The making of the Anya-Nya insurgency in the Southern Sudan, 1961-64

Øystein H. Rolandsen

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), P.O. Box 9229, Grønland, No-0134, Oslo, Norway

Available online: 12 May 2011

To cite this article: Øystein H. Rolandsen (2011): The making of the Anya-Nya insurgency in the Southern Sudan, 1961-64, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5:2, 211-232

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2011.571386

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
The making of the Anya-Nya insurgency in the Southern Sudan, 1961–64

Øystein H. Rolandsen*

Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), P.O. Box 9229, Grønland, No-0134 Oslo, Norway

(Received 6 February 2011; final version received 2 March 2011)

Political tension, local violence and government suppression escalated in the Southern Sudan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During this period of increasing international acceptance of “freedom fighters” and “wars of liberation”, groups of politicians in exile together with militarily trained Southerners progressively focused their efforts towards launching a rebellion; in exile, they sought international support and established political organisations. They also founded the Anya-Nya rebel movement and built military power. Their activities, combined with violent reprisals from the Government of Sudan, explain how the Southern Sudan gradually entered a state of civil war during 1963 and 1964. This process was fundamentally influenced by contingencies, unfulfilled expectations, and a lack of capacity and co-ordination, which preclude a formulaic and linear account. This article contributes to a multi-faceted and empirically grounded history of rebellion in the Southern Sudan, and challenges the common assumption that the first civil war started in 1955. The article exposes weaknesses related to a strict analytical dichotomy between “war” and “peace”. Theory-driven, comparative studies of civil war need a clearer focus on the dynamics of escalating violence and on individual and group agency.

Keywords: Sudan; civil war; insurgency; exile politics; conflict escalation

The Anya-Nya insurgency first advertised its existence in August 1963. Armed groups attacked sites in the Equatoria province of the Southern Sudan in late September. Joseph Lagu, a lieutenant who had recently defected from the Sudanese armed forces, participated in one skirmish close to Yei. He writes:

Although I had only a machete in my hand, I took position [sic] with the men to direct operations and to ensure that the orders were carried out correctly. The returning army patrol reached the ambush at about 2:30pm, and the three gunmen and the archers shot at the last vehicle when it reached the specific point. The muzzleloader unfortunately misfired. Nonetheless, we heard shouts from the back of the truck as the convoy came to a halt, and the troops began to fire at us. But by then we were walking quietly to our rendezvous to re-group, having first taken to our heels.1

It is this and other small-scale operations in the period from September 1963 to January 1964 that represent the actual beginning of the first civil war in the Southern Sudan, at least from an academic and historical point of view. In the years

*Email: oeystein@prio.no

ISSN 1753-1055 print/ISSN 1753-1063 online
© 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2011.571386
http://www.informaworld.com
immediately preceding these events we find the explanation for why a politically tense situation, rife with government oppression and local insecurity, developed into a large-scale conflict.

This analysis contrasts with the current, politicised discourse on the background for this civil war, within which the mutiny in Torit, on 18 August 1955, and the violence of the following two weeks are presented as the beginning of the civil war, the “root causes” of which are traced far back in history. These accounts have not been sufficiently challenged because examination of the first civil war has to a great extent been overshadowed by research related to the second civil war (1983–2005). Yet some previous studies have pointed out that the conflict in the Southern Sudan did not reach the level of civil war until the early 1960s. This is a first step towards explaining how a tense situation in the mid–1950s had by the late 1950s developed into a full-scale war. From a structural perspective, the civil war was predictable: The Southern Sudan lacked social and economic development; the Sudanese state was hardly present; a political transition had recently taken place (independence); the size of the country and the terrain favoured irregular warfare; and neighbouring countries could provide sanctuary for prospective rebels. These factors indicate that starting an insurgency was feasible, but it does not explain why and how. When answering these questions we need to turn to individuals and groups, their actions and strategies, and the effects these had on others.

A deeper insight into these developments in the Southern Sudan also contributes to addressing a lacuna in the theoretical study of internal conflict: How a society makes the transition from a state of relative peace to one of war. Comparative research on civil war has in the last two decades taken a behavioural turn and focused on how geographical, economic and societal factors shape people’s actions. This has resulted in studies identifying factors favouring onset, continuation and recurrence of civil war. These contributions lack, however, consensus on a theory on how assumedly pertinent structural factors actually bring about civil war. The missing concurrence is partly explained by a fundamental weakness in the design of these studies: a misconceived peace–war dichotomy. Quantitative studies of civil war in particular presuppose a clear distinction between war and peace, where periods of escalation are defined out of the equation. However, students of specific civil wars will notice that, in contrast to most conventional wars, civil wars tend to have a period of escalation of varying length preceding a full-scale war. This case study of the Southern Sudan identifies some elements of a more general explanation of escalation: Certain individuals and segments of society tend to go in the forefront; they regard violent measures as part of their strategy to reach their goals; to start violence on a large scale, weapons and military training are needed; and when these individuals start pursuing these goals, they generate dynamics of action and counter-action. The combination of these elements does not, however, produce a neat predictable pattern; ideographic factors – inter alia, chance, uncertainty and inadequate assessment of one’s own and others’ capabilities – preclude general explanations. We must discover within each case how the opportunity to rebel and rebellion itself are brought about.

This article is a contribution to a dispassionate, empirically based history of the start of the Anya-Nya civil war. It challenges earlier accounts by suggesting a tighter bond between politicians and the militarily trained Southerners in the bush, and it suggests a more direct involvement of some Southern politicians in planning the initial attacks. The article combines insight from a heterogeneous collection of
largely unused written and oral sources, which permits unprecedented access to relevant events and processes. Structural factors favouring rebellion are first introduced. Then, three interrelated processes by which groups and individuals among educated or militarily trained Southerners attempted to escalate the political and social tensions in the Southern Sudan are examined. The last section of the article analyses the initial rebel attacks and their consequences.

Factors facilitating rebellion in the South

The majority of theory-driven comparative studies of civil war focus on domestic factors – a trait they share with much of the historiography of the contemporary Sudan. Sudanese politicians – and intellectuals of all nationalities – have devoted much attention to the bifurcated Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1956) policy of actively favouring a centre in Khartoum while neglecting and isolating the peripheries, and this policy’s consequences for the independent Sudan. Within this perspective the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium had – by isolating the South administratively, by introducing Christian missionaries, and by not investing in social and economic development – intended to create a South separate from the rest of the Sudan, and hindered the “natural” assimilation of the South into the Northern Sudanese cultural sphere. Immediately after the fall of Abboud’s regime (1958–1964), Northern Sudanese politicians and scholars conveniently blamed his government for escalation of the conflict. We need, however, a larger explanatory framework when analysing how it became possible to instigate a civil war in the Southern Sudan in the early 1960s. Elements of such a framework include a weak state structure which was supposed to govern a vast, inaccessible, and, in most cases, sparsely populated territory; government policies in the South, which from 1955 were dominated by a Sudanese elite stemming from Khartoum and the central riverine areas, who provided both opportunity and motivation for rebellion when pursuing counter-productive policies of internal security and cultural and religious homogenisation; the forming of groups of politicians, Southerners with military training and students and commoners who were willing to use violence in pursuit of their goals; and finally, a regional and wider international political climate facilitating exile politics and insurgent activities.

When explaining the factor of governance structures in the beginning of the first civil war in the Southern Sudan, British motivation is less important than the assessment of the apparatus that they passed on to the new rulers in Khartoum in 1954–1955. The Condominium administration was essentially designed to dominate the area with a minimum of government intervention and to keep the peace through maintaining “business as usual”. The vast majority of the Southern population lived in rural, largely self-sufficient households, where a system of government chiefs exercised a bare minimum of government administration, policing and social mediation. The District Commissioners were the link between the government and the chiefs and bolstered the latter’s authority. A convincing threat of overwhelming individual and collective punishment kept local violence at a manageable level. This was a convenient and cost-effective method for ruling the rural population, but the extent of government control and its ability to interact with the population were limited. Towards the end of the Condominium, the British initiated a few agricultural schemes and began supplementing the hierarchy of chiefs with local and provincial advisory bodies, but these reforms were still at an early stage in 1955.
This inheritance gave the new national leadership few viable short-term options other than maintaining “business as usual”, and it provided Southern politicians and other oppositional elements plenty of room to manoeuvre.

When representatives of the national elite in Khartoum and their officials in the South assumed positions of control, the new rulers were driven by a desire to rectify the wrongs committed by the British, i.e., the blocking of cultural and religious assimilation of the South. This implied nationalising missionary education and health services in the South, building mosques and Koran schools, and converting chiefs to Islam. Furthermore, the disturbances of August 1955 convinced Northern Sudanese administrators that firmer rule was urgently needed. Small groups and individuals who had run for the bush after the disturbances were involved in attacks on convoys, patrols and police posts in the period 1956–60, particularly in Equatoria. Far from amounting to a civil war, these incidents merely maintained the Northerners’ fear of another uprising and contributed to perpetuating a state of emergency and restrictions on travel. The government’s attempts at control and suppression became more pronounced after the 1958 military coup led by General Abboud, who also reinforced the authority of the chiefs at the expense of nascent local government reforms. In terms of economic development, Northerners in government adopted the British attitude that the South was mainly an expense in the national budget that should be kept at a bare minimum. Most of the projects planned or initiated by the British during the last years of the Condominium were cancelled or relocated to the North.

One result of antagonistic government policies in the South was therefore that from 1955 onwards small but militant groups of Southern Sudanese politicians emerged. In the early 1950s a Southern identity manifested itself among educated Southerners and other town dwellers, which was fuelled and formed by dislike of their Northern rulers. In the process that resulted in Sudanese independence, Northern politicians made vague promises of considering a federal constitution, which came to naught when Abboud seized power. Subsequently the Southerners lost all positions and influence in Khartoum. A combination of personal and political grievances and lack of opportunities inside the Sudan suggested political exile as an option for the most ardent opponents to the government. These became the political leaders of the Southern rebellion. In addition, groups of militarily trained Southerners in the armed forces, police and other para-military branches of the government became renegades during the second half of the 1950s.

The Southern soldiers who were not arrested in 1955 and who hid in the bush in subsequent years are often presented as the core of the rebellion. Closer scrutiny reveals that the link between these and the Anya-Nya of the 1960s is spurious. Rather it was two other segments among the militarily trained that were the main elements of the initial armed resistance: Southern soldiers who had been imprisoned as a consequence of the 1955 disturbances, and who were in most instances released in the early 1960s; and Southerners who defected from government service in the years after independence. The militarily trained Southerners’ reasons for hiding in the bush and in neighbouring countries were often personal, but they were still susceptible to political propaganda. In addition to the educated and militarily trained Southerners, students and commoners also fled to the bush or to other countries. Their reasons for leaving were more related to finding work and education than to political opposition, but many were recruited into political activities and rebellion.
Although the situation inside the Sudan motivated Southern politicians to leave the country, there were also incentives within the international system that made exile desirable. An international apparatus was established for the support of “liberation” struggles in Africa during the early 1960s. The main proponents of this system were African countries that had already become independent and which prospective rebels solicited for political support, funds and arms. Governments and interest groups in Europe and the US were other potential sources of support. Prospective rebels also lobbied different networks of independent African states. After the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963, external support to African rebellions came to be focused around the Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

The Southern politicians in exile had ample opportunity to start a rebellion in the South: The Sudanese government’s mutually exclusive policies of, on the one hand, winning hearts and minds and, on the other, control and suppression were doomed to be counter-productive. Educated Southerners, labourers and the militarily trained who could have been valuable allies in the endeavour to consolidate Khartoum’s grip on the South were instead barred from participation and later harassed. Second, these policies and their execution in the South could be presented by the Southern opposition as active attempts at discriminating against an “African” population through religious intolerance, political suppression and social and economic neglect. In this way they could justify their struggle to potential international allies and backers as well as to the Southern population. Third, by reinforcing the indirect rule model, the government lost its opportunity to control the rural population or include them in the government sphere. This left the government with few possible reactions beyond indiscriminate punitive expeditions, which played straight into the hands of the insurgents. Yet these and other factors had to be brought into the political discourse by groups and individuals’ statements and actions, which were often rooted in unrealistic, unarticulated and incompatible strategies.

Searching for funds, gaining political legitimacy and building military power

In December 1960, the initial group of senior politicians escaped to Kenya and Uganda. They were followed by several others in the months to come; most prominent was William Deng, one of the highest-ranking Southern government officials. In February 1962, the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU), the first opposition party in exile, was launched. The party leaders, Deng, Father Saturnino Lahure, and Joseph Oduho, travelled widely, attempting to raise funds and championing their cause. In early 1963, SACDNU became the Sudan African National Union (SANU), and the exiled politicians intensified their instigation of armed uprising in the South. They followed a strategy made up of three different processes: Seeking political and economic support abroad; cultivating political legitimacy in exile; and building military power. These activities, described in more detail below, seem to have been pursued more or less simultaneously. Still it appears that, initially, gaining international support was highest on the agenda, while by 1963 organising an armed rebellion was the centre of attention.

Southerners realised that political and financial support from abroad would be essential for launching a rebellion against the Sudanese government and promoting their programs for the South. In rebellions elsewhere in Africa only one “liberation” group was recognised by the international system as the legitimate
representative of the African majority. When recognised as legitimate rebels, insurgents could receive economic support and arms, and sympathetic countries would raise their case in the OAU and the UN. This gave a strong incentive to aspiring rebels to remain united. Furthermore, neighbouring countries would be willing to give sanctuary to armed groups thus recognised. International recognition of their cause as a legitimate anti-colonial struggle was therefore the first step for the Southern Sudanese politicians in their quest for foreign support.

Some information exists regarding the Southern politicians’ international lobbying efforts in the period 1961–63. During this period they operated out of Kampala, Leopoldville and Dar es Salaam. Deng, Father Saturnino and Oduho probably started their first round of visits to African countries in July 1961. According to a “Report to Azania” signed by “SACNU”, memoranda from the Southern Sudanese politicians had been presented, assumedly by Father Saturnino and Oduho, to meetings at the Afro-Malagasy Summit (23–27 January 1962), to the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa and to the Afro–Malagasy Union in Bangui (25–27 March 1962). Furthermore, the report somewhat optimistically states: “The party is glad to point out that the reaction in Lagos, Addis Ababa and Bangui was satisfactorily favourable to our case, and [it] won’t be long before some African States will give us open support”. These visits were listed first among the “achievements” of the SACDNU, indicating the perceived importance of foreign support. In April 1962, Father Saturnino and Oduho visited other African countries and met with Deng in Europe. Deng travelled extensively in Africa, Europe and the US in 1961–1963; between December 1962 and autumn 1963, he visited Rome, Geneva, Brussels, London, Bonn, New York, Washington, Paris and Bangui to lobby for support. Deng also wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary General claiming that a second revolt in the Southern Sudan had taken place since November 1962, a claim which, according to the British Embassy, was vigorously denied in Sudanese newspapers. In April 1963, he delivered a 25-page petition to the UN in New York. In May 1963, two students lobbied African politicians and journalists during the African Summit meeting in Addis Ababa. They distributed SANU material and tried to raise sympathy for the Southerners’ cause, but with few immediate results. Oduho visited London in November and December 1962, where he was interviewed by The Observer and The Scotsman. The interviews caused controversy and protests from the Sudanese embassy. During this period the Institute for Race Relations in Oxford published the controversial booklet The Problem of the Southern Sudan. Father Saturnino and Oduho returned to East Africa during the first months of 1963. Lawrence Wol Wol, a Southern Sudanese living in London, started in February 1963 to publish a quarterly, The Voice of Southern Sudan, with news from the South and political statements from the politicians in exile. The time and resources dedicated to these activities suggest that international lobbying was regarded as important by the exile leaders.

It proved difficult, however, to obtain the international support and endorsement the exiled politicians had hoped for. Although neighbouring countries and African political leaders unofficially sympathised with their cause, in the political climate of the early 1960s they were not inclined to support thinly veiled separatists against an independent African government. Deng complained that the US and the European countries he visited were all “friends of Khartoum”. The US and western European countries were reluctant to assist the Southerners after the Sudanese government accepted US aid in 1958 and was regarded as an ally of the West in the competition
with the USSR for dominance on the African continent. This is corroborated in a US assessment of the initial rebel attacks in the South: “The possibility is enhanced that we may be faced with an urgent Government of Sudan (GOS) appeal to furnish arms at small or no cost. A negative response would in all probability result in the GOS turning to the Soviet Bloc for arms assistance”. Advocacy groups in the Western countries opposed what they perceived as apathy towards the situation in the South.

The exiled politicians managed to garner support to finance their travels and upkeep in the period 1961–63. Some contributions came from Southerners in neighbouring countries, but there were obvious limits to this source. The Sudanese government claimed that the Vatican and church organisations were assisting the Southerners, but it is unlikely that US and European church organisations donated money for armed resistance in the period 1961–63. Other Southern politicians accused the three leaders of receiving money on behalf of Southern Sudanese refugees, which they instead used for their own purposes. At a meeting of the Executive Committee in February 1964, Father Saturnino was said to have received the equivalent of 150,000 Sudanese pounds from Italian churches with which he bought three cars. William Deng disclosed that he had received USD 2600 from the “National Catholic Welfare Conference” in New York, out of which he spent “2000” buying a car. The British Foreign Office and US State Department, as well as Khartoum, suspected Israeli involvement as early as 1963. Deng claimed that only a formal agreement with the government in Congo was awaited before it would act as the “middle man” for Israel. The substance of these claims is difficult to establish.

In a memorandum to the Foreign Office the US Embassy indicated that: “The Department of State would also be most interested in any comment the Foreign Office may have on the allegations of Israeli support of the rebels. These allegations are a hardy perennial in Foreign Service and intelligence reporting, although as things stand the Department cannot consider the case proven”. Significant support from Israel did not materialise until 1967–1968.

To the extent that neighbouring countries’ governments wanted to provide any direct support to the Southern opposition in exile, such a desire was balanced by their commitment to the OAU policy of leaving the colonial borders unaltered and by the need to maintain good relations with the government of the Sudan. Yet Ethiopia, Congo, the British colonial governments and, later, the independent government of Uganda decided to give sanctuary to Southern politicians or ex-soldiers along or inside their borders, and they tacitly tolerated the politicians’ activities. Officially the Southern politicians’ room for manoeuvre was restricted, and the Ugandan government put some effort into enforcing that restriction. However, for most of the time these governments turned a blind eye to the politicians and their organisations. This constituted subtle yet essential assistance, the importance of which has escaped previous observers of the early years of the first Southern rebellion.

Khartoum put pressure on its neighbours to repatriate the Southern opposition leaders. According to SACDNU, the Sudanese Armed Forces conducted raids across the Ugandan and Congo borders as early as December 1962, even attacking a Congolese village and killing three people. Such raids in fact probably took place and made neighbouring countries’ government less co-operative. Moreover, a number of tribes of the Southern Sudan straddle the borders with neighbouring countries and these groups had some influence in their respective countries. Another factor is that SACDNU/SANU appealed to Pan-Africanism and the fight against “Arabs” when addressing the OAU and African governments; leaders of the recently
independent African nations possibly felt sympathy with the proclaimed anti-colonial struggle of their Sudanese “brothers” and may not have liked the prospect of aggressive policies of Islamization and Arabicization on their borders. Finally, despite reassurances from the Sudanese government of fair trials, there was a high probability that the Southern Sudanese leaders would be prosecuted and sentenced to death or long-term imprisonment if they were extradited.

The limited success of the Southern politicians’ attempts at mobilising foreign support had three consequences. Firstly, Deng, Oduho and Fr. Saturnino were protected and mobile, which enabled them to advocate their cause internationally and among Southerners in exile. The assistance gave them the opportunity to develop a consistent programme and the semblance of a political organisation. But, secondly, the support was not sufficient to develop a coherent military organisation; without substantial funds and arms, Southerners with militarily training were not ready to accept the politicians as leaders. The politicians’ ability to provide overall direction to the rebellion had less appeal to these groups, whose personal and parochial reasons for going to the bush did not warrant co-ordination with other armed groups hundreds of kilometres away. Thirdly, although the funds received by several individuals during the early 1960s were limited, they were sufficient to cause jealousy, distrust and infighting among the diaspora. The more recent examples of John Garang and Joseph Lagu demonstrate that if one person controls a significant source of foreign support, others will fall in behind him. The incentive for a united front was significantly reduced when Southern politicians failed to obtain both the official endorsement of the UN and OAU, and the funds and arms this was expected to bring about.

Educated Southerners had since the early 1950s organised themselves in political parties representing “the Southern Sudan”; moving into exile was partly motivated by the desire to establish oppositional parties. Such organisations were the modus operandi at the time for political resistance in Africa. A political party was the assumed “government in waiting” in case the rebellion was successful, and it was needed for justifying the claim to speak on behalf of Southerners. Although such entities could have been used to extend the influence of the political leaders into the Southern Sudan and as a nexus for popular resistance, the leaders focused their efforts on winning foreign support and extending their authority over the militarily trained and other potential fighters. Events in the Southern Sudan during the early 1960s did, however, indicate that there was untapped potential for popular, non-violent resistance.

The Sudan Christian Association (SCA) had been the only significant organisation established among the Southern diaspora in the period 1956–1961. According to received wisdom, the SCA was established in 1961 by the escaped politicians as a cover for their political activities; the SCA was, however, non-political and founded in 1957. It was first and foremost a mutual assistance organisation for people in exile, particularly the educated. In 1961, the board denied allegations made at the annual congress that the escaped MPs had been supported financially by the SCA. Nonetheless, the SCA became increasingly politicised, and by 1963 it expressed open criticism of the Sudanese government’s handling of religious affairs in the Southern Sudan. It is interesting to note that in contrast to the subsequent political organisation founded by the exiled politicians, the SCA had many members, several local branches and was in general quite active.
The Southern politicians’ arrival on the East African scene introduced a new dynamic to exile politics. William Deng moved to Dar es Salaam in late 1961 and started to promote what he called the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. On 10 January 1962, he wrote a short text on behalf of this movement with the title “Arab Colonialisation and Oppression of the Southern Sudan”. Some months later, in an interview with Africa Confidential, he claimed that the movement had 30,000 members inside the Sudan and that they wanted autonomy for the South and a federal constitution. After Father Saturnino and Oduho’s meeting with the Monrovia group in February 1962, they joined Deng in Dar es Salaam. There the three politicians founded the openly political SACDNU. Oduho became the president, Deng the Secretary General and Father Saturnino Lahure assumed the opaque position of “patron”. The majority of the other board members were former MPs. SACDNU was first and foremost a letterhead for publications and petitions. By 1963, the level of the group’s activity had increased somewhat and it changed its name to SANU. “SACDNU” was probably too awkward a name and one not immediately understandable to outsiders. Furthermore, “SANU” resembled names of similar organisations in other African countries (e.g. TANU and KANU). SANU still fell short of becoming a functioning organisation. Uganda and Congo remained the centres for exile politics. The Ethiopian branch was operating to a large extent autonomously and mainly in the refugee camps. Southerners resided also in Kenya, but there was less political activity there. Deng tried to establish support groups in some other countries, notably Ethiopia and the UK. In the introductory letter to the first Voice of Southern Sudan he advocates the idea that the UN should conduct a plebiscite in order to decide whether the Southern Sudan should become independent. Deng was perceived by other Southerners in exile to operate too independently; in February 1964, he was criticised for starting local branches of SANU in Congo among the refugees. Yet during the period 1961–63, the politicians worked together towards developing a political network in exile and formulating and promoting their political cause. This co-operation has been overshadowed by their subsequent quarrelling and factionalism. By 1963, the three leaders seemed to pursue different paths: Oduho was apparently most concerned with developing the political organisation; Deng travelled extensively in Europe and the US; Father Saturnino was preoccupied with the military aspect of the struggle and preferred to operate along the Congo-Sudan border recruiting, organising supplies and acquiring weapons for the makeshift camps of future insurgents. The different activities were probably less a result of a rational division of labour as a manifestation of diverging strategies.

The exiled politicians had limited reach within the Southern Sudan. One exception is the unrest of late 1962, which included a widespread school strike. Marco Rume, a politician from Juba and deputy secretary–general of SACDNU, contributed to this by writing letters that were smuggled into the schools. These letters announced that a Southern liberation army would enter the Sudan upon the independence of Uganda in October 1962. The students and youths were asked to leave the schools to avoid harm; anyone remaining would be considered a collaborator with the North. Rume’s letters and the rumours they spawned were, however, not the cause of the strike, but rather the excuse the students needed to take action. There was widespread dissatisfaction among the students at the secondary and intermediate schools regarding both declining standards and political developments. The government accused the few remaining foreign missionaries of manipulating the
youth and indoctrinating them to work against the Sudanese state.\textsuperscript{53} Although the missionaries movements were by 1962 severely restricted, and they were careful not to give the government any excuse to expel them,\textsuperscript{54} it is still likely that the students received some assistance and inspiration at least from the Southern Sudanese priests and catechists, who did not experience the same restrictions as foreign priests. For instance, during an earlier school strike in 1960, one Southern priest, Father Paulino Dogalle, had helped striking students print leaflets, an action that was rewarded with 12 years in prison (later reduced to five).\textsuperscript{55} The strikes disrupted the educational system, which did not recover until 1972, and tension in the South increased. Another consequence of the strike was that many students and schoolchildren migrated to neighbouring countries. Here they could be useful to the politicians in different capacities; as refugees they could attract foreign funding and some were also recruited as soldiers.

It does not appear, however, that the Southern politicians put much effort into building a political apparatus of any consequence. In this, SANU resembled the past political parties inside the Southern Sudan, and their legacy could have influenced the way the leaders of SANU ran their organisation. The three leaders’ focus on travelling abroad and raising cash spawned allegations of personal aggrandisement, but a general lack of funds and other resources is probably a more important reason for the weak organisation. However, lack of focus on organising inside the Southern Sudan appears to have been an opportunity lost for SANU leaders. As the school strike indicates, by 1962 the political tension, at least in the towns, was sufficient to instigate large-scale protest and strikes. A stronger organisation and a leadership focusing on change inside the Southern Sudan could have used this momentum for a non-military protest. But Deng, Father Saturnino and Oduho concentrated their attention on establishing a military organisation in the bush in the period after January 1963.

The politicians in exile had by early 1963 reached a consensus on the use of violent means to further their cause. But they needed someone to fight for them; with the exception of two former policemen, Elia Lupe and Alexis Yangu, the exiled politicians lacked relevant experience, and they did not intend personally to take to the field. They needed to co-operate with – and preferably lead – the militarily trained populations who had escaped to the border areas of Ethiopia, Uganda and Congo during 1961–63. The key to fulfil these ambitions was political organisation and obtaining arms and supplies. Since (as we have seen) neither of these endeavours was particularly successful, the question arises of the degree to which the politicians were involved in planning the initial attacks. To answer this question a careful historical reconstruction of the processes and events preceding those attacks is needed. Spatial variation is a key element in such a reconstruction.

Local violence and government retaliation had escalated significantly since 1960, especially in Equatoria. Although the Southern Sudanese politicians stayed in contact with refugees and other groups in exile, there is no indication that they systematically organised any armed groups before the beginning of 1963. Joseph Oduho claimed to have started military action in January 1963,\textsuperscript{56} but he remained in Kampala most of the time until he was arrested in October of that year. Several incidents in Eastern Equatoria in the period 1961–2 seem to have been the work of groups of mutineers who had been released from prison, led by ex-Lieutenant Emilio Taffeng. He evidently established a camp in late 1962 or early 1963 in Eastern
Equatoria, where he managed to gather a number of militarily trained Southerners, schoolboys and commoners.57

Marco Rume was allegedly involved in planning an attack on a police station near Kajo-Keji in November 1962. The attack was led by David Dada and Bernadino Mau.58 Dada was an ex-mutineer who had lived in Uganda since 1955, while Mau was a defected service man. They killed at least one police officer and managed to steal a few rifles. About the same time, groups of Southerners, possibly with military training, showed up in three cohorts along the Sudan–Uganda border. There they apparently exercised with sticks while awaiting an arms drop from foreign supporters. The Ugandan army dispersed the groups during December.59 Rume’s involvement in these events was a result of personal initiative. Since the three SACDNU leaders were still travelling in late 1962, there is little indication that any of these actions was planned and co-ordinated by SACDNU as an organisation. Indeed, when Oduho heard about the attack on Kajo-Keji, he reportedly wrote to Rume and asked him to prevent any similar actions.60

Lieutenant Joseph Lagu’s defection from the Sudanese armed forces in the summer of 1963 was in the short term useful to the politicians. As a regular army officer, he commanded respect from those with a military background. Lagu was at the same time young and impressionable, and could be manipulated by the more experienced politicians. In his own accounts, Lagu emphasises that Father Saturnino was the mastermind behind the initial attacks in Central Equatoria.61 In fact Father Saturnino had moved his headquarters to the border town of Agu in southeast Congo, where he had an office in the Catholic mission.62 Here, because those with military training had relatively weak leaders, he managed to have direct influence over the planning and execution of the initial attacks. He recruited people from refugee camps and sent them on to a camp in Adranga close to the Sudanese border, where David Dada and Bernadino Mau were in charge. Father Saturnino worried that the men would lose patience, and he therefore urged an attack despite the lack of training and equipment. Meanwhile, farther north in Congo, many of the refugees were Dinka, and Dinka politicians such as Dominic Murwel and Camilio Dohl tried to win support for them from the Congolese authorities and to organise local armed groups.63 William Deng visited these camps as well. Elsewhere Phillip Pedak, who had studied in the UK, seems to have travelled to Addis Ababa and to the refugee camps in Western Ethiopia sometime in 1962–63. These camps were populated with Nuer, Anuak, Murle and Shilliuk refugees from the Upper Nile province. There are indications that he tried to convince the militarily trained in these camps to become part of a fighting force.64

With no shortage of potential fighters, the main obstacle was the lack of weapons and supplies. These were hard to come by inside the Sudan itself. The border with Ethiopia made it possible for peoples of the Upper Nile, particularly the Anuak, to acquire some weapons. In Equatoria, the British had strictly controlled gun ownership, but old Italian rifles seeped in from Ethiopia. Some Chiefs and a few hunters had guns. The politicians’ promise of obtaining arms from abroad was probably one reason that Taffeng, Gbatata, Dada, Mutek and other leaders of the militarily trained Southerners were willing to cooperate and to some extent fall into line. However, the politicians failed to fulfil their promises; Joseph Lagu tells how Father Saturnino provided three old rifles for the initial attack. Some fighters had managed to hold on to the guns they had got while employed by the government.65
Molotov cocktails were frequently used, as well as other locally produced weapons (spears, bows and arrows and bush knives called pangas).

The prelude to the initial rebel attacks was a meeting among the politicians in Kampala in late July or early August 1963 where they formally decided on violent action and founded the Anya-Nya. Joseph Oduho, Joseph Lagu, Severino Fuli, George Muras, George Kwani and possibly others participated. They quickly agreed to initiate military action in Equatoria, but naming the “armed forces” involved considerable debate. Several English names were rejected. Father Saturnino suggested Sudan Pan-African Freedom Fighters (SPAFF). His initial insistence on this name was because he saw a reference to Pan-Africanism as important for winning support from other African countries. Lagu tells how Father Saturnino in August 1963 composed leaflets “announcing the launching of the Sudan Pan-African Freedom Fighters (SPAFF) as a military wing for SANU, to liberate the south from northern Arab domination”. However, this name was soon rejected and “Anya-Nya” became generally accepted.

Several participants claimed credit for insisting on “Anya-Nya”, which refers to a local venom. Reference has been made to a poisoning incident in the 1930s. ‘Anya-Nya’ also resembles the names of the Maji-Maji rebellion in Tanganika and the Mau Mau of Kenya. It was further assumed that “Anya-Nya” would be more meaningful to the general population in Equatoria and would even provide a motivation in itself. An alternative explanation is that some armed groups had already adopted the name, and that the political leaders, realising that they were not in a position to force a foreign name on these groups, instead chose to endorse it. The fact that armed groups outside Eastern and Central Equatoria initially had other local names seems to strengthen this theory.

Before mid-1963, contact between the militarily trained in Eastern Equatoria and the politicians in exile was limited, and the politicians played a more indirect role than in Central Equatoria. Lagu was sent by Father Saturnino to contact ex-lieutenant Taffeng and the others from the Equatoria corps on the Eastern Equatoria side. Lagu went back to Kampala before travelling north with Oduho. In Northern Uganda, at Pajule, east of Liria, they met the local SCA representative, Valeriano Orege, the headmaster of a local school. He sent a car and driver with a local guide to get Taffeng and two of his officers. They met during the evening and Taffeng agreed to co-operate. Despite this agreement and other efforts it is safe to conclude that there was no rebel army available to Southern Sudanese politicians by mid-1963, and that their command over the few extant groups was weak if it existed at all.

What did the politicians achieve by resorting to violent resistance? Lack of arms meant that the first attacks had mainly two purposes: To demonstrate that there was an organised armed opposition and to acquire weapons. The politicians may also have hoped that military operations inside the South would cause the Sudanese government, the Southern population, and potential foreign allies to take them more seriously. This would then increase the support and negotiating power of the insurgents. Lagu claims that Father Saturnino gave him the following explanation in August 1963: “We must make some noise against the enemy and shake their military. That will show the world that there is trouble in the Sudan... That is the message we want to send”. Although Khartoum was out of reach, they could hope to destabilise at least parts of the South. It was predictable that attacking government installations and personnel would lead to reprisals by the army and police against the
civilian population. Some of the rebels may have calculated that this would increase popular resentment and boost rebel recruitment.

Starting civil war

The attacks in Equatoria during September 1963 were the beginning of the sustained and partly co-ordinated political violence in Southern Sudan that would last until 1972. Nevertheless, it was not until January 1964 that the rebellion had engulfed all three Southern provinces. Who participated in these initial attacks? To what extent were politicians in exile involved, and how did this involvement vary geographically? It is necessary to analyse developments in Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal separately since the first attacks were largely results of local circumstance.

Exiled politicians were involved in directing the initial attacks in all parts of Equatoria province, but to a greater degree in Central Equatoria than in the East. In August 1963 the Anya-Nya distributed a leaflet announcing their existence and programme:

Now, ANYA NYA the national liberation army of the Southern Sudanese Africans who have been suffering victimisation, exploitation and social discrimination by you have lost patience with our political leaders who have told us to wait and so far achieved nothing that will ensure our freedom.

We have now decided to act on our own account, in our own way. You all know we desire nothing short of unqualified freedom for our country and our people. We have the means, the spirit, and the might to achieve our national independence from you – the Arab Northern Sudanese.70

The leaflet is from the then-deceased “Field Marshal Lutada Hillir” to “Arab traders; farmers; bureaucrats; teachers; police; armed forces, and other agents of Khartoum neo-colonialism now settled in the Southern Sudan”.71

The leaflet attempts to distance the Anya-Nya from “our political leaders”, but Joseph Lagu states that it was the politicians who in fact wrote it.72 First, Father Saturnino Lahure wrote one SPAFF leaflet and, after the meeting in Kampala, Oduho and the other politicians wrote another using Anya-Nya as the name of the organisation. It is evident from the following passage that the politicians were behind the leaflets:

For the last 8 years, members of ANYA NYA73 have been suffering and have been living in the bush, under rain, among wild beast[s] – while you ravage our Holy Land – oppressing our people and looting their property. Meanwhile our national political parties: the Liberal Party (which your leaders dissolved on 17 November 1958), and SANU (which your very same leaders forced into exile as soon as it was conceived after the above mentioned Liberal Party), have been offering your successive Government[s] generous terms under which our people could peacefully attend their God given rights to political freedom without encroaching upon your corresponding rights.

But unfortunately the words of our politicians fell on your leaders’ deaf ears. On the other hand, you, the agents of Khartoum neo-colonialism resident here in the South, like your leaders, ignored the fact that we the Southerners, being negroid by race, culture and sentiment wish to remain free of you and your Government’s rule.74
It is implausible that an insurgency of militarily trained Southerners would emphasise and elaborate on politicians’ activities first in Khartoum and later in exile. The preoccupation with “neo-colonialism” and “political freedom” also suggests a politician’s involvement in the composition of the leaflet. In order to avoid prosecution by the Ugandan authorities, SANU officially condemned the attacks in Equatoria in September 1963. The governments of neighbouring countries were not deceived. Following the attacks in Equatoria and Upper Nile in September and October 1963, William Deng was put under house arrest in Leopoldville, Oduho and seven other SANU members were arrested by Ugandan authorities and the Ethiopian government handed over 25 refugees to the Government of the Sudan. Oduho received a nine-month sentence for running an unlawful society.

The armed groups struck several places in Equatoria during late September 1963. In the southern part of Eastern Equatoria, small groups under the overall command of Taffeng attacked several sites, including Nimule, Parajok, Magwi, the Katire saw mills, Ikotos and Chukudum/Nagishot. At about the same time, in central Equatoria, insurgents trained and organised by Father Saturnino Lahure and Joseph Lagu made raids. In the western parts of Equatoria few, if any, assaults took place before 1964. The groups had only a few rifles; they had spears, pangas, Molotov cocktails, and bows and arrows. Some of the Anya-Nya had participated in irregular warfare during the Second World War, but the majority lacked both experience and training in insurgency warfare. Still, they managed to conduct their operations with a certain level of success against an enemy who was better equipped and in most cases holed up in strong defensive positions. The element of surprise was probably important. This advantage was soon lost, as indicated by an operation in December 1963 against the police post at Tombili on the Yei-Kajo-Keji road. A group of Anya-Nya attacked, but they met with tough resistance. The police had been warned and had dug trenches around the station. The army soon arrived and pursued the rebels into the bush. Even if exaggerated, the gist of reports coming from SANU in late 1963 and early 1964 on how government forces retaliated against civilians, particularly in rural areas, appears plausible. The locals were suspected of harbouring and feeding the rebels. Villages were burned, and people were rounded up and reportedly tortured and executed. The result was an increasing stream of refugees and stronger support for the insurgents, despite a heightened army presence, a network of informers and attempts at establishing easily controllable “peace camps”.

The attack on the police station at Pochalla in October 1963 was the first significant battle in the Upper Nile region and signalled the start of armed rebellion there. Details of the circumstances of the attack and of the attack itself are murky at best. When comparing conflicting accounts of these events it is possible to arrive at a plausible synthesis: Schoolboys and commoners, together with some militarily trained Southerners, had fled to western Ethiopia during 1961–63. The schoolboys lingered in the town of Gambela and waited to join the promised liberation army, but they were harassed by police and threatened with forcible return to the Sudan. The schoolboys and others received instruction from militarily trained refugees in camps along the border. The force they comprised, who at this time apparently called themselves Ohat-diim (outlaws) or Kooc Roor (freedom fighters), may have numbered several hundred. Eventually, it moved on Pochalla, a small border town. The motive for the attack could have been food shortage. The government evidently kept only a small garrison in Pochalla, which was far away from reinforcements. The insurgent force managed to overrun the town and loot it. At one point, at least one airplane
was used against the rebels and civilians. It seems that during this period the rebels were reinforced from the local Anuak, whose chiefs contributed weapons and cattle. In this respect the attack on Pochalla resembles tribal uprisings of the Condominium period. The insurgents appear to have remained in the town until government reinforcements arrived. The rebels then withdrew to a point where they could control access to water, and later to a camp farther into the bush. In the aftermath they split up and established themselves in their leaders’ home areas, whence they conducted raids on government posts and convoys. Self-preservation was probably a strong motive for the groups’ further activities. The politicians in exile appear to have had no direct influence over this train of events.

By contrast, exile politicians, William Deng in particular, strongly influenced the decision to launch an assault on Wau, Bahr el-Ghazal, in January 1964, an event clearly linked to earlier attacks in Equatoria. During the second half of 1963, Deng returned from Europe to Congo. He visited the camps in northern Congo that hosted mainly Dinka refugees. One source mentions three camps, Isiro, Niranga (400 men, mostly Dinka) and Rinidimba (150, mostly Zande): “Large sections of these camps were militarily oriented, and training was carried out in secret using sticks instead of rifles”. Deng was determined to expand the area of operations for armed groups. In a confidential letter in October 1963 to Father Saturnino he wrote: “There are disturbing reports that we have concentrated only in the Torit area. This would be a mistake if it is true”. He suggested that the armed struggle should be spread to all parts of the South. The letter indicate that Deng was not directly involved in planning the first attacks in Equatoria and that he assumed that Father Saturnino had the authority to direct operations of the Anya-Nya.

Deng planned to expand the insurgency to Bahr el-Ghazal. Towards the end of 1963 he persuaded Bernadino Mau, a Dinka, and others at Agu to come with him to northern Congo, ostensibly only to visit the camps. We cannot ascertain whether it was Deng’s idea that Mau and his men should attack Wau. Nevertheless, this – if not foolhardy, at least ambitious – plan to attack the government’s provincial stronghold could very well have been the scheme of someone who wanted a spectacular victory, but who lacked the military insight to estimate the likely outcome of the operation. Mau left with perhaps as many as one hundred men but with as little as one modern rifle. The others were armed with bows and arrows and other weapons. They were supposed to get assistance from sympathisers inside the town, but the help never came and the government had been alerted. The attack failed spectacularly, and Mau was captured and executed.

The assault was successful, however, in terms of advertising the inclusion of Bahr el-Ghazal in the area of insurgent operations. The event caught the attention of observers well beyond the borders of the Sudan. A US State Department note put it this way:

We have hitherto believed that SANU was unable to engage in sustained operations, that its leadership lacked cohesiveness and was divided on tribal lines, and that its militant activities would have to be limited to assassinations, sabotage and hit-and-run attacks on small police and army installations. This assessment must now be revised.

Subsequently, government forces allegedly took revenge on surrounding villages for harbouring the attackers prior to the assault, and many town-dwellers were
rounded up for harsh interrogation, which probably accomplished more than the attack itself.

**Initial relation with civilians**

Anya-Nya groups have been portrayed as outlaws and terrorists, but also as an integrated part of the local population. Case studies have demonstrated that relations between guerrillas and civilians are generally complex. Support from civilians has proven to be particularly important for rebels without foreign backing, as was the case in the Southern Sudan. The Anya-Nya rebellion may not have been immediately accepted by the general population of the Southern Sudan. Information on this topic is scant, but there is a high probability that relations between armed groups and civilians varied considerably and were influenced by local factors. Several chiefs, particularly in Equatoria, sympathised with the rebels and some secretly supported them, while other chiefs chose to flee to other countries. In 1956–59, Chief Lomiluk Lohide was, together with Latada Hillir, the leader of a local group in the area around Ikotos, Eastern Equatoria. The chiefs may have had their own grievances against the government as they, more than the average commoner, were in direct contact with Northern Sudanese administrators. It appears that the chiefs were both blamed personally for any irregularities in their areas and also targeted in particular in the Islamisation campaigns.

There are reasons to believe that initially the majority of the civilian population tried to maintain a position of neutrality, but that they were forced to choose sides. A British reporter travelling with government forces in Equatoria in the autumn of 1963 describes the situation thus:

> The savagery employed by the secessionists – murder, flogging, indiscriminate ambush and the razing of villages – matches exactly the charges so freely and for so long alleged against the Sudan government by the secessionists themselves.

This journalist was travelling with the army, and it is possible that the razed villages he saw were actually the work of the army itself. Still, it is plausible that the armed groups could “punish” villages for being uncooperative or for being in league with the government. Storrs McCall mentions that some years later one local commander, Mutek, started governing civilians directly and with unfortunate consequences, e.g., cattle theft. Lagu explains that some chiefs and villages along the Sudan–Congo border were initially uncooperative. Finally, there are also accounts from Bahr el-Ghazal and the Bor area in Upper Nile of antagonistic relations between chiefs and the local population and Anya-Nya groups in their vicinity.

It is probable that the Anya-Nya used violence selectively against civilians as a way to maintain control in contested areas and to punish individuals who cooperated with the government. There is little reason to doubt this account of how a government informer was handled:

On the west bank of the Nile, ANYA-NYA advertised its presence in an uglier way, to a medical station assistant called Peter Kurra Ginziri. He was shot dead... Under Ginziri’s lifeless head were found three documents. One, headed “Terror”, was written in ink in block capitals with the following message: “ANYA-NYA: This is one of the Traitors. You can see: He who does likewise, dies likewise. We are prepared forever now”... The other two documents by the body, in Arabic and English, were from
“SPAFF” – Sudan Pan-African Freedom Fighters. They outlined the secessionist determination to force “the Arabs” out of the south.98

The first note related to a local conflict and appears to have been written by someone within the group of militarily trained Southerners who had participated in the killing. This group probably came from Father Saturnino’s camps, and Lagu confirms that “the practise was to kill any such people on sight to frighten people from unpatriotic or reasonable activity”.99 However, the leaflets outlining the political goals were probably the same as cited above, using Father Saturnino’s name, SPAFF. This indicates at least contact and possibly supervision from Lagu or Father Saturnino. In lieu of more systematic research, we may assume that the Anya-Nya groups in general limited their violence against civilians to selected individuals, while the government army more often resorted to collective punishment.

Conclusion

Insurgency warfare is used for protest and to gain power, and it is an imprecise tool that can easily be modified to meet local circumstances. Southern political leaders such as Father Saturnino Lahure, Joseph Oduho and William Deng attempted to exploit domestic and international factors favouring political resistance and armed rebellion. Their aspirations pointed to a desire for a future federal Sudan or an independent Southern Sudan, and violent means became permissible in the pursuit of these goals. The first civil war in the Southern Sudan escalated over several months in late 1963 and early 1964, and remained at low intensity for several years. This testifies to the lack of capacity on both sides: the initial rebel groups of the early 1960s were poorly organised and equipped, yet the Sudanese armed forces and police did not manage to eliminate these groups. The transition from peace to war in the Southern Sudan was an inherently complex process and there was no “recipe for rebellion” that the Southern politicians and the militarily trained could follow. To paraphrase E.P. Thompson, the Anya-Nya did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. Instigating civil war in the Southern Sudan was a historical process which was “embodied in real people and in a real context”,100 and which cannot be reduced to ticking off statistically significant “causes”. The Southern politicians operated within an environment where the dynamics of actions and counter-actions influenced their priorities and strategies; in turn, these dynamics affected the opportunities to instigate civil war. The prospective rebels decided to attack in late 1963 and early 1964 without adequate personnel and equipment, and with limited control over the actions and strategies of the military trained. The result was a complex and unmanageable process where the consequences of decisions – or lack of such – became difficult to predict.

The circumstances and processes related to the start of the first civil war in Southern Sudan have implications for the comparative study of internal conflict. The above analysis of dynamics of slow escalation as a result of actions and reactions buttresses more general theories of a blurred line between war and peace in intra-state warfare.101 Admittedly “war”, “peace”, and “civil war” are potent political signifiers, but deeply problematic as analytical categories in scholarly studies of conflict. Their abstract and general nature makes these categories concurrently too specific and too diffuse; they make it more difficult to trace the actual ruptures and continuities in the processes of escalation of political violence. Too much attention
has been given to measuring which constellation of abstract categories such as greed, terrain or climate change bring “peace” and which trigger “enmity”. We need to focus on the ways in which political goals are formed and pursued; how do prospective insurgency leaders choose their strategies and means; when is violent protest chosen as one of these means; how do they garner support and recruit their initial followers; what decides the success of these strategies; and who chooses to oppose them and, in doing so, what kind of measures do they adopt? Such an enquiry must centre on unconventional and asymmetric warfare as a practise, as a technology, as a mode of collective action and as a political strategy.

Acknowledgements
Research for this article has been generously supported by the Research Council of Norway (Grant No. 163115/V10) and by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs funded project “Micro-Macro Issues in Peace Building”. The author is grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Endre Stiansen and Helge Pharo. Gratitude is also due to supportive colleagues at the PRIO, to a number of people who have assisted in excavating written sources, and to individuals and organisations in the Southern Sudan, in particular informants and research assistants.

Notes
1. Lagu, Sudan Odyssey, 110.
2. See for example, Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War; Deng, War of Visions; Wai, African-Arab Conflict. For exceptions, see Howell, “Political Leadership”; Arou, “Regional Devolution”. See also fragments of Storrs McCall’s unpublished and untitled manuscript in different collections in the Sudan Archive in Durham, UK (SAD): SAD (Collins) 919/6/85-209; SAD (Parr) 827/2/34-128; SAD (Luce) 830/4/26-102.
3. Johnson, Root Causes; Passmore Sanderson and Sanderson, Education, Religion & Politics; Albino, The Sudan; Daly, “Broken Bridge”; Rolandsen, “A False Start.”
4. The Journal of Conflict Resolution and Journal of Peace Research are important outlets for this type of studies.
6. Research has been conducted in the Southern Sudan, Khartoum, UK, Italy, USA and Canada during the period 2005–2010, and primary sources include archival material, interviews, government reports and publications by the politicians in exile.
7. See for example, Beshir, Southern Sudan; Abd al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism; Deng, War of Visions; Lesch, Contested National Identities.
8. Sharkey, “Arab Identity.”
10. Passmore Sanderson and Sanderson, Education, Religion & Politics; Daly, Imperial Sudan; Leonardi, “Knowing Authority.”
15. This is a summary of findings in Rolandsen, “Civil War Society?,” 109–37. Intended for publication in a future issue of JEAS.
16. See for example, Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War.
18. Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War; Rolandsen, “Civil War Society?”
19. See for example, Archivo Comboniani Roma (ACR), A107/1a/Fr. Saturnino to Fr. Bartolucci, 3 March 1962.


24. SACDN, “Petition”; SAD (Collins) 919/6/102.

25. The two students were George Kwani, SACDNU/SANU Information Secretary, and Alphonse Malek (supposedly the President of the Southern Sudanese Plebiscite supporters in Ethiopia), *Voice of Southern Sudan* 1, no. 3, 13/4.


28. SAD (Collins) 919/6/102v.


30. MCA/2B/53.


33. [Verona Fathers’ Mission], *Black Book*.

34. MCA/2B/53.


38. On early Southern politics, see Howell, “Political Leadership,” 103–81.


40. The following reassessment is based on SCA files kept in MCA section “U.”


43. MCA/1M/2604.


45. SAD (Collins) 919/6/102.


48. MCA/2B/54.

49. sergeant, see for example, Holt and Daly, *History of the Sudan*, 154. See Howell, “Political Leadership,” 192; SAD (Collins) 919/6/102v.

53. Verona Fathers’ Mission, *Black Book*, 24; Passmore Sanderson and Sanderson, *Education, Religion & Politics*, 366–7, 378 (n4), 402. Another official explanation was that students at Juba Commercial School resisted corporal punishment from an Arab teacher and the strike spread from there - see PRO, FO 371/165683.


55. Ibid., 368, 383 (n72).

56. SAD (Collins) 919/6/102v.


58. SAD (Collins) 919/6/106v, 106. Dada was earlier known as Vitorio Logungu.


60. SAD (Collins) 919/6/102v.


62. Ibid., 92.

63. SAD (Collins) 919/6/128.

64. Wakoson, “Anya-Nya Movement,” 141.

65. Lagu, *Sudan Odyssey*, 104.


68. “In the 1930’s [sic] there occurred in Madi County a very serious outbreak of poisoning by Madi witches. The poison was made from snakes and rotten beans, and was given the Madi name *Inya-Nya*,” SAD (Collins) 919/6/106.

69. Lagu, *Sudan Odyssey*, 104.


73. Here, it referred to mutineers who had hid in the forest since 1955, but it is unlikely that they called themselves Anya-Nya in 1955.


75. *Voice of Southern Sudan* 1, no. 4, 2.


78. SAD (Collins) 919/6/117v-118; Alusjo Louis Ohoro Lovie confirms attacks on Nimule, Katire, Parajok, and in addition, he mentions Yei and “Obbuale” (possibly Obba). Interview, Torit, February 2, 2007.

79. SAD (Collins) 919/6/108v-109, from Oliver Albino, who allegedly participated in the attack himself.

80. See for example, Sudan African National Union, *Memorandum*.

81. SAD (Collins) 919/6/112-5v; Arou, “Regional Devolution,” 49–51; Interview with Stephen Ogut, Bor, April 25, 2007; Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 70–1, 80–2; Wakoson, “Anya-Nya Movement,” 141–5.

82. Interview with Stephen Ogut.

83. PRO/FO 371/173230, K.R.C. Prideham to FO, “The Sudan airforce claim to have made three successful air strikes in the Pachalla area in the last few days,” 9 November, 1963; SAD (Collins) 919/6/114; Interview with Stephen Ogut.


85. SAD (Collins) 919/6/128.

86. MCA/5B/2608, October 14, 1963.
The account below of the Bor attack is based on: SAD (Collins) 919/6/128–128v; Lagu, *Sudan Odyssey*, 114–5

PRO, FO 371/178813/26.


Group interview, Torit, February 27, 2006; Sudan African National Union, *Memorandum*, 9; Rolandsen, “*A False Start*.”


See Deng, *War of Visions*, 145.

PRO/FO 371/173230/76, 2.

SAD (Collins) SAD 919/6/119.


Interviews in Aweil and Twic East, February and April 2007.

PRO/FO 371/173230/76, 3–4 [Reproduced exactly from original].

Lagu, *Sudan Odyssey*, 116. This was also practised in Eastern Equatoria. Group Interview, Torit, February 27, 2006; Group interview, Birra village, Ikotos County, 12 February, 2007.

Thompson, *Civil War*; Richards, “*New War*.”

**References**


