Report on the current and potential impact of displaced people returning to southern Sudan

Jake Phelan and Graham Wood

An Uncertain Return
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January 2006

Ockenden International

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I am pleased to present Ockenden International’s first published paper for 2006. Focusing on the impact of return and reintegration in Western Equatoria, Jake Phelan, who undertook the original research, and Graham Wood have provided an interesting account of the difficulties inherent in population movements.

January 2006 marks 50 years of Sudanese independence. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in January 2005, ending decades of north-south civil war. This provides an opportunity for some four and a half million displaced Sudanese, potentially, to return ‘home’. Returning populations in Sudan, many of whom have been displaced for decades, may provide the key to sustaining peace. This paper examines a number of features relevant for all returns, while also pointing to the uniqueness of each return situation.

The paper leads to a number of conclusions:

- That the complexity of the situation requires an ability to think and analyse beyond the simple categories of ‘returnee’ and ‘stayee’
- That the local authorities and wider civil society need considerable assistance to develop an environment in which peace is sustained
- That the provision of formal and non-formal educational opportunities for all is vital for the future of Sudan and for sustainable reintegration
- That a huge investment is needed in infrastructure to make sustainable and peaceful return possible
- That potential exists for localised conflict which may have wider ramifications, especially in exacerbating existing social divisions
- That adequate protection must be ensured for all, and that all displaced people must be afforded the choice of if and when to return

We believe that this will be an important contribution to the wider debate about sustainable peace in Sudan as well as providing valuable information about Western Equatoria.

The whole of Sudan is at something of a crossroads. Significant insecurity in Darfur with some two million displaced; low grade insecurity in parts of the east. Add to this the largest single IDP burden in the world and the potential, both good and bad, is enormous.

James Beale

Chief Executive
Executive Summary

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) heralds the prospect of huge population movements amongst southern Sudan’s 4.5 million displaced people.

The return of refugees and IDPs to the south will not only increase the demands on the region’s stagnant infrastructure. It will also force a re-negotiation of social, economic and political values and identities. The meeting of people who have been separated by so many years could cause more sudden and widespread social upheaval than any that occurred during the war.

This study investigates the current and potential impact of returns to Western Equatoria, southern Sudan. It examines the effects of returns on physical resources and in particular on the opportunities for returnees’ and stayees’ livelihoods; how stayees perceive returnees; changes in community dynamics and the potential fault lines between those who stayed, those who fought and those who left. It focuses on Ockenden’s southern programme areas of Maridi, Ibba and Ezo counties.

The recent history of these counties is one dominated by movement. This further complicates definitions of ‘returnee’ and ‘stayee’. These terms are shown to be fluid, often arbitrary and of little theoretical significance, and yet potentially divisive for those categorised as such.

For all areas studied, this report highlights the difficulties and problems of accurate recording of returnee numbers. The several thousands who have returned to date are a small proportion of the possible total but have already had a significant impact in certain areas.

Maridi county, particularly Maridi town, has strong links with Uganda. These links and the safety of its inhabitants are currently being attacked by the Ugandan LRA. As the largest town in the research area, Maridi raises specific issues with regards the likelihood of increased ‘urbanisation’. The relative concentration of services is likely to be a strong pull factor for many returnees and ex-combatants, increasing pressures within the area. This includes the pressure on land, which otherwise is not seen as a significant problem.

Maridi county also hosts a significant number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The presence of Nilotic pastoralists, particularly the Bor Dinka, among the agriculturalist Bantu population has been a source of conflict. Cattle belonging to the Dinka cause severe damage to crops and water sources. It has been argued that ethnic divisions between the ‘Bantu’ and ‘Nilotic’ were one cause of the slide back to war in the 1970s. More recently, there has been serious conflict in neighbouring counties between the local population and Dinkas.

Ibba county was until recently part of Maridi, and shares many of the same issues. Several thousand rural to rural refugee returnees from the DRC have settled in Ibba in recent years. Many of these people were forced to return by insecurity in DRC. Arriving with very little, they compound the poverty of their hosts.

This is also the case in Ezo county, where returnees are commonly harassed by armed groups in Congo. There also some Congolese refugees in the county. The
borders between Sudan, DRC and CAR are porous, and in some cases seemingly unknown. Returnees have settled peacefully but have placed a huge strain on existing shared resources, and cannot be said to have ‘reintegrated’ and become self-sufficient.

The threats to security faced by returnees are a pressing concern. The large quantity of small arms available in the region is also a cause for apprehension. Official transportation of returnees would provide protection for some, but also raises other questions.

HIV/AIDS presents another threat to security. The current conditions suggest a strong possibility of an increase in the prevalence rate. There is also the danger of stigmatisation against returnees causing further instability.

Access to water is liable to become a focal point for community tensions. A growing queue at water sources is a particularly visible illustration of an increased population and demand for resources. The queue for water thus becomes a site of potential collision between different groups; frustrations exacerbating perceptions of difference.

Differences between the educational standards and livelihood opportunities of returnees and stayees are extremely significant. A large number of Sudanese refugees have had access to an education and other opportunities denied those who stayed in Sudan. Their return would be a huge boost to the development of southern Sudan, providing much needed teachers and officials for example, to aid the reconstruction process.

However, this in itself could raise tensions between returnees and stayees if returnees are felt to have a disproportionate benefit of the dividends of peace; a peace some stayees do not believe they have fought for.

Returning populations may also bring about the impetus for positive social changes. Yet such changes may be seen as foreign impositions and thus be ill-received. The return of displaced people will inevitably bring about profound changes that are likely to raise tensions amidst the confluence of changed identities and social values.

Equitable economic development and opportunities for a range of educational programmes would achieve a great deal in bridging what could otherwise be divisive differences between returnees and stayees.

However, there is also a danger of reifying categories of ‘returnee’ and ‘stayee’ that are in fact extremely diverse and complex. Nor are ideas of ‘return’ and ‘reintegration’ straightforward, especially if one is returning to a new place.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Service</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lords Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MCDP</td>
<td>Maridi Community Development Project</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontieres</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non Food Item</td>
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<td>NIDs</td>
<td>National Immunisation Days</td>
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<td>NSCSE</td>
<td>New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NSWA</td>
<td>New Sudan Women’s Association</td>
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<td>NSYA</td>
<td>New Sudan Youth Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHCC</td>
<td>Primary Health Care Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHCU</td>
<td>Primary Health Care Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBEP</td>
<td>Sudan Basic Education Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance</td>
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<td>VCT</td>
<td>Voluntary Counselling and Testing</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The January 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement ends years of devastating conflict in which the barren statistics have become too well known.

Some two million people killed, four and a half million displaced, with another two million displaced from Darfur. At war since independence in 1956, an all too brief respite in 1972 when over a million people returned from exile, only to be displaced once more when war commenced again in 1983. Africa’s largest country and longest running civil war, the world’s largest population of internally displaced and now, potentially, an unprecedented number of people returning home. Unprecedented in size, but with a worrying precedent in result:

“In some instances, such as in Sudan during the 1970s, repatriation and recongregation had caused serious local tensions, and eventually led to renewed warfare and further population displacements...Far from being a straightforward and optimal solution, it became clear that mass voluntary return could have adverse consequences and tended to compound other problems of post-war reconstruction.” (Allen and Turton, 1996: 2)

The challenges of peace are immense. Returning populations have a huge potential for reviving their country. If they do return, they will also place enormous strain on its minimal resources. As such, unless adequate attention is given to the reintegration of returnees they may destabilise a fragile and precious peace.

The return of refugees and IDPs to the south will not only increase the demands on the region’s stagnant infrastructure. It will also force a (re)negotiation of social, economic and political values and identities. The meeting of people who have been separated by so many years could cause more sudden and widespread social upheaval than any that occurred during the war.

The idea of a ‘New Sudan’ was the vision of the late John Garang. This new country was to be a unified, secular and equal Sudan. It has always been presumed that most people within the SPLA/M were fighting not for a unified Sudan but for southern independence. (Following the CPA, this decision is now due to be made in a referendum scheduled for 2011.) Despite the inconsistencies, the term New Sudan has become standard parlance in the south, and the ideological, though not the legal, place of return.

It seems an appropriate title for a region arising from the ashes of war. It is a title that suggests a great deal of hope for a new beginning. And yet to a large extent this beginning relies upon a return: the return of several million displaced people, many of whom will have been born in exile. Can such people be said to be able to ‘return home’, and what does this ‘home’ signify? Can the displaced return to a new place? Or can they help rebuild a place anew? And might the only novelty for those who stayed be the return of others from ‘outside’? All such issues, along with the name ‘New Sudan’, remain contentious.
This research was conducted by Ockenden International as part of a DfID funded programme to aid sustainable return and reintegration. Ockenden International has been working in Sudan since 1982 and in Western Equatoria since 2003. Its programmes aim to support the self-reliance of displaced people and their host communities.

1.2 Aim

The aim of the research was to investigate the sustainability of return and reintegration in Western Equatoria, the impact of returnees on the host population and the changing context of a post-conflict Sudan.

It is anticipated that following the signing of the CPA there will be significant population movements within and to southern Sudan. This study considers the effect of such movements on community dynamics and sustainable peace in Western Equatoria, and thus the ability of returnees to reintegrate socially and economically. As such, it explores the current and potential impact of returns on the livelihoods – specifically the prospects for employment and education – of returnees and the host community, how the host community perceive returnees and potential fault lines between different social groups. While education and livelihoods are key foci of Ockenden’s and the terms of reference for this study, there are several other factors that cannot be divorced from the overall context.

This paper, then, aims to analyse the changing context of a post-conflict scenario, with potentially massive population upheavals and consequent impacts on the social, economic and political dynamics of the country. As such, this research is part of the ongoing process of studying and learning from the situations in which Ockenden works so as to continually improve and adapt Ockenden’s response. It is hoped that this report may also contribute to wider debates as to return and reintegration, and raise awareness amongst practitioners in southern Sudan as to the nuances of ‘return’.

1.3 Scope and Limitations

Research was carried out in Western Equatoria, south Sudan from 25th August to 15th October 2005. This was followed by 10 days visiting Ockenden’s other Sudan programme areas of Khartoum, Red Sea and Kassala States.

The research geographically focused on Maridi, Ibba and Ezo counties within Western Equatoria. Ockenden International has been working in Maridi county since 2003 and is now expanding its programme into Ezo county. Until 2004, Ibba county was a payam in Maridi, and for the most part there is little that sets it apart from other payams in the area. (Payams are the separate administrative areas that comprise a county. Payams, in turn, are subdivided into bomas.) As such, that which is relevant for rural areas in Maridi county remains of significance in Ibba. There are, however, a few issues which are drawn out separately. It should be noted though, that in all UN assessments, Ibba continues to be included within Maridi county, complicating many statistics.

It is recognised that this does not provide a representative sample of Western Equatoria, but rather provides an in depth comparison between the counties, from which certain issues can be seen as of wider relevance. These areas were chosen
for study as providing related but distinct contexts for comparison in which large scale population movements are underway or anticipated; as being directly related to Ockenden’s programme areas in southern Sudan and so enabling both logistical support and the relevant bearing of policy on practice; and as locations to which some IDPs from Ockenden’s other programme areas in northern and eastern Sudan may return.

However, primary research was not carried out with IDPs in these regions, nor with Sudanese refugees in countries neighbouring Western Equatoria. Definitions of key terms and certain theoretical considerations are covered in section three.

Map 1: Sudan

![Map of Sudan](image-url)
1.4 Methods Used

Research was carried out using a variety of methods, particularly semi-structured interviews and group discussions (see appendix for lists of people and groups met), questionnaires and social mapping exercises adapted from PRA methods. Formal and informal discussions were held with government and administrative officials, local leaders, community based organisations, women’s and youth associations, traders, soldiers, ex-combatants, and NGO staff. Discussions and PRA exercises were held with a range of ‘host’ community members (stayees), IDPs, returnees and refugees.

Numerous written sources were studied for background information, an historical perspective and statistical information regarding returnees. Those cited in this report are listed in the bibliography.

1.5 Structure of the report

Following an historical and theoretical overview (sections 2 and 3), the report then introduces the particular contexts of Maridi, Ibba and Ezo payams (in sections 4, 5 and 6 respectively). These sections introduce the specific context of each county and certain issues pertaining to them. This is followed by an analysis of the key thematic issues relating to all geographical areas (section 7), focussing lastly on education, livelihoods and employment (section 8), and social differences and changes (section 9). Section 10 concludes this study.

2. Historical overview

The historical context of any situation should never be ignored. In Sudan, the danger of repetition is all the more reason to examine the past. This section highlights certain aspects particularly pertinent to Western Equatoria. A timeline of key national events giving a general historical overview can be found in the appendix.

The ‘conservative’ administration polices of colonial rule in southern Sudan saw little development in the region, nor economic or educational opportunities. Many of those living close enough to the border travelled into Uganda in search of such opportunities even before independence, and such movement increased as civil war took hold (Allen, 1996: 224-225). During the Anyanya One war (the first stage of the civil war, from 1955 to 1972), around one million people were displaced, over 200,000 as refugees. The Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1972 “led to one of the first and largest assisted mass voluntary return operations, and was a foundation of peace in Sudan for almost a decade.” (Salih, 1996: 164) Hindsight now often sees the 1972 peace agreement as flawed from the start, the years that followed it a hiatus. It collapsed in 1983.

Yet while it lasted, the political and religious sensitivities of the war were eased by painting it as a problem of underdevelopment in the south, with a corresponding need for rehabilitation and the return of the displaced (ibid: 164). Expectations for development were high, and it was recognised that the benefits of peace must be made quickly apparent in order to maintain it. Yet it has been suggested that the
renewal of fighting in 1983 “unfolded because of the way in which reintegration of the
displaced southern Sudanese occurred in the 1970s." (Akol, 1994: 94)

From the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in May 1972 to the end of that year,
20.3% of refugees repatriated. Others waited to see. Between January 1973 and
October 1973 a further 49.7% repatriated. 30% remained outside Sudan. Many
others would have returned independently and unregistered (ibid: 81).

As Tim Allen (1996) has written, there has been a long history of movement between
Uganda and Sudan. Very often it has not been voluntary, but rather the result of
political upheavals in one country or the other. The return of Sudanese refugees in
1972 was 'helped' by increasing insecurity in Uganda following Idi Amin’s take over
the year before. Many Sudanese who had stayed in Uganda long after 1972 were
finally forced back in 1979 when Tanzanian and Ugandan National Liberation Army
forces invaded. Many of these returnees, unlike earlier ones, were relatively well
educated and became politically influential in southern Sudan. “They tended to
become antagonistic to less educated southern Sudanese who had established
themselves in important posts in what had become Sudan’s autonomous Southern
Region." (ibid: 225) The administration of the Southern Region became a divisive
issue.

“Various factions opened up in southern Sudanese politics, which increasingly
became polarised between, on the one hand, the ‘Nilotics’ (including many of
the prominent Dinka, the largest ethnic group in southern Sudan), and on the
other hand the ‘Equatorians’, who sought to escape ‘Dinka domination’ and
make better use of its supposedly more ‘progressive’ population. These
antagonisms played a significant part in the drift back to full-scale war in
Sudan.” (ibid: 226)

The political situation now is of course substantially different, though returning
populations may still have significant consequences on the balance of power and
political structures. As will the likely increase in development aid. Mohamed Salih
(1996: 170) has argued that the achievements of the early ’70s are likely to be
forgotten unless the international community and INGOs work seriously to empower
local organisations, institutions and authority.

Remembering the past is of course equally important on an individual basis, shaping
our perceptions of present and future. One man in Ezo, discussing why he did not
leave alongside many others in 1992, pointed to his experience of being a refugee in
CAR during the Anyanya One war. “I decided it was better to remain and die on my
own land.” And an aid worker, Dan Langoya, discussed the broader recollections of
the past:

“Following the Addis Ababa agreement, there was a big influx of southern
Sudanese into the country. Unfortunately, ten years down the road, people
ran back. And I think the lesson they have is, they don’t want to be bitten
twice; they say once bitten, twice shy….People do not want to come [from the
refugee camps in Uganda] until they are very sure there is peace.”

The experiences people have had in exile often have a profound impact on their
future decisions to return or not, and their ability to re integrate. Key variables include:
the length of time spent displaced; the settlement of displaced people (i.e. in camps
or within other communities); the degree of integration in exile; relative level of socio-
economic development achieved while displaced; the pressure of authorities;
physical disruption in the area of origin; the reports of early returnees or other sources; and the extent of political change during the period of displacement.

Another important factor for any analysis of return is the original cause of displacement. The end of conflict is not always a prerequisite for people to return home, but the removal or end of the original causes of displacement are a crucial element in the future viability of return. In southern Sudan, war has been the primary cause of displacement. People were caught with or between opposing forces as front lines changed or conflict intensified or died down. Other causes ranged from draught, floods, cattle rustling, abductions, rape, or the denial of access to humanitarian assistance. The reasons why some people stayed are equally variable but also of importance when it comes to the return and reintegration of the displaced.

This study could not determine whether particular socio-economic groups were more or less likely to be displaced than others, the decision to stay or move often depending on individual circumstances that cannot be generalised. The counties that are the focus of this study were all under the control of the GoS until the early ’90s. The approach of SPLA forces forced many to flee. Fighting for garrison towns such as Maridi was particularly destructive and also led to the separation of many families. After the SPLA took over the region they remained in control, enabling relative stability. Yet looting, the fear of conscription or abduction by the SPLA, and aerial bombardment by the GoS displaced others. Some people may not have been ‘forcibly’ displaced, but moved to join family or to access resources elsewhere. Others moved from one place to another within the same region according to how ‘hot’ it was.

The relationships between people who may meet after many years apart depend to a large extent on previous experiences. Political affiliation or ethnicity may shape the encounter. Those who fought, who were forced to carry supplies for soldiers, or who suffered under the Antanov’s bombing while others were seen to ‘run away’, are likely to be less welcoming of them on their return. Those who were raped, had relatives killed or property looted before fleeing may be equally wary of encounters with a disrupted past.

3. Theoretical overview

One of the principle points to note from the history of southern Sudan with regards to the present study is that “an estimated 80 percent of southern Sudan’s 5 million people have been displaced at least once during the past 15 years of war.” (USCR, 1999, quoted in Global IDP Database, 24 March 2005: 88). To some extent, nearly everyone is a ‘returnee’.

Such a view is not generally held by southern Sudanese themselves. There is always the danger of imposing overly ‘simplistic categories on complex social situations” (Allen and Morsink, 1994: 7), but the term ‘returnee’ has gained local currency. Yet how to define such a term, who are returnees and how long one remains one having returned – somewhere, are not easy points to pin down. Furthermore, the label ‘returnee’ has the worrying potential to isolate people and exacerbate divisions between those who went into exile and those who did not.
While recognising the danger of falsely imposing such definitions on seemingly homogenous groups of people, for the sake of clarity in the following document, the following terms are used.

Definitions of **refugees** and **IDPs** are widely accepted within legal frameworks (though the difference between these two groups and migrants is not always clear cut, nor is the point in time when an IDP no longer counts as an IDP). However, there are other groups of displaced people that also need to be recognised. The joint HAC/SRRC return policy framework includes the category of “Other displaced: Persons who, as a consequence of the conflict, were induced to leave their normal places of residence for protracted periods and whose current circumstances may make their return and reintegration problematic. These include demobilized combatants from demobilized militia, child soldiers and abductees.” (HAC/SRRC, 2004: 1) In Sudan, these groups of people are of particular importance with regards to returns. The *displaced* is used here to refer to all such groups of displaced persons. Repatriation is taken to be the official, assisted return of refugees and IDPs. Return, and returnees, is used to refer to the movement of the displaced back to their region of origin, voluntarily or otherwise (and, broadly speaking, within the previous two years). The term returnee is not used in reference to ex-combatants, the specific issues around whom are discussed separately. (It is worth noting that returning combatants may wish to distance themselves from other returnees who have fled and not fought, and may thus be seen as ‘less deserving’.) Hosts and stayees are those people who have not been displaced but have stayed in their region of origin. (Can one ‘host’ someone who has returned to their ‘homeland’? And can someone count as a ‘stayee’ if they have been displaced but returned, as the majority of ‘stayees’ have?) Other key terms are used as defined by HAC/SRRC: “Resettlement: The voluntary process of starting a new life in another place in Sudan other than that of the original place or region of origin. This shall include displaced originating from rural areas who choose to resettle in urban areas. Reintegration: Describes the re-entry of formerly displaced persons or refugees back into the social, economic, cultural and political fabric of their original community.” (ibid: 1)

The problem of definitions of return are further complicated when borders have no bearing on cultural and economic relations and when returns are not one-off events but part of a history of crossings. The Sudan/Uganda border, for instance, has been in state of ‘crisis’ for the past 40 years.

“To focus, in such a case, on a single movement of people, in one direction and at a particular point in time, would be to give a false, if comforting, impression that one is dealing with a simple and well circumscribed event rather than with an untidy process, involving multiple, and sometimes overlapping migrations in both directions, and considerable flexibility with respect to nationality and ethnicity.” (Allen and Turton, 1996: 7)

And to focus on a single movement of people, without regards to other factors, would give a severely limited perspective on the meaning and measurement of sustainable return and reintegration. Sustainable return might be defined, narrowly, as whether or not individuals re-emigrate. Or, on a wider basis, of whether or not individuals reintegrate and the impact of their return on the community (Black and Gent, 2004). For the present study the latter is more important.

However, both positions tend to assume, or imply, that return is a permanent end to movement, with no further transnational links. Yet such social and economic links may be an important component of livelihood strategies. “Such life strategies imply that return and non-return may not be mutually exclusive options” (Lubkemann,
Exile and return may make further migration possible, and desirable. The issue of cyclical returns is likely to be a significant one for Sudan. Reports in northern Sudan suggest that some southerners who returned have then ‘returned’ again back to the north, dissatisfied with conditions and opportunities in their ‘home’ areas.

For how long does someone need to have returned before they are ‘reintegrated’, or for them to be called migrants when they next move? Reintegration should be measured over generations, not years; “socio-economic ramifications of repatriation cannot be assessed adequately from a short-term perspective. Establishing farms, forming communities, creating local markets, integration into national politics, and rebuilding infrastructures take time.” (Allen and Morsink, 1994: 2) But successful reintegration should not be commensurate with stasis.

Reintegration implies, as a word and as a concept, the return to things past, the integration of unchanged entities. Similarly, “a returnee is seen as the reverse condition of a refugee. While refugees are perceived as uprooted and displaced, returnees are considered to be naturally ‘re-rooted’ and placed back in the right order of things as soon as they are back home.” (Ghanem, 2003: 15) It is increasingly recognised though, that returning ‘home’, in this case returning to a ‘New Sudan’, is often a new beginning; a meeting of changed peoples and place. For some people, their ‘reintegration’ will be into communities – indeed a society and culture – that they have never known. This includes ex-combatants; bought up in the army and now to be reintegrated into ‘the community’. Whether or not stayees will also perceive these changes as a new beginning is not so clear.

The return of the displaced is a powerful symbol of the end of a conflict. Yet one cannot assume that the end of a conflict will lead to voluntary returns. And what constitutes a voluntary return is not always easy to pin down. For some young people, return from Uganda was prompted by the unwelcome end of their ability to continue financing their education. Their return was not forced, but in so far as it was voluntary, it was unwillingly so. On a wider level, the effects of political manipulations of return must also be considered. Numerous actors – be it the GoS, SPLM, UN, foreign donors, INGOs or neighbouring governments that host Sudanese refugees – may be seen to have certain political or economic interests dependent on the movement of the displaced.

The many questions regarding the peaceful and sustainable return of the displaced in Sudan depend in part on the nature of that return; the numbers and the time-scale. Before the CPA was signed, both the GoS and SPLM were assuming a massive return to rural areas of origin following any peace deal. The Inter-agency mission of November 2002, however, suggested instead that returns would be partial and staggered, with many opting to return to urban areas (UN, 2002). The large scale quantitative surveys carried out to establish IDP intentions confirm that the majority of southerners in the north wish to return home. The IOM 2005 survey revealed that of the 80 percent of southern Sudanese who said they wish to return home, 78 percent said they would return to their place of origin. Of those who said they would return southwards, 38 percent said they would do so during 2005, 41 percent after 2005 (IOM 2005 Volume 1). Of those who originate from Western Equatoria and are now in the north, 82 percent plan to return to their place of origin; 2 percent will return but to a different place; 11 percent are not yet decided; and 5 percent will not return. (IOM 2005 Volume 2: 67). 35.6 percent of all West Equatorians returning will do so within six months. A further 8.7 percent will return within one year, 33.2 percent after one year (ibid: 68). The data behind these figures, extrapolated from a small sample size of people originating from Western Equatoria, are not statistically significant. However, they do confirm the anticipated trend.
This trend also seems to be corroborated by follow up OCHA-IMU reports. From January to July 2005, 260,454 returnees were predicted to the south (not including the transitional areas). The number recorded during this time (the source of which is unavailable) was 240,702 returnees (OCHA-IMU, 19 Sep 2005: 2). This document, in making future predictions, does recognise some disparity between what IDPs said they would do and a scenario in which, for various reasons, many do not.

Projections of return numbers drawn up for planning purposes are a useful guide, but are arguably flawed, and one must question the scale and timing of anticipated returns. For instance, the two main factors respondents who have decided to return said might prevent them from doing so were having no money and no transport (75% and 46% respectively. IOM Vol. 1, 2005: 25). Neither of these two factors is likely to be quickly overcome.

These surveys are of less relevance for Western Equatoria than elsewhere. In Western Equatoria a large proportion of returnees (probably a majority) will be from CAR, DRC, Uganda and to a lesser extent Kenya, and not IDPs in the north. And there are other factors, such as the security situation and level of assistance for repatriation, which will have significant effects on the scale of return along this southern border.

As of 2003, there were 198,281 Sudanese refugees in Uganda, 45,060 in DRC (UNHCR, 2003a) and a further 36,479 in CAR (UNHCR, 2003b).

Another indicator as to current patterns of return may be the pattern of return following Sudan’s last peace agreement in 1972, discussed in the previous section. The initial rate of return was quite high, but spread over nearly two years. Following which, a large proportion of refugees remained in Uganda for many years until forced back. Their return, though delayed, had a significant impact.

4. Maridi County

“The five tribes of Maridi, a hospitable tribe. Maridi has love for very many people” Gladdet Kennet; Project Officer, MCDP

4.1 Background

Maridi county, in the greenbelt region of Western Equatoria, has a population of approximately 161,722 (based on NIDs 2004 information for Maridi county, 198,803, minus the population of Ibba payam (now county), 37,081). (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005) The population of Maridi is comprised of five ethnic groups: Zande, Baka, Mundu, Morukodo and Avukaya.

Maridi has been under the control of the SPLA/M since 1991. The fighting between the SPLA and GoS leading up to this time forced many people from their homes. Since when, further damage and displacement was caused by the aerial bombardment of the GoS. Forced conscription into the SPLA was another subsequent cause of displacement here as elsewhere.

The county’s southern border adjoins north east DRC. This border is the scene of significant refugee flows. However, the county’s transport links are such that Maridi
town is strongly tied economically and socially with Uganda via the road to Yei. Its geographical location enabled an economic development during the ’70s uncommon to other areas of Western Equatoria (Akol, 1994: 92-3).

Map 2: Maridi County

However, this link is threatened by the increased presence of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) around the Sudan/DRC/Uganda borders. The LRA were reported to be within 7 miles of Maridi on 23rd November. As this report was being finalised, the LRA had carried out attacks on Maridi and abducted several people. Insecurity caused by
the LRA will affect humanitarian access, trade and the movement of refugees and returnees. Some people in Maridi believe the LRA are currently supported by the GoS. There is no evidence to suggest this is the case, but such claims, irrespective of their validity, could be dangerous in undermining trust in the peace process. Sudanese refugees in Congo have been forced to return by the activities of armed militias. The LRA are also causing further internal displacement within southern Sudan.

There are some areas in the county which are suspected of containing landmines. However, these are not thought to present a serious risk. Maridi is a garrison town in which small arms are abundant. There are plans for the construction of a regional headquarters for 250 UN peacekeeping troops.

Maridi has traditionally been seen as a food surplus producing county. During much of the 1990s, humanitarian agencies involvement in food marketing and distribution enabled a reliable trade. In 2000 it was estimated that 90% of the population produced a food surplus. The remaining 10% were able to supplement their intake through wild foods, labour and petty trade. (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005: 8) However, since 2000 surpluses have decreased with the withdrawal of NGOs and the lack of available markets. The Maridi Farmers Association has since struggled, but farmers say they would be able to produce a surplus if assured of marketing opportunities. (ibid: 10)

Maridi county’s road and market links with Uganda and northern counties gives it economic potential as suggested by its recent past. Other local enterprises such as timber extraction and the export of processed honey through Equatoria Foods Maridi add to this potential.

Maridi town is the largest urban centre examined in this report. Its large number of INGOs has a significant impact on the local economy. (To talk of towns or urban centres is perhaps misleading given the size and infrastructure of such places. But in this context the designation is relative.)

Information from 2003 suggests that in Western Equatoria, “about 76.2% of households drink unsafe water during the dry season and 68.1% drink unsafe water during the cultivation period” (ibid: 23). In June 2005 there were reportedly 188 water points, 138 of which were functional. 22 of these (including 14 functional ones) were in Ibba payam – now county. If the total population were evenly distributed around functioning water points it would mean 1,441 per water point. The SPHERE Standard recommends 1:500. Sanitation facilities in the county are reported to be relatively good. (ibid: 23-4)

Maridi county has one general hospital (with two medical doctors), one PHCC in each payam (including Ibba) and 25 PHCU. In practice, without transport to cover the large distances between them, most people simply attend the closest facility. Shortages of basic equipment, medicines and trained staff are the norm.

Western Equatoria is considered to have the most developed education infrastructure within southern Sudan. And Maridi is one of the better off in the region. It has three secondary schools, one of which is privately run, and 43 primary schools (County Education Department figures, September 2005). The majority of primary schools are constructed of plant materials. These primary schools cater to 8827 pupils (5089 male; 3649 female) with 431 teachers (354 male; 78 female), the majority of whom have no education above primary school themselves. Teachers work on a voluntary
basis. The enrolment rate for girls (and to lesser extent boys) decreases significantly as they progress through the system.

There are several inconsistencies between the figures used here for the number of water sources, schools and pupils and those cited in other documents (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005 and UN/SRRC July 2005). All figures are treated with caution and intended as a rough guide only.

4.2 Returnees

Given the difficulties of collecting accurate statistical information it is not surprising that the figures given for the number of returnees is open to dispute. The UN Inter-agency assessment team and the SRRC could not agree on a figure for the number of returnees to Maridi. The SRRC figure of 23,779 returns from January 2005 to April 2005 (23,904 by September 2005) was deemed too high “as the people interviewed either came earlier or are not actually returnees with few who came between January and April” (UN/SRRC, July 2005: 2-3). Clearly the definitions of a returnee, and how long one remains a returnee, are complicating factors.

In an earlier document, OCHA predicted that 25,595 people would return to Maridi in 2005 (a population increase of 16%) (OCHA-IMU, Dec 2004). A large proportion of these returns would be expected during the latter part of the year in the dry season.

According to OCHA’s predictions, then, the SRRC figures given do appear overly high. Yet OCHA’s figures are based on information collected amongst IDPs in the north, not refugees in the south who will most likely constitute the majority of Maridi’s returnees. With all such data, one must also expect inaccuracies due to people avoiding registering with the authorities or registering more than once in the hope of added assistance. No set of figures can be trusted to give any more than a broad indication.

Most returnees in rural areas of Maridi are currently from DRC. Some have reportedly returned as early as 2000. Most of these people are probably rural to rural returnees, not from camps in Congo but areas nearer the border. Attention will be focused on such groups in the next section of this report with regards to Ibba county.

Of the areas studied in this report, Maridi town is the largest, arguably only, urban centre. It would be strange if so many years of conflict and upheaval in Sudan were not then followed by radical social changes. One facet of this is likely to be a relative growth in urban centres. “IDPs that have been in urban areas for extended periods…will be less likely to return to rural areas unless basic services are in place. If they return, it will likely be to urban destinations where services and opportunities similar to those they have become accustomed to will be perceived to exist.” (UN, Dec 2002: 13)

The relative concentration of services such as health, education and employment prospects in Maridi town will be a strong pull factor for many, including many who had ‘originally’ lived in rural areas. All southern towns are likely destinations for youths in Khartoum and Juba, refugee camps in Uganda and demobilised combatants. In such instances, access to land and property in and around towns is likely to become a more pressing issue. A larger non-food sustainable population may increase trade and prompt the production of a greater food surplus, but may also lead to greater food insecurity for the more marginalised. And the services and
opportunities which draw many people to urban areas will not be able to withstand any increase in the demands of them for some time. Without sufficient attention to urban livelihoods, an increased concentration of vulnerable persons, and heightened competition and tension over scarce resources seem assured. Such tensions are likely to develop along the faultiness of ‘those who fought, those who fled and those who stayed’: “unless concerted efforts are made by the authorities to rehabilitate essential services, the additional pressure placed upon them by returnees, and the resultant reduced access or further decline in quality, risks engendering friction between returnees and residents.” (ibid: 16)

4.3 IDPs

“There is a need to work first on the internally displaced people, to get them back to their places before we bring back those who are outside in exile”

Fugoyo Chris; Deputy Headteacher, Maridi High Secondary School

The issues surrounding the presence of IDPs in Western Equatoria are relevant to Maridi, Ibba and to a lesser extent Ezo. However, the situation in Maridi is particularly acute and will be dealt with in detail here.

During 2004, 5,181 IDPs were reported in Maridi county. They originate from Bor, Mundri and the Nuba Mountains. (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005: 3)

Approximately 500 IDPs from the Nuba Mountains (ibid: 3) have been settled at Affa since 1999. With the signing of the CPA, the majority of them are willing to go back. However, they remain unclear as to how the CPA will affect them, and say they are waiting for an official message from the GoSS as to what they should do. Furthermore, they are unwilling, or unable, to return without transport. The uncertainty as to the risks involved in returning adds to their dilemma. And so for the present, the group continues to look to their many problems and needs where they are settled. These problems may be further complicated if returnees settle in the vicinity, but the group trust that their leaders could resolve any problems arising: ‘We are all Sudanese, all indigenous’, and so there need be no conflict with returnees.

The dilemmas and contradictions of their position were illustrated by the words of one elderly man: “we have passed through many difficulties”, he said, “we have suffered, been away so long, and now everybody needs to go back. If other people return here from exile there will be no problems. But if we are not treated the same as returnees” – if they are not given the assistance that it is expected returnees will receive – “then we will want to go back to the Nuba Mountains.”

The sentiment of this may be interpreted as suggesting that the availability of resources and services is seen as more important then an uncertain return ‘home’.

The following edited transcript of a discussion that took place in Maridi illustrates some of the various perspectives of locals’ with regards to IDPs:

A: Maridi people are good people, they have a very good relationship with IDPs in Maridi…we have enough land.

B: To add a negative aspect; some of those IDPs they are cattle keepers, and the indigenous are mostly agriculturalists. So, there is bit of conflict sometimes when the animals happen to enter into their fields and eat their crops. So this one is actually being resolved by the community themselves.
And if sometimes it goes to a higher level, the government can also intervene, and it is settled. But sometimes…this is a point of confrontation.
C:…it happens sometimes that people are even killed. That one happened as a result of IDPs…
D: Another point to add, there is a problem of culture, for some people of different cultures…there are some who are fond of fighting…Some other people fond of robbing things…
E: [this] is right, especially with this Nuba tribe, it was a problem some years ago. Was like, they are used to that rough life at home where they come from…
D: This case it is very hard unless the government is involved in this. Because in their places there, it is very dry…now to go back, they will not go. I don’t know how this will work.
E: It is going to work, but not peacefully I think.
A:…In New Sudan policies, I think everybody has the right to live wherever he wants. But [if people want to develop their place and have opportunities for jobs and political involvement, they must do so in their own county] So of course, the government will intervene and go and take them back to their places…we need to have access to the land.

While in the conversation above the Nuba are mentioned as being violent, those settled at Affa are relatively well received by the local community. For the agriculturalists of Maridi, it is the cattle keeping IDPs, predominantly Bor Dinka but also Amburoro, who present a major challenge. It is widely believed and desired that the government (GoSS) will ensure the IDPs return north. The discussants above felt it was incumbent on the government to provide water and other services in the IDPs’ area of origin so that they would return. They recognised that the ecological and economic imbalance between Western Equatoria and northern regions made this return unlikely.

In all but one of the locations where research was conducted outside Maridi town, participants mentioned IDPs as a considerable problem. The most commonly raised problems included: the contamination of water sources by cattle and cattle seriously depleting water sources; the destruction of crops, without compensation; destruction of wild bee hives and hunting of wild animals by IDPs; IDPs preventing people from hunting and harvesting wild foods. It was widely felt that the local authorities did not listen to complaints against the IDPs. Several people accused IDPs of killing local residents in the bush. In one location, the Amburoro were accused of witchcraft against local residents. Some people kill cattle in revenge for the damage caused to their crops, perpetuating hostility.

In Maridi, the Dinka are seen by many as having a strong influence in the local authority and army. As such, many people believe that they are not treated equally in their conflicts with IDPs. One participant said of the Dinka IDPs; “they say they will not easily go for they shed their blood in the war. And host communities are saying: ‘it was not only the IDPs who fought in the war, they must leave’”. The connections between the Dinka, the armed forces and government adds to the complexity and sensitivity of the situation. It may also be seen to complicate the definitions of IDPs.

Within Western Equatoria, land is not usually in short supply. However, in certain situations it becomes more of a concern. Most households within Maridi town for instance, own land nearby. The concentration of people obviously results in a higher demand for land, and thus a possibility of conflict that might otherwise be unusual. Such potential conflicts are likely to be aggravated, or made harder to resolve, by the presence of influential IDPs on previously abandoned land. This study did not directly
investigate conflicts over property, and did not identify it as a pressing concern during the course of the research. However: “In Maridi County the county authorities reported a significant number of conflicts regarding ownership of property.” (UN/SRRC, July 2005: 11)

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and GoNU policy ensure any displaced person the right to freedom of movement or settlement. How the apparent wishes of the host community will be reconciled with the rights of the Bor Dinkas will be a severe test of the local authorities. It appears to be the desired strategy of the SRRC and other agencies that the Bor Dinka and their cattle should be ‘voluntarily’ repatriated. Lack of institutional and physical capacity would seem to make this prospect unlikely in the foreseeable future.

“The desired strategy of a phased return of IDPs and refugees in Equatoria seems to be difficult under the present conditions. Influential IDPs, including military and economic displaced Dinka occupy temporary abandoned land and property from refugees and are not likely to vacate these before or upon the return IDP [sic]. It may be a more pragmatic and probably more cost-effective altogether to consider the allocation of new plots to returning refugees, instead of embarking on a cumbersome restitution process, of course with the consent of the legal rights holders.” (UNHCR, 1 August 2004, quoted in Global IDP Database, 24 March 2005: 181).

According to the Inter-agency rapid needs assessment report of July, the authorities in Maridi and Mundri counties “sounded hopeless about the possibility of cattle moving back to Bor” (UN/SRRC, July 2005: 2) and identifies this as a potential risk to food security in the region. The regular, large-scale cattle movements damage crops along their route, leading to conflict as residents attempt to prevent it. Because of this, some people are limiting the area of land they cultivate to that which they can more easily defend. These two factors together are threatening food security.

IDPs, or the ethnic divisions they represent, seem to have been involved in more severe conflict already in nearby Yambio county (IRIN, 16 Nov 2005). Fighting broke out between Zande and Bor Dinka resulting in several deaths. This apparently followed rising tensions due to the Dinkas’ decision to stay. Some reports allege that Dinkas within the SPLA were involved in the conflict, firing on Zande civilians. Tensions have also grown in Tambura county to the north of Ezo. There has also been serious conflict in Mundri county to the east of Maridi. More than 60 people have been killed in recent months due to fighting between the Moru and Bor Dinka over resources (OCHA/SRRC, Nov 2005). These conflicts have severely impacted UN and INGO operations in the area. As this study was being finalised, there were reports that many Dinka were moving out of the region to Bor (see Murphy, 2005 for further background information).

In many respects, IDPs in Maridi have taken on the role once ascribed to refugees by the international community: as matter out of place and thus ‘polluting’ in anthropological terms, in need of being put back in their rightful place. In Malkki’s (1997) critique of such a view, refugees were premised as a ‘problem’, an anomaly in an otherwise sedentary existence. For many ‘indigenous’ people in Maridi, this holds true. The international community, local authority and local people have all seemed keen for the Bor Dinka to ‘return away’ from Western Equatoria. Yet any encouragement of such movement may be said to run contrary to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
5. Ibba County

5.1 Background

Ibba county was, until 2004, part of Maridi county (see map 2 above). This change was bought about as part of the SPLM’s policy of increasing the number of administrative centres. In general, that which can be said about areas in Maridi outside the town hold true for Ibba. This includes the presence of cattle keeping IDPs in some areas. The administrative split has, however, added a degree of uncertainty to the available figures.

Ibba has a population of 37,081 according to the WHO NIDs 2004 survey (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005). SRRC figures of September 2005 have it as 68,663.

Ibba ‘town’ lies approximately 50 kms west of Maridi town on the road to Yambio. However, most trade between these two larger towns passes Ibba’s small market by. The county borders DRC to the south.

There are 22 boreholes in the county, 14 of which are functional. This means an average of 2,649 people to each working borehole (based on WHO NIDs data). The PHCC in Ibba town was supplemented by an MSF France hospital for sleeping sickness but this has now closed. There is no medical doctor in the county. The county has 17 primary schools for 2,168 male students and 968 female students. There are no secondary schools, and no data as to the number of teachers. (UN/SRRC July 2005)

There are no reported landmines in Ibba, but evidence of a small number of un-exploded ordnance.

5.2 Returnees

Between January and June 2005, 2,752 IDP returnees were recorded in Ibba (UN/SRRC, July 2005). This study was not able to establish where these people were from or if they comprised a separate group to other returnees. Between August and October 2004, 5,768 refugee returnees entered Ibba from DRC. These people may be considered forced returnees, as they were fleeing insecurities within DRC. For several decades past, people have been moving around southern Sudan, DRC and Uganda in search of safer ground. These movements are not likely to cease just because of the CPA.

These people settled in five ‘camps’ of Bamani, Iggi, Nabanga, Gangbara and Wowo. In 2004, 101 MT of food was delivered to them by the WFP.

Research was conducted for this study at Nabanga, the largest village in the vicinity of the ‘camps’, where as of June 2005, 2,926 refugee (and, according to UN/SRRC, IDP) returnees have settled over the last two years. It seems that these camps were partly labelled as such to attract food aid. The majority of those who have settled here originate from the area. The camps were temporary settlements for those unable to stay with the host community, used while the returnees built their own tukels (traditional mud-brick, thatched houses) and cleared new plots of land.
Nabanga has a school, but no teachers, a health centre, but no drugs. Vehicle access is limited by weather conditions.

People originally left the area in the early 1990s. Those who have returned so far did not settle in UN supported refugee camps in DRC but remained closer to the border. As such, they never received outside assistance. Returnees report mistreatment, looting and killing by Congolese forces. It was this as much as news of the peace that prompted them to return, indeed many returned well before the signing of the CPA. The insecurity in Congo added to the difficulties of transporting belongings on foot through the bush, and means that on arrival in Ibba, most returnees have little to aid their reintegration.

It might be presumed that refugees in camps in DRC will be in a more secure position and may wait for assistance in returning or the end of assistance where they are. However, “some returnees reported raids in refugee settlements in DRC, which took place after the CPA was signed. DRC soldiersstormed refugee settlements and chased refugees towards the border to Sudan.” (UN/SRRC July 2005: 10) There is also the possibility that rumours or the presence of the LRA in Congo, particularly Garamba National Park, will increase the pressure on Sudanese refugees to return.

6. Ezo County

6.1 Background

“One cannot hate his home, however poor it may be.” Returnee; Ezo

Ezo, like Maridi and Ibba, lies in the fertile greenbelt of southern Sudan. It borders Yambio county to the east, Tambura county (from which it was separated in 2000) to the north west, DRC to the south and CAR to the south west. Population estimates range from 70,976 (NSCE 2004) to 86,156 (WHO NIDs 2004). The majority of the population are Zande, an ethnic group that crosses the tripartite colonial frontiers. There are also Avukaya, Baka and Mundu.

Ezo was taken over by the SPLA in 1992 from the GoS. Since then, it has remained relatively peaceful. There is no legacy of mines or UXO reported in the county, and has only a small number of soldiers in the area.

The county is linked by road to Yambio and Tambura. However, both these roads are in poor condition, and at times impassable. The state of the roads severely limits trade with neighbouring counties, the transport of basic goods from Uganda and food surplus to Bahr el Ghazar relying more on cyclists than vehicles. The county does however benefit from its trade with DRC and CAR at the weekly cross-border market – also one of the entry points for returnees and refugees into Sudan.

Agriculture is the dominant activity and contributor to the local economy, “and meets about 80% of the annual household food requirements except in the case of IDPs, new returnees and refugees. In general, all socio-economic groups of Ezo are self-sufficient in food production.” (OCHA-IMU, June 2005: 7) Wild foods contribute to the household food basket throughout the year, and a few people own goats or sheep. There are a relatively small number of pastoralists in the county.
CARE International’s withdrawal from Ezo in 2000 adversely affected the production of a food surplus as they had previously supported farmers’ marketing opportunities. There were subsequently no INGOs in Ezo until the recent involvement of MSF Spain in sleeping sickness prevention and WVI. Ockenden International is expanding its programme into the county during the second half of 2005.
Of 74 water points, 37 are currently operational – thus an average of 1,918 people to one water point. (OCHA-IMU, June 2005: 16) Alternative water sources such as streams and ponds are often used instead but may dry out during part of the year. There is a relatively high incidence rate of water borne diseases in the county.

Ezo has 6 PHCCs and 19 PHCUs; all lack drugs, basic equipment and trained personnel. There is no hospital, doctor or equipment for basic surgery such as hernias in the county, and two microscopes. Lack of equipment and trained teachers is equally a problem in Ezo’s 43 primary schools and one secondary school. 19,890 pupils attend school: 11,490 boys and 8,400 girls, taught by 269 teachers (36 of whom are female) (Hewison, 2005). In comparison to other areas in Western Equatoria, Ezo’s education standards are poor.

6.2 Returnees

"War forced us to Congo; war forced us back to Sudan. But we had wanted to return if we could." Returnee; Ezo county.

UN OCHA has predicted that 15,624 people will return to Ezo during 2005. Based on an earlier population estimate of 65,237 this would equate to a 24% increase in the county’s population. There are currently an estimated 2,471 IDPs in Ezo (NSCSE/UNICEF 2004, in OCHA-IMU, June 2005: 1)

Up to date and accurate information as to the numbers of returnees is scarce. It is complicated by poor – possibly non-existent – registration of returnees at entry points; porous borders; and both a lack of clear definitions of returnees and IDPs, and a tendency of international agencies and assessments to enforce categories on people and solidify events in writing that ignore divergent viewpoints and recollections, yet outlive peoples’ experiences as ‘the truth’. The data available, compiled from tukel counts, focuses on what are seen as distinct ‘camps’; Baikpa, Bariguna, Anderi and Naandi. These have a total population of 3454 returnees plus 1246 refugees. Each of these will be dealt with below. Returnees who have no doubt reintegrated in other locations are harder to see.

In Naandi, there are approximately 200 households – an estimated 1,200 individuals – returned from Congo from November 2004. Most are originally from the payam. Having first been hosted by others, they are now integrating into the area. More Sudanese refugees are reported to be currently returning to the area. They left Naandi in 1990 and tended to stay together as a group while in DRC, supported by UNHCR with food and NFI, primary school education in French and limited life skills training. According to participants, their time in exile, united as refugees, developed a strong community and co-operative spirit that remains on return.

Although many people profess that their Zande identity is more important than their Sudanese, on crossing the border it appears that nationality becomes the stronger. This may be explained in part on the imposition of national identity with regards to definitions of refugees and thus qualification for assistance. As such, the international community and UNHCR might be seen as reifying a particular identity for people beyond the category of ‘refugee’. Zande themselves on both sides of the border also play a part in this process, identity being both internally and externally created. The affirmation of Sudanese identity may in part be a means to separate a group from its hosts, affirming their temporary ‘displaced’ status. It may alternatively be a means to
maintain a group or self identity in opposition to an ‘other’ in a changed environment. Or, refugees’ ‘Sudaneseness’ may have been ascribed by their Zande hosts. One man we spoke to at Naandi accused the Congolese of practising witchcraft against Sudanese refugees and killing them. Such things did not happen in Sudan he said, “but in Congo we were not always accepted and so were easier to kill.”

According to the Inter-agency assessment, returnees to Naandi and Anderi “decided to settle in camps in order to attract humanitarian assistance” (UN/SRRC Feb 2005: 2). It has also been suggested that it was SPLM policy to keep returnees together. The 100 households who returned to Anderi during 2004 at first settled in a camp, where they report last being given food aid by WFP in July 2005. Following the advice of a UN assessment team they dispersed to the nearby village of Anderi. However, the local authorities were not informed of this proposal, highlighting a lack of co-ordination.

The Inter-agency assessment reported that “the returnees in Andari and Naandi camps who arrived between Nov 2004 and Jan 2005 were found to be in an appalling food situation.” (ibid: 9). Cases of measles were observed in both camps. In both Naandari and Anderi payams, access to potable water is extremely limited, and water shortages occur during the dry season.

Returnees report being harassed by Congolese forces and armed gangs, who ‘tax’ them as they return. The issue of protection within Congo and along the border is a serious concern. Furthermore, the increasing threats posed by the LRA look likely to delay the repatriation of refugees in camps in DRC.

It is not just Sudanese returnees who are crossing the border. There are approximately 1,246 Congolese refugees who have crossed into Sudan. Baikpa now has a total estimated population of 2,000 returnees and most of the Congolese refugees. The returnees were originally from Anderi. They settled close to a village in Congo, with whom they developed strong ties over the intervening years. A strong community grew around a Christian ‘cult’ which in turn led to both Sudanese and Congolese followers being forced away, into Sudan, in January 2004.

Moving as a group, and at the suggestion of the local authorities, they settled along the road side at Baikpa, an area largely abandoned during the war as people moved further into the bush. The returnees and Congolese refugees settled at Baikpa are not in a typical situation. The returnees have resettled (in the same county) rather than reintegrated, and so are without strong kinship ties, and the group is possibly set aside from the local community by their religious beliefs. Yet on the whole they claim to be peacefully settled alongside their neighbours. Those who do not like them, it was said, are envious of the food aid they have received. According to one man, “when you are a returnee it forces you to work hard, harder than residents. So after some time you are looking better than residents, who then feel you have something they don’t, who feel resentment.” Another explanation offered was simply that they were seen as ‘returnees’. They were happy to have returned, it was added, “because the government has not asked us ‘why did you run? Why have you come back? Instead we have been accepted into the community.”

The situation of the Congolese refugees is such that they do not feel able to return to their area of origin in the foreseeable future. Three years after arriving, refugees and returnees seem comparatively well settled into, though still slightly apart from, the ‘host community’. During this time they have received food and NFI, including the drilling of a borehole by CRS. The Inter-agency report of February 2005 suggests
that those at Baikpa and especially at Bariguna are severely dependent on food aid, and recommended they continue to receive it.

Close to the border with CAR, Bariguna has received approximately 150 households (900 individuals). People fled from the area into CAR in 1990. On maps provided by the UN (see map 3 above) Bariguna is within Tambura county. According to maps printed by CDE, University of Berne, Bariguna, on the road to Tambura, lies within CAR. If this is the case, then the ‘returnees’, and their ‘hosts’, are in fact refugees. Yet as this is the place many initially fled from, they may still be said to have returned home. Sudan’s southern borders are porous and ill-defined. There exact whereabouts may be seen as being of little regard, but they also have the ability to curiously define who people are.

While many refugees in CAR were supported by UNHCR, others were not. Those who have returned to Bariguna cite the presence of nomadic militias known as Janjaweed, and the arbitrary arrests and attacks by CAR soldiers as reasons for finally retuning in early 2003. A few participants said they were returning to care for cash crops, possibly as part of a regular cycle of movement. There are also reports of economic migrants from CAR moving into Sudan following the signing of the CPA.

Since their arrival in their place of origin, the returnees have continued to receive food aid. Refugees living further away from the border under the auspices of UNHCR are said to be waiting to be repatriated (see section 7.2 below).

7. Returning to a New Sudan

This section aims to trace a broad course through some of the key issues arising from the return of displaced people to Western Equatoria.

7.1 Security

The security situation in CAR, DRC and Uganda will continue to affect the rate and manner of refugee returns. Coerced returns might be a better way of describing present movements than either straightforwardly forced or voluntary. Yet attempted subtleties of definition may be missed by those who face extortion, abuse, robbery, rape or death in exile or as they return. Such threats are faced by refugee returnees and also IDP returnees from the north, and may be accompanied by landmines or malaria, amongst other risks.

Landmines at least are less of a hazard in the three counties covered by this study. Small arms, however, are abundant, and an integral part of a militarised society, and means of personal protection. Their prevalence is taken for granted, though not always by younger returnees. The huge number of firearms will worsen any personal argument or wider social division.

There are also more fundamental security concerns: the activities of the LRA; ethnic divisions, including the presence of IDPs, that have already fractured in Yambio and Mundri and which were part of the return to insecurity during the 1970s; conflicts over scarce resources between returnees and stayees; perceptions of the dividends of peace, their equitable division, and probable disenchantment when they are not delivered; and the successful implementation of the CPA itself. This last factor itself
depending on the ones before it. Similarly, peace and security are necessary pre-
conditions of sustainable return but also that by which long-term sustainable return
will be measured.

Rape was often both a cause and consequence of displacement. It is a continuing
threat to many as they return home. It is to be hoped though, that with peace the
silence and impunity that surrounds sexual violence may be challenged, as with the
stigma attached to it. However, GBV is a continuing threat to many.

During both return and reintegration – and amongst ‘stayees’ – children, the elderly
and disabled people are particularly vulnerable.

HIV/AIDS may also be seen as an issue of security but is discussed separately in
section 7.6 below.

### 7.2 Transportation

An immediate concern is the transportation of returnees. Many will continue to return
on foot, with all the dangers that entails. Yet there are also dangers of returning by
vehicle. In Ezo particularly, it is strongly felt that repatriation should not occur until the
roads have been repaired, otherwise it is too dangerous. 23 IDPs died on their (well
documented) return from Mabia (Tambura) to Bahr el Ghazel, when a bridge over
which they were driving collapsed. Several people in Ezo, citing this tragedy,
expressed their fears of further deaths now there is peace. The expectation though,
is that sufficient vehicles – and improved roads – will be provided. John Bengeuuka,
County Education Director in Ezo, expressed the feelings of many others:

> “When are our people going to come back? When is the UNHCR going to
take these people back? [...] We are waiting for them to come back. These
questions are being asked here. We have our friends we have our relatives in
those camps, in those areas. We are hoping for their coming back as soon as
possible.”

The sense of waiting is pervasive, the unknown and lack of control unsettling.

“UNHCR aims to repatriate 22,000 people from Uganda, DRC and CAR by the end of
2005” (UNHCR, June 2005). This process has been delayed by the road conditions.
The largest group to be repatriated – 10,000 from DRC – is less than one quarter of
Sudanese refugees living there (45,060 in 2003).

Refugees in CAR are due to be flown back to Sudan as a cheaper alternative to road
transport. “UNHCR plans to begin return flights for 12,400 refugees from Mboki to
Tambura town before the end of November.” (IRIN, 14 Nov 2005) This is from an
estimated 36,000 refugees in CAR, many of whom will return to Ezo county.
UNHCR’s budget for repatriation remains “substantially underfunded” (ibid).

North – South IDP returns are too numerous and too costly to be a viable option for
repatriation, apart from maybe the most vulnerable. (Too costly both for the UN, the
GoNU and in many cases the individuals themselves.) Nor are IDPs under the
auspices of any UN agency. Any official transportation of returnees is also
dangerously open to political manipulation, as is the associated question of way
stations.
The question of officially organised transportation for returnees raises many other questions. It seems clear that the offer of transport will act as a key incentive or contributing factor for returns, and in some cases is an essential prerequisite for safe and dignified return. Yet it is less clear how the provision of transport may encourage people to return who otherwise may have chosen not to. There is the understandable assumption that people should go home, and that 'home' is not Khartoum, for instance, where many younger IDPs will have spent their entire lives. The role the provision of transport, as with any other form of intervention, plays in shaping people’s choices and decisions should be not be ignored.

7.3 Land

"Land is available, why do we have to fight over land?" Peter Saru Paul; SRRC Secretary, Ezo County

In much of the literature on return and rehabilitation (particularly with regards to Bosnia and Herzegovina), land and property restitution are seen as “one of the most important components of post-conflict reconciliation and rehabilitation” (Leckie, 2000: 4).

In contrast, land is one resource Western Equatoria has in abundance. But in Maridi town and surrounding high-density agricultural land, it is more of an issue. As discussed above, the presence of IDPs in Maridi town adds to the problem. Asides from the issue of IDPs, it is generally felt that local leaders, or if needs be the local authorities, can successfully arbitrate in any dispute. However, as one participant – a member of Maridi Students Association – pointed out, the issue of land can raise other questions:

“You see that when people escaped from here, because you leave your land here bare, empty. And when you come from there, you see that someone has already occupied your land…But if you request that 'please this one is my plot and I have come and I want to get it settled', then that one will also raise up some very good questions: ‘Where were you? If you think that this one was actually your land, why did you run?’ Then it maybe becomes less easy for someone to regain his or her land title. So in the issue of regaining it it will actually make some people quarrel.”

Another issue raised by several people was that of family members selling the property of their relatives in exile. In some instances, plots of land previously abandoned have been taken over by the SPLA.

There is also the fact that an estimated 50% of returnees may be female headed households. “It is acknowledged that women and female headed households do not enjoy the same quality of land rights then men under most of the southern Sudan customary systems (conditional use of land, problems with inheritance laws).” (Global IDP, March 2005: 180) And so on their return, women may face extra difficulties in claiming back previously owned land.

In Ezo county land was not seen as a significant problem. Plots of perennial cash crops such as coffee, teak and mangos are of greater value and may be the subject of disputes with the return of refugees. But according to the SRRC secretary, Peter Saru Paul, disputes are resolved by headmen at the local level without trouble.
Even if people return to their place of origin, many are more than happy to move to a new plot rather than old. The bush has reclaimed any empty land, and it makes sense to move to unused and more fertile soil. Furthermore, Zande are unlikely to settle on land where the ancestors of another family are buried.

**7.4 NFI and Food**

“The little [food] people are sustaining themselves with will now not be enough to accommodate those ones who are coming.” Mudirr Martin Grow; Senior Co-ordinator, MCDP

For refugees in DRC and CAR, the security situation and lack of transport makes bringing ones belongings back to Sudan a difficult process. Cooking utensils, water carriers, blankets, mosquito nets, tools and seeds are all in short supply and geographically and/or economically out of most returnee’s reach. In previous reports and in this study, returnees saw the need for tools and seeds as a priority.

Refugees returning on foot cannot carry enough food to last them long, if at all. Most returnees are initially dependent on their kin. Occasionally a single person or family will be at the centre of a kinship group and will host several returning households. This is also the case with many local leaders, whose status comes with the expectation of support to extended networks. The Naandi Payam Chief said he was hosting 10 households, who have been with him between one and two months.

Other returnees have settled in temporary shelters rather than staying with hosts. Either way, returnees often rely on the support of others for NFI and food. Both returnees and stayees talked of ripping up blankets to share, arguments over the use of cooking utensils and the theft of food. In Ezo, “stealing of foodstuffs from gardens of resident population and petty crimes like house breaking have been adopted as one of the coping mechanisms. This is creating animosity between the residents and the returnees and will damage the kinship support the returnees have been enjoying.” (UN/SRRC, Feb 2005: 1)

The threat to food security caused by cattle has been discussed above (section 4.3). Added to this is an increase in the population which the largely subsistence level of agriculture cannot keep pace with, and a lack of the tools and seeds needed to increase production. Hosts have to use or share their seed stocks needed for next seasons planting. As well as using their limited tools to cultivate their own food and thus provide for others directly, they also have to share their tools so that returnees can establish their own plots and tukels.

The lack of tools and seeds slows the process of reintegration and becoming food sufficient, even in one of the most fertile regions of Sudan. Returnees to Bariguna, for instance, have been there for two cultivation seasons. But with limited tools, one cannot clear and tend a large plot and it takes several cultivation seasons to grow enough food to last the year and to be able to set aside seeds for the next season. The resources slowly established by returnees are liable to be quickly depleted if they in turn host further groups of returnees.

Returnees to Bariguna, as well as the other sites in Ezo, have all been targeted with food aid. In all these sites, and in Ibba, returnees claimed food deliveries were insufficient and irregular. The Inter-agency needs assessment of February 2005
claimed that “reports are consistently indicating that humanitarian aid to the region is fast causing over dependence on relief supplies to an extent that their propensity to grow own food [sic] is on the verge of total collapse.” (ibid: 6). For virtually all those people Ockenden spoke to for this report, tools and seed were seen as much more important than direct food aid.

There is always the danger that aid targeted to a particular group will foster resentment. In this case though, as the recipients of food aid are often reliant on others for assistance, aid, even if not shared with hosts, relieves the burden imposed on them. Not everybody sees it this way of course. The situation at Baikpa (see section 6.2 above) is not a typical one but may point to more general underlying tensions. And some people, often described by others as lazy or idlers, claim they are returnees in a bid to receive aid. For the most part though, intermittent aid deliveries do not seem to have had any great impact on intra-community relations.

It was suggested in section 3. of this report that to an extent, everyone is a ‘returnee’ of some kind. Stayees in rural areas where there have been substantial returns challenged this largely theoretical proposition. Asked what impact returnees had had, one woman at Nabanga responded: “Hunger. We have had to share our food, so we are facing the same problems as returnees. And blankets we have had to share. We are living the same life as if we were also returnees.” Or as an elderly man at Bariguna softly complained: “Now we are sharing all we have; now we will all look like returnees.”

As Peter Saru Paul, SRRC Secretary at Ezo said, “no one will die of hunger here.” Wild food, kinship support and wage labour will provide a bare minimum for most, though not without increased malnutrition and associated health problems. Nor without raising the tensions and frustrations of impoverished communities.

The basic reintegration of rural to rural returnees is relatively straightforward. But “Rural livelihoods are expected to remain the economic mainstay of the South. The recovery process must, therefore, focus upon re-establishing food security through the provision of basic agricultural inputs of seeds and tools.” (UN, 2002: 14) The ability of returnees to be food self-sufficient, and produce a food surplus, also affects their ability to enter the cash economy and so gain access to health and education, for instance. In turn, the food security of people in urban areas who may not have any or sufficient land themselves, depends on their ability to find employment. This will be discussed below.

### 7.5 Water

A growing queue at water sources is a particularly visible illustration of an increased population and demand for resources. The queue for water thus becomes a site of potential collision between different groups; frustrations exacerbating perceptions of difference.

“...the issue here is people looking at each other from different perspectives, that’s what I will presume will happen. Not will happen even because it has already started happening. The host community, though they are willing to accept returnees, that aspect of looking at people who have not suffered in the conflict in the Sudan; it’s there. So that I think will cause some problems in the sense that it will be a lot of conflict between the host community and those who are coming, I presume such things will happen. And coupled to that; the
availability of resources we have inside the county may not be enough and
that will lead to more conflict. Things like boreholes – sources of water – they
are not so enough…Because even here now, when it comes to the dry
season there is great problems, people fight over water. What if many people
come?” Student; Maridi

Access to water is a recurring concern across the region. The limited numbers of
functional boreholes, the cost recovery systems in operation for some, the reliance
on unsafe sources – especially during the dry season – the distance some people
must walk, the several hours some people must wait; all such factors go to make
water a scarce and contested resource. The burden of collecting it falls squarely on
the heads of women and children, and increases in proportion to the growing
demand. The time needed for collecting water impacts upon children’s education.
Growing demand leads to an increase in the breakdown of pumps. In Maridi county,
the lack of water, and conflicts over it, are worsened by the presence of IDPs and
cattle. And of course lack of safe water has a severe impact on public health.

On top of this, access to water becomes an all too apparent manifestation of the
strain put on communities’ resources by returnees. Lack of water, then, has the
potential to widen and entrench the fault lines between returnees and stayees,
increasing the tension between them and hampering reintegration.

However, discussing these concerns with returnees and stayees at Nabanga, Ibba,
they said that any such conflict would only revolve around access to water, not
impact upon social interaction. Elsewhere, it was said that the frustration generated
by lack of resources would be directed towards the government and their failure to
improve conditions, not on one another’s kin. This is more likely to be the case in
small communities than urban centres where a greater mix of unknown people are
combined.

The need for increased resources and service provision before an increased number
of people return was widely expressed. Otherwise the state of things will get worse
before it can then be improved.

This should include improved sanitation facilities. In Maridi, “very few returnees have
pit latrines. Excreta disposal end up in the bush” (UN/SRRC July 2005: 3). Less than
a quarter of the total population in Ezo have access to safe excreta disposal systems
(UN/SRRC Feb 2005). This adds to the public health hazard caused by the lack of
clean water.

7.6 Health and HIV/AIDS

The under-funded and under-resourced health care system has little capacity to cope
with an increase in users. As with many sectors, it is heavily and unhealthily reliant
on foreign NGOs. Returnees – themselves often particularly vulnerable – will have a
negative impact on future health provision unless there is a corresponding increase
in capacity.

Furthermore, many stayees believe returnees will bring diseases with them from
abroad. In Ezo payam it was suspected that an outbreak of measles that had been
reported in DRC, and a subsequent outbreak in Ezo, were connected and caused by
returnees.
Concerns over the introduction of diseases from outside the region are widespread, with obvious implications as to the perception of returnees. For instance, in Bar-olo, Maridi, it was suggested by one group that returnees should be kept separate during the initial stages of their reintegration. This is a suggestion that has some currency on the national level, but would arguably increase the stigma attached to returnees.

One of the health threats that is often seen to be ‘outside’ the region, and liable to be brought in, is HIV/AIDS.

According to a UNICEF survey of four counties in 2000, “approximately 48% of adults in Western Equatoria had never heard of HIV or AIDS. Some 5.4% had heard of HIV or AIDS but did not know about problems related to it, while 10.2% did not know about the relationship between unprotected sexual activity and HIV or AIDS” (OCHA-IMU, Sep 2005: 18).

The limited data for south Sudan suggests prevalence rates ranging from 0% to 7% by location (OCHA-IMU Sep 2005: 17). ZOA Refugee Care runs a VCT centre in Maridi hospital. Data collected for 2004 had 4.8% of all clients from Maridi town testing HIV positive, and 3.2% from Maridi outreach. The prevalence rate was higher for women than men (5.6% to 3.8% in town; 4.2% to 2.3% in outreach) (ibid: 18).

Since 2000 some local and international NGOs and CBOs have been involved in HIV/AIDS awareness raising, hopefully improving the number of people with knowledge of the virus. Outside of urban centres it is suspected that awareness remains poor. Dr Victor Guma, County Medical Officer, Maridi County, sees that HIV/AIDS presents “a very big problem that needs to be addressed from the very start, not only with returnees but with those already present”. With little awareness, a sexually active population, polygamous relationships, and no condoms or acceptance of them, the risks are high. Added to this is a poor, largely uneducated population, previously isolated by conflict but now facing large-scale population movements, and an ill equipped health service (see also Lake and Wood, 2005). Dr Guma did not believe there was any stigma attached to returnees at present. However, he pointed out that HIV is not seen as present in Maridi, that it is a thing associated with the outside (especially Uganda) where it is talked about freely and thus assumed to exist and be a problem. And so if there is an increase in the prevalence of HIV as seems almost certain, it is likely to be felt that it has come from ‘outside’ and so spread with returnees.

This opinion was confirmed by the comments of many participants. Returnees, however, often having better knowledge of HIV/AIDS, are playing an important role in educating others. The increased movement of returnees, traders and peacekeepers within and between Sudan and neighbouring countries with a substantially higher rate of infection will however, almost certainly see a subsequent rise in south Sudan’s prevalence rate.

HIV/AIDS was mentioned less often in Ezo, possibly due to a lower level of awareness (or at least of the level of awareness generated by the plethora of INGO t-shirts common to Maridi). The CBO Undo is working to raise awareness in Ezo. They have also received limited funding to train two VCT counsellors and have received some 200 VCT kits from Yambio hospital. No statistics for these were available at the time of research. According to a 1999 study by the International Medical Corps, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Ezo county was 2%. (OCHA-IMU, June 2005: 13)
The difficult contradictions involved in the relations between peace, returnees and HIV/AIDS must be overcome with increased education, dialogue and comprehensive awareness raising.

8. Education, livelihoods and economic change

“There are in exile will not understand that education is possible under trees”

Many Sudanese refugees in camps in CAR and DRC, and especially refugees in East Africa, have had access to a level of education largely denied those who stayed in Sudan. The quote above, from a member of the New Sudan Women’s Association in Ezo, expresses one aspect of complex and at times contradictory perceptions of educated returnees.

It also raises the question as to whether or not students or families with children in school are likely to return to a place with such severely limited educational facilities. Particularly for those who are able to benefit from Uganda’s (UNHCR supported) education system, a return to Sudan before finishing one’s schooling is not likely to be an attractive proposition. As such, the future policies of UNHCR and the educational support they offer to refugees will have a significant impact on the rate of returns. The current education system in Sudan will also negatively affect the sustainability of return. The cross-border education imbalance will also contribute to the separation of families and has already created an educational hierarchy based on those who sought refuge outside Sudan and those who remained within.

Not only will returnees further strain the education system in Sudan but their level of education may also further polarise the division between ‘returnee’ and ‘stayee’. In areas outside urban centres the former is the more obvious, though not only concern. Returnees from the forests of DRC and CAR have had extremely limited access to education, on a par with many children in Sudan. One imagines these returnees would be satisfied with a school under a tree, if they can afford it. And if the severely limited educational facilities can sustain any increase in students. But in places such as Maridi town, where the large number of INGOs and government posts create an unusual number of formal employment opportunities requiring the right bits of ‘paper’ and qualifications, the latter is of greater significance.

The following section assesses differences in access to formal and non-formal education, and the consequences for employment and other livelihood opportunities.

Those who have received primary schooling in DRC and CAR have been taught in French (with the exception of some seminaries). For these children to join Sudanese schools in which the language of tuition is English, they will usually have to drop down two levels or so. Those who have completed their primary schooling in French will be at a disadvantage in the English speaking formal employment sector of the New Sudan. The same applies to those who have been in GoS schools and taught in ‘standard’ Arabic.

In Ezo, most people will be united by the Zande language that crosses the colonial borders. But this will not apply to all. Across the region people will return speaking numerous different languages of which French, Lingala, Ki-Swahili, English and Arabic are the main, but certainly not the only ones. IDPs returning from a lifetime in the north may well speak ‘standard’ rather than the ‘Juba’ Arabic of the south. It
would be unusual for two people not to have at least one common tongue despite this, but people may still categorise themselves or others according to the languages they speak. And as well as setting people apart socially, language will also influence individuals’ education and employment prospects.

The number of relatively well educated Sudanese currently in exile is going to be a vital part of the country’s future development. But their return will also present certain challenges.

At present, the average level of teachers’ own education is low. Most are untrained and work voluntarily. Fugoyo Chris, Deputy Head teacher at Maridi High Secondary School, explained some of the potential benefits and challenges of returnees:

“As soon as those people come in, then we shall have enough teachers. Because right now we have not enough teachers…This is the positive part of it. But the negative part of it now; maybe they will come with the ideology that maybe they have learnt more than those ones who are here. Then they will ignore them, and that will bring some conflict around.”

Fugoya Chris spoke of the dangers of returnees attempting to take control without respecting local customs and communities. This concern is tempered by the need for change with regards to girls’ education for instance. Equally, there is a need for more teachers, but they must be integrated in such a way that they do not displace others from their posts or cause resentment. John Batista Bengeuka, Ezo County Education Director, suggested one possible scenario:

“It should be done gradually. For example: I’m a headmaster in a primary school, and I learnt up to primary 8. Then you come with your certificate up to senior 6, then you are a teacher in that school. It is not automatically that you will take over from me. The administrators will try and do it bit by bit. I may be sent on a training course and you will act in my place. When I come back, I may be transferred. The department here will plan a policy for this.”

Whether qualified returnees will want to take posts as teachers if such work remains unpaid is another matter.

The example of teachers raises two related points. The first is a similar but more generalised paradox involving the need for skilled returnees and the tensions they bring. The second is the question as to whether jobs – particularly those in the local administration and government – should be given to those who have earned their place by fighting in the war, or to those who have earned their qualifications in exile. The two quotes below illustrate what are, unsurprisingly, two different perspectives. The first is from a stayee, describing what he felt would be the opinion of others:

“Cause these people who are here, they will say ‘you people who were in exile while we were suffering, while these Antanovs was throwing bombs on us, and now you are just coming in the peace era, to come and settle. And we have suffered and suffered.’ Especially in the issue of employment. If there is need for employment, and some of these people are coming with their papers, then, you will find out that they will be the people to occupy all those places, definitely. And you who were here suffering you will not get that chance.”

A returnee described the divergent position:
“Those who have been staying here, maybe their qualification is down, and have never even been to secondary school. You who have come with the paper, maybe you completed advanced level, maybe you completed O’level…you will not be given employment, you will not be given job. Those that suffered here since, they are supposed to have right to employment. But you who have just come, you have been enjoying there, so you don’t have right to employment. So there is a major problem. They have that negative attitude on the returnees, especially on terms of employment.”

Some people feel that education does not hold much weight for those who stayed in Sudan. One returnee commented that “the community doesn’t regard education high…they don’t consider that education of yours, they will tell you, ‘please, you have been there for your studies, you have been learning, you get these papers…My paper is the gun.’”

The lack of weight given to education is particularly the case for girls. “South Sudan has less girls going to school than any other country in the world.” (Hewison, 2005: 8) There are many reasons for this, from lack of female teachers to poverty. One male teacher gave the following explanation: “this one goes to some cultural things. Some parents turn their girls into property, you are not sent to school, you are just kept at home and …a man can come from their and request through your father and then you are married…”

Returnees may bring with them a greater appreciation of education, and possibly the ability to impart it. And many of those who have been fighting while others are learning are likely to become very aware of the advantages afforded those in exile and the benefits of an education for future employment. Some SPLA officers went to school before the war, or have received military training since. But despite their rank they may be put at a disadvantage in the New Sudan without qualifications or English language skills.

A large, armed and disenfranchised population is liable to destabilise the peace at both the local and the national level. As such, “employment is critical to reintegrate particularly volatile groups (ex-militia/soldiers, refugees/IDPs) and to create a sense of confidence in the future that will help to demilitarise politics.” (Sørbø, 2004: 7) Many soldiers will of course continue to serve but there is a fear that even those who are demobilised will continue to rely on their guns for a livelihood. Disarmament and demobilisation will fail unless substantial efforts are made towards reintegration. Even more so when, as noted above, many combatants have never been truly ‘integrated’ within society before. One must also consider the needs of soldiers’ dependents. The peace agreement will abandon many army officers and soldiers with no skills or future opportunities.

For all sections of society there is an urgent need for greater formal and non-formal education opportunities. Children brought up in the bush, or children brought up in the army, may now be too old for joining formal education. Instead they must be offered the opportunities for learning new skills by which they can ensure their livelihoods. The difficulty is ensuring the equitable distribution of opportunities such that the most vulnerable are protected, without aggravating social divisions by targeting particular groups above others.

At present, there are simply not enough people in southern Sudan with the qualifications or experience to form an effective government administration or civil service, let alone provide the human resources to educate the population to such a standard. Yet there are a large number of highly skilled and educated Sudanese...
refugees in neighbouring countries and the wider diaspora. Those who have been in
exile have a virtual monopoly on the level of language, in English or Arabic, required
for government positions. To an extent this has always been the case, and never
before presented any problems. (It might be suggested that nearly all of the
SPLA/M’s upper echelons have at one point been refugees or received an education
outside of Sudan.) But it is possible that it will become a more noticeable facet of the
new government as more educated refugees return.

The international community has long been criticised, with reason, for not seeing
refugees as people with a contribution to make. There is now a danger though of
seeing refugees as an elite, the only people with enough potential, while ignoring
many others. Persuading educated refugees to return is currently seen as an
important component of developing the south, as indeed it is. It is equally important
to enhance the educational prospects of those who stayed within southern Sudan, to
draw upon their own potential and build their capacity. The same goes for refugees
and IDPs returning with as little education or vocational skills as those who stayed in
the south.

Formal employment is only a small sector of overall livelihood strategies in the area
(though a symbolically and politically important one). Those who have been in exile
are likely to have much greater non-formal skills as well. This may include valuable
experience of utilising the resources of NGOs and donors and, more importantly,
experience and understanding of active community groups and civil society. Many
will have gained experience through work, be it driving, mechanics, cooking,
construction, tailoring and so on. Even greater familiarity with computers, electrics
and mobile phones, for instance, could be valuable in Sudan where such things are
predominantly absent. And it is to be hoped that with peace the opportunities and
investment in such commodities and productions, and attendant need for specific
skills, will increase. Yet again, those who will benefit most from such opportunities
will be those who have been in exile. Disparities such as these are unlikely to go
unnoticed by the host community, who may understandably see returnees as
intruders within the labour market.

Returnees will also impact upon local markets and the activities of farmers and petty
traders. An increase in the number of people may contribute to growing local
markets, if enough returnees have the economic potential to contribute and not be
dependent on others. In Ezo the Chamber of Commerce said that the majority of
returnees to date do not have the finances to bolster the local economy. Without
sufficient tools and seeds to produce a food surplus the local economy will continue
to stagnate. It is expected that some returnees will bring business skills, networks
and possibly capital developed in exile to Sudan. While this may benefit the local
economy it may also undermine local traders unless there is a suitable provision of
training and micro-finance opportunities.

It is not suggested that such disparities will lead to conflict between returnees and
stayees. Rather; tension and frustration that will hinder reintegration and may stratify
society along historical lines of flight: the opportunities an individual has depending
on their previous movements. However: “If hosts have access to vocational training,
they will not be busy looking at those coming in.” Fugoya Chris. If opportunities for
formal and non-formal education, basic language tuition and skills training are open
and available to stayees (with a strong emphasis on increased women’s education)
and returnees (including returning ex-combatants) it would achieve a great deal in
mitigating potential fault lines. This should include capacity building for stayees and
civil society structures. The economic and livelihood considerations of all groups are
likely to override concerns about people’s identity that otherwise might prove divisive.
Furthermore, economic survival is not only a utilitarian concern; it also contributes to the process of emplacement for returnees. For Ethiopian refugees returning from Sudan, “Household economic activities were among the most important set of strategies that returnees employed in the process of emplacing themselves within their new environment.” (Hammond, 2004: 110) In Hammond’s study of Aba Bai, economic maximisation activities were not merely ‘survival strategies’ but part of the process of reordering social relations. The process of emplacement in Western Equatoria is occurring in a substantially different context, but economic activities will play an equally important role in social reintegration.

9. Perceptions of difference and social change

The separation of social, educational and economic changes – and the ways in which such changes are perceived differently by different actors – is largely a false one, of use only in structuring this report.

Levels of education, for instance, have a significant impact on social relations. One woman spoke of some stayees’ reaction to educated returnees like herself: “they say those who have come with their papers, they are just proud, you are just proud of your education: what is it?” The idea of stayees as seeing returnees as showing off was matched by another’s comments suggesting an ‘inferiority complex’ of some stayees with regards to educated returnees and a gap in their common background and understanding that may hamper communication. Such a gap is only to be expected after a decade, maybe a lifetime, growing up in different environments. Differences will be particularly marked for the younger generation.

The behaviour of returnees will be closely watched by many others. “If someone returns from exile to his home place, others will mark him out as a returnee... On return, people will be identified as such. They will watch you to see if you isolate yourself from others and from this place, to hold themselves aloft or make efforts to be free [with others in the community].” Martin Yasona, Ezo Payam Chief.

It is clear that many returnees have come back with little or nothing, particularly those who have remained in the bush. As such they are a burden on their hosts, removing the somewhat abstract, quotation-mark-embraced returnee/stayee divide by making all ‘look like returnees’. However, some people also expressed the feeling that “if they are looking wealthy, we will not be well united.” For those who stayed, the burden is seen to rest firmly with returnees to adapt their behaviour, to integrate themselves, or to offer something to the whole community. A young man in Maridi saw returnees as having two choices: “They either work hard to adopt the standard here. Or they work hard to raise the standard here to theirs. They have to choose one of the two.”

In some respects, stayees claim a ‘monopoly on suffering’ (Stefansson, 2004). As one recent returnee explained:

“Cause they will be feeling that they fought and they were suffering and [you were just enjoying yourself]. They don’t know that even the returnees, those people in exile, they also suffering. They thought that you were enjoying life there. Yet it is hard to stay in exile.”

40
It is not only an education that returnees will bring back from exile. The imposition of ‘foreign cultures’ and what is seen as their negative impact on the young are also considered a problem by many stayees. Aside from education and language, dress was the most often mentioned difference expected of returnees. Miniskirts and more sexually forthright women were commonly associated with East African countries. Their entry into Sudan causes concern for some.

There are also potential problems associated with southerners who have been IDPs in the north.

“When they shall also come, I think people will perceive them in a negative way. Because they have a, I mean, they learnt that classical Arabic, and on top of that some of them have already changed into Islam. And when they are back…for them to reintegrate into the communities it will be a problem. Most people have been seeing the Arabs just as enemies…"

This quote suggests an uncertain conflation of language, religion and politics, tied up by some four decades of war with an enemy that has hosted several million of one’s compatriots.

It seems less the arrival of northern Sudanese or Muslim southerners that may cause problems, but again the fear that ‘foreign’ cultures and religion may be imposed. Some women expressed concern over the thought of women returning from the north wearing the hijab. Some, ironically, feared that they may not approve of stayees brewing alcohol. There are also fears that there will be a more organised attempt to develop the south along Islamic principles. “Because the Islamic fundamentalists are targeting the youth and women, and teachers to influence them…they are going to introduce Islamic education”. The potential offer of free education in madarassas is feared to be too tempting for a population impoverished and ‘weakened’ by war.

The return of refugees and IDPs brings forth the prospect of significant social changes. For over two decades southern Sudan has been isolated through conflict. Peace opens up borders that had previously seen mainly an outward flow of people. Returnees may force a (re)negotiation of social norms and values that could prove unsettling for those who stayed in the south.

Changes in women’s traditional roles and responsibilities, the education afforded many girls in exile and the economic independence of female headed households, are particularly important in this regard. The expectations of others in Sudan will pose difficult challenges for returnees negotiating the borders of shifting identities. Samia Phoebe, a young woman educated in Uganda, talked of her own experience:

“Mostly the host community will have attitudes towards the returnees, that’s in terms of education and employment. Because even just of last year, when I was still at school in Uganda, while coming this way and going that side you will find on the border they will tell you; ‘you think just school is ok for you, we are here fighting in the bush and you people you are there. Women you are supposed to come back here and we fight together and get married’, such things are said before the peace was signed. Now with the peace and more people will be coming back, it will be more than what was there.”

Attitudes to girls’ education were mentioned in the previous section. One of the contributing factors to low female enrolment is an emphasis on their early marriage to secure dowry payments – an important income for impoverished families. Yet one
that increases their vulnerability and exclusion from community decision making processes (see Sherif, 2004: 38-39).

The struggle and hardships endured by women does not appear to translate into a significantly increased responsibility for Sudan's future. Conflict meant extremely limited opportunities for education, and extreme destitution, and it is essential that peace brings dividends. Groups such as the New Sudan Women's Association in each county, and the Women's Federation in Maridi and numerous church groups, are doing what they can (with no resources) to support girls’ and women’s education. Female returnees may be able to further change attitudes and challenge the dominant patriarchal traditions and continue working on peacebuilding initiatives. The social changes underway present not only an opportunity for challenging entrenched views as to girls’ education, but also to GBV and women’s property rights.

To maximise this potential an environment conducive to dialogue needs to be fostered, one in which civil society can burgeon. This in turn requires the development of opportunities for formal and non-formal education and capacity building for community groups.

Given the disparities in education and experience, there is a danger that opportunities for political and social participation become the preserve of returnees. However, the new skills and experience of returnees may be met by indifference or hostility to change, alienating returnees. Even more likely perhaps is that returnees will be frustrated by the lack of capacity to move things forward. Civil-society is hampered by a complete lack of funds, resources and infrastructure. Its potential is in danger of being overshadowed by foreign NGOs.

The return of displaced people to southern Sudan will inevitably bring about profound social changes. The way in which returnees are perceived, and social changes received, will be largely shaped by the economic development, or lack of, experienced by individuals. The meeting of ‘returnees' and ‘stayees' will force both to reconsider their own and each others identity. How the process of reintegration is achieved will in turn shape not only the identity of a ‘New Sudan', but also its future viability.

10. Conclusion

“People are different in viewing a situation. What is important is that every one be in unity, and share ideas with one another in peace and harmony to carry forward the vision of our late leader John Garang.” Afafu; New Sudan Women’s Association, Maridi

Equitable economic development would do a great deal to mitigate social divisions growing along the lines of those who stayed and those who left. But an increased strain on limited resources and opportunities is a more likely scenario at first. “Because of the scarcity of resources, all people rush towards those limited resources, and these people will have some differences. So definitely there will be some clashes.” The basic returnee/stayee fault line is itself fragmented along other social, ethnic, religious, economic and political contours. The differences people have must be carefully considered if clashes are to be avoided.
Concepts of ‘returnees’ and ‘stayees’ are too broad, and too complex, to be accepted uncritically. As discussed earlier, a returnee may be an ex IDP, refugee, combatant or abductee. They may be returning from conditions the same as that to which they are returning to. Or the returnee/stayee divide may be the divide between those with an education and those without; those with or without vocational skills. The returnee/stayee divide may be a divide between people speaking different languages, or with different cultural backgrounds, religious beliefs or political affiliations; a divide between those who have opportunities to capitalise from the peace process and those who have none. At its simplest: between those who may be a burden on their ‘hosts’, making all look like ‘returnees’; and those who threaten the future livelihoods of their ‘hosts’, armed with skills that, it is hoped, will make the guns redundant. The divisions made apparent by return will encapsulate all of the above, and probably more.

The category of ‘stayee’ or ‘host’ is just as diverse, as are the ways in which stayees will perceive returnees. (Although diverse perceptions are likely to be influenced by and coalesce around dominant social concerns.) “Each return creates its own logic, contradictions, and possibilities for the future. And in each return the meaning of home is created anew.” (Oxfeld and Long, 2004: 15)

Many such definitions and identities are themselves formed around porous, and at times unknown, borders. People’s movements are not one-off, neatly measurable events. Rather, multiple and complex flows and convergences that cannot be separated from past events and that will have significant impacts on future ones.

And so while many thousands have returned to Western Equatoria, less than one year after the CPA others are being displaced by the LRA.

There is a danger of reifying the divisions between ‘returnee’ and ‘stayee’, and of course all interventions should be based primarily on the area rather than a particular group of people. Yet it must also be recognised that the lived experience of such identities and the ways differences are perceived are more important than external definitions alone. And there are differences between these two broad groups of people, and tensions are liable to gather along the polarised divide. A divide not only caused by the many years apart that separate people, but also due to the initial causes of displacement.

“When we focus back, and the movement was not easy, you know, some people fled out of hardship, by the coming of the SPLA and the earlier time, they are so rough on the people, and some properties where looted, even some members of the family where killed. Both by Sudan government and SPLA side. And that bitterness is still in their hearts.”

Above and beyond the obvious, and urgent, need for the rehabilitation of southern Sudan, is the need for reintegration to be accompanied by reconciliation. Indeed, it has been argued that in peacebuilding, “reconciliation and reintegration are fundamentally linked” (Fagan, 1996:3); the two are mutually supporting. In southern Sudan, the reintegration of the displaced and the reconciliation of all are vital for supporting the peaceful formation of communities.

Ethnic divisions, usually between ‘Nilotics’ and ‘Equatorians’, have been prominent components of a return to instability both during the ‘70s and early 80’s, and during the last year. In both cases, peace, followed by the movement of displaced people, changed expectations and demographics, have led to further conflict. Another aspect of this is potential changes in the political landscape brought about by
returnees. Many returnees will have been forcibly displaced by the SPLA. Depending on where they have been during their exile, they may have become less accustomed to the common political ideology of Western Equatoria. And so on return, political disjuncture may add to and compound socio-economic fault lines.

If people in the receiving community see tangible benefits of a peace they have waited so long for then return and reintegration will be that much simpler. Particularly if it occurs before the population starts to significantly increase and the ground is prepared in advance for returnees. This seems less likely to happen in time, at least with regards to the physical and economic infrastructure of the region. But there are other opportunities as well.

“One way of preparing the ground is through the awareness raising. Let the community know that your friends your brothers your sisters who went outside are coming back …don’t look at them as enemies, don’t look at them as at people who have deserted you. They went out because of the conflict, now they want to come back and enjoy the peace together with you. Help integrate them. Stay together with them. They’re your friends…” NSYA; Maridi

In promoting dialogue across the social fractures engendered by 22 years of war, attention should not only be given to the returnee/stayee divide. There is a need for awareness of the multifarious, complex fault lines if the provision of aid is not itself going to exacerbate tensions, or indeed reify the groups of people it aims to integrate.

This is particularly the case with regards to the provision of standard assistance packages to repatriated refugees. As this report has shown, the impact of such packages is largely context dependent. Where returnees have little and are a burden on their hosts, the provision of basic NFI is vital and likely to be broadly welcomed. Yet where returnees are (seen to be) ‘better off’ then their hosts, assistance may increase tensions. There are also wider debates as to whether cash is more beneficial than goods, and whether IDPs are assisted. Official repatriation packages complicate the recognised need for area based interventions.

The critique of homecoming has gained a lot of ground in the last decade. Rather than return being seen as the end of the problem, the difficulties of return are now widely recognised. (UNHCR, for instance, long the primary target of criticism, has started to close the gap in its mandate.) Yet the change in focus to a concern with returnees raises further questions. There is a danger that the returnee will join the refugee as ‘the problem’: those who “are not ordinary people but represent, rather, an anomaly requiring specialised correctives and therapeutic interventions.” (Malkki, 1997: 63) The same might be said of some groups of IDPs in southern Sudan. The common consensus has it that for the Bor Dinka, the ‘durable solution’ involves them returning home. The extent to which this particular solution runs contrary to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is debatable.

Reintegration is a lop-sided concept, the emphasis firmly on the returnees: the fluid category of the displaced needing to be absorbed by the static, somehow sponge-like host community. Stayees’ perceptions of returnees have not received sufficient attention either in academic or policy circles, or in southern Sudan in general. Yet it is crucial to understand their expectations and concerns if one hopes to aid the reintegration of displaced people. It should be emphasised that the majority of people involved in research conducted in southern Sudan stated the wish to see their families and friends return from exile. The ‘imagined homecomings’ of returnees’ are matched by those of stayees’. Many people in southern Sudan are waiting for the
return of the displaced as keenly as for the dividends of peace. It is often expected that the former will in fact lead onto the latter; returnees, it is believed, will bring with them the attention of aid and so are to be welcomed.

However, ‘homecomings’ are rarely straightforward. This research has highlighted numerous areas where the return of the displaced will increase the demand for scarce resources and opportunities for livelihoods, demands that at present do not look like being met by the international community, and will exacerbate tensions and possible conflicts within communities. The social, economic and political changes brought about by peace are immense, as are the challenges they pose. Conflicts in the east and west of Sudan are understandably drawing attention away from the needs of the south. But if peace in the south is overshadowed by conflict elsewhere, and if the return and reintegration of the displaced is treated as a short-term problem then conflict could continue to spiral around the country.

As this report has shown, dilemmas, hopes, fears and contradictions abound at the convergence of ‘returnees’ and ‘stayees’. Without adequate attention to long-term educational needs and the strengthening of civil society and local authority’s capacity, return will remain a turbulent process liable to destabilise a precious and precarious peace. To ensure the emplacement of the displaced, their acceptance by those who stayed, the sustainability of return, and the opportunities for peaceful reintegration – one must focus on the contours, the gaps, overlaps, shadows and dynamics at the confluence of ‘returnees’ and ‘stayees’.
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Appendix

**People met**

James Benson, SRRC Secretary, Maridi County  
Amos William Ginana, SRRC Secretary, Ibba County  
Peter Saru Paul, SRRC Secretary, Ezo County  
Luciano Bakinde, Executive Director Ezo County  
Dr Victor Guma, County Medical Officer, Maridi  
John Batista Bengeuka, County Education Director, Ezo  
Filbert Victor, County Medical Officer, Ezo  
Peter Jamada Opia, Deputy County Education Director, Maridi  
Frazer Juma Mande, Payam Education Statistcs Officer, Maridi  
Fugoyo Chris, Deputy Headteacher, Maridi High Secondary School  
Martin Yasona, Ezo Payam Chief  
Colonel James Bior, SPLA Commander, Maridi and Ibba Counties  
Martha Hewison, Care/SBEP  
Dan Langoya, Care  
William Arkangelo Baabe Care  
New Sudan Women’s Association, Maridi  
New Sudan Youth Association, Maridi  
Women’s Federation, Maridi  
Maridi Student’s Association  
Maridi County Development Committee  
Maridi Community Development Project  
Chamber of Commerce, Ezo County  
New Sudan Youth Association, Ezo  
New Sudan Women’s Association, Ezo  
Yuba Development Agency

This list is only of people or groups interviewed formally. Many others contributed to this study. Thank you to everyone who did so. And apologies to those who are quoted in the text without being named.
### Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899-1955</td>
<td>Sudan under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Southern soldiers rebel against their northern commanders, heralding the start of the Anyanya One war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Independence from British rule. Arab-led government reneges on pledges to southerners to create a federal system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Coup d'etat lead by General Abudd brings in military government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>General Abudd overthrown and a national government established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Jafar Nimeiri leads a successful military coup.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Addis Ababa peace agreement signed, ending the Anyanya One war. South becomes self-governing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Oil discovered in Sudan.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Nimeiri switches from pan-Arabism to support of Islamism</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Sharia Law declared, reigniting civil war. John Garang forms SPLA/M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Popular unrest, Nimeiri replaced by a Transitional Military Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Coalition government lead by Sadiq al-Mahdi formed after general elections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>General Omar Al-Bashir’s National Islamic Front (NIF) takes power in military coup.</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD) initiates a peace process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 2002</td>
<td>IGAD brokers a ceasefire between the GoS and SPLA/M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 2003</td>
<td>Start of insurgency in the Darfur region of western Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 9th 2005</td>
<td>CPA signed in Nairobi</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>International donors pledge $4.5bn (£2.38bn) in aid to help southern Sudan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 9th 2005</td>
<td>John Garang becomes Sudan’s First Vice-President and President of the GoSS</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 30th 2005</td>
<td>John Garang dies in a helicopter crash. He is succeeded by Salva Kiir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 2005</td>
<td>Establishment of the GoNU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 2005</td>
<td>Establishment of the GoSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2006</td>
<td>50 years of Sudan’s independence</td>
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This timeline is adapted from Forced Migration Review 24 (published by the Refugee Studies Centre of the University of Oxford), and from the BBC.