962, p. 263).

The fear of increased political arrests caused Southern members of Parliament as well as a number of prominent citizens, politicians, and educated Southerners to flee the country. The military government's plan to move over a million and a half Arabs to the Southern Sudan, combined with the army's repressive measures in the South, drove thousands of other Southerners into neighboring black African countries.4

In February of 1962 the military government announced the expulsion of all Christian missionaries in the Southern Sudan. Previously all religious gatherings except for prayer in church were banned.5 It is not clear whether this was a deliberate part of the Northern plan to Islamicize the South, including the adoption of the Arabic language, or whether activist Christian missionaries provoked Northern response. In any case, the combination of political repressions, religious decrees, and the Southern exodus made it appear that the Northern government was on the verge of forceful national integration.

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

The Sudan African National Union (SANU) was formed in early 1962 from previous organizations of Southern exiles, that is, the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union. However, it was not until 1963 that the Anya Nya, a military group associated with the Southern resistance

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4See SSHM. Africa reported that there were 200,000 Southern Sudanese refugees.

5See Beshir 1968, p. 83 and Said 1965, pp. 105-113, for discussion of the expulsion of the missionaries. Although the purpose here is not to study the expulsion order, it is interesting to note that some authorities rationalize it in terms of missionary intransigence towards government control.
movement, was organized. It represented a new phase in the problem. Not only did this resistance now take on the characteristics of a military movement, but it also signaled the frustrations and dissatisfaction of peaceful attempts at resistance against the Arab North.

Neither SANU nor Anya Nya at this stage, however, represented a mass movement or cohesive political or military effort. In fact, SANU was followed over the next five to six years by a variety of resistance organizations to include the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, the Nile Provisional Government, the African Liberation Front, and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. The proliferation of groups fragmented the resistance movement. Moreover, this fragmentation had its parallel in the military organization. Armed groups appeared sporadically across the Southern Sudan with no apparent central military coordination. Indeed, there were cases reported in which Southern armed groups fought one another. Furthermore, the military forces appeared to operate independently of the political movement nullifying one of the major advantages of revolutionary guerrilla warfare—military operations in support of political objectives and under control of the political leaders.

Generally, there were four phases in the military operations of the Anya Nya. The first was the organizational period which started from the 1955 mutiny and extended through 1963, when a number of separate and variously organized bands were loosely organized into the Anya Nya. The second phase was the "Simba" revolt period of the Congo, when the Anya Nya was able to gather a number of modern weapons from a spillover of the Congo rebellion. Ironically, the Sudan government assisted the Congolese rebels, but in so doing also provided an opportunity for the Anya Nya to gain access to a reasonable assortment of modern weapons. Some of the convoys moving to the Congo were ambushed by the Anya Nya and the weapons used to arm impoverished military bands. Additionally, a number of "Simbas" fleeing into the Sudan were relieved of their weapons. Thus, the Anya Nya were able to initiate more active military operations against the Sudanese Army. Until this period, weapons and supplies had been too few to engage in any substantial military effort. Parenthetically, only much later did the Southern resistance movement receive some aid from external sources—aid that was negligible and primarily nonmilitary.

The third phase extended from about 1965 to 1970 and was the period of greatest military and organizational activity which culminated in a unified political and military structure in 1970. The fourth phase, the consolidation and negotiation period, ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement.

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6 Anya Nya forces were estimated to be 5,000 although estimates vary from a few hundred to over 10,000. Sudanese government forces numbered about 17,000. Generally, Anya Nya forces were divided geographically, each unit operating within a particular locality with little coordination with other units.
The study of the military phase of the resistance movement is a subject in its own right. However, the sparsity of available information and documentary evidence makes it hazardous to attempt any serious study at this period of time. Suffice it to say, the activities of the Anya Nya followed a classic revolutionary guerrilla warfare pattern. That is, the Anya Nya were able to operate very effectively in the countrysides in the Southern Sudan and limit the Sudanese army and administrators to the larger villages and towns.\footnote{For an interesting insight into the nature of the war, see Reed 1972. The discussion by Reed seems to represent a microcosm of the war in all of the Southern provinces.}

In the North, meanwhile, the Southern resistance war created concern for Northern people and problems for the military government. The military regime refused to acknowledge the existence of Southern problems while missionaries and Southern politicians were denounced for their activities. Nevertheless, the Abboud government was faced with an expanding guerrilla war, an ever expensive counter-guerrilla effort, and a restive public. In an effort to alleviate the problem, a commission of inquiry consisting of Southerners and Northerners was selected to investigate the causes of unrest in the South. The commission accomplished little other than to convince members of the Southern resistance movement of the futility of dealing with the military regime.

An important catalyst of the Sudanese October 1964 revolution was the Southern Sudan problem. One could reasonably argue that it was the major factor in the downfall of the military government in Khartoum. The events of the October revolution have been well documented (see, for example, Hason 1967, pp. 491-509). In capsule form, the military government, searching for solutions to the Southern problem, invited public debate and participation. Students at the University of Khartoum accepted the invitation, which ultimately led to student demonstrations. The response of the government resulted in a student death and the closing of the University. The repressive measures of the government against the students precipitated a general strike in Khartoum which finally led to the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the key governing body of the military. This was followed by the reinstitution of parliamentary government under the new prime minister, Mr. Khalifa.

In an effort to reach some kind of solution to the Southern problem, the new prime minister announced an unconditional amnesty for all Southern Sudanese who had fled since 1955 and appealed to exiles to return home to work for freedom and equality in the Sudan (Africa Independent 1972, p. 82). The Sudan African National Union, in rejecting the offer, noted the lack of substantive political reforms and again demanded complete independence for the South. Nevertheless, the Khartoum government continued its efforts. This led to a round table conference in Juba in 1965, but only after two postponements due to disagreements as to sites and agenda. Meanwhile another resistance movement, the Southern
Front, emerged and with it a degree of militancy which did much to perpetuate Southern disunity at the conference. To compound the Southern unity problem, the Anya Nya continued its military operations despite pleas for a cessation during the period of the conference.

Although there was some hope that the conference could bring the rebellion to an end, little of substantive value was achieved. While the Southerners demanded independence, the Northerners were ready to concede anything but independence. Moreover, while the Northerners presented a unified front, the Southern delegation was wracked with disagreement. To be sure, the Northerners were sincere in their desire for political accord, but they became increasingly concerned with the exercise of political power in the North after years of military government: in their eyes the Southern problem became secondary.

If the conference did not accomplish its immediate objectives, it did identify the issues and clarify them for both Northerners and Southerners. In this respect, it provided an opportunity for leaders and public in both regions to get a firsthand view of the problems.

The collapse of the Juba Conference, and with it another missed opportunity, shifted the focus of the conflict into the military arena. In 1965, as a result of the Simba revolt in the Congo and its subsequent collapse, the Anya Nya gained access to a supply of modern arms from the Simbas fleeing the Congo. With the acquisition of these modern arms, the Anya Nya was able to mount a number of effective ambushes and raids during the next few years.

A military regime was reestablished in the Sudan in 1969 by General Al Nimeiri. The parliamentary regime that preceded it was torn by political dissent, violent political activity, disagreement as to economic and political issues, and the continuing and persistent problems in the Southern Sudan (Kershaw 1965, pp. 269-270). Although the twelve months preceding the June 1969 coup were relatively calm as far as the South was concerned, General Nimeiri immediately announced that "any attempt at secession would be regarded as high treason and severely repressed. Two-thirds of the Sudan's troops continued to be stationed in the south and were engaged in sporadic clashes with the Anya Nya, the military arm of the secessionist movement" (Africa Independent 1972, p. 87).

This occurred despite General Nimeiri's announcement that his government would grant local regional autonomy or self-rule to the three Southern provinces. Combined with Nimeiri's desire for union with Egypt and Libya, these activities reinforced the Southerner's feelings that

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8Forty-five representatives attended the conference, eighteen representing the Northern political parties and twenty-seven representing the South. Observers also attended from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, and the UAR.
any union with the North submerged them in a totally Islamic environment. Needless to say, the overtures by the new military government were rejected.

The attempted coup against Nimeiri and his eventual triumph did not have a great impact on the South. However, it did provide the opportunity to reassert Southern claims. In addition to vehemently denouncing General Nimeiri, the Sudanese Army, and the Arab world in general, the Anya Nya declared that:

Local autonomy for south Sudan and the federation of the Arab republics are obviously incompatible. This confirms our contention that Nimeiri has no plans to solve the southern Sudan problem by means other than winning military victories. The main question to be answered by every Sudanese collectively or individually is whether circumstances have changed since 1956 to make unity among the Arabs a feasibility. We in the southern Sudan liberation movement think not and therefore call upon all patriotic Sudanese from north, west, east central and south Sudan to work together to bring down the dictatorial regime of Nimeiri and restore to Sudan the independence and democracy which had been betrayed by this gang of human butchers ("The Return..." 1971).

There followed a concerted effort by the military government to defeat the Anya Nya. A number of camps were captured, but in the long run there was no significant effect upon the resistance movement or the Anya Nya. It is interesting to note that the Sudanese army tactics conformed to conventional techniques which have historically proven incapable of solving revolutionary warfare problems.

It was during this period that some degree of unity was achieved in the Southern resistance movement, perhaps as a result of the ineffectual efforts of the Khartoum government as well as the growing psychological unity of the South. General Joseph Lagu emerged as the symbol and spokesman of the resistance movement while the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement established itself as the leading organization, thus ending a fifteen-year organizational vacuum.

In February of 1972, contrary to the prevailing popular attitudes and surprising a number of observers, an agreement was signed by the Sudanese foreign minister for the Khartoum government and representatives of the South Sudan Liberation Front officially ending the seventeen-year civil war between the North and the South.
THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The Addis Ababa Agreement is unique in that it not only brought to a close a long, drawn-out struggle, but it apparently did this without either side having achieved their declared goals. The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and its military arm had not been eliminated, nor had the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement achieved a separate state or even a federation. The war ended (although perhaps only temporarily) simply because both sides had wearied of it. Indeed the war has not stopped but has moved back into the political realm.

There were a number of other factors at work, one of which was the increasing disruption of the East African region and the dilemma it posed for the Organization of African States. The efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie to reconcile the Sudanese should not obscure the fact that the Southern Sudanese received little material or psychological support from the Organization of African States, or for that matter from individual Black African states (Uganda may be the exception). Yet it was this struggle that was most susceptible to influence by the OAU and individual African states. Obviously, the Southern Sudan created a highly sensitive issue and a political dilemma for African states. To support the Southern Sudanese would have provided implicit recognition to secessionist movements denigrating the Nationalist argument for strong, unified states. Many of the African states in close proximity to the Sudan have separatist tendencies within their own countries. Political realities, therefore, may have required a discreet attitude regarding support of the Southern Sudan.

Another factor which created an environment conducive to political settlement was the minimum concern with international issues. Although the Sudanese Army did have access to Soviet and Egyptian modern arms, the military struggle, in the main, was confined primarily to the conflict between the Sudanese Army and the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. As such, the issues were confined to the immediate interests within the borders of the Sudan and were not escalated to issues of an international or even regional nature.

One of the intangible factors was the growth of a Southern Sudanese nationalism. Where historically there had been antagonisms between Southerners, the common Northern enemy tended to subdue these traditional antagonisms for the sake of a unity and the growth of a Southern "togetherness." Whether this will be sufficient to build a cohesive Southern effort for economic modernization and political power within the Sudanese state is another matter. Nevertheless, the recognition of an emerging Southern unity combined with the ineffectiveness of the Northern counter-revolutionary operations undoubtedly added to the increasing futility with which the struggle was viewed by the North.

Moreover, the confidence and ability of the Southern leaders
growing out of seventeen years of persistence, with only minimum outside support and nominal recognition by other Black African countries, may have provided the cohesiveness of purpose to explore peaceful directions. Undoubtedly, Southern leaders became aware of the questionable viability of the South as a nation, while recognizing the futility of expanding military operations outside the South. The Southern resistance could persist. It was unlikely, however, that it could ever go beyond the stalemate phase.

In light of the years of mistrust, alien intrusion, and lost opportunities for uniting North and South, the most one can say about the Addis Ababa Agreement is that it is a beginning. In this context, the real problems of the Sudan began with the end of the rebellion. Without attempting to catalogue all of the issues, it is useful to point to the scope and depth of some major problems faced by both North and South in the coming months.

The major problem is to lessen the degree of mistrust and fear between the regions, particularly in the South. Simultaneously, there is a need to provide some meaningful Southern stake in the Sudanese government. These two major issues complement one another, but how they are to be done rests on the attitude of the Northerner and the response of governmental institutions to Southern needs. Initially, therefore, this will require meaningful implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement so as to provide visible and meaningful signs of Northern sincerity.

In this respect, the first item of note concerning the Agreement is that it is experimental: the status of the Southern provinces are neither federal nor self-autonomous. It is a compromise based on a mix of federal, confederation, and regional autonomy. Consequently, a relatively wide range of directions are possible depending upon the inclinations of political leaders and the utility of institutions emerging from the agreement.

Under the present system, the Southerners are apparently managing their own affairs under an emerging regional autonomy. Additionally, seven of twenty-one posts in the "principal decision-making body in the Sudan, the Politbureau of the Socialist Union, are Southerners" (Africa 1972, pp. 46-47). It might be added that the South seems to have gained much in the peaceful accommodation—at least up to this point.

This leads directly into the next major issue, that of interpretation. Many of the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement are vague and leave considerable room for varying interpretations. Much work has to be done with respect to identifying common purposes in order to insure that interpretations as well as implementation reflect agreed-upon goals. This, in turn, rests on the scope and depth with which the agreements are accepted, particularly in the North. There are a number of questions relevant to this particular matter. Have all Northern leaders, as well as the general public, accepted the Agreement? Or is this essentially an agreement between General Nimeiri and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement? If the men in the Northern government were to be thrown out of
office, how would this affect the Addis Ababa Agreement?

The Agreement does not establish a common constitutional framework for all of the Sudan. Indeed, one can argue that the uniqueness and separateness of the South is perpetuated. On one hand there is a military government in Khartoum, and on the other a civilian and more representative structure exists in the South. One wonders about the effectiveness and efficiency of institutional structures between two obviously unequal and distinctly different governments.

Moreover, it must be recognized that the Addis Ababa Agreement is vague and obscure in many respects, thus affording the possibility of disagreements not only in interpretation, but in implementation.

Although this may initially create a disadvantage, in the long run it has the potential to develop into a permanent framework since it is based on the assumption that both Northern and Southern leaders are sincere in wanting an end to the struggle and in unifying the Sudan. The basis for lasting peace, therefore, rests on the attitudes and intentions of leaders of both groups and interpretations of the Agreement in such a way as to provide benefits to both North and South. The Agreement, in this sense, has provided a framework in which there can be political negotiations and compromise at each step of the way. Contrary to the outcry of constitutionalists, this type of political instrument may have been the only realistic means of achieving some type of agreement. It may delay the need for hard decisions, while providing a degree of flexibility and more importantly time to resolve issues "politically."

Compounding these substantive difficulties are at least three immediate problems facing the interim governments. The first is the resettlement of approximately 200,000 refugees returning home from neighboring African countries as well as 800,000 displaced persons within the South. The need to find employment quickly for thousands in conjunction with economic development both in agriculture and industrial sectors is second. Third, the Anya Nya must find some realistic accommodation with the Northern military. At present there are plans to enroll 6,000 out of the reported 20,000 Anya Nya into the Sudan military system. Moreover, it has been reported that most of the security system in the South is already manned by the Southerners (Africa 1972, pp. 146-47).

Solutions to these problems, or even partial solutions, will go a long way towards establishing a climate for a permanent institutional arrangement and towards creating a sense of confidence and trust which is so necessary for success. In the final analysis, it may be that the Addis Ababa Agreement has provided a vehicle by which the Southern leaders can, for better or for worse, take their place in a united Sudan. After all, they may be asking themselves, "What are the alternatives?"

In retrospect, it is clear that Southern Sudan's resistance to alien intrusion, beginning with Egypt, is at the root of the current issues between North and South. These intrusions have fostered an embryonic Southern Sudanese nationalism which is enmeshed in a Black
African identity rather than the Arab cultural sphere. The perpetuation of a separateness that stemmed from the historic distinctions between the North and South by the British and implicitly by the Northern Sudanese has sustained a Southern defiance to integration into a Sudanese state.

Although there have been opportunities in the history of the Sudan to move in the direction of national integration, little has been accomplished. One major step towards integration is institution-building—structures that provide meaningful channels for the various groups to express their grievances with some expectation for rectification. In the long history of antagonisms between North and South, it was the British administrator more than any institution that was receptive to Southern attitudes and opinions. This is hardly a condition that fosters institution-building.

Another major step is value integration—acceptance of the major values of the various groups as legitimate bases for the political system. This is difficult enough in modern systems, but in the Sudan it remains an almost insurmountable problem. How can the values of a basically Arabicized and Islamic community be integrated with those of a basically tribal Black African system which has been influenced by Christianity?

The years of bitter conflict have done much to exacerbate these issues. It is within this context that the Addis Ababa Agreement must be viewed. The immediate issue is whether or not the years of separation can be sufficiently bridged within the eighteen-month probationary period to take the next step—a permanent constitutional arrangement for all of the Sudan.

The history of the Southern Sudan, most recently reflected in its conflict with the North suggests caution against undue optimism regarding the Agreement. The high hopes with which it was accepted may create the kinds of expectations and eventual demands which the Khartoum Government will find difficult to meet. To allay the suspicions in the South, the Khartoum government must do more than simply abide by the Agreement. It must insure that interpretations and implementation have a decided Southern bias. Additionally, a permanent constitution will probably require guaranteed minority rights and representation. None of these can be accomplished without Northern acquiescence to Southern interests. More important, it necessitates a broadly representative government for all of the Sudan.

An eighteen-month period may be hardly enough time to accomplish the minimum essential for continuing a peaceful evolution towards a unified Sudan. Obviously the problems are many, the gap between cultures wide, and necessary empathy insufficient. Yet, in viewing the last seventeen years, one can only wonder at how peace was accomplished in the first instance. It will take equal effort to insure that the Addis Ababa Agreement does not succumb to the historical patterns of North-South relationships.
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