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Coercion and Collusion:  
Change in Rebel Group Treatment of Civilians

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ABSTRACT

Coercion and Collusion:  
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This dissertation explains why some rebel groups act in a highly coercive fashion toward local populations, only to shift to increasingly contractual behavior, and why other groups that share similar circumstances evolve in the opposite direction. Drawing upon fieldwork in Sudan, Iraq, Turkey, and Colombia, this study examines three rebel groups in the context of the type of resources they extract, their intensity of need, and the presence of rivals. Using multiple qualitative methods such as process-tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this study finds that the ability or inability to monopolize resource extraction accounts for the change in rebel group behavior toward local populations.
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For Molly
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

“Wars teach us not to love our enemies, but to hate our allies.”
W. L. George

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an explanation for the change in behavior of rebel groups toward populations they claim to represent. It accounts for the transformation in rebel groups from durable, representative entities that provide local civilians with public goods and services in exchange for resources, to coercive groups that extract resources without providing services in return --- and thus interact coercively. In the same sense, this project examines why some rebel groups sharing similar circumstances evolve in very different directions. Why, for example, do groups that hold similar ideologies and operate within the same international environment (and are thus susceptible to the same international norms at relatively similar periods of time) transform their behavior in opposing directions? As this study further demonstrates, international pressure to adopt democratic norms does not produce uniform outcomes. These questions present a challenging riddle. Most rational choice models that explain rebel behavior link it to the scramble to obtain the resources they need to fight their foes, whether these are the government or other armed groups. Easily obtainable resources offer opportunities for looting; where resources are scarce, rebels must try to gain acceptance from local people in return for their material support. Yet in the cases below, we find that rebel group behavior shifts independently of changes in resource endowments. That is, some groups suddenly shift from predatory to solicitous behavior,
even though resources appear to be constant. Likewise, shifts in resource availability do not correlate well with changes in rebel behavior toward communities. I find that the ultimate nature of power issues from the ease with which sources of power can be monopolized (Earle 1997, 4).

I propose that the threat (or lack thereof) to the monopoly over resource extraction, as indicated by the presence or absence of significant rivals, explains the change of behavior in rebel groups toward civilians. The model I develop has implications for the study of contemporary conflicts. It identifies conditions under which rebel groups will become less predatory when faced with a new set of democratic norms from insistent outsiders and when rebel groups will become more predatory when confronted with the same demands. In more general terms, this model provides insight into new forms of state-building under conditions of shifting external norms. While French and English state-builders in centuries past could massacre communities in the name of national unity, contemporary rebel leaders—would be state-builders among them—encounter the critical scrutiny of outsiders who may hold diplomatic and financial clout that can aid or frustrate rebel aims.

My focus in this project is on rebel groups in weak states. I argue that these groups often function as modern day state-builders in the absence of consolidated nation-states. This venue offers more range of capabilities and points of external interference for study in the non-OECD world, though the conclusions in this work can be applied as well to groups such as the Basque separatists and Northern Irish rebel groups in Western Europe. The data collected in the field and from the literature reveals
that when moving from coercive to contractual the absence of rivals acts as the causal
mechanism for this change, and when a group moves from acting in a contractual
manner to the more coercive end of the spectrum, it is the presence of rivals enacting
this transformation.

1.0 The Puzzle

Why do some rebel groups change their behavior in relation to noncombatants?
That is, why do some rebel groups initially act in a highly coercive fashion toward host
communities, only to shift to increasingly contractual behavior? What is puzzling is that
despite similar external conditions other rebel groups evolve in the opposite direction,
moving from contractual to coercive behavior.

Labeling groups “coercive” indicates that they extract resources from local
communities without providing services or goods in return. This accounts for the use of
violence as a tool to acquire resources in such circumstances. On other hand, a
contractual rebel group is one that provides services in exchange for resources from
local communities, much like the relationship that develops between a state and its
citizens: in exchange for paying taxes, citizens receive public education, social services,
etc. Thus I view rebel groups as contemporary state-builders. They participate in state-
making, war-making, protection and extraction, all characteristics of state-building
according to Charles Tilly. In viewing these groups as state-builders – that is, entities
with future constituents to look after – it seems counterproductive to use coercive tactics
against civilians. Yet this is what occurs in some contemporary cases. For example, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began as a peasant self-
defense organization and at one point in its history came close to modeling itself as an alternative to the central government when Andres Pastrana’s administration agreed to create a demilitarized zone (zona de despeje). During past decades, however, the FARC has used notorious strategies that harm local communities, including the kidnapping of civilians and the slaughtering of villages. If, as Charles Tilly says of state-building, the object is to gather as many resources and as much support as possible, rebels and state regimes that fight within the boundaries of the state should attempt to recreate a mini-state-building dynamic. Abusing locals and forgoing access to material resources seems counterproductive to fighting enemies and asserting their authority so as to gain local acceptance. Drug trafficking arguably enticed the FARC away from the arduous tasks and compromises that cultivating a wide base of local support would entail. What caused this change? Why use such tactics on potential supporters when past experience dictates it is more effective to cultivate political and material support among peasant communities? Why do some rebel groups, on the other hand, develop strong ties with host communities, approaching what many locals believe are more optimal alternatives to the existing government and creating what rebels and their supporters call “liberated zones”?

1.1 Significance

The study of rebel groups and their behavior toward local communities addresses several over-arching themes. Among these topics is an understanding of the origins and nature of legitimate political order—contractual relations—in contemporary politics. My definition of legitimate political order is based on Max Weber’s concept of
“legitimate domination,” by which he means the expectation of obedience to command rests on the basis of a belief that those who execute orders also share a community of interests (Weber 1947). Herein lays the reciprocal exchanges between communities and “legitimate rebels” that define the contractual end of the scale of rebel treatment of civilians.

This project builds on the historical state-building literature and sheds light on state-building’s contemporary form. In doing so, this study explores the linkages between violence and order, a relationship that has been understood historically as a component of state-building (Olson 2000; Tilly 1985, 1990). Subsequently, this study examines why some rebel groups reject violence as a historically formidable tool of state-building by analyzing these groups within their own environments – taking into account their relationships with local noncombatants, the histories of their regions and inequalities, and by examining the role of the state and the international system. In examining shifting international and internal factors I find that contemporary state-building possesses a dynamism for which the literature has not accounted. The model I develop in this study suggests a nuanced nature to this process.

By accounting for internal as well as external forces in addressing transformation in rebel group behavior toward civilian populations, this dissertation also constructs a broad method of studying change in political science. This study presents a model that accounts for the links between international and state politics and the behavior of rebel groups and finds that this dynamic often produces unintended changes in rebel group behavior. For example, I find that members of the international community can
unknowingly deter some rebel groups from a strategy of mobilizing local communities, leading these groups to employ more coercive tactics against noncombatants. Policies aimed at pressuring rebels to respect human rights can, under a specific set of conditions, give rebel groups incentives to do the contrary. Alternately, specific shifts in international and local state relations with rebels have provoked the creation of deeper bonds with local communities, as exemplified by the contractual institutions the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) developed as it gained greater levels of dominance and control over southern regions.

Likewise, this study sheds new light on why other rebel groups become predatory in ways that go beyond approaches privileging the distribution of resources as a primary explanatory variable (Weinstein 2003, 2005, 2006). In cases where rebels do build strong connections with local communities, this study addresses the issue of how these links become institutionalized. By extension, it asks how some rebels create non-state political orders in the context of contemporary global reluctance to recognize new states and concerns about rebels who violate human rights. Predation and contractual behavior are ideals in their extreme, or what Weber refers to as “ideal types” and this study finds that rebel groups exhibit degrees of these elements of behavior.

This project serves a practical, policy-oriented purpose as well. It defines the conditions under which contemporary rebel groups are likely to behave as social movements to reform states or to make new ones. As such it identifies conditions under which rebel groups will become more or less predatory toward local populations. This study is designed to help policymakers understand the motivations behind changing
rebel group behavior and in so doing creates possibilities for social scientists and policymakers in tempering the most violent effects of internal conflicts.

1.2 Findings

The central finding of this study is that the monopoly over resource extraction as indicated by the presence or absence of significant rivals affects the rational calculations of rebel groups and their treatment of noncombatants. “Significant” rivals are those that threaten to extract from the same pool of resources from which the group in question extracts.\(^1\) Resources are that which facilitates a rebel group’s achievement of its goals and its operation. Such as people, food, support, guns, trucks, bullets, oil, and diamonds…anything which helps the group to obtain its objective. In other words, resources can be both physical as well as intangible, as in the case of popular support. If a rebel group is taxing drug traffickers who move through the rebel group’s territory, the group wants to be the only entity taxing these traffickers. Similarly, if a rebel group obtains food for its soldiers from local farmers, control over the mode of extraction means that it is the only group to which the farmers provide food. In other words, as one scholar has pointed out in his study of criminal organizations in post-Soviet Russia, the subject of concern is opportunity (Volkov 2002). Therefore, while rebels may claim to control specific territories (Kalyvas 2006), the key to explaining their behavior lies in their ability to dominate resource extraction. This is indicated by the presence or absence of rivals.

\(^1\) The implication here is that there are some actors and groups that are not significant rivals. These are groups that, while at times may engage in battle with the rebel group in question, they do not extract from the same pool of resources. Thus, these groups do not pose a direct or “significant” threat to the rebel group under examination.
Why is resource extraction important to rebel groups? These entities often operate in extreme environments where survival is rarely guaranteed on a day-to-day basis; for rebels, resources are scarce, in part because of their status as illegal armed actors, but also as a result of the conditions of the countries in which these groups survive. Rebels need resources to operate and resources are most efficiently accessed from local communities for the simple reason that such goods are right there! It is more efficient for rebel groups to extract resources from local communities because these resources are readily available. Rather than taking the time to raise their own crops, for example, rebels are more likely to take agricultural goods from local farmers. Therefore, rebels will in most cases look to local communities for resources. It turns out, then, that security-driven motivations can be predatory. Snyder and Jervis point out that the security fears of parties involved in civil wars were intertwined with predatory goals. Thus, security seekers are likely to take any opportunity to exploit others in order to build up strategic resources (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 16). This argument is in line with the theory presented here. Rebel groups that find themselves in a situation where threats to resources are increasing (a security threat) are likely to use predatory or coercive behavior toward noncombatants because increasing its security while rivals are present means reducing the security of others (Snyder and Jervis 1999, 19).

Rebel groups can extract resources from local communities in two general ways: through coercion (usually entailing force) or by behaving in a contractual manner. When a rebel group is the sole entity extracting from a pool of resources, it can more efficiently mobilize populations, collecting resources and accumulating strength in personnel to
gain autonomy from the state and potential rival rebel groups. Due to the scarcity of goods and resources in many environments in which these groups operate, if a rebel group can act as an intermediary between locals and outsiders – thus controlling the flow of scarce goods and the political distribution of norms that embed themselves in a host community – the group will behave in a more contractual manner, provided there are no significant threats their domination over resource extraction in the area. When rival groups – which can include a reforming state – enter the dynamic, coercion is likely to increase in the short-term. In this study, I place the treatment of civilians by rebel groups on a spectrum ranging from coercive to contractual (see Figure 1.1).

![Figure 1.1 Rebel Group Behavior Continuum](image)

Coercive = No services/goods in exchange for resources  
Contractual = Services/goods provided in exchange for resources

While the monopoly over resource extraction is the main factor affecting rebel group behavior, additional factors can intervene and shape the context of the rebel-local dynamic: international norms of democracy, the change in the need for resources, the type of resources (illicit or not), and the behavior of the state. In this study, however, I focus on the “need” and “type” factors as intervening variables, the reason being that international norms are constant across all cases (all groups operate in the same international environment). Likewise, in the majority of the cases herein, the
government’s behavior also remains constant – that is, the state is consistently coercive toward the local populations whom the rebel groups claim to represent. However, this variable does become a significant factor for the PKK, as will be demonstrated.

The “need” for resources, while it does not play a direct role in determining rebel group behavior, can provide a critical juncture necessary to force a group to choose a specific type of resource. The FARC demonstrated this process when it decided to focus on developing its military, increasing its number of fronts and necessitating a significant increase in need for resources. However, I consider these two factors to act as intervening variables. That is, the effects of need and type of resources shape the context in which rebel groups pursue extraction. The monopoly over resource extraction is the currency for which rebel groups struggle against rivals.

This study also finds that the quality of the state and international norms of democracy, while not acting as causal mechanisms, shape the local environment in which the groups operate. In some cases international norms can serve to enhance or diminish contractual rebel behavior. When foreign donor organizations and donor countries emphasize democratic norms as a condition for assistance, a rebel group with a monopoly of control will often imitate such representative forms of governance. For example, the SPLA characterized itself as a democratic reforming political movement following major changes in the way it dealt with local communities during the mid- to late 1990s. Like any other resource-maximizing individual or organization, rebel groups will adopt what on the surface appears antithetical to their nature in order to achieve their goal. Therefore, these groups are more likely to take the interests of those communities
into account in formulating their strategies when there is incentive to do so and if they will not lose their monopoly over resource extraction. In practical terms, this means rebel groups will become “better democratizers”, although this shift is dependent upon an underlying coercive element of rebel strategy (Metelits 2004). Rebel groups behave much like “stationary bandits” if they find that it allows them to more efficiently extract resources from locals.

However, in an unexpected consequence of democratization, this study finds that national governments and global norms that offer host populations the access to new political channels can encourage rebel groups to become more coercive toward noncombatants. That is, as the governing regime and transnational organizations such as the United Nations recognize and grant various forms of group rights and encourage autonomy to communities where rebels operate, those rebels – feeling their support networks and resources threatened as civilians shift their support (and resources) to the reforming state – are likely to increase the use of coercive measures against locals. One of the major parallel findings then is that democratization can have devastating effects on local populations in the short-term, resulting in a greater abuse of human rights on the part of rebels.

The existence of rivals for political allegiance such as a reforming state, additional rebel groups, or government-sponsored militia, can lead to an increase in local violence against noncombatants as groups do battle to determine the dominant extractor – to get rid of rivals and obtain a monopoly over resource extraction. This also occurs where diplomats, international organizations, and activists succeed in
independently organizing and mobilizing local communities outside of rebel efforts. In an interesting twist, rebel groups facing states that are more repressive to local populations in which rebel groups operate are far more likely to adopt international demands for democratic internal governance. They do so, however, only in conditions where they are confident that they can manipulate the implementation of “democratic reforms” in ways that allow them to maintain or increase their ability to be the sole resource extractor. Rebels will tolerate reciprocity if they can retain power in the area; they will become more democratic, but only insofar as they can benefit organizationally. “Benefit” here is defined as the ability of a rebel group to remain the primary resource extracting agency while preventing interloping political organizations such as rival rebel groups and the state from entering the arena. On the other hand, rebels will reject international norms of democracy (and the political and material resources that come with conforming to these norms) if it will result in increased rivals; rebel groups will refuse options of democracy and reject innovators who bring such pressures. The rejection of democratic norms will be more pronounced if the existing state becomes democratic, providing opportunities for communities to define and pursue goals that overlap or replace rebels’ goals and the benefits they can provide to locals.

1.3 Case Selection

The three groups that are the subject of this study are the SPLA, the FARC, and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) located from Turkey, though based in Northern Iraq. These groups share several important features. First, they have all persisted since the time of the Cold War. Despite the ever-changing nature of the international
environment, groups like the PKK and the FARC have survived, even though their original ideologies are no longer in line with the global norm of democratization that left Communism and Marxist beliefs largely behind. Unlike coups, which continue to be a tool for regime change in some African states, rebel groups fight battles that are not over in a day and where there is (or is expected to be) significant effort *ex ante* to bid for community support prior to achieving their primary goal.

Second, as is most often their nature, the rebel groups included in this analysis challenge a state regime as a response to historical inequalities and they do so from both within and outside of the states they are battling. Here I refer to both administrative and military arms of the groups. Both the SPLA and the FARC, for example, have offices in major cities outside of their countries of operation. In a similar vein, the PKK has been based in northern Iraq for several years. Thus all the groups in this study engage in cross-border activity. Ethnic Kurds in Turkey – the minority group for which the PKK portends to fight – live with insecure access to land, income, education, health and state resources. For decades this ethnic group in Turkey has been denied the ability to speak and learn its own language and to participate in cultural ceremonies. Likewise, the southern Sudanese, represented by the SPLA since 1983, have for centuries lived in relative deprivation in comparison to Arabs in the North of the country. British-Egyptian colonialism did not improve inequalities in the country when it officially administered the North and South as two separate entities. By the end of foreign rule, more than three-quarters of state expenditure went into the North.
A third point of similarity across cases, and perhaps the most relevant to this study, is that each rebel group examined here has undergone a change in its treatment of noncombatants. Variation occurs, therefore, not only in their behavior, but also in many of the explanatory variables. I find variation therefore, not only in the dependent variable, but also in the independent variable. In examining groups from three very distinct areas of the world, I recognize their inherent differences. Each rebel organization contains its own rich cultures, histories, languages, and religions and hence its own distinct relationships not only with locals, but also with the state and members of the international community. Because these vary from one case to the next, I am able to control for such factors as culture, regional characteristics, and identity-based politics when the outcomes are similar.

Further variation is demonstrated in each group’s access to and sources of resources, making them ideal cases to control for resource-based arguments. The FARC is regularly depicted as an enemy of the United States and as such has been placed on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations along with the PKK. This label limits the amount and type of support these two groups can obtain from international organizations such as humanitarian groups. The FARC, however, obtains funding from drug-trafficking and extortion. The PKK at one point acquired support from international drug trafficking, though much of its financial originates in the Kurdish Diaspora. As an enemy of a fundamental Islamist regime that at one point during the 1990s harbored Osama bin Laden, the SPLA found itself in an advantageous position in terms of resources. The nature of the Government of Sudan (GoS) created a natural
alliance between the SPLA and the West, shaping the type and amounts of material and moral support the rebel group acquired and further influencing its doctrine.²

The Cases

My analysis expands the understanding of armed groups’ changing behavior. Seen in the context of societal structures that mediate (or fail to mediate) norms, one sees that the SPLA historically exercised coercive domination over indigenous authority structures. During the 1980s, when the group first began fighting the repressive government of Sudan, the group’s Leninist command structure and reliance on Ethiopian backing gave it license to ignore local demands and to repress societal groups that it regarded as rivals. Since its success did not depend upon acceptance among local populations to willingly contribute resources for its sustenance, its members could prey upon communities without fear of consequences. When the group shifted its strategies in 1994, it appeared to integrate locally legitimate social structures by supporting traditional forms of governance. On the surface, this strategy exhibited a show of respect for evolving international norms of human rights and democratization. In fact, the SPLA’s leadership remained confident in its continuing ability to control the southern Sudanese that voiced these demands. Ironically, by the mid-1990s, the SPLA so dominated local social structures that it could seize the benefits of external

² I have argued elsewhere that this doctrine is merely a veneer for the purposes of acquiring significant resources and continued support from local populations (Metelits 2004). Such behaviors have been studied in other international entities. During the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) overcame unfavorable views of member states on their own membership by employing rhetorical action. Candidates used arguments based on the norms and values of the Western community to induce acquiescence for enlargement. As demonstrated by various modern rebel organizations, rhetorical action can consist of – among other things – expressive actions such as dress, mimics, and gestures (Schimmelfennig 2003).
patronage by voicing concern for human rights, while remaining secure in the knowledge that these ideas would not pose a risk to its control of the population. This security enabled the SPLA to adopt a less predatory strategy, yet one that still provided the group with resources independent of the contributions of host communities. This is a disturbing outcome for those concerned with enforcing norms of human rights and democratization. It suggests that successful implementation among insurgents is correlated with the degree of coercive domination prior to “reform”. Contrarily, the autonomy and density of “civil society” groups that can respond independently to new opportunities may prompt insurgents to ignore pressures to adopt these norms and opt instead for a more violent and predatory strategy. The extent to which locals become socialized into the intended function and not just the form of new norms remains to be seen, and has been a consideration as I have conducted research.

In contrast to the SPLA, the FARC began as a mediating force in rural Colombian society protecting various peasant communities in the southeastern region of the country. The organization came close to modeling itself as an alternative to the central government when the Pastrana administration agreed to create a demilitarized zone for the FARC, a geographically defined setting for the evolution of further peace talks between the group and the government. Such measures to bring the revolutionary left into mainstream political (peaceful) activity led to the development of La Unión Patriótica (UP), a formal political party composed of the FARC, the Communist Party of Colombia, and other left-wing representatives. Also significant in the FARC’s transformation to more coercive tactics toward locals was the existence of rival groups.
Around the time the UP fell apart, drug cartels were pushed out of Peru and established operations in the frontier zones where the FARC maintained a significant influence. A break in many of the tentative alliances between the rebels and the cartels occurred in 1987 when paramilitaries (paras) affiliated with the Medellín cartel, in complicity with the Colombian army, the police, and local landowners attacked the left. Faced with increasingly powerful rivals such as the AUC, the ELN and other right-wing paramilitary groups, the FARC adopted a more coercive strategy toward locals.

Unlike the SPLA and the FARC, the PKK has gone through multiple changes in its strategy and treatment of civilians. In 1984 the PKK launched military operations against Turkey. Initially, the goals of the PKK included the creation of a Kurdish state. Following the deportation and arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the group underwent numerous tactical transformations. In a move toward a more realistic reflection of the political environment, some members attempted to shift the group’s objective from a separate state to cultural and political autonomy. Interviews conducted in Turkey and Iraq indicate that some PKK cadres do not accept these changes, and it appears the organization is fracturing.

1.4 Methodology

In studying and analyzing the SPLA, the FARC, and the PKK, I use a variety of methods. One of the primary modes of gathering data was to conduct fieldwork in the locations of these three rebel groups. To research the SPLA, the FARC, and the PKK, I traveled and conducted fieldwork in Kenya, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Turkey, Northern Iraq, and Colombia. I acquired information primarily by conducting semi-structured
interviews with non-governmental organization (NGO) officials, grassroots organization leaders, displaced individuals and groups, refugees, government officials, embassy representatives, church leaders, journalists, academics, rebel soldiers and rebel commanders. In two of the three cases I studied, I was able to travel and stay with local detachments of rebel groups. All in all, I conducted over 100 personal interviews. I traveled to large urban cities such as Bogotá, Ankara, Irbil and Nairobi as well as rural towns and villages such as Rumbek in southern Sudan and Chinulito in Colombia. I was housed by international humanitarian organizations, journalists, students, churches and rebel groups themselves. I stayed with the PKK, for example, in northern Iraq for over a week. I also traveled for 13 hours by car during the rainy season, from Uganda to Nimule, southern Sudan with a rebel commander tasked with de-mining the area. I also traveled with an activist and lobbying organization from the U.S. in the northern region of Colombia. Doing so was one of the only safe ways to get access to the most rural regions of the country. This work could not have been done without the assistance and protection of such individuals.

My fieldwork also allowed me time to collect primary literature. This literature ranged from rebel group propaganda to inter-group communiqués, to NGO reports. This work was just as valuable as much of the interviews I conducted in providing me with a sense of the situations on the ground as well as the perspectives of the organizations I interviewed and studied.

Another source of information was an extensive review of secondary literature surrounding conflict and the three rebel groups in particular. I looked to such literature
for studies of historical state-building, rebel groups and social movements, conflicts, as well as analyses of international norms. This literature provided the framework from which to work and debate, as well as a point of departure. Some of this research was accessed from the Northwestern University Library, though much of it I found while exploring the British Library’s Collection and the stacks at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Second, I studied hundreds of human rights reports on all three rebel groups. These reports were most often written and published by international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and International Crisis Group. The in-depth analysis and reporting works provide allowed me to trace the behavioral development of the rebel groups in relation to local populations. Some of the reports I analyzed were sent to me via email from contacts in Kurdish Turkey and Colombia.

The small-n nature of this study makes it most conducive to qualitative analysis. Whereas statistical studies risk problems such as conceptual stretching by massing together dissimilar cases to achieve a large n, case studies facilitate conceptual refinement with more validity over a smaller number of cases (George and Bennett 2004). While several quantitative datasets of “low-intensity” or internal conflicts exist, often involving actors such as rebels, few combine this with in-depth field research. Furthermore, these studies do not capture the variables studied here – change in rebel group behavior and the factors that affect these changes. There have been great strides made in uncovering the benefits of qualitative analysis in recent years. Scholars such as

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3 See for example the Correlates of War Intra-State War data set and the PRIO Centre for the Study of Civil Wars Armed Conflicts dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Database.
Ragin, Mahoney, and Gerring have helped to develop more robust techniques. These methods facilitate a careful examination of rebel group behavior and its transformation.

The empirical examination makes use of three methodological tools – process-tracing, crisp-set analysis, and fuzzy-set analysis – to examine and interpret the data collected in the field and through a review of secondary sources. These methods allow me to look at the different contextual conditions alongside the three main variables I have chosen as likely cause a change in rebel group behavior toward civilians. Process-tracing focuses on sequential processes within a certain historical case. It allows one to parcel out the events and figures involved in complex interactions and processes and often uses typological theorizing as a way to model this complexity (George and Bennett 2004); it formalizes the multiple links in the causal chain (Gerring 2007).

Because this study analyzes both macro- and micro-level phenomena, process-tracing is particularly helpful, and provides a way for drawing causal inferences when it is not possible to do so via controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2004). Process-tracing also allows us to easily identify critical junctures, key points in time that, depending on the choice an actor or actors make, is consequential because it can lead to the development of patterns that endure over time (Mahoney 2001). Changes in rebel behavior arise from the complex conjunctions of factors that are more easily and accurately assessed using this method.

I also employ two Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approaches – crisp-set and fuzzy-set analysis (Ragin 1987, 2000). The former helps to highlight the dynamics of process by first providing a dichotomous account of variables (Clement
accessed 2007) – in this case the variables’ presence or absence. Presence of a variable or condition is noted with a “1”. The absence of a variable is denoted by a “0”. The qualitative data is then minimized. Using combinations of the variables, I find that the configurations of these different conditions can produce the same outcome. This is known as equifinality, or “multiple conjunctural causation,” meaning there is more than one pathway to the same outcome.

Fuzzy sets take the data beyond mere dichotomous scoring by indicating a continuous set calibrated to indicate degree of membership; it allows the scaling of membership scores, permitting partial (fuzzy) membership in combinations of variables or sets. Whereas the “1” and “0” of crisp-sets represent the presence or absence, values between 0 and 1 are given as continuous sets standardized to indicate degrees of membership. Throughout this study, I employ a five-score calibration: a score of 1.0 means a condition is “fully in”, 0.75 denotes “more in than out”, 0.5 represents the cross-over point, the point at which a variable is neither more present nor more absent, 0.25 represents “more out than in” and 0 denotes that a condition is “fully out”. In this way, the scores of the cases can reflect the degree to which a case is in or out of a set of (e.g.,) coercive group behavior, where membership can vary from being fully present to fully absent. Perhaps the need for resources in one case had a marked effect on the causal process of change, yet in another case the need was quite low. Fuzzy sets provide links between data and theory and facilitate the determination of the strength of outcomes by assigning degrees of intensity to the variables (Ragin 2000).
1.5 A Note on Levels of Analysis

Analytical tools are often pitched at the level of the nation-state. Thus, rebel organizations often are depicted as being acted upon. National political institutions are described as representing a primary cause for rebel activity and by extension their specific behaviors. However, as a result social institutions such as culture, history, and local group relations are perceived as weakened in the face of state authority. While I do not refute the strength and significance of the state’s impact, I maintain that a state-centered analysis narrows our study and understanding of rebel groups. Rebel activity indeed occurs within the boundaries of internationally recognized sovereign states. Power is often depicted as flowing from larger entities, such as states, inward to impact local actors, such as rebels. However, this illustration of the direction of “power flows” provides an inaccurate understanding of what occurs locally to affect the behavior of rebel groups toward host communities.

Some political scientists – in particular international relations scholars – expand their analyses beyond the boundaries of states. Several authors, for example, have studied the influence and power of transnational networks that spring up around specific movements. Skocpol accomplishes this in her analysis of revolutions in States and Social Revolutions. She locates the causes of revolutions within the nexus of the international system of nation-states and the national political system of the landed upper classes, state ministers and bureaucrats as they contend with fiscal reform (Skocpol 1979). However, there is much that can be overlooked in using such a lens.

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4 See (Bob 2005; Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999)
While taking an international approach escapes the limits of national analyses, it – like a state-centered methodology – misses the influences of local or “on the ground” politics in understanding rebel behavior toward noncombatants.

In past studies local factors such as rival groups and the type of resources used to fund rebels have been overlooked by contemporary political science scholars. This is especially true in the wake of scholarly preferences of more systematic comparison from among large numbers of cases. Therefore, readers may find that my argument stresses the importance of the much harder to measure “local aspect” more than national and international influences. In the three groups presented here – all of which include firsthand observations and over 100 interviews in several countries, including several conflict zones – rebel behavior in relation to noncombatants fundamentally depends on the ability of these actors to remain the only group extracting from a resource pool more than it relies on the effects of national and international environments.

Nevertheless, I find varying degrees of threat and opportunity from such factors as international norms and coercive or contractual states. The SPLA, and specifically the Southern Sudanese, constantly face a repressive state, whereas the Kurds in Turkey at first faced an outwardly repressive and coercive state, though the recent actions on the part of Turkey to join the European Union may mitigate this repression of the PKK. These variances in turn affect the levels of violence that rebel organizations

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5 As will be explained in the following chapter, more recent studies such as Weinstein (2006) and Kalyvas (2006) are exceptions and have helped move the conflict studies forward by their examination of local-level factors.
display against those they profess to represent. Nevertheless, at the end of the day it is the presence or absence of rivals that is the mechanism for transforming rebel group behavior.

1.6 Presentation of the Argument

This chapter has introduced the primary puzzle under investigation – the changing behavior of rebel groups toward civilians. The remainder of the dissertation is organized along the following lines. Having introduced the basic theoretical argument, Chapter Two provides both a review of the relevant literature and an explanation of the model derived from this study. I look at the “rebel group” or “non-state armed actor” literature and examine how it has changed over the past century, from being largely associated with the Cold War to today often being described as post-ideological and resource-driven. This and other issues related to rebel groups are examined. I also analyze the link between the rebel group and state-building literatures, and conclude that rebels are in many instances contemporary state-builders. Finally, this chapter looks at the key independent variable and the intervening variables that help structure the rebel group environment.

Chapter Three examines the change in the behavior of the SPLA from a group that committed numerous human rights abuses against its would-be supporters, to a nascent state that garnered the support of both local southerners as well as the international community. Following a brief background description of Sudan, I look at the evolution of the SPLA, from a Marxist group supported by Ethiopia’s Mengistu, to a disunited, faction-prone organization, to a group that drafted its own constitution and
provided security and order to southern Sudan. I discuss the various changes that took place both internationally and locally that structured the local Sudanese environment and spurred the group to change its strategies in managing local communities.

Chapter Four details the formation and development of the PKK and its transformative history. Following a brief discussion of the general plight of the Kurds in the Middle East, I examine the development of the Kurdish Workers’ Party in Turkey. I then provide a study of the group’s strategies, particularly in relation to local Kurdish communities, following the start of its military operations in Syria. I examine how these strategies changed over the lifetime of the group and the effects of such events as the arrest and imprisonment of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Finally, I suggest a reason for changes the group experienced and provide analysis that suggests which direction the group is moving – toward becoming more coercive or more contractual.

The FARC is the subject of Chapter Five, and is a direct contrast to the two cases preceding it. Unlike the SPLA and the initial years of the PKK, the FARC made a change from contractual to coercive behavior. I trace the evolution of the FARC, from a group that had its roots in peasant self-defense organizations, supporting – among other things – better working conditions for agricultural workers in the Tolima region, to its growth as an independent guerrilla organization with resources springing from narco-traffickers and extortion. I examine the variables that structure the rebel group environment and which ultimately lead to the FARC’s violent strategies.

Chapter Six, provides an in-depth analysis of the three cases using the QCA and fuzzy-set approaches. These specific types of qualitative analyses confirm that the
monopoly of resource extraction is the critical variable for explaining the transformation of rebel group behavior toward civilians. These approaches also highlight the various nuances each variable has on the separate rebel groups, thus enhancing the multiple causal pathways to the same or similar outcomes. This is followed by a discussion of this study’s findings and what they mean for academics and policy makers.
CHAPTER TWO

The Rebel Group Dynamic and Its Consequences for Change

…so much is evident in itself, that this, like every other subject which does not surpass our powers of understanding, may be lighted up, and being made more or less plain in its inner relations by an inquiring mind, and that alone is sufficient to realize the idea of a theory.

Von Clausewitz, *On War*

2.0 Introduction

Soon after its inception during the early 1980s, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) became infamous for committing massive human rights abuses against communities on whose behalf it claimed to be fighting. This included looting, kidnapping children, coercing civilians, summary executions, and the creation of famine conditions in southern Sudan. Yet in 1994, the group significantly transformed its strategy toward noncombatants. It separated its military from its civil administration and established structures of governance, including a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. It is reasonable that the SPLA would strive for unity and greater legitimacy. It is not clear, however, why this shift occurred when it did and against the personal interests of faction leaders who still had ample resources at their disposal.

In direct contrast to the SPLA, the FARC had its roots in peasant self-defense organizations, supporting – among other issues – better working conditions for

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6 While much of the civilian devastation that occurred during the SPLA’s early years were the effects of battles between the rebel group and the Government of Sudan (GoS), many observers maintain that struggles against rival factions within the rebel group claimed more civilian lives (Human Rights Watch 1994)
agricultural workers in the Tolima region. On this basis it enjoyed a measure of local support. However, the late 1980s saw the FARC quickly evolve into a more violent and locally coercive rebel group with resources stemming from drug-trafficckers and extortion (Safford and Palacios 2002). Violence against local civilian populations in Colombia perpetrated by the FARC began to increase exponentially.

Each transformation in behavior described here occurred within similar international circumstances, in this case the end of the Cold War and rising international pressures on rebels to respect basic human rights. Paradoxically, these groups also appear to shift political strategies against their rational interests in maximizing resources and support. The FARC, for example, could have become involved in drug trafficking much earlier than it did. It also is baffling as to why insurgencies such as the SPLA do not engage in the FARC’s kind of kidnapping for raising funds, for example. Moreover, the FARC turned its back on a viable political strategy that had built up a reservoir of legitimacy through past interactions with local communities. Drug trafficking would benefit some FARC members and supporters, but it also brought insecurity to communities, undermining the rebel group’s initial appeal as a parallel government.

What mechanism for change is most critical in determining rebel group behavior in relation to local communities? Is the international environment of nation-states, with increasing post-Cold War tendencies to favor democratic standards the key to affecting rebel behavior? Is the type of resource – either illicit or not – a determinant of strategy? Does a change in need for resources lead to a transformation of rebel group behavior? Or is the causal mechanism for transforming rebel group behavior to be found in a
group’s need to be the sole extractor of resources and hence have no rivals? This dissertation makes the claim that parties that fight a governing regime using a range of violent and non-violent political means to achieve their objectives respond to and are influenced primarily by local dynamics as they are by the international and national environments. The strategies that rebel groups engage in with relation to local populations reveal a great deal about their strength, longevity, and most importantly their tendency to engage in coercive or contractual behavior and the transformation from one to the other. More specifically, this study reveals that, in the end, the presence of significant rivals determines the type of behavior these groups display toward civilian populations.

2.1 Rebel Groups

In recent years, policymakers have identified rebels as major obstacles to the resolution of wars and the mitigation of violence. Rebel groups use violence in purposeful ways, it being one of their primary political resources to reformulate or destroy the legitimate foundation of politics in an existing state (O’Neill 1990). Thus it is virtually axiomatic that war is a popular form of policy among these non-state organizations. In classic “Clausewitzian” terms, war is a continuance of policy by other means.

Rebels and those among whom they operate hold diverse ideas about the violence these groups employ. Rebels are often referred to as “rebels,” “guerrillas,” “bandits,” “separatists,” and “terrorists,” depending upon the observer’s political viewpoint about the conflicts involving these actors as well as the evolving context of
warfare and battle. During the 1950s, Africans fighting colonial occupiers were referred to as “terrorists” while most Africans considered them to be “nationalists.” Forces in Eastern Nigeria during the 1960s were labeled “ethnic separatists,” while the Biafrans referred to their movement as one of “self-determination.” The ruling Portuguese faced what they referred to as “communist rebels” during the 1970s in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique, while those who wanted an end to colonial rule called these groups “freedom fighters” (Reno forthcoming).

These varying perceptions of rebels can leave the observer somewhat confused. What are the ideological and programmatic parameters of insurgent action and what determines how rebels choose goals and means to implement them? Some would argue that rebels have little choice in respect to the strategies they choose. This argument is based upon the actions of Cold War era superpowers, which sought to cultivate rebels as proxies in the struggle for global political and economic influence. In return for military supplies and diplomatic support, rebels had to take on the ideological trappings of their backers (David 1991).

More recently, Kaldor (1999) and others identify what they view as an absence of mobilization around ideological platforms. Scholars identify “new wars” in which rebels merge with organized crime networks and use coercion or destabilizing tactics in local communities to build criminalized economies that they control (Kaldor 1999). Closely related to this “war as business” perspective of new wars is warlordism wherein rival armed groups practice organized looting along with or in place of military confrontation. At the head of such a group is a dominant authority – a warlord (Allen 1999) – who
operates by looting and taxing areas under his control and by fostering export trade with
outside business interests. These interests have included foreign firms (Reno 1993),
political elites in neighboring states, and ECOMOG commanders (Duffield 1998; Reno
1996). The nature of these “new wars” – also referred to as wars of the “third kind” (Rice
1988) – is described by one conflict scholar as follows:

No single crisis precipitates them, and they typically do
not start at a particular date. There are no declarations
of war, there are no seasons for campaigning, and few
end with peace treaties. Decisive battles are few. Attrition,
terror, psychology, and actions against civilians highlight
“combat.” Rather than highly organized armed forces based
on a strict command hierarchy, wars are fought by loosely knit
groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, and not infrequently by
locally-based warlords under little or no central authority.
(Holsti 1996, 20)

As opposed to most wars fought before 1945, new wars are not between states, rather
they are intrastate conflicts. Between the end of the Second World War and 1995, 77 of
the 164 conflicts were internal. That is, armed conflict was not against another state but
was fought against the governing authorities or between various armed communities
within the state (Holsti 1996). Wars have transformed from being institutionalized – the
Clausewitzian eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concept of conflict – to battles that
have no fronts, no uniforms and no respect for the territorial limits of the state (Van
Creveld 1991). As a result, violence in these “new wars” is targeted largely at civilians
instead of rival groups. Vulnerable groups such as women, children and refugees are
often the primary targets as rebels use rape and kidnapping as weapons of war (Allen
1999). Such wars have been noted for their seeming break with an ideological past as
well. Holsti claims that what were once considered ideological wars – conflicts fought for
universal principles such as socialism or democracy – merely masked social cleavages and other grievances held by communities within states (Holsti 1996). These explanations for rebel group behavior point to external (international) factors as key determinant variables. The weakness in this type of explanation is that it provides very little agency for rebel groups.

**Post-Ideological Rebels?**

Some scholars explain this supposed non-ideological tendency among rebels in terms of local social structures such as the rise of an urban “lumpen proletariat” that has little in common with the rural peasantry and uses violence as the only way to control them (Mkandawire 2002). This motivation for behavior is devoid of programmatic or broad political justifications. While it may reward individual rebel group members, it does not involve the evolution of any significant contractual relationship with a particular community of supporters. Usually, such rebel groups are simply extensions of earlier political violence. For example, politicians in Sierra Leone were culpable in much of the violent behavior of “lumpenised youth” after recruiting thugs and criminals into national security apparatuses, detaching these new “experts in violence” from the social groups in whose name rebels previously fought (Kandeh 1999). For these scholars, “new wars” are non-ideological because they draw in the rural poor in ways that are much more difficult to mobilize and control with programmatic platforms. Snow claims that these “new wars” are absent of a discernible political ideology altogether – something with which the group can justify its activities (Snow 1996). While individual fighters are not
bereft of ideas, they either have the wrong ones or they cannot coordinate among themselves. The problem then is one of poor leadership and faulty coordination.

Since the 1980s, there has been a great deal of attention directed at the impact of natural resources on rebels and the wider conduct and organization of conflict within states. Some scholars link the scramble for natural resources (Keen 1998; Collier 2000b; Weinstein 2003; Ross 2004) and the development of organized crime networks (Kaldor 1999) to a perceived tendency for rebels to abuse local community members in favor of exploiting opportunities in the global economy, which their control over people and resources garners them. Collier and Hoeffler provide the foundation for the “looting model of rebellion”, observing that “opportunities are more important in explaining conflict than are motives” (Collier and Hoeffler 2001, 2). Their analysis of 78 civil conflicts between 1960 and 1999 lends validity to the argument that the availability of abundant natural resources plays a major role in providing such opportunities. Scholars of this argument view the rational choices of rebels in the context of individual incentives and the availability of easily lootable resources. In this context, rebels fight largely for personal enrichment obtained through loot they may seize in conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). According to some US security analysts, insurgencies have indeed transformed into commercial operations with the larger goal being the search for wealth (Metz 1993). When material incentives are used to recruit participants in conflict, high levels of civilian abuse are exhibited (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004). While the development of criminal networks run by rebels is important in the survival of these organizations, it is not the primary determinant of these actors’ behavior toward local
populations. One can identify counter-factual cases in which rebels actually forego or even give up these opportunities. For example, the SPLA could have kidnapped and/or killed aid workers as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) did in Uganda. Furthermore, groups in Africa could have cultivated drugs, modeling groups like the Taliban. However, they declined such options.

Much of this literature ignores the wider political context of this behavior. While a few scholars such as Collier point to the presence of weak state institutions as contributing to the rise of predatory non-ideological rebels, in general this particular aspect of the conflict literature discounts the ideological capacity of individual fighters. These two categories see a decline in ideological motivations and expression among rebel groups, yet they differ on where they perceive the deficit. For the former, it is the problem of the society and leadership. For the latter, individual fighters do not seem to be capable of articulating ideologies. In fact, this latter perception is rather static. Where, other than outside tutelage and resources, would ideological rebels come from? If everyone is motivated by the acquisition of loot, there should not be any ideology (except getting rich as quickly as possible) anywhere. This fails to explain past phenomena such as rebel groups that persisted in ideological mobilization even during the Cold War against incentives that would-be superpowers provided. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), for example, was a Marxist insurgency, despite the fact that the Soviet Union aided their ally from 1977 to the USSR’s reevaluation of foreign policy in the late 1980s. Moreover, it built and operated extensive “liberated zones” with significant local support.
More often than not, contemporary small wars have clear political objectives, and the perpetrators of coercion possess rational political aims. An inability to communicate these goals is more a result of poverty and isolation than it is any natural tendency towards anarchy and devastation (Richards 1996). In Richards’ analysis of the Sierra Leonean insurgency he points out that the violence during the 1990s was often cited as an example of New Barbarism due to its high levels of atrocities perpetrated against civilians. Some scholars such as Kaplan (1994) compare the groups of youth who inflicted some of this violence against populations in Sierra Leone to the mercenary hordes that ravaged 17th century Germany before the conclusion of the Thirty Years War. Richards reminds us, however, that in war there are always opportunistic individuals and groups who complicate an already unruly environment. Furthermore, the explanation for the endurance of these contemporary civil wars lies in that which can help clarify the initiation of conflicts in the first place: social factors (Richards 1996).

Global economic connections are important for rebel groups, although the cases examined here demonstrate that other relationships play key roles in shaping how rebels pursue and use resources. Resources *per se* are not a primary cause of variation in insurgent behavior. While they influence their strategies and the perceptions of choices, rebels’ connections to resources are in fact embedded in a different set of relationships. Rebels shape their strategies toward local communities according to the number of rivals they have. If these actors can achieve and/or maintain their status as the sole extractors of resources with relatively little threat from other political and military authorities, they are more likely to seek mutually beneficial ties with local populations.
However, once rebels perceive a threat to extraction – most often in the form of rival groups or state reform – they are more likely to harm locals. They do this to acquire more immediate access to resources (Weinstein 2005, 2006) and to prevent rival groups from establishing political authority over these communities. To the extent that existing states, global actors, and rival local rebels threaten this hegemony, those pressures will make rebel groups more likely to engage in “resource wars” and the systematic abuse of human rights.

One study that fruitfully diverges from the greed and grievance debate is Stathis Kalyvas’ *Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Like the present study, Kalyvas examines the variation between the micro-level and macro-level experiences of war. He finds that opposing groups use violence instrumentally to try to collect local information that they can use to control local people. For Kalyvas, the key causal variable is control, what he defines as “the extent to which actors are able to establish exclusive rule on a territory” (Kalyvas 2006, 111). He predicts that violence is most likely to occur where one actor is nearly hegemonic, and not where this actor is in full control or is being actively contested because there is a conjunction of group capabilities to apply violence and the prospect that this violence will produce local information that armed actors can use to fortify their control. Though he does not reference much of this literature, his work fits into the counterinsurgency framework that views violence against locals as a form of communication and as a fairly precise instrument of strategy. In other words, Kalyvas, unlike the present study, is concerned with the state and its competitors. “Political actors

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7 I would like to thank Will Reno for this observation.
use violence to achieve multiple, overlapping, and sometimes mutually contradictory goals” (Kalyvas 2006, 23), he argues. In this way he offers a respectable critique of the literature that sees violence as a continuing cause of civil wars, or violence for violence’s sake (Kalyvas 1999, 2006). This study in many ways takes Kalyvas’ definition of control and expands upon it. This study sees control as the monopoly over the extraction of resources. Such resources can include land, but they can also be people, crops, diamonds, and guns. Furthermore, where Kalyvas views violence as an instrument of strategy, the present study views it as a strategy that groups are often forced to choose. It is not so much that rebels prefer to exercise coercive behavior (and here coercion is not necessarily physical violence --- coercion is the taking of resources and providing no services or goods in return). Rather if faced with rivals, rebel groups find that coercive behavior is their only option if they are to a) survive and b) continue to strive to achieve their objectives. Using a rational framework, he argues that during periods of intense conflict, there will be more violence in order to reduce civilian defection.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the subsequent termination of support for proxy conflicts, and the so-called end of international ideological battles, several rebel groups continue to follow – at least in name – the leftist ideas of this era. The FARC, for example, continues to refer to itself as a “Marxist organization.” Likewise, the Nepalese rebels carry the label “Maoist rebels,” as do other rebel movement in Southeast Asia. Despite their portrayal as small bands of nomadic outlaws, these groups can consist of large numbers of soldiers, both male and female. This demonstrates that there exists a
possibly consistent ideological motivation among rebel groups and that this can
translate into significant ties to local communities. Yet, like these actors, the ideological
motivations are diverse. New war rebels and less coercive groups can exist in poor
countries in the same historical period. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation
(EZLN) claims to represent the poor and disposessed of this region. Not only did this
group have the popular support of much of the indigenous in Chiapas and surrounding
regions, it also attracted transnational NGO support for the rebels’ defense of
indigenous rights, human rights and social justice (Bob 2005). At the same time, the
FARC’s image as a group inflicting terror on locals and participating in narco-trafficking
increased during the 1990s. In fact, one can find different kinds of rebels in the same
general period of time and the in same region. Rwandan exiles fought in a hierarchical
and cohesive Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) up until their victory in 1994. Those they
chased out of Rwanda by 1997 were being studied as “new war” rebels without
ideology. All of these individuals were Rwandan (or at least from that region) and all
were post-Cold War rebels. The point here is that rebels possess agency – they
strategize and make choices. However the agency they possess clearly lays within a
constrained arena of action. While these groups have choices, they cannot always
choose the strategy they prefer due to mitigating circumstances. This project
investigates these choices and the resulting behavior among rebels that they foster.

2.2 Rebel Groups as Contemporary State-Builders

Other rebel groups have organized quasi-states (Spears 2004) or states-within-
states in areas under their control. It is in such “liberated zones” in this post-Cold War
era that rebel groups such as the SPLA established state-like institutions such as
governing councils, courts, tax bureaus and diplomatic offices for foreign travelers.
These larger and somewhat more rooted groups are quite distinct from the smaller,
more predatory groups of soldiers in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and the
Central African Republic. Bands that crossed from Côte d'Ivoire in 1989 joined Sierra
Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and became “warlords” (Reno 1998,
forthcoming). In response to this, many individuals developed “civil defense forces.” Yet
what most of these defense organizations have in common is a state-building objective
and because of this they use violence to transform or destroy the politics of a central
governing authority and to administer in its place. While these rebels’ specific goals are
distinct, they share in a broad desire to change the current system of politics. Moreover,
they carry out four types of interrelated activities that have been identified as state-
building characteristics. These are:

1. War-making: The elimination or neutralization of rivals outside the areas
   where they have apparent and continuous claim as the wielders of force;
2. State-making: The elimination or neutralization of rivals within these
   territories;
3. Protection: The elimination or neutralization of the enemies of their
   constituents or host communities;
4. Extraction: The acquisition of the means to carry out these first three activities
   (Skocpol 1985; Tilly 1985).

Because we are dealing with rebel groups that are engaged in intra-state conflicts, we
can view these groups as state-builders.

Insurgent ideologies can reflect rebel relations with local communities. For some,
ideology is an optimal way to mobilize and organize people and resources. Rebels
operate in this social context of control over these factors. Historically, state-building
projects have often employed ideology as a political tool. Nationalism – collective action which renders boundaries of the nation in sync with those of its governing entity – is just such an ideological device used to guide individuals to the perspective that they share a common history, a shared culture, and a common homeland (Hechter 2000). Groups such as the Irish Fenians used patriotism for native Ireland to develop the Fenian Movement in both Ireland and the United States. Hungarian and Greek nationalists also used this device during the 19th century to foster state-building. Hence, it seems logical that contemporary rebels would also use ideology to gain local legitimacy and mobilize followers to further their state-building objective.

The prospect that rebels can be contemporary state-builders provides a springboard into analyzing and explaining their behavior toward noncombatants. Just as the study of contemporary rebels involves the analysis of the relations between them and local societies, historical state-building also examines the interplay of violent groups and local populations. The literature on past efforts among rebels to build states (thus “freedom fighters” or “nationalist saviors” to some and “terrorists” and “bandits” to others) provides much more relevant theorizing about these social relationships that underlie definitions of ideology and ultimately the target of this study – the variations in their behavior toward local populations.

Robert Bates notes that historically the strongest states grew out of the efforts of armed gangs to determine how to better organize their looting operations. These groups negotiated with local communities, encouraging them to continue producing resources to fund their armed organizations. Armed groups quickly discovered that it was to their
benefit to heed the interests of local communities for fear that they drive their sources of material and economic support into bankruptcy (Bates 2001). Today, it is a common observation that some acts of violence do more political harm than good and hence some armed actors would limit atrocities (Snow 1996). Thus contractual rebel groups may conclude that it is more advantageous to provide public goods and especially security to local communities that they can use as willing providers of resources, recruiting and political support. This dynamic is demonstrated by Hezbollah in Lebanon. This group has created a state-within-a-state that protects its Shiite supporters, taxes them, provides social services and fights foreign invaders like Israelis.

In a similar vein, Mancur Olson devised his well-known categories of bandits to explain how different armed groups operated in relation to host communities. The latter enjoyed more success in the long-run because they ensured that their local “victims” could continue to produce wealth by permitting such basic social transactions as engaging in independent economic activity and allowing freedom of movement to foster economic development. In fact, Olson concluded that the most efficient armed groups were the most democratic ones. The more secure the “victims,” the more they produced, increasing the amount of resources the armed groups could extract despite it being at a lower rate of imposition (Olson 1993).

Olson built his interpretation on observations by Lucian Pye (1971) who observed variation among Chinese warlords during the 1920s. According to his classification, there existed two types of rebels at the time – predatory “roving bandits” in the form of White Wolf and “stationary bandit” in the form of Feng Yü-hsiang’s National People’s
Army. Feng, the warlord leader of the Kuominchün or NPA in Northern China, relied on personal relations and rewards to maintain control over a compact area and to move from being solely a military persona to a political one. This indicates that, indeed, variation among rebel groups is not a new phenomenon, but has existed throughout the world for years.

These observations suggest that, like states, rebels ought to confront overwhelming incentives to treat local communities well and listen to their interests, at least in the long-term, even as other rebels in the same region and at the same time chose other paths. This view of aggregate interests of armed groups is radically at odds with analyses above such as Collier's that look at individual incentives. For the former, there is no route to success that does not include discipline and some regard for community interests in return for support. For the latter it would seem that this is impossible for these rebel groups are always trumped by the short-term interests of individual commanders or followers to grab what they can before someone else does.

History shows us that rebel groups can evolve in both directions. Tilly follows Weber in his claim that state-making is the process of defeating internal rivals, a sort of conflict-within-a-conflict. The political actors responsible for this defeat then concentrate the administrative and coercive apparatus that form the institutional backbone of a strong state (Tilly 1990). This process varied among early state-builders and while it was not necessarily the most efficient form that arose from the change in the international system, it was the organizational form that survived the selection process
and developed out of early armed groups’ adaptations to economic transformation and the politics of coalitional bargaining (Spruyt 1994).

One of the crucial elements in the evolution of the state (and by extension a factor of success for rebel groups) is the social bargain between different actors. Much like the development of ties to local populations by Olson’s stationary bandits, this bargain was one that centered on an agreement between actors with coercive power on the one hand and those with economic power on the other (Spruyt 1994). Perry Anderson noted the importance of this social bargain between rulers and ruled. The construction of the national state and its organizational consequences were a function of the relative weight and centralization of coercion, the latter of which is key to this book’s argument since rebel-community relations are based on coercion with in the end and not merely friend exchange. Absolutism in his analysis was a functional requirement for states in Eastern Europe that wished to survive the geo-political pressures from more competitive neighboring polities, particularly those in Western Europe. While war provided monarchies with the political leverage to overcome resistance to authority that had then become centralized (Anderson 1979), society’s principal armed groups nevertheless were forced to accommodate productive groups in society to get the resources and popular support they required to obtain their goals. As Anderson’s different trajectories of state development demonstrated, these bargains were often forced (coercion) and imposed severe penalties on those who refused them.

Despite the parallels between early state-building and modern rebels, this literature leaves us without the resources to explain modern rebel behavior. In fact,
scholars have used the historical analysis of state-building to explain primarily the lack of consolidation in the developing world. In Europe, the competition for territory as a result of rising population growth and the consequent diplomatic pressures led to the formation of states (Herbst 2000). The “continuous aggressive competition for trade and territory among changing states of unequal size…made war a driving force in European history” (Tilly 1990, 54). In Europe, capital centers developed close connections with peripheral areas, which further enhanced state strength. Links to rural areas enhanced security as border defenses protected the center from external competitors and at the same time fostered internal consolidation (Tilly 1990).

The particular avenue of European state-building has been shared by few other regions of the world. For example, by 1975 Africa had the population density equivalent to Europe in 1500. Furthermore, unlike the relations that transpired between the capital centers and the rural regions in Europe, the colonial powers in many developing areas were not interested in fostering tight political ties to their periphery except in a few sectors that were more easily controlled. The scarcity of land in Europe necessitated these more extensive ties for defensive purposes. The large expanses of land in places like Africa, however, stifled any colonial drive to establish defensive borders as well as stunted the growth of large administrative state apparatuses with close ties to rural areas. Thus, during colonialism, much of the developing world lacked the internal consolidation that took place in Europe. Consequently, upon their decolonization, these regions did not have a strong central state. The period of decolonization further adds to the incongruence in using the historical state-building literature to analyze developing
regions of the world. During this time, nationalists became heads of newly independent states that were molded according to how colonial rulers conducted politics. That is, these new leaders based politics primarily in urban centers with few links to peasant populations living in outlying communities (Herbst 2000).

Scholarship on areas further east than the early European states such as England and France provides partial insight into ways that some non-Western states developed and the motivations behind their particular state-building behavior. In the newly forming Ottoman state, for example, state-building was not a result of the classical mix of capital and coercion. Rather, the Ottoman rulers chose to build states largely through public co-optation and bargaining with potentially violent non-state actors. Their strategy was to incorporate the peasantry and rotate elites, keeping both groups dependent on the center. Bandits emerging from mercenary troops employed in the Empire’s wars were likewise more interested in accumulating resources from the state than they were in challenging it. Similarly, the Ottomans were willing and able to control and manipulate these bandits with bargaining and patronage politics, attesting to the Empire’s strength (Barkey 1994). This description provides insight into how some non-Western European states developed. However, it also falls short in illuminating the motivations behind insurgent behavior. It does not explain how Ottoman state-building, specifically the bargaining and co-optation of bandits, affected local communities, whether these communities had any influence over the decisions of bandits in this process, or whether bandits took their relations to local communities into account as they calculated how they would respond to Ottoman state entreaties. Relating state-
building that occurred within the Ottoman Empire to that of modern rebel groups is an imperfect comparison because the two do not share similar resources, strengths or external environments.

In conjunction with this study, we see that early European state-building converged on the model of the nation-state and the coercion-capital mixture that led to its development. Coercive-intensive states could mobilize massive armies through forceful means that necessitated the creation of large, bulky administrative structures. This led to the development of empires which stunted the productive capabilities of the population. Capital-intensive forms were usually found near ports and relied on capitalists for purchased military power. These less bulky administrative structures took the form of city-states as developed in Venice and the Dutch Republic. Essentially, these were businesses that become state with little rural (national) depth. Capitalized-coercive state forms incorporated coercive techniques and capitalist resources. To extract the necessary resources for large-scale war, they built bureaucracies, tax-collecting apparatuses and channels of communication. As this latter form was the most successful in battle (owing largely to its efficiency), they fostered the dominance of the nation-state. The coercive-intensive and capital-intensive states could not compete and were defeated or adapted to meet the terms of war set by stronger states that fielded larger armies funded by capital (Tilly 1990). This highlights how democratic states (in this study, contractual rebels) are more efficient revenue-generators and warriors (Olson 1993). Yet, this study finds that some rebels groups diverge from the coercive-capital combination. In Southern Sudan, for example, the SPLA went from being highly
coercive toward local societies to highly representative and state-like in its various functions. The FARC developed in the opposite direction, directly contradicting the rationale spelled out by scholars of early state-building. In employing increasingly coercive tactics and involving itself in the international drug trade, Colombian rebels reject the development of more contractual strategies and closer ties to local communities. The historical state-building literature facilitates an understanding of why rebels are state-builders and how they can be successful, but it does not offer adequate insight into why these non-state actors often reject the classical state-building strategy.

2.3 The Role of Rivals

The central hypothesis of this study is that the level of coercion that rebel groups inflict upon local communities is inversely proportional to the presence of rival groups. The presence of rivals determines the amount and ease with which rebels can obtain resources from resource pools.

As explained in the Chapter One, coercive behavior is characterized by the extracting of resources without the provision of services or goods in return. As such, this type of behavior is characterized by violent tactics such as the strong-arming of resources and the manhandling and killing of civilians. Highly coercive behavior is the type that, for example, was inflicted on civilians by the RUF during the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone, or the ongoing abuses committed against noncombatants in northern Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) since the late 1980s. This behavior is characteristic of the predatory strategies of Collier’s “resource wars” or Kaldor’s “new wars” and the systematic abuse of local people’s human rights. In contrast to coercive
behavior is contractual treatment of local populations, which is found at the opposite end of the rebel group strategy scale. Contractual treatment of local populations encompasses the provision of public goods such as security, access to resources, and the ability to participate in decision-making in exchange for resources.

One of the most important aspects for any dominating body is the ability to mobilize populations. Political mobilization “is the collective and structured expression of commitment and support within society” (Nettl 1967, 123). Political mobilization is an effective tool that involves directing people into various organizational frameworks that will enable leaders to develop strong armies, collect more taxes, and complete other tasks (Migdal 1988). A key method in achieving such mobilization is by being the dominant resource extractor. While there are various types of “extraction”, the kind referred to here is that which a state or a dominant group projects. In a basic sense, dominance of extraction of resource is power. To be more specific, Michael Mann’s characterization is used in this analysis. Infrastructural power “denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” (Mann 1984, 189). Placing this designation into the context of rebel groups, increased capabilities of rebel groups rests upon higher levels of extraction of resources. In Weberian terms, this means greater legitimacy, for extraction through compliance and acceptance is cheaper and more effective than simple domination by force. Rebels need resources to operate. As was established in the preceding chapter, rebel groups operate in environments where resources are often scarce. Resources from local communities are easiest to access because are an immediate good. Thus,
rebel groups are likely to first extract resources from communities. From this point rebel group behavior moves in two distinct directions. The rebel group can become coercive or it can become contractual. The presence or absence of rivals determines the paths that rebel groups choose. Rebel environments are arenas of rational choice behavior. If there is more than one rebel group or armed actor attempting to extract from the same resource pool, violence against civilians will increase. In direct contrast, a rebel group will behave in a contractual manner toward local populations when it is the only group extracting resources. Rebel groups find that in terms of efficiency it is optimal to enter communities in a contractual manner. In being the only group extracting resources in an area, the rebel group can begin to operate and think long-term – it can invest in contractual relations with locals. The rebel group prefers to do this because establishing such reciprocal relations allows it to extract resources more efficiently. That is, by developing a contractual strategy with locals, a rebel group will be able to rely on a steady supply of resources without worrying that these goods (if they are people for soldiering) will flee, or (if it is food) be sold to other rival groups.

However, once another group encroaches on the original group’s territory, threatening its resource base, the original group will turn coercive. When there are competing groups, the previously dominant rebel group must begin to operate according to short-term logic. This is done to guarantee the group’s survival. With more than one group operating in and extracting resources from an area, resources become scarce and competition for them increases. The most efficient way to extract resources in the short-term is through coercion. Rebels do not have the resources to expend on
establishing contractual relations with local communities when there battling competitors. Developing contractual relations is a long-term investment, and focusing on such a strategy in the presence of rivals will lead the group to a speedy demise. In many of these rebel environments, resources are scarce, and thus resources are critical to operation and survival. As soon as there is more than one group extracting resources, the logic of survival for the groups becomes preeminent. Time horizons change to the short-term. The most efficient way to extract resources in the short-term is by using coercion.

2.4 Intervening Variables

Intervening variables play a role in these outcomes. While this study maintains that the key mechanism in transforming rebel group behavior toward noncombatants is the monopoly over resource extraction, as indicated by the presence or absence of rivals, two other factors appear to play an important role: the need for resources as a result in an extreme change in strategy and whether or not the resources extracted by the rebels are illicit. While these are just two of several variables that can intervene in the rebel group dynamic and shape behavior, data from this study indicates that they can be critical in framing the rebel environment. Before discussing these two conditions that, along with rival groups, are examined in this study, we should examine two additional variables that at times can shape the rebel environment: international norms of democracy and the character of the state.
The Norm of Democratization

One explanation for the behavior of rebel groups in the literature is that the international expectation of democracy has an effect on the behavior of rebel groups toward civilians. The relationship between democratization and rebel group behavior is justified. Contemporary rebel groups are guided by the influence of world powers that dictate the development of norms of democracy and thereby the recognition of such principles as human rights. This includes norms against ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other standards of international law. Acceptance of democratization and its accompanying requirement of respecting human rights is a precondition for participation in international political and economic arenas.

During the last few decades, democratization has been a driving force in the international system of state-building. The following figure displays this trend. In a brief period of time, a large number of states have begun a process of democratization – the movement from authoritarian to democratic forms of rule. This has been the case more precisely in developing countries. Some scholars maintain that the rise in democracy is a result of international pressure to reform, or the diffusion of democratic ideals. Gleditsch points out that the rise in democratic regimes suggests that these developments are not entirely the result of internal state processes (Gleditsch 2002, 13). Democratization in Africa, for example, became a part of a larger world-wide movement to transform non-democratic governments. The economic and political liberalization occurring around the world during the 1980s fostered such a process,
particularly after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War when totalitarian systems in Eastern Europe fell to democratic regimes.

International donors and Western powers adopted the post-Cold War democratization project of the hegemons and exerted subtle and interventionist pressure on developing countries to guarantee that they would follow what was quickly becoming a standardized path (Osaghae 1999). In Africa, several one-party systems headed by rulers who took personal charge of the state were challenged by opposition forces, many of which exploited newly gained political liberties. Furthermore, in Latin America, military dictatorships began to fall apart (Sorenson 1998). Between 1972 and 1993, the number of democratic governments more than doubled, rising from 44 to 107
(Karatnycky 1994; McColm 1993). Over half of the countries in the world today have adopted democratic political systems. In a twist on the reasons for such democratic predominance, claims about major power prestige suggest that the type of demonstration effect stemming from the visibility and overall success of these states is behind the rise of democracies (Fordham and Asal 2007, 32). Democracy, according to one scholar, has become “the only legitimate and viable alternative to an authoritarian regime of any kind” (Huntington 1992, 58). Thus it appears that the current international normative environment looks unfavorably toward repressive regimes as they continue to lose international support, and is auspicious for contractual rebel groups who can gain support for such behavior. While the international norm of existing state boundaries favors states over such groups, the international community is more critical of domestic behavior.

Typically, states use International Organizations (IOs) to advance democracy. This IO-democracy link has been employed to justify the expansion of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Association (Pevehouse 2002). Yet, IOs are not the only avenues for advancing the democratization norm. States have attempted to spread democracy as a system of governance through economic policy and through the force of militaries. The promotion of democracy has become a foreign policy objective for numerous existing democracies. Deeply embedded in today’s neoconservative model is a concern about the nature of regimes. The world witnessed how forceful such a
justification could be when the Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003. Yet this was not always the case. Cold War realists did not concern themselves with the domestic behavior of states. Some argued that the lagging development of political institutions behind social and economic change led to political instability. Stability could be achieved through the institutionalization the rationalization of authority and development of bureaucracy. Hence, it was not the type of government that mattered, but the degree (Huntington 1968). Those who attested to a realist notion of politics in the U.S. focused on whether cooperation promoted U.S. national interests. Today neoconservatives evaluate regimes on the basis of their values. This appeared (though it did not begin during the 1980s) when Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” George W. Bush has used normative statements to classify many non-democratic regimes, which in turn has served to help justify the West’s aggressive behavior toward regimes that previously enjoyed the protections from outside interference in their internal affairs that recognition of their sovereignty gave them. One of the arguments the Bush administration provides for invading Iraq is that Saddam and his regime were not providing freedom to Iraqis. Bringing freedom to the Middle East via democracy serves to rationalize Bush foreign policy.

In a slightly different light, others argue that internal characteristics of powerful states have an effect on whether weaker states adopt certain norms. In this case, the adoption of democratic institutions and practices may be a demonstration effect whereby weaker states adopt the norms of powerful ones (Fordham and Asal 2007). In the same vein, Florini argues. “[i]nternational norms may also begin to spread in the
absence of a norm entrepreneur if some states simply emulate the behavior of some prestigious or otherwise well-known actor, even if the emulated actor is not attempting to communicate its behavior” (Florini 1996, 375).

While democratization has been and remains a central facet of political science scholarship, there is relatively little written about it acting as a prerequisite for acceptance in the international state system. Inherent in Tilly and Olson’s work on the state is that to be sustainable, a state requires some sort of relations that are acceptable to its citizenry, or at least to those who generate the surplus that state leaders need to field their armies and pay of administration. If leaders destroy or undermine these relations with the people they govern, they forego capabilities that a consistent stream of revenue provides. This concept applies directly to contemporary states because of the prevalence of external sources of income.

In arguing that rebels are contemporary state-builders, we would also expect them to be influenced by norms that affect the behavior of modern states. However, one could argue that the classical formulation of state-building applies more to rebels. This is because rebels live in a world where their organization can become extinct if they do not get the resources that they need to fight. They face “external” threats of competition and extinction that sovereign states have not faced since the end of the Second World War. Therefore, mobilizing the population is a more critical strategy for acquiring access to resources and winning support to move forward and capture the existing state’s key urban centers. As stated in one FARC propagandist essay, the FARC will have undermined the national order when they seize power of “el pueblo colombiano”
(Lozada 2003). This behavior does appear in some of the cases considered below, yet even where the distribution of resources is similar, some insurgencies forego this state-building strategy.

Governments – at least on paper – adhere to certain standards in the treatment of their citizens. They have also accepted the right that other governments and international institutions may hold them to these standards. This tactic has increased in recent years. UNCHR activity was considerably higher in post-Cold War years than it had been prior to this. During the mid-1990s, for example, the number of countries scrutinized for their human rights records grew substantially (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 865). It also appears that this extends to armed conflicts, as evidenced by the convening of a special court for Sierra Leone to try defendants from all the major armed factions that took part during the recent civil war. The establishment of war crimes tribunals also exemplifies the extension of international standards to rebel groups. One tribunal was established in 1993 to manage the international and partly internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Another tribunal took place in 1994 to deal with a purely internal conflict in Rwanda (Neier 1996-1997). In statistical tests they find that a state’s human rights performance significantly determined the amount of aid the country received. Those states with poor human rights records received less U.S. bilateral economic aid than those with better records (Apodaca 1999). Thus it becomes even more baffling as to why some rebels would counter the trend toward compliance, or at least rhetorical support for these norms. Resources and penalties are associated with these norms. One would reasonably think that they should structure the behavior of
rebels toward local people and gain the rewards of more international support and possibly resources.

While the structure of international human rights networks is largely focused on the conduct of states, there is evidence that this is changing. New treaties have developed in the last few years which include armed groups in their scope – for example, the treaty to ban landmine use, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and the protocol that bans the participation in combat of individuals less than 18 years of age. The INGOs did not begin to systematically monitor human rights abuses by armed groups until around the 1990s. The reason for this is found in the notion of sovereignty. Traditionally, as proclaimed by the World Court in the Wimbledon case, the doctrine of state sovereignty has been interpreted to mean that the state “is subject to no other state, and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by applicable law” (Hoffman 1966, 164). Today, few states will claim, on grounds of sovereignty, that the international community of states embodied in the UN mainly and other outside agencies should be barred from looking at their human rights record. This, in part, explains why these international agencies are more likely to look at the behavior of armed groups today than they were during the mid-1980s (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2000). There even appear to be an expectation among actors in the international community that these norms affect rebels in uniform ways. The chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC) at the Hague has begun investigations into crimes against humanity committed by local militia in the Darfur region of Sudan (Rubin 2006). Uganda has referred the Lord’s
Resistance Army in the northern regions of this country to the ICC, and the Court is investigating alleged abuses carried out by this rebel group (International Criminal Court 2005). These moves on the part of the international legal community suggest that rebel groups are beholden to the world of norms, just as states are.

The development of international humanitarian law dealing with armed conflict was aimed in one sense to limiting the scope of conflict. Prior to WWII, predominantly soldiers engaged in conflict and attempts were made to exclude civilians from areas of combat. Likewise, a soldier who was captured was no longer considered to be an enemy soldier and those who held him were expected to respect certain rights of that individual. This was codified in the first Geneva Convention, which had roots in 19th century laws of war that sought to limit the damage that new military technologies and strategies imposed on soldiers and civilians in places where battles were fought. Self-interest, not merely humanitarianism, was a large motivating factor for these conventions for if it was known that a soldier, if captured, was to be treated well. This then would induce him to allow himself to become a POW rather than continue fighting. There remains this incentive for governments to follow this law of armed conflict in the hope of undermining fighting resolve of the enemy. Consequently, the combatant was clearly defined in order to benefit from this favorable treatment. Within the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is an article stemming from the Hague Conventions that specifies several categories of individuals to whom the convention applies, including members of militias, those belonging to organized resistance movements (Suter 1984).
It appears that under international law there is an expectation that rebels will behave uniformly. However, other structural incentives such as resources and the nature of the state they are battling do not have the same impact across all cases. Therefore, international law and threats of prosecution will have only a partial effect on the behavior of rebel groups. Of a higher priority to these entities is survival, which due to the end of the Cold War has become all too uncertain. Unlike states, rebel groups can “go out of business”. If forced to choose, these rational actors would attempt to survive first and concern themselves with human rights law later – if these two objectives clashed. Furthermore, one would not necessarily equate the violation of the above legal conditions necessarily with violations of the human rights of communities.

While international human rights law does not transform the behavior of rebel groups from coercive to contractual, it has become a factor that they must consider. Rebel groups that abuse local populations will not acquire the more efficiently acquired resources and support that groups who treat locals in a contractual manner will. The FARC demonstrates this contention. The FARC arose from peasant self-defense organizations, supporting better working conditions for agricultural workers in the Tolima region of Colombia. Due to these local beginnings, the FARC enjoyed a measure of local support. However, the late 1980s saw the FARC quickly evolve into a more violent and locally coercive guerrilla organization with resources stemming from narco-traffickers and extortion. The rebel group did not necessarily lose resources – they lost the efficiency that comes with contractual behavior and traded it for another resource, drug money. The real explanation for the behavior of rebels is the three-way nature of
their relations with the state and the local population seen through the lens of the overriding objective of rebels to remain in business and win power—within the full range of contemporary structural constraints such as a sovereignty regime that favors existing states and an international community that often claims to act on behalf of human rights. With full knowledge of international laws, and as contemporary state-builders, the most likely route for rebel groups to take is to follow international human rights law we would expect that rebels would follow this norm in fairly uniform ways. This is even more likely since the international community is now making attempts to bring rebels or non-state armed actors to international judicial bodies to account for their behavior, as illustrated in the acts of the Hague Tribunal explained above.

In respect to the affecting interaction and treatment of local communities, we find that there is variation among insurgent behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that rebel groups do not incorporate local community interests into their behavior in spite of the fact that norms of democratization and human rights dictate that such treatment garners various types of resources and international support. For example, the SPLA was at its most isolated during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The organization was fiercely opposed to the Khartoum regime and was predatory and coercive toward local communities in southern Sudan. The southern Sudanese rebels were also highly factionalized. However, in 1994 the group made a dramatic change in its behavior towards host communities. The SPLA called its first national convention in an attempt to develop a greater grassroots appeal, stating that a New Sudan would henceforth exist and be governed on the basis of equality and justice. One could say the movement was
democratizing. This New Sudan was to include: the separation of powers; the separation of the military from the civil authority; and well-defined, established structures of governance including a legislature, an executive and a judiciary. The SPLA seemed to be undergoing tentative steps toward institutionalization. Many policymakers and scholars argue that this rather dramatic transformation was motivated by a desire for foreign support. The SPLA continues to stress accountability in relations with locals, despite already having well-established channels of resources. This example would support the hypothesis that rebel groups respond to the outside pressure of democratization, subsequently reaping the external and internal (local) benefits.

To provide another example, the European Union (EU) has been involved in the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC since the early 1990s. Three rounds of peace talks took place under the sponsorship of the EU in Madrid, Bogotá and finally Brussels. Yet, despite Europe’s efforts to demonstrate to FARC leaders the material and political benefits of making a democratic shift, these rebels in the end chose not to sign on to a settlement. In a similar circumstance, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission traveled to the region during 1998-1999 to attempt to unify factions of the KLA into a single unit (Daalder 2000). These examples indicate that while the international and national environments influence the behavior of rebels in relation to locals, these variables are mediated by the rebel groups and the politics “on the ground.”

One possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory behavior in rebel groups is that norms of democratization and human rights may complicate insurgent
efforts to build local support. As has been noted, aid (often the result of this global awareness of human rights, etc.) can act as a rent-seeking opportunity that facilitates the disregard of indigenous opinions and instead fosters authorities’ focus on their own fortunes (Duffield 2001). When sources of material and political support and legitimation originate from external actors rather than from potential constituents, local authority structures (in our case, rebel groups) have few incentives to create strong social, economic, and political ties to indigenous societies. This has been noted in aid-dependent states where leaders use aid to further embed themselves in the halls of power as occurred in the former Zaire under Mobutu. In fact, with some of the groups examined in this study, the variables play a role in influencing behavior.

While international norms are thus quite important in providing the context for rebel group behavior, this study does not view it as playing a central role in determining treatment of civilians. The main reason for this is that within the three rebel groups examined in this study, international norms remain constant – that is, international norms in affect are the same for each rebel group during each period because all groups exist under the same international environment.

*The Quality of the State*

Likewise, the quality of the state can play a role in affecting rebel group behavior. The limitations within the state-building literature motivate a closer look at this factor. “Quality of the state” refers to the government’s relationship with the local populations whom the rebel groups claim to represent. This quality, like that of the rebels’, can range from coercive (extracting resources without providing goods or services in return)
to contractual (providing services in return for resources). To demonstrate, a state will tax citizens, and in return the citizens receive protection (police), a public education, or welfare services. If the states under analysis for this project change toward a more contractual policy toward local populations the rebels claim to represent, they do not become contractual in the sense that liberal democracies are contractual. Rather, these states are moving toward the contractual end of the spectrum of behavior and are thus “reforming”. However, the character of the state – like democratic norms – remains more or less constant for all cases; the state is consistently coercive. Thus, a focus on the state is not measured as an intervening variable in most of the cases. Rather, the character of the state is examined in the final chapter when further discussing this study’s findings.

The justification for focusing on need for resources and use of illicit resources as the primary intervening variables is a choice made by the author and stems from what the data reveals. A review of the relevance of “need” and “type” follows.

*Need for Resources*

Departing from previous studies that argue that greed is a primary motivator of rebel behavior toward noncombatants (Azam 2002; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999; Cairns 1997; Collier 2000b; Grossman 1999; Reno 1998), this study assesses the influence of need as a causal factor. Azam and Hoeffler argue that violence against civilians serves a military purpose. They maintain that rebels terrorize local populations for strategic purposes – namely to acquire more resources (Azam and Hoeffler 2002). Thus, rebel group coercion may be a result of this increased need. Simply put, rebel
groups must obtain the material means to wield their force, whether it pursues the economic interests of its members or seeks to achieve some broad political goal. This material pursuit may (but not necessarily) become an overriding interest (Reno 2004a) and thus become the prime motive for group behaviour.

**Type of Resources**

The type of resources may determine the behavior that rebels exhibit, and dovetails nicely with the need variable. This argument follows the logic that the illicit nature of a resource endows it with unique characteristics. For example, disputes are at times resolved using violence rather than mediation. Other studies point to a wider range of opportunities that play significant roles in causing conflicts, such as increasing access to small arms and the growth of opportunities to participate in lucrative global criminal networks (Collier and Sambanis 2002). This approach to thinking about behavior is not far removed from Jeremy Weinstein’s explanation for civilian abuse. In his study, the nature of economic endowments to which groups have access, in addition to the amount they have, can shape rebel tactics (Weinstein 2006). He finds that soldiers recruited with the promise of loot such as oil or diamonds are less invested in the communities for which they fight. Hence, these rebels display more violent treatment of civilians. This line of thought has much in common with the “new wars” argument presented earlier.

While the study presented in this paper provides data that concludes that the development of criminal networks run by rebels is not the primary determinant of these actors’ behavior toward local populations, such a variable can nonetheless be an
important factor in determining shifts in rebel group behavior toward civilians. This paper
looks not at what is used to recruit, but what resources the three groups under
examination draw from and whether this affects their behavior toward local populations.

2.5 Modeling Change in Rebel Group Behavior

Determining the direction of change a rebel group will turn toward requires some
simplification of a complex process and therefore distorts portions of reality. While this is
a cost of modeling, it does allow us to present a process clearly. To depict rebel group
behavior and dynamics in a theoretical format, we must also make certain assumptions
about the rebel environment.

This analysis makes the following assumptions:

1. Rebel groups must acquire resources in order to survive, whether or not locals
   are willing to provide them. Therefore, rebel groups will always extract resources,
   doing so in a way that ranges from a highly coercive manner to a contractual
   one.
2. Local communities have resources.
3. Local communities will give these resources to the least coercive entity, whether
   it is a state or a rebel group, because the people acquire more utility from public
   goods than from violence. Locals’ support of rebel groups can be explained by
   employing Samuel Popkin’s argument that peasants are rational utility
   maximizers who respond to incentives offered by such groups. Rebels can offer
   peasants protection, security, employment, and services (Popkin 1979).
4. Resources in a community are limited.

When the rebel group uses coercion to extract resources they create environments of
insecurity where little or no public goods are provided to noncombatants. When such
groups use contractual behavior (much like Olson’s stationary bandits), local
communities receive public goods. The question remains: when does a group behave
one way or another? The answer lies in the number of “competitors” operating within
this environment and who attempts to extract resources from the same resource pool.
The number of rivals extracting from a pool of resources indicates the level of coercive behavior. The more competitors, the more there is a threat to resources, resulting in an increase in violence toward local populations. Not only must rebels obtain resources to increase their power and achieve their objectives, they must also acquire resources to survive. This forces rebel groups into a market dynamic. The more groups that are present in the immediate rebel environment, the fewer resources there are to go around. Competition between groups becomes fierce and, with less dominance over extraction, rebel groups are forced to extract resources through the most efficient means possible in this situation – through coercion. The more competitors or groups we see, the fiercer the competition and the less amount of control any one group has, resulting in an increase in coercive behavior. Therefore, the most efficient method of extracting resources varies according to the number of competitors in the dynamic. It is more efficient to acquire resources coercively when there are several rebel groups in one area or vying for the resources from one community the reason being that the high degree of competition for resources means there is little time to develop reciprocal relations with local populations by behaving in a contractual manner. However, when one rebel group dominates a community, it is more effective to establish a contractual relationship with locals because there are less transaction costs in the long-run.

Depending on the presence of rivals and the degree of threat to resources they inflict, rebels will consider short or long-term consequences. The presence of more than one competitor or group means rebels focus on short-term effects because what is most at stake at that moment is survival. Thus the need to out-extract rivaling groups
becomes preeminent. However, a monopoly on extraction means that rebels can have larger horizons – the long-term is taken into consideration, as the threat of extinction has low salience. In some ways, this model may appear to suggest that rebel group behavior is directly related to the level of resources required for a group to survive. It appears logical on the surface that the more resources a group possess, the more likely its behavior toward local communities will improve. However, the ability to collect resources is a function of the monopoly on extraction that a group possesses.

The rational choice approach developed in this project is displayed in Table 2.1 and explained below. All modeling refers to short-term effects, a point that is crucial for explaining the need to control the mode(s) of extraction of resources over cultivating contractual relations with local noncombatants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Rebel Behavior (assuming a coercive state)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 rivals</td>
<td>(a) contractual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or more rivals</td>
<td>(b) coercive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Box (a)** When a rebel group is the sole extractor of resources from a specific pool it will move toward the contractual end of the behavior spectrum. Knowing that local populations being coerced by the state have a choice as to which party to give their popular support, the rebel group will begin to offers goods and services that the state is not. The rebel group becomes more contractual (providing public goods in
exchange for resources) because they find it is more efficient (less transaction costs) to extract resources this way as opposed to doing so coercively.

Likewise, in the case of rebel groups and their relationship with local communities, the group has an incentive (the steady and efficient provision of resources) to treat civilians with less coercive tactics because if it does not, either rivals will take the resources away or locals will flee. As depicted in Chapter 5, this is what happened in the case of the FARC in Colombia.

**Box (b)** With the presence of rivals, the original group’s pool of resources is threatened. The group shifts to more coercive behavior. This short-term shift to predatory behavior is a result of intense competition for limited resources. This kind of competition among groups can fracture whole rebel groups creating conditions of more competition and thus making it more difficult to restore the control over extraction. Even if a moderately violent group exists and another even less violent rebel group enters the picture, violence will still increase (though perhaps not by a large amount relative to highly coercive groups) only because the amount of resources are limited and can become scarce. As competition for control of populations and regions increases, violence increases. Such activity is similar to that of post-Soviet gangs and criminal groups. The more groups formed to seize opportunities the more they became engaged in struggles with one another because the opportunities, however broad, were limited (Volkov 2002). However, this violence will most likely be targeted to those populations that support rival groups. Because we are usually dealing with weak states, the central government cannot obtain a monopoly by extracting enough resources to get rid of
other rival groups. As the degree of monopolization over resources decreases, the level of coercion used in extracting resources from local communities rises. This inverse relationship is explained by the increase in the number of groups taking part in the rebel dynamic. More rivals means more competition for resources, putting rebel groups in a position where, due to the increase in competition and the subsequent decrease in resources, rather than being able to barter or engage in a contract of sorts with locals, rebel groups must forcibly acquire resources.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an explanation for the changing behavior of rebel groups in relation to host communities. Specifically, it addresses the scholarly literature and explains why current explanations are insufficient in their accounting for transformations in rebel group change. The model suggested in its stead represents a rational choice approach to the analysis of these groups’ behavior and has implications for the study of contemporary conflicts and new forms of state-building. In capsule, the argument presented here is that rebel group behavior is directly related to the number of rivals it has for the same pool of resources.

As demonstrated in the following case-based chapters, this study champions the influence of local dynamics. However, in using a model and emphasizing the local dynamic, it becomes clear that some limitations cannot be avoided. For example, several elements are, admittedly, excluded from consideration in the model. By emphasizing the dynamics on the ground, one may argue that the model is overly reductionist. Do the actions and support of local populations actually help determine the
strategy of rebel groups that operate in the international arena? At the other extreme, one can suggest that the model is too structural in its approach in the amount of influence it lends to such international forces as norms. The tension between theoretical models and concrete developments is eternal. For the purposes of analysis, however, we must engage in some degree of reductionism such as examining a band of rebels as one unit of analysis, as well as local populations and states. If we were to focus only on observable outcomes, the picture we present would become so complex that measurement, much less model-building, would prove impossible.

It also can be argued that this theory keeps certain key factors, such as the state, exogenous to the local dynamic. Indeed, this is true. In nearly all of the cases examined here, the state had little or no presence in the local communities in which the rebel groups operated at their inception. The state does, however, play a role in affecting rebel group behavior and will be examined in Chapter 4 as well as the Conclusion. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the state is continuously depicted as an exogenous force. Rather, the role of the state is case-specific, though its effects appear to be similar across groups.

Likewise, as stated earlier in this chapter, the role of international norms in influencing rebel group behavior toward civilians should not be overlooked. Norms act as powerful strictures that guide the behavior of states. Rebels, however, are caught in a state-building dynamic that is more akin to the early modern European realist competition inside these states because if these groups do fail, they are likely to become extinct. Therefore, rebel groups examine how states respond to norms, what
they themselves must do with regard to these international ideas, and in turn weigh how their different context shapes the outcome.

One area of contention in this study may be found in the ability to measure change. Indeed, the constraints in such measurements are a limitation to this model. For the cynical (and often realistic) scholar, this translates into a deep suspicion of rebel group intentions. How do we know, for example, that rebel group rhetoric of transformation actually implies change? Change is difficult (though not impossible) to measure, and may not indicate genuine transformation but rather lip-service to those who demand it. However, just as we have recorded human rights abuses, so too can we pinpoint periods of transformation. While declarations of rebel groups may not correspond to actual behavior, these are important data points of reference for this study. These declarations indicate that rebel groups respond to an external audience. This concern points to the importance of research carried out on the ground, as it is possible to gain a general understanding of the degrees of internal participation of locals who did not take part in the original rebel force by conducting carefully planned fieldwork.

Finally, this model does not account for certain intervening variables that intrude in the causal pathway, from the inner dynamics of rebel groups – the personal disputes and individual characteristics of leaders that can affect group behavior – to the actual military and economic strength of a state. These factors lend a complexity to the model that makes it difficult to assess. Again, herein lays the limitation of modeling human behavior – the inherent “cleanliness” that it creates out of actual events. Reality –
particularly that which exists in zones of conflict – is indeed quite messy. As such, the model presented above and applied in the following case studies has running through it two contradictory themes: uniformity and elasticity. In the author’s mind, this dual-purpose model is simply the only way in which to reflect actual events in a manner that is at most scientific, and at a minimum understandable.
CHAPTER THREE

“The elephant is not yet dead”
The Reform of the SPLA

“War is a great teacher.”
Deputy Brigade Commander, SPLA

It is nighttime in Yei, Southern Sudan. Commander Aleu Ayieny Aleu sits in his office (one of several crumbling buildings in the middle of his compound) after leading a group of foreigners from Northern Uganda, a 13-hour drive over mud roads. He is asked to think back to what the SPLA was and to what it is, fitting since he is currently managing the de-mining in areas that the rebel group and the government of Sudan (GoS) mined only a few years ago. “The movement ran from the opposition,” he says, “but we replicated the system we ran away from. There were human rights violations and little tolerance of different ideas” (Aleu 2001).

3.0 Introduction

The remarkable shift in strategy that the SPLA made was not a spontaneous event; the change the SPLA experienced took place after several years of fighting between the rebels in the South and the government in the North and within the SPLA itself. Following the Cold War and the fall of Ethiopian leader Mengistu, the rebel group lost its external resources. The group began to face pressure from the West to democratize and followed accordingly – at least on the surface. From an external point of view, this evolution in relationship to outside forces (and possible financial support) is
highly rational. The rebel group was forced to find new a source for new resources and thus evolved to suit foreign backers. However, given the SPLA’s history of human rights abuses and violence towards its own people, it is remarkable that the rebels not only weathered the shift but that they made the change altogether.

Why did the SPLA change? In a recent work, Øystein Rolandsen argues that the group’s 1994 National Convention, which formalized much of the reform of the SPLA, was the result of the loss of Ethiopian support since the end of the Cold War and the need to make appear credible in the eyes of locals and the international donor and political community (Rolandsen 2005). Yet the explanation for the group’s transformation from a fractious and coercive movement to a contractual nascent state lies not in the pressure from the international environment and its democratic agenda. Rather, the key reasons for the SPLA’s shift in strategy toward Southerners rests in the presence or absence of rivals within the revel group’s own environment. Indeed, the SPLA was forced to confront resource choices, but did not base its decision to reform around this issue nor the international community’s normative environment. Rather, choices were made in the context of the group’s overall concern for being the sole extractor of resources in Southern Sudan. Shifting alliances and the history of factionalizing in the region led to the group’s coercive behavior enacted during the 1980s and 1990s throughout regions of the South. Once the SPLA dominated resource extraction, and most importantly, once rival factions either disseminated or were absorbed by the SPLA, the rebel group was able to transform itself (though strictly on its own terms) into an entity that developed reciprocal relations with its host populations,
enforcing rules, policing, and acting as intermediary between NGOs and local populations. As a result, violence against Southern civilians decreased.

3.1 Background

There perhaps has never been more diversity and distinctiveness among a people, a history, and a land than in Sudan. Physically, it is the largest country in Africa (see Map 3.1), boasting a population of 23-30 million people, one-third of which lives in the South. Sudan is roughly 65% African and approximately 35% Arab.

Map 3.1 Sudan

Source: (United Nations 2007)
The Northern Sudanese are primarily descendants of Arabs who traded and ruled Sudan thousands of years ago. Yet these numbers simplify the points of culture and identity. In actuality, Sudan is home to over 500 tribes. In the South this includes the larger tribes of the Dinka and the Nuer peoples, and numerous smaller tribes such as the Shulluk, Bari, Madi, Kakwa, Azende, Bagara, Toposa, and the Didinga peoples, in addition to many others. More than 100 languages are spoken in Southern Sudan alone. These simplifications can be deceiving, for African Muslim leadership has existed within the various liberation movements, while African and Arab Christians live in the North (New Sudan Council of Churches 2002, preface). Nevertheless, generalizations can be, and are, made: Arab and Islamic identities dominate Northern Sudan, while African and Christian identities prevail in the South. Furthermore, the majority of Southerners are pastoralists and many are alien to state-like control.

Arab political dominance in the North came to an end at the hands of imperial forces. From 1820-21, joint Turkish and Egyptian forces invaded Sudan and took control of the Northern regions, establishing, among other operations, a base for slave trading from which they could conduct incursions into the South. This invasion had a unifying effect on the country, as the North and South united to resist foreign domination.

Popular unrest in opposition to the offensive culminated in a successful revolt in 1881, bringing Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi to power several years later. This marked the

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8 As Douglas Johnson pertinently points out, most people use “tribe” and “clan” interchangeably, associating it with units of kinship and blood line. Political affiliation is thus based on lines of descent. In reality, a “tribe” is the largest unit of combined political sections. “The organizing principles of a tribe vary from people to people, and even within peoples; combinations vary over time; and the people within a tribe do not necessarily claim direct common descent or kinship links with each other (Johnson 2003, xvii).
establishment of the first independent Sudanese state. Khartoum in the North became the capital. However, freedom from outside domination was fleeting, though. Soon Egypt and Great Britain cooperated to re-conquer the country from the Mahdist regime. This British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government became a hybrid of shared sovereignty developed to acknowledge the Egyptians’ former claims on Sudan and to accommodate British interests. In an attempt to keep Islam from spreading to the South between World Wars I and II, the condominium government administered this region as a “closed district”. This policy marked the beginning of the formal administration of Sudan as two separate entities. Resistance in the South, together with religious and cultural differences between this region of the country and the North, led colonial authorities to adopt opposing policies of administration for the two regions. The interests of the British and Egyptian parties were reflected in the separate policies they adopted for the administration and social and economic development of the Northern and Southern regions. Thus, Sudan remained relatively non-state-like as British indirect rule enhanced a tendency toward localism.

The balance in levels of development between the North and the South was severely disproportionate. By the end of the condominium, more than three-quarters of state expenditure went into the Northern cotton-growing scheme; all government and higher education facilities were located in Khartoum and its surrounding towns (Warburg 1992). The result was the emergence of urban elites and a landed aristocracy in the North which excluded the South from their struggle for independence. The gap between the regions was widened further by attempts to dominate and Islamicize the South
through hard-line policies of successive regimes. Sudan develop as a country that was structured to resist organization as a simple political unit.

In response to the marginalization of the South, a group calling themselves *Anya-Nya* mutinied on the eve of the country’s independence in 1956 (Deng 1995). This instigated the first of Sudan’s two civil wars - a response to the economic, political, psychological, educational and cultural ostracism of the South by the North. The first war lasted until 1972 ending with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which established the South as an autonomous region with a parliament and a High Executive Council. Yet the relative peace that the agreement affected was fleeting. In June 1983, under pressure from conservative and radical elements and in an effort to eliminate growing liberal democracy in the South (which was incongruous to a national system of an authoritarian presidency), Nimeiri issued “Republican Order Number One” (International Crisis Group 2002). This order called for the re-division of the South into three regions: Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile (Deng 1995) and enabled the central government to handle each region separately, using tribalism to induce inter-tribal fighting. The effect was increasing community division and factionalism. The government’s repressive measures were effective, despite helping rebel groups look more appealing by comparison. Furthermore, when the North sponsored other factions, it created rivalries and competition for resources in the South developed. State repression and inter-group rivalry was high; no one rebel group dominated resource extraction. This supports the model put forth in this dissertation. Amidst such an intense and violent context, Nimeiri slowly eroded Southern autonomy. In September 1983, he
declared a revision of the penal code, linking it “organically and spiritually” to Islam, making Islamic law “the sole guiding force behind the law of the Sudan” (Lesch 1998, 55). Although one-third of the country’s population was non-Muslim, Shari’a was imposed upon all Sudanese (International Crisis Group 2002).

Civil War and the Genesis of the SPLA

There is a diverse literature on Southern Sudan and the conflict that began in 1983 with the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Some scholars stress the distinctive cultures of the North and South (Deng 1995; Lesch 1998), emphasizing the radical differences between the two as a major factor in the war. Another area of study analyzes the humanitarian aspect in areas of the South. Some of these, for example, focus on the efforts of the international aid community and attempt to develop general approaches to studying the effects of NGOs in the international arena (Burr and Collins 1995; Tvedt 1994, 1998), while others look more specifically at refugee issues (James 2001). Some scholars write on the role of humanitarian aid and how it has been used in the Sudanese civil war as a tool to fuel the conflict. Duffield claims that commanders on both sides of the fighting were reported to have deliberately starved civilians in order to attract more food aid (Duffield 1995). Another robust area of academic research on Sudan is in anthropological studies (Evans-Pritchard 1969; Fukui 1994; Hutchinson 1996). The study of the SPLA in particular, however, has lent itself to a gap in the conflict studies literature, with a few notable exceptions (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005).
Sudan’s second civil war began following the SPLA’s formation in 1983 with the compounding of various events and circumstances including the discovery of oil in the central and Southern regions of the country. The breaking of the Addis Ababa Agreement only served to intensify Southern grievances. This led President Nimeiri to become apprehensive about the make-up of the Southern Command’s populace, as it was dominated by individuals from the original rebel group, the Anya-Nya. To further entangle matters, in January 1983, Southern troops belonging to the 105th battalion refused orders to abandon their weapons and transfer to the North. These soldiers feared that they would be sent to Iraq to join with another Sudanese contingent fighting that country’s war against Iran, a condition that would leave the South open to an all-Northern unit and increasing its vulnerability. Following failed negotiations with this unit, Nimeiri ordered an attack on the soldiers, forcing it to flee. This act inspired a succession of mutinies throughout the South. Deserters and mutineers found refuge in Ethiopia, where they came together to form the SPLA (Johnson and Prunier 1993).

Many Southerner Sudanese rallied around the SPLA, some in protest over the abrogation of Addis, others expressing a rejection of consistent inequalities affected by the North on the South. John Garang de Mabior, a Twic Dinka, emerged as the group’s leader. Garang was a former officer in the Sudanese Army and a US-educated agricultural economist. Under him, the SPLA’s objectives were broadly defined – a marked difference from the goal of Southern autonomy expressed by the Anya-Nya following independence. Garang justified this change in objective by arguing that Sudan needed to transform as a whole into a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic
democratic state (International Crisis Group 2002). The SPLA saw the war as a struggle for liberation built upon a socialist base. Therefore, during the rebel group’s formative years, the struggle against oppression and domination by the North dominated SPLA rhetoric. In its manifest the group declared that

…the main task of the SPLA/SPLM is to transform the Southern movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and concerned with the South, jobs and self interest to a progressive movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country. It must be reiterated that the principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation for the South. The South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neocolonialism and its further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies.

(SPLA/SPLM 1983, 16-7)

The SPLA viewed liberation as the separation between religion and the state, not the creation of a separate state; it called for a “New Sudan” that encompassed a new cultural order. In following Mengistu’s preferences, Garang demonstrated the constraints of the Cold War where Ethiopia did not want a separatist SPLA as an ally while Mengistu’s military fought a separatist EPLF. During the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, NGOs and democracy-related aid were more malleable and the SPLA found itself freer to define its own goals contingent on the group’s ability to remain the only group extracting resources from the people of the region.

While the SPLA attempted to consolidate its forces and resources in Ethiopia, Nimeiri confronted growing opposition in the North, and before long an intifada led to his political downfall. The transitional government that took Nimeiri’s place was unable to reach an agreement with the SPLA, and the war in the South moved north into the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and the Southern Blue Nile. During this period, a
radical religious organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood restructured itself into a broad-based political party called the National Islamic Front (NIF). When it appeared there was sufficient will behind the peace process, the tide of war shifted to favor the religious right in Khartoum, which viewed any compromise with the SPLA as a threat to the Islamic trend. This suspicion among conservatives in the GoS resulted in another coup, and in 1989 Sadiq el Mahdi’s government was overthrown by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir in alliance with the NIF.

Bashir endorsed the NIF’s national agenda of Arabization and the deepening of divisions between the government and the SPLA. Under his leadership, a Command Council was drawn up to rein in opposition and in so doing suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament and all political parties. At the end of 1989, the regime announced that Shari’a laws were to be implemented throughout the entire country, including the penal code of amputation. Furthermore, the GoS stepped up offensives in the South (Tvedt 2000). It is interesting to note that during this period the GoS was backed by the US. Like many of the US’s choices of allies during the Cold War, the alliance with Sudan was strictly ideological. At the time, the NIF was at war with a rebel group allied with USSR-supported Ethiopia, which in turn garnered Khartoum support from countries battling the Soviet Union and the “communist threat”. This made issues confronting the nation more acute. Religion became a critical force in widening the division between the North and the South in a manner that re-ignited calls for Southern secession (Deng 1995). As the Sudanese state became increasingly coercive toward
Southern Sudanese, the appeal for independence from the North surfaced with more force. This, however, proved to be a divisive factor within the SPLA.

*Fractious Politics*

Intra-group fighting in Southern Sudan has been characterized as the extension of tribal enmities, though a more accurate explanation for tensions within the SPLA includes ideological and personal differences among the leadership. Conflicts within the rebel group arose over its Ethiopian-backed objective of unification and complaints of dictatorial behavior among some of the high-level SPLA officials. While the result within the movement was a lack of unity, this discord’s most intense impacts were felt by civilian populations who found themselves caught in the middle of conflicts between the North and South as well as those between SPLA factions. With the presence of rivals for Southern resources, levels of violence rose in the South and hit civilians hardest.

In an effort to understand the SPLA’s fractious nature during its development, one Southerner and former SPLA member explained that the group did not have the advantage of undergoing a period of political incubation that would have allowed it to develop a distinct political ideology. From the start, it was primarily a military-focused rebel group, influenced by its Marxist backers in Mengistu-led Ethiopia (Nyaba 1997). In fact, Ethiopian support and a militaristic focus arguably impeded the development of a clear political program in the SPLA’s infancy that represented the ideology of the dominant social forces. In other words, it is possibly that had the SPLA begun with backers other than Ethiopia, it would have called for Southern secession. Unification had not appeared in the rhetoric of the South’s political struggle prior to 1983, and many
within the SPLA criticized its leadership for this seemingly short-sighted objective. To further emphasize this point, several people interviewed by the author, as well as scholars, argue that the group’s socialist beginnings were merely exercises in “sloganeering” and were intended to motivate the masses (Nyaba 1997; Metelits 2004). One Southerner remarked that the original source of the SPLA’s resources did not necessarily confirm a communist framework for the rebel group (Former Governor of Lakes County 2003). Indeed, some Southerners who voluntarily joined the SPLA were not motivated to rally behind the group for ideological purposes but rather for nationalist ideals. That notwithstanding, Garang continued to push for unification, citing the deterioration of Sudan and in particular Southern grievances as representative of the country’s problems.

The movement was hardly a month old when the first cracks in its veneer materialized. To retain their former seniority, several Anya-Nya veterans proposed that the military and political wing of the SPLA be separated. These individuals proposed that two men, Samuel Gai Tut and Akwot Atem, head these two bodies, and offered Garang the position of deputy commander of the group. Tut was a Nuer officer and Atem, like Garang, was Twic Dinka. This further reinforces the claim that the original tensions within the SPLA were not tribally or ethnically defined. Not surprisingly, the Anya-Nya members also preferred the South’s original (post-independence) objective of separation from the North (Johnson 2003). However, the group’s stated goal of a united Sudan was directly in line with the policy of Mengistu-led Ethiopia, which was battling its own separatist groups and as such its resource needs trumped its political goals. The
implication here is that support from the Ethiopian regime, then, was not dictated by ideological solidarity with the SPLA, but by national interests. These interests inhibited Ethiopia from backing a secessionist rebel group such as Anya-Nya. Support for the SPLA’s call for a New Sudan was a worthy cause for Mengistu because it did not spur a diplomatic backlash for the Ethiopian regime in the OAU and within other international fora (Nyaba 1997); it did not challenge the norm of sovereignty. Ethiopian support garnered Garang more resources against an already weakened Anya-Nya movement, tipping the scale in his favor. At the same time, divisions deepened within the SPLA, as several elite members began to form separate units outside of the SPLA’s main body.

Furthering the earlier divisions within the rebel group, complaints surfaced over Garang’s leadership of the SPLA. Some officers claimed to be dissatisfied with his qualifications to lead the rebels. Garang was an educated Southerner with an advanced degree from a Western university. His time in the field was limited to a few months serving in the original Anya-Nya after the completion of his military training, which forced him to rely on Anya-Nya veterans during his early years as leader. This was a source of tension in his relations with field commanders, many of whom, though lacking in formal education, had spent several years in combat with the Anya-Nya and had advanced to high levels (Johnson 2003). Some argued that the SPLA quickly became a group that served a few high-level and mid-level Southern elites (Confidential source 2003).
The Impact of Militias

Though the imposition of Shari’a became a driving force for the war, racial issues soon surfaced and became another factor in the instability and underdevelopment in the South (Deng 1995). The GoS was largely responsible for fostering this element of the war. The impending threat of Southern rebels and the desire to clear the Upper Nile regions for oil exploration by interested foreign corporations spurred Khartoum to implement its plan of raising a Nuer army to fight the SPLA (Johnson 2003). The GoS began to support several militia groups for such purposes. Normally, militias pay allegiance to an ethnic group or a nationality that views its political and physical security as independent of the state. The fact that Khartoum was supporting them did not necessarily mean that these armed and mobile groups were loyal to the North and supported its cause. Many of these militias were part of the rural populace and used the war to pursue their own objectives, which often differed from the government’s goals. Many militias went to war to settle enmities with neighboring ethnic groups, or to seize resources – all under the guise of a religious war (Johnson 2003). During 1989, in an effort to bring these groups under more central control, Sudan legalized militias under the Popular Defense Act (Salih 1994). In terms of this dissertation’s model, the state was able to address grievances of some core communication within the liberated areas of Southern Sudan. The state was responsible for this not by behaving less repressively, but because of its increasingly repressive nature combined with selective help to give local communities some exemption from the effects of such oppression, much like a racketeer does.
So began what one SPLA commander referred to as the “balkanization of tribes” (Lino 2005). While some Nuer tribes remained allied with the SPLA, a large portion of these militia groups drew their support from the Bul Nuer, Lak Nuer and various Lou Nuer sections and from former Anya-Nya soldiers. The group became known as Anya-Nya II. Yet the impact that Khartoum’s divide-and-rule tactic had was felt directly by the Southern civilian population. The Anya-Nya II’s strategy was to make civilians in SPLA districts targets, spurring SPLA retaliation. The SPLA struck back – often indiscriminately – against the Lou, Gaajak, and other Jikany Nuer, and did so particularly violently against civilians they believed to be supporting the militia. Coercion was a response to the presence of rivals. While one can argue that some of these attacks were motivated by revenge, many were induced by a need to replace supplies lost in attacks (Johnson 2003), demonstrating the impact that the need for resources can have in shaping the overall environment in which the rebels operate. Because the SPLA faced several rivals at this point, their need for resources became more pressing; competition among rivals increased competition and the rebels for forced to extract resources as quickly and efficiently as possible in order to ensure their immediate survival. Civilians thus became entangled in the SPLA and GoS’s personal vendettas as well as the rebel group’s need to have dominance over resource extraction in areas where resources were scarce.

The GoS strategy of supplying tribal militias continued under successive regimes and became a particularly important factor after the fall of Nimeiri. Generally, the effects were two-fold: it gave the war the appearance of a tribal conflict with little relation to
national policies. Second, by conducting war through surrogates, the GoS could claim with little opposing evidence that it was not fighting a civil war (Johnson 2003). Adapting to this change of government strategy, the SPLA began to achieve the upper-hand over the government-backed militias as early as 1987 by adopting a more mobile strategy. Eventually some of the militias began to make peace with the SPLA and limited abuses on civilians. Some civilians found it in their interest to negotiate with the rebels to return to pastures denied to them. Garang encouraged this “but insisted that they use Dinka chiefs as intermediaries” (Johnson 2003, 85), which furthered his control over the liberated and non-liberated zones in the South, and strengthened the monopoly the SPLA was attaining over resources, including individuals, moving in and out of rebel-controlled regions. The explanation for undertaking such a different tactic in dealing with the militias, however, remains unexplained by scholars and will be addressed later in this chapter.

The Split of 1991

Control over the movement was more or less centralized under Garang, though there were limits to this domination. The nature of Southern geography limited widespread control in many ways, and though the use of two-way radios between headquarters and the field improved matters, local commanders often fulfilled their duties in their own ways and with a great deal of autonomy. For example, while all death sentences imposed by SPLA-supervised courts were to be referred back to the high command for confirmation, in practice they were imposed and carried out by local commanders with or without the presence of courts (Johnson 2003). Several high-level
commanders, for example, were said to have performed summary executions of their own troops and, according to one member of the movement, were never held accountable (Nyaba 1997).

The division between the SPLA leadership and soldiers in the field meant that the administrations established in liberated zones during the group’s formation were wrought with uneven levels of control. In the end, this led to a number of individuals and groups denouncing Garang’s leadership, many for the lack of transparency and dictatorial style in which he led the rebel group. To demonstrate this authoritarian hold on power one need only look to the SPLA’s institutions and their opaqueness early on. For example, after the rebel group’s first national convention in 1983, it did not hold another until 1994. The movement’s central organizing body, the Political-Military High Command (PMHC), whose members Garang appointed, was not fully convened between 1986 and 1991. In fact in 1987, the body became a double-tiered structure of permanent members as well as alternate commanders that had limited voting rights. Civilian figures had little role in the creation and implementation of policy, and there was no regular forum where questions of accountability could be raised on political, military, financial, and matters of peace. The SPLA did not have a monopoly over the extraction and distribution of resources. While some of the resources the group was able to collect came from the rebels’ looting activities, most came from Ethiopia. With such a supply, there was no need for Garang to win the local participation and support of Southerners for he had access to Ethiopian resources.
The lack of transparency in the SPLA was a part of the group’s early character. Internal purges of individuals the rebel group suspected of being government spies was common as well. This included the confrontation of several members of the PMHC and culminated in the arrests and detention of various commanders. Some charged with military indiscipline were executed, while others were held in prisons without being formally charged (Johnson 2003). Two commanders in particular spoke out against the lack of transparency within the movement: Riek Machar and Lam Akol. These two high-level officers were involved in a number of diplomatic missions with Garang on behalf of the SPLA, yet by the end of 1990 they had been reassigned to field positions. The shift in focus of the group’s military strategy from the north of Southern regions to the south in towns such as Juba left the two men politically and militarily marginalized. Stationed at Nasir, the SPLA’s rear base near refugee camps and training areas in Ethiopia, Akol and Machar had direct access to potential recruits for their cause as well as the option of receiving assistance – in whatever form – from Khartoum. There they found strong support among the Nuer in the region and even among Ethiopian Nuer authorities for the removal of SPLA leadership, while others who were sympathetic to the Nasir cause supported structural reform of the rebel group.

The split in the movement began with an attempted coup by Akol, Machar and Gordon Kong, all senior SPLA commanders. In a paper entitled Why John Garang Must Go Now, the three men protested Garang’s “dictatorial” style of leading the rebels and demanded independence for the South (Prunier forthcoming). This offshoot of the SPLA
became known as the SPLA-Nasir faction. The SPLA was once again faced with rivals. All of a sudden, the SPLA no longer had a monopoly over resource extraction and coercion toward civilians increased. The split within the SPLA was not surprising. Within most movements that challenge a ruling regime and link a radical intelligentsia to the peasantry, there can exist a “revolution within a revolution” – a movement with divergent visions of legitimate political order and justice (Scott 1979). These movements, seen from the rebel perspective as unruliness or outright rivalry, can promote disunity and encourage factionalizing. It also offered an exploitable division to Khartoum.

Initially SPLA-Nasir did not have an overwhelming level of support, though soon changed. Since the start of the war in 1983, a large Sudanese refugee population had settled around three camps in Western Ethiopia: Itang, Fungyido and Dimma. Official estimates put the number of refugees in Ethiopia from Sudan in 2003 at nearly 95,000 (UNHCR 2005). Most of these refugees arrived in 1983 and during the 1990s (UN News Centre 2006). By the end of the 1980s, there had not been any large-scale return of this mobile population. Traveling great distances meant that refugees and IDPs had little if any ties with the local communities through which they passed and thus were utterly dependent upon the relief agencies for food. During the early months of 1991, anticipating the fall of Mengistu, international donor agencies began to tackle the idea of repatriation. To assess the refugee situation, many of these donor agencies traveled to Nasir where a majority of the refugees had settled. Because Akol and Machar were stationed in this region, they found themselves in a position to negotiate with relief

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While the SPLA itself never changed its name, the original group led by Garang was, during this period, often referred to as SPLA-Torit or SPLA-Mainstream (Johnson 2003).
groups and speak directly to UN agencies and foreign governments. Of greater significance, though, was the link established between SPLA-Nasir and the GoS. Machar’s brother-in-law, recently appointed as head of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the relief wing of the SPLA, was the faction’s main link with the North. Direct contact was established and by August 1991 SPLA-Nasir had secured military support from the Khartoum for the overthrow of Garang. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which allowed numerous international NGOs access to areas in the South that had not been able to enter this region of Sudan since the beginning of the war, was fairly new at this time, having only formed in 1989. The impetus for this large-scale project was the hunger disaster of 1988 when approximately 250,000 Southerners died (Minear 1991). Hence, it was not difficult for rebel factions and the GoS to take advantage of NGOs’ status as outside observers to the conflict. For example, in 1991 a representative of Norwegian People’s Aid videotaped the ruin caused by SPLA-Nasir’s attacks on Dinka civilians north of Bor. As a result, other rebel factions blamed SPLA-Nasir for subsequent devastation. This video, which circulated among several donor groups, was in part responsible for the original fervor among NGOs for the Nasir faction (Burr and Collins 1995). This furthered highlighted for the SPLA the need to gain a firm grip on new norms and resources that these foreign donors brought.

The intra-SPLA coup was announced via radio to SPLA commanders in the South during late August. SPLA-Nasir announced the new objective as the independence of Southern Sudan. While support on the ground for this initiative was at
first sparing, it did spur Garang to retaliate. Thus began a period of tactical conflicts between the two factions, encouraging the formation of further offshoots and increasing competition for scarce resources. The populations that bore the brunt of this division were the local communities in which these groups traveled and at times based themselves (Human Rights Watch 1998, 1999). Devastation among Southerners included the obstruction of relief efforts; the raiding destruction and looting of Southern towns, and the seizing of food from rural civilians (Human Rights Watch 1994). In 1991, for example, the perceived inequality in aid distribution among Dinka and Nuer led to several devastating raids by Nuer in which 12,000 civilians in Dinka Bor Country were killed (Human Rights Watch 2001a). The SPLA’s attitude toward the relief community was uncompromisingly hostile. “The most important causes for famine were the results of deliberate policies adopted by the insurgents. Both the government and the SPLA denied food to the civilian population in the war zones” (Efuk 2000, 49) and implemented such tactics as obstructing relief supplies and preventing starving populations from carrying out coping strategies such as collecting wild foods from the bush (de Waal 1993). The diversion of aid has been widely documented by scholars and aid organizations, as well as confirmed by Southerners themselves. One man interviewed in a refugee camp confirmed that food did not go directly to civilians. Relief, he explained, first passed through the hands of the SPLA, which used it for its own consumption. Many commanders took advantage of their positions and diverted aid to sell (Marko 2001). To further demonstrate the impact of the war on civilians, between 1983 and 2002 there were reported approximately two million deaths as a result of the
war. Only three percent of these deaths were battle-related. The remainder of deaths was caused by civilian attacks, malnutrition and disease (Gleditsch and Lacina 2005).

The split within the SPLA along with Khartoum’s role as main supplier to the Nasir faction enabled the government to direct and regain the military project in the South. As time progressed, SPLA-Nasir went through further iterations. In 1993, the group dropped its SPLA-Nasir label and became SPLA-United when it combined with other ethnic groups in the South. In 1994, it went through another branding following a Nuer reconciliation meeting when it adopted the moniker the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). This occurred after a small gain by the SPLA within the South. In 1997 the SSIM went through a final organizational transformation when it became the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), an army formed under the Khartoum Peace Agreement from ex-rebel forces including those from SSIA. The changes in moniker highlight the irony of a regime aiding a separatist movement in its own state by demonstrating the primacy of the state-rebel relationship over considerations of ideology in determining rebel strategies and behavior. What was important for the GoS was the demise of the SPLA. Likewise, the collapse of the SPLA was beneficial to Machar’s faction, as it would expand his power not only in the North as a result of his government alliance, but most importantly in the South. The ease with which factions such as the SSDF changed sides highlighted for the SPLA the priority of doing away with rivals over the importance of ideology.

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10 SPLA-United was retained by Lam Akol as the name of his Tonga-based group following the creation of the SSIM/A
Throughout this period, these factions remained under the thumb of Khartoum, an affiliation that lasted until January 2000 when Machar left the government and once more took up arms against the North, forming the Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF). As will be outlined in greater detail, the factionalizing among the SPLA during the 1980s and early 1990s contributed to the rebel group’s coercive behavior toward civilians in the South.

3.2 Change

By the mid-1990s, there was a perceptible shift in the SPLA’s treatment of civilians. The group began to change, decreasing its level of coercion against civilians, acknowledging the need for democratic institutions, and addressing the immediate needs of Southerners, a population that it had previously overlooked and harassed. What caused the SPLA to shift its behavior toward noncombatants? Does the reason lie in the disappearance of significant rivals? Did the shift from relying on communist to western resources affect the group’s behavior? As this section will demonstrate, the explanation for shifts in SPLA lies primarily with the absence of rivals, which in turn led the group to pay heed to the resources Western donors brought and the normative stipulations they carried. This section describes the major changes that the SPLA underwent; it emphasizes the decrease in human rights abuses, the expansion of local participation in the governance of Southern liberated zones, and the marked change in the character of the SPLA.
Transforming Structures of Governance: The 1994 National Convention

The SPLA’s initial goal of a complete reformation of Sudan as opposed to the pursuit of outright secession meant that it initially did not carve out a quasi-state; leadership did not focus on constructing institutions that would address the needs of Southerners. During the early years of its development, the SPLA concerned itself mainly with the negotiation of disputes and the administration of law through local traditional courts. Local administration from 1983-1991 was rudimentary at best.\textsuperscript{11} The group initially relied on a system of indirect rule for governing the civilian populations and displayed a reluctance to cooperate with civilian organizations and churches (though this improved with the establishment of OLS. However, while some local traditions were recognized, many chiefs found themselves subordinated to the SPLA, losing much of their autonomy in the process (Rolandsen 2005). This, in addition to a general unwillingness by the rebel group to address the interests and basic needs of civilians in liberated zones, as well as the murder of several humanitarian aid workers, spurred numerous complaints in the region, within the movement, and among external observers (European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council 2001).

Amidst this criticism from international and local actors, the SPLA held its second national convention. The 1994 National Convention (NC) served several functions. First, it signified a political rebirth of the rebel group by introducing a political program and the objective to equip the SPLA and the liberated zones with structures in which civil society could participate. Second, the NC confirmed the SPLA’s position as leading

\textsuperscript{11} See (Kuol 1997) for a detailed analysis of this system.
organization of the South. It began the formalization of the SPLA’s political structures. Resolution No. 7 prescribes the development of autonomous local administrative units at traditional authority levels – the payam, the village and the county. This resolution also states that civilians could become members of the SPLA without going through military training – a significant step toward decreasing the group’s militaristic culture (SPLA 1991). This signified the group’s move to open participation to civilians. The NC promoted renewal and promised Southerners a chance to voice their opinions and grievances to the rebel group without fear of retribution. The NC also saw for the first time in the history of the SPLA the election for top positions within the group itself as well as the newly formed Civil Administration of New Sudan (CANS). The NC was not merely a performance for the international community and local supporters (Prunier forthcoming; Rolandsen 2005); a number of reforms were actually developed and put into practice at the local level.

The primary product of this meeting was the Watershed, a document that spelled out policies for a civil administration and the development of structures that would foster democracy. The Watershed formally separated the military from the civilian administration and established a political and administrative entity in the Nuba Mountains region of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile presided over by a National Executive Council (NEC) and a newly-created National Liberation Council (NLC). The latter represented a legislature made up of approximately 200 members. These areas had been part of Northern Sudan for administrative purposes since independence. A final result of the Convention was the reaffirmation of Garang as
chairman of both the NEC and the NLC. Garang modeled the need to reform Sudan on the legacies of such African rebel leaders turned presidents as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame. Museveni also provided aid to the SPLA during the 1990s (Clark 2001; Connell 1999).

A number of liberal institutions based on traditional forms of rule were established. Using entities like the boma and payam, the SPLA facilitated the building of a new hierarchy of customary courts, from the village to the county level. In other words, the SPLA was doing as Olson’s “stationary bandits” did: providing public goods amidst disorder (Olson 1993). The immediate effect was to expand the degree of local participation in governance. For example, the SPLA strengthened the role of chiefs in matters of appeal and made an effort to reflect the legal history of the South, dealing with issues such as water supply, the lack of infrastructure, education, and road maintenance. Furthermore, officials who served in these branches of the “government” were elected and dealt directly with local populations (Marko 2001). The NC helped in the formation of a new system of courts that would supervise the traditional chiefs’ courts, representing the integration of the traditional courts into the “national” judicial system. At the same time the SPLA remained aware of its need to hold on to its newly acquired leverage in the South. While the group claimed to recognize the authority of

12 The Ugandan leader’s influence on the SPLA cadre is palpable, even today. Many of the Southerners who took up arms and joined the movement in 1983 were schooled at such Ugandan universities as Makerere. In fact, Garang and Museveni were classmates at school in Tanzania.

13 The local levels of governance in Southern Sudan include the boma and the payam, the former being the smaller of the two.

14 In Africa, rural social institutions such as courts and grassroots organizations play an important role and serve as arenas for discussion, influence, and the promotion of accountability within governmental structures (Newbury 1992).
traditional structures, these reforms also meant that it had the right to overrule all court decisions of chiefs (Johnson 1998). “Thus, the price the chiefs had to pay for recognition and integration was subordination” (Rolandsen 2005, 117).

While many of these structures were merely Potemkin villages, they instigated a shift in the relationship between local communities and the rebels. The SPLA expanded local opportunity to participate in decision-making to traditionally under-represented groups of Southerners. Twenty-five percent of the local leadership positions were designated for women, for example, though admittedly this was difficult to implement due to the slowly changing tradition of not providing formal education for females (Awat, Woll, and Deng 2001). In what was called the First Equatoria Regional Congress of 2002, it was proclaimed that “there should be a basic law (constitution) for the New Sudan to guarantee all the rights of citizens and their obligations” (First Equatoria Regional Congress 2002, Supremacy of Laws) and that “women[’s] representation in the government, executive, legislative, judiciary and all parastatal bodies shall be proportionate to the women[’s] population” (First Equatoria Regional Congress 2002, Contribution of Women). This shift in the lines of gender equality likely reflected the norm among international organizations and thus was a clever method of acquiring additional international attention and potential resources from donors.

While the most significant changes occurred at the historically neglected local level (Rolandsen 2005, 124), radical changes took place in the SPLA’s rhetoric as well. The increasing emphasis on democracy and civil society supports this. For example, the SPLA held a conference for high-level officers, relaying the need to stop the harassment
of civilians by rebel soldiers and other military personnel. One conference organized following the NC was the 1996 Conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in New Cush. The main goal of this meeting was to “deliberate thoroughly and pass resolutions and recommendations that [would] help strengthen civil society and encourage the establishment of effective and accountable civil authority in the New Sudan” (Sudan People's Liberation Movement 1996, 2).

One of the more significant elements of the 1994 Watershed was the modification of the SPLA’s original charter to include the right to self-determination. This acknowledged that the Southern Sudanese should be guaranteed the ability to decide through elections whether to remain a part of Sudan led by the North or form their own state once the region was liberated. This edict represented a major shift from the goal expressed by the rebel group during its formation and supports the theory that the international norm of sovereignty was largely ignored by the rebel group – the SPLA would pick and choose the they wanted to abide by (choosing more democratic ones, for example).

The right to self-determination has traditionally been employed by countries that were former colonies. Insurgent struggles following World War II occurred within a growing recognition that colonies ought to be granted the right of self-determination. This right to independence became international law and was expressed in UN Resolution 1514 of 1960. This resolution declared that “all peoples have the right to self-determination” and that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” (United
Nations 1960). Therefore, during the period of de-colonization rebel groups found that they had to confine their objectives to the liberation of individual colonies rather than the creation of new states. The 1963 Charter of the OAU also highlighted this principle that all member states would “respect the borders existing on the achievement of national independence” (OAU Charter Article 3, 3). Rebel groups had to abide by this particular norm in order to attain diplomatic recognition, for lacking it would create enormous obstacles to foreign aid. Groups would be ineligible for loans from the IMF or World Bank as well as being denied a seat at the United Nations. The SPLA’s choice to adopt this agenda indicates that the decreasing presence of rivals and the subsequent monopoly over resources allowed the rebel group to choose policies that it saw would garner additional local and international support.

The development of these liberal institutions indicates that the SPLA changed its relationship with civilians during the 1990s. Individuals and groups in several towns in the South confirmed this; many claimed there was a huge contrast between the history of the SPLA prior to 1994 and following this point in time. As one former administrator remarked, in the beginning the organization was purely a military one: judges were military people, as were the administrators and the policemen (Magnong 2001). Furthermore, civil society groups did not exist in the South prior to this point, at least not as formal participants in SPLA affairs. Following 1994, local communities were allowed to participate in local governing institutions (Isaac 2001) that involved “every sector of society” (Buoc 2001), and guidelines were laid that dictated how governance

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15 Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) were formally allowed to operate in rebel-held areas as early as 1989, but again, most were prohibited from taking part in political/military affairs.
was to be centered upon civil society. As one Southerner maintained, “In the beginning it was tough because it was a military government – there were no laws. Now, when the [group] captures a city, it establishes a civil structure. Leaders are elected and appointed” (Riel 2001). A prominent local judge in Rumbek confirmed that, following 1994, “ordinary Sudanese were given the chance to say something about governance and the liberation struggle.” The courts and the local commissioners were more accessible than in the past, and people were allowed to speak openly without fear (Arol 2001). One woman who identified herself as a member of a local women’s group called Kony-rot (“Help Yourself”), said that people participated in local decision-making and the SPLA authorities asked the community to participate (Kok 2001). Two women in the town of Nimule mentioned that they were able to vote for leaders within the Episcopal Church. The SPLA, some claimed, provided the opportunity for locals to elect women to the local payam (Deng and Nyahong 2001).

This development, according to one Southerner, reflected a new working relationship between civil society in the South and the SPLA. This relationship at first was difficult to maintain because the rebels were governed by the military. Following the transformation in the rebel group’s behavior, when the SPLA captured a town, for example, it would establish a civil structure with elected leaders. The position of commissioner, for example, was filled through a vote. As described by one local in Sudan, civilians recommended five names for the post of commissioner and one person out of this group was appointed by the High Command (Riel 2001). As the then-commissioner of Rumbek asserted, the civilian population participated in its own
governance demonstrating the development of democratic principles within the South. Since the rebel group had liberalized, he said, people have had representation (Buoc 2001). A woman from the same town remarked that local communities in the South were modifying old laws throughout liberated zones to make their societies strong bases from which democracy could grow (Maguat 2001). Local Sudanese believed in the democracy that the SPLA was selling. The SPLA’s new-found legitimacy among Southerners reflects its freedom to administer without rival competition and explains why the group shifted its behavior beginning in the mid-1990s rather than 1991, after the split.

In spite of the demonstrations of liberalization, many of the reforms were enacted selectively or not all and much of the change did not reach the inner workings of the group itself. The draft constitution drawn up at the 1994 NC, for example, was never formally enacted. This document introduced the idea that the rebel group was comprised of two separate entities: the SPLA, or military side, and the civil authority structure. Though it was not formally enacted, this was significant in that it formalized the regulation of the South by a civil authority taking on the responsibilities that normally was the prerogative of a state (Rolandsen 2005). Yet this lack of application meant the political bodies created at the NC were firmly in the hands of the military arm. The changes developed at the NC at Chukudum would have had a significant impact, namely the re-distribution of power as the chairman’s decisions were subject to the approval of a congress. Rolandsen argues that this represents an unwillingness within the SPLA to give form to such rhetoric (Rolandsen 2005). However, this study’s
theoretical implications break down the motivations within the SPLA’s actions even further. While supporting Rolandsen’s supposition that the SPLA was indeed unwilling to enact central reforms, the fact that some reforms were carried out at the local level indicates that the group was comfortable with allowing local structures to administer to the populations in liberated areas. These structures were manned by SPLA officers who appeared to possess certain degrees of autonomy, often to their own financial benefit. The ability for such personal enrichment meant there was less likelihood of a coup by such individuals. This was a strategy by which to hinder the development of further rivals as it allowed the group to monitor the flow of resources. Thus, while the leadership was not willing to surrender central control to the populace in the form of a parliamentary democracy, it was able to allow liberated areas to carry out political matters, as long as there was a SPLA presence within the local administration. A fine demonstration of the group’s control over resource extraction (and confidence in it) is the visas it issued for traveling throughout Southern Sudan. In order to get into Southern Sudan, and travel between towns and villages, visitors did not obtain a visa issued by Khartoum. Rather, travelers to SPLA liberated areas had to obtain SPLA visas issued through the group’s administrative offices in Nairobi, Kenya. Each time an individual enters a village or town, the visa had to be handed over to the rebel group’s relief wing, the SRRA. This allowed the SPLA to know who was coming in and out of its territories. This was also a money-raising scheme, as most visa applicants had to pay a $100 fee to obtain the document.
Human Rights Abuses and the SPLA

While the SPLA was seemingly transforming its structures of governance, it also improved its human rights record. The SPLA committed numerous human rights abuses during the war including summary executions and disappearances, torture, holding prisoners in harsh conditions (Human Rights Watch accessed 2006), the pillaging of civilian assets (mainly cattle and grain), the destruction of civilian property (primarily by burning houses), the capture of civilians including women and minors, and denying minors the opportunity to be reunited with their families (Africa Watch 1993, 1995). Although the constitution drafted by the South during the war provides equal status to men and women, the protection gap between customary and formal law frequently leads to the abuse of women’s human rights (Joint Assessment Mission Sudan 2005).

SPLA-Mainstream was not the only group guilty of these abuses. SPLA-Nasir, for example, was accused of hindering relief barges to the South, a violation of agreements between the SPLA and the GoS under UN auspices (Verney 1993). One SPLA faction directed the movement of civilians to Yuai in the Upper Nile – a frontline position – exposing them to military dangers rather than taking measures to protect them. Yet another faction reportedly would siege garrison towns and use the starvation of locals as a form of combat (Human Rights Watch 1994). "The total impact of these abusive practices [was the destruction of] the safety net the [S]outhern Sudanese utilize[d] as a safety net" (16)

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16 The vulnerable and difficult circumstances under which women in Africa often live are exacerbated during times of war. For example, during the protracted conflict in Sierra Leone, approximately 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced women were reportedly the victims of sexual violence (Physicians for Human Rights 2002). In Southern Sudan women have less chance of survival than men – the reverse of the human biological trend (The New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation 2004).
protection from hunger in times of food scarcity in this environmentally precarious region” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 91).

Forced recruitment was also common among SPLA units – boys brought to or lured to Ethiopian refugee camps for educational opportunities were separated from their families, trained, and deployed as soldiers in the organization (Human Rights Watch 1994). The SPLA organized a “Red Army”, a force consisting of fourteen to sixteen-year-old boys. Former SPLA officers claimed that these boys initially were used for fighting. During the early years of the war, the Red Army experienced continuous losses (Human Rights Watch/Africa and Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project). Despite these reports, the SPLA continually denied engaging in underage recruitment of soldiers (Human Rights Watch 1996). Most national laws permit recruitment into national armies at the age of eighteen. International law, including humanitarian and human rights law, offers protection to children in areas of conflict through a variety of devices drafted since World War II. The most significant of these instruments for protection of children combatants are Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.17

Interviews with civilians and soldiers alike confirmed the shift in the SPLA’s tactics and policies in regard to its human rights record. During the early days of the rebel group, one man reported, civil society was not safe in the face of the SPLA (Oloya 2001). In fact, one source remarked that Garang had “personally liquidated” individuals whom he perceived to be a threat to his position within the group (Confidential source

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This is a theme that surfaces throughout this study. One female SPLA soldier admitted that the organization was not “progressive” or “free” in the past. In the beginning, she said, there were internal conflicts and many human rights abuses. “It took time to realize we had problems” (Kuol 2001).

Each individual interviewed noted a shift in the SPLA’s relations with noncombatants. While its mechanism was never directly remarked upon, the fact that nearly every person interviewed in the Southern Sudanese cities visited by the author, including civilians, SPLA personnel, religious officials, soldiers, and foreigners consistently remarked on a change in the behavior of the rebel group in relation to its treatment of local communities. It appears, for example, that the group slowly began to address many of the social issues that arose among local populations as a result of the war. One female civilian noted that many women in the South had to live without their husbands due to the war, and consequently had to make ends meet by themselves. Since the group’s transformation, she said, the SPLA has taught women how to provide for themselves (Kuol 2001).

The Transformation of the SPLA’s Legitimacy

Because its origins were founded in guerrilla tactics and the preference of the military over civic needs, the SPLA did not experience a smooth transition into an authority that Southerners took to be their legitimate representatives. Yet, by the late 1990s, the group had made progress in institutionalizing its authority and dominance in the region through military and civic means. Legitimacy refers to the popular acceptance of an actor’s entitlement to rule. When power is joined with a perception of its
legitimacy, it is transformed into authority. As Weber emphasizes, legitimacy makes up the basis of real differences in the way power is exercised. Power can be legitimately exercised via tradition, charisma, or legal rational authority (Weber 1946). States that are the result of armed struggle are granted the laurels of revolutionary legitimacy, though they also face the pressure to maintain their political ideals (Schutz 1995). In context with this study’s theory, actors or groups with revolutionary legitimacy are not faced with rivals in the same community and thus they behave in a contractual manner. This makes the group’s initial tasks of gathering resources much simpler than if it began from a coercive point because the group does not have to gather resources and compete for them at the same time. Control over extraction and distribution of resources is already in the rebel group’s hands. In many ways this is the best possible scenario in which a rebel group can find itself. However, once a revolutionary group wins its own state (a point that has already been established as highly difficult due to international norms of sovereignty), it moves from being a group with a monopoly to the ruling regime that is responsible for keeping its political promises to the people or else facing new revolutionary groups.

With the support of USAID and other foreign donors, development was launched in the South, enabling the SPLA to enhance its legitimacy on the ground with Southerners and throughout the West. The SPLA held a prime position, for the lack of infrastructure in the South and the group’s dearth in resources meant that most development was paid for by foreign NGOs. Support from the US, for example, was significant. By the mid-1990s, nearly 80% of US aid to Sudan went to Southern rebel-
controlled areas. One report claims that, "On humanitarian grounds USAID [had] committed to supporting the SPLA/M in the south, and Garang said the aid agency [had] committed US$42.5m over the next five years" (Cobb 2002, 1). The rebel group’s initiative, formerly called “Peace through Development”, facilitated micro-enterprise, fostered income-generating and food security projects. In November 1999, President Clinton signed Public Law 196-113 – the government budget for FY2000. Included in the law, in section 592, was a line item that allocated aid from the US to the SPLA:

…providing humanitarian assistance, including food, directly to National Democratic Alliance participants and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement operating outside of the United Nations’ Operation Lifeline Sudan structure…(106th Congress 1999, 1501A-122)

In the first five months of 2002, the US designated over $26 million to the Southern sector of Sudan (USAID 2002). This money was officially allocated to health (USAID 2002) care services, food relief, infrastructure development, and water and sanitation services. However, the SPLA was able to control much of the distribution of these resources because any entity, individual, or organization working in the liberated zones of the South had to pass through the SRRA. This allowed the SPLA to take credit for services provided to local communities; foreign assistance facilitated the good name that the SPLA won for overseeing the distribution of public goods, resulting in an increase in the rebel group’s civic legitimacy. Interviews by the author in 2001, toward the end of the war, indicated that international donors were well aware of the SPLA’s power in the area and more specifically of its monopoly on the distribution of resources. This was to both parties' benefit. Cooperation for the donors meant less civilian death
as they were able to distribute more humanitarian relief. Cooperation was advantageous for the SPLA meant the continuance of western resources.

Development initiatives granted the rebels a greater degree of legitimacy and control among Southern communities. According to one man, the people felt empowered by such projects (Lemin and Odera 2001). Two Southern Sudanese women maintained that they were able to openly go to a local administrator with funding problems for a soap-making project. Women gained more skills and more began to obtain an education. According to one woman, since 1994 women have had more power within their families and community (Deng and Nyahong 2001). Another woman in Rumbek who at the time said she was part of the “regional liberation council,” said women had the opportunity to be self-reliant, using as an example the fact that they could trade in the market independently (Maguat 2001).

By obtaining legitimacy among locals, the SPLA was able to widen its dominance in the South without having to revert to coercion. In other words, the SPLA learned that by granting at least a minimum of services, it could more efficiently and effectively obtain the support it needed to acquire resources; it did not need to expend additional resources on forcibly extracting from local communities, nor did it have to spend resources on provisional public goods since it could claim credit for the foreign provision of such goods.

Another indicator of the change in the SPLA’s legitimacy on the ground was the freedom of movement it allowed local populations in the liberated zones, particularly in later years. An ability to move freely in an area meant that individuals could increase the
operation of independent economic activities. In many ways, the ability to move freely through areas is necessary for Southerners in order to ensure their survival. Engaging in independent economic activities such as trading goods in markets allows Southerners to obtain a wider range of basic goods. By allowing a degree of movement from town to town, or from rural village to town market, the rebel group was perceived as increasingly representative of the people. This further facilitated the group’s monopoly over resources. One Southerner claimed that prior to 1994 the military ruled the liberated areas, restricting movements between villages – a necessity of control amidst competitors. After this period, the people could move freely and were released from the burdens that came with supporting a military regime (Mading 2001). One woman in Kakuma Refugee camp in Northern Kenya, who identified herself as a member of the Machar’s SPDF, said she was granted permission to travel into SPLA-controlled areas to tell civilians that all Southerners must fight the common enemy in the North (Ring 2001).

The SPLA’s legitimacy was equally enhanced with an increased presence in the international arena. Shedding their military fatigues, the SPLA became a regular presence in the US and Europe. They also became signatories to internationally supported doctrine. For example, the group signed the landmine ban treaty in Geneva. It agreed to demobilize child soldiers 18 and signed the Maputo Declaration on the rights of the child in 1999. In attending international human rights conferences, holding talks

18 Despite the signing of this agreement, as of 2003, reports by NGOs indicated that the group continued the practice of using child soldiers. See (IRIN 24 June 2003; United Nations Briefing Report 16 January 2003).
with USAID and government officials in Europe and the US, the SPLA leadership filled a role that foreign donors needed filled in Southern Sudan. The SPLA took advantage of foreign donors who were quick to provide resources for any actor that would stand up to the Islamic regime in the North and play a leading role in a region of Africa that appeared to be unendingly messy. It was enough for the rebel group to attend meetings and sign protocols in order to obtain foreign assistance.

Following September 11, 2001, the SPLA further improved its status in the international community. Khartoum, in particular Bashir, felt mounting pressure to sit at the negotiating table with the SPLA. Having formerly harbored international terrorist Osama bin-Ladin, the GoS was not in an ideal negotiating position as far as the international community was concerned. International awareness for Sudan and its conflicts was heightened by events in Darfur in the western part of the country. This placed the idea of a peace deal (and the SPLA’s legitimate part in the peace process) on international political agendas, and in the sights of the general public.

While international support facilitated much of the developmental progress the SPLA made in the South, local support also impacted the group’s image on the ground. One Southerner maintained that legitimacy of SPLA leaders did not require acquiescence from the international community. Legitimacy in Africa, she said, came from the people (Adugu 2001). While many of the statements made by Southerners during interviews can be questioned as to their authenticity, the fact that similar statements in several different towns were made in and out of the presence of the SPLA indicates that there was a general consensus about the legitimacy of the SPLA and its leadership of
Southerners. One may argue that the views of these people may not reflect what was occurring in reality – that Southern civilians expressed merely their perceptions rather than actual events on the ground. Perhaps civilians perceived that they could move with more freedom; perhaps they thought their level of participation in their own governance had increased. Though some analysts will argue that change in the SPLA was merely the perception, the fact that Southerners even perceived a change was important as it highlighted to views concerning the SPLA’s legitimacy and by extension its community support. It was this perception that helped facilitate the maintenance of the group’s monopoly in the region because it led civilians to willingly accept authority. This in turn led to a decrease in coercion and a rise in contractual relations between the SPLA and local Southern Sudanese. Figure 3.1 mirrors this trend. The data depicts one-sided violence by the SPLA toward civilians during the bulk of war years. As the qualitative data tells us above, the SPLA’s coercion against civilians was high in its earlier years and eventually decreased. This section has recounted these changes noted in the behavior of the SPLA. The next section will explain why these changes occurred and why the belief in this transformation by locals and the international community was important in respect to the levels of violence in the area as the rebel group evolved.

3.3 Analysis

There are several possibilities for the SPLA’s transformation in strategy that lie outside of the immediate rebel environment. Some claim that the group’s vulnerability to externalities, such as its dependence on Ethiopia during the Cold War and its
subsequent termination of military support, forced reform within the rebel group. Another explanation lies in the evolving Western perspective that championed democratic agendas following the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also resulted in the loss of the group’s rear bases on the Ethiopian border and its political headquarters in Addis, forcing it to face the realities that accompanied over 130,000 refugees who were forced to evacuate from Ethiopia camps (Rolandsen 2005).¹⁹ Yet another reason lies in the ever-repressive nature of the regime in Khartoum, which could easily have spurred

¹⁹ Various estimates exist. One scholar cites 350,000 (Hutchinson 2001), another 200,000 (Karim 1996), while another puts the number around 130,000-150,000 (Johnson 1996).
reticent Southerners to lend support to the rebel group. While these explanations are all reasonable, they do not get at the key mechanism for change in the SPLA’s treatment of noncombatant – local dominance and the ability to maintain this control. As is clarified in the following pages, the rebel group’s role as sole extractor of resources was significantly more critical than the type of resources and the international norms that came with many of them. The SPLA’s ability to be sole extractor in the South during the late 1990s and early 21st century can be explained by the decrease in rivals it faced – the weakening of factions and the decision of Northern political parties to support the SPLA. It was this role that made possible the SPLA’s new strategy of allowing more access to external donors and the adoption of international norms of democracy and human rights.

Analyzing the SPLA Using QCA

The importance of the presence or absence of rivals is best demonstrated using crisp-set and fuzzy-set analysis. Using the data collected in the field and the analysis performed through process tracing above, the SPLA is separated into three periods of time. This gives us not one but three cases with which to work. The first case, SPLA1, begins in 1983 with the group’s inception and ends ten years later. This period in the group’s history is riddled with intra-group as well as inter-group rivalry. Not only is the SPLA fighting government-sponsored militia, it is also competing for scarce resources with splinter groups, the most significant of which is Machar’s SPLA-Nasir. In the beginning the group acquires resources not only from Soviet-backed Ethiopia, it also extracts resources through looting. This period is also the group’s most violent, when
human rights abuses are a significant characteristic. SPLA2 begins in 1994 with the second national convention in Chukudum and the Watershed Agreement. This document established democratic institutions within the SPLA and gave greater participatory rights to the Southern population. The SPLA has fewer rivals, and the group’s coercive treatment of civilians decreases, though this is the most intense period of fighting between the rebels and the GoS. Because Ethiopian resources run out with the end of the Cold War, the SPLA eventually secures cooperation with OLS, which gives the rebels a monopoly on the resources coming into the South. The group adapts to the requirements of Western funding because it is able to do so with fewer rivals. The last case, SPLA3, is the period of peace negotiations. The SPLA firmly establishes itself as the legitimate representative of Southern Sudan. Peace talks are facilitated by an international task force. This case ends with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. John Garang becomes Vice President of Sudan, with Bashir remaining as head of state. The decision on self-determination is scheduled for election in 2011. These three periods and the presence or absence of the relevant variables are represented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Crisp-Set Representation of SPLA Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1 1983-1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2 – 1994-2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA3 – 2001-2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = presence
0 = absence
However, by recoding the variable scores within the respective cases, we get a more varied and more accurate reflection of these conditions. Table 3.2 contains the fuzzy-set scores for the three SPLA cases, including the variables and the outcomes.

Table 3.2 Fuzzy-Set Representation of SPLA Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.0 = fully in
0.75 = more in than out
0.5 = neither in nor out
0.25 = more out than in
0 = fully out

By referring to the history of the SPLA explicated in the pages above we can see the link between these fuzzy-set scores and the qualitative data. As has been established here, the SPLA was plagued with intense rivalry both inside and outside of the group during its nascent years. Thus SPLA1, Presence of Rivals, has a score of “1.0” (“fully in”). Also during this first SPLA case, the group’s Need for Resources was intense (“1.0”). The reason for this intensity in need is the lack of assuredness of its resource base in the beginning. The SPLA was not guaranteed resources from its constituent population because of the intense rivalry, which increased the competition for scarce goods. The group did not easily win the support of locals because its main method of extracting resources within Sudan was through looting. This was also a time when the group was highly disorganized and not unified, thus making the source of resources within Sudan less of a guarantee. While the SPLA had resources coming from Ethiopia,
this did not ensure the operation of rebel units located far from the Sudan-Ethiopia border. The mixture of illicit resources obtained through looting and the resources provided by Mengistu gives the Use of Illicit Resources variable in SPLA1 a score of “0.75” (“more in than out”). The behavior of the SPLA toward noncombatants, as related previously, was extremely coercive and included such atrocities as forced starvation, rape, summary execution, looting and kidnapping of child soldiers. Thus the score for Coercive Outcome is “1.0”.

During the SPLA’s second case, SPLA2, the group saw a decrease in rivalry. The score for Presence of Rivals is thus “0.25” (“more out than in”) because, while most rival groups had begun disseminating or folding themselves into the main SPLA, Machar’s SPDF existed during this period, though by the end of SPLA2 it was fighting the GoS once again. Machar decided to terminate cooperation with Khartoum but found himself in the minority among his commanders. He subsequently dismissed Akol, who moved to Tonga in the Shilluk homeland where he used the SPLA-United nomenclature to rally armed groups who remained loyal to him. This indicated that rival factions were fast becoming less of a threat. Once Machar left the government and did not act as a rival to the SPLA, many of these south-versus-south battles decreased. The formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches also aided the SPLA’s grip on resources in the South. Formed in January 1990, in part with the support of the SPLA “to strengthen the churches to better serve the suffering people in the SPLA/M-held areas” (NSCC 1991, 2), the organization represented the Catholic and Episcopal Churches in SPLA-controlled areas. The NSCC, despite its ties to the SPLA, was accepted by several
international organizations as an independent body. For example, World Relief, the
humanitarian arm of the National Association of Evangelicals, presented the leaders of
the NSCC as church leaders who could provide perspective on critical Sudan issues.
Some groups have thus argued that the NSCC has facilitated the skewing of American
and Canadian perspectives on Sudan, providing representatives from these countries
with a selective reading of events (ESPAC 6 June 2002).

The development of Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs) also facilitated
greater monopoly over Southern resources for the SPLA. “In early 1993 the SPLM/A
allowed the establishment of the first Sudanese indigenous NGO (SINO)” (Rolandsen
2005, 78). These organizations were financed by external donors and reflected activities
that these outside sources were willing to fund such as providing services to local
populations and attracting further donor monies. These, according to one scholar, were
the only activities they could safely engage in without posing a threat to the SPLA
(Rolandsen 2005). Thus, while SINGOs were a positive step for Southern civil society
and may have appeared as a further step toward the development of democratic
reforms in the South, the activities of these locally-operated organizations remained
firmly under the watch of the rebel group.

Support from the international community, in this case namely foreign NGOs and
donors, helped the SPLA gain further control at this time. Warring parties in 1994 signed
an agreement that made formal the tripartite principle of the OLS operation. As long as
the NIF regime in the North remained hostile toward relief operations, it was in the
interest of OLS and foreign donors to encourage the SPLA to establish an explicit claim
for the right to administer the liberated zones in the South. “A quasi-autonomous region in the South would make the humanitarian apparatus less dependent on approvals from Khartoum” (Rolandsen 2005, 46). “At the operational level, inside the Southern Sudan, the guerrilla factions had the last say in the never-ending discussion on access, security and abuse of the humanitarian organizations and their assistance” (Rolandsen 2005, 52). The increasing ability of foreign NGOs and other external donors to work in the South demonstrated concern for the well-being of civilians. This increased the group’s legitimacy among such international agencies and foreign states as well as among the local Sudanese communities, embedding its position as sole extractor of resources and legitimate force in the South.

Under Need, SPLA2 has a score of “0.75”, because while Western donors had begun bringing resources into the South, the group was not yet fully recovered from the loss of Marxist resources following the end of the Cold War. That is, the group was experiencing a re-evaluation of its strategy as a result of the Cold War and had not yet reconciled itself to abiding by the democratic norms that many Western resources required. The cessation of aid from Ethiopia following the end of the Cold War and the factionalization among Southerners made maintaining a monopoly on extraction much more important because increasing competition meant a higher premium on resources and support. Thus, need, while not extremely high, is still elevated. The resources the group uses in SPLA2 is a mix of illicit and non-illicit goods (“0.5”, “neither in nor out”). As the group began establishing democratic structures, it gained popular support and was able to extract resources legitimately from the population. However, it still participated in
some forms of looting and skimmed resources off the donors operating in the region. Also contributing to the SPLA’s solidification of control over the Southerners and resources was the breakthrough made in 1993 with the Northern opposition. The SPLA linked up with Northern political parties via the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included the *Umma* party and the Democratic Unionist Party (Kevane and Stiansen 1998; Kok 1996). The NDA agreed to actively participate in the fighting against the GoS and for the first time recognized Southerners’ right to self-determination. The NDA, which needed SPLA firepower in order to force the NIF out of its position, agreed on establishing a secular constitution after NIF dominance in the government was at an end (Rolandsen 2005). Thus, by the mid-1990s, this alliance further won the hearts and minds of the Southerners --- who saw that the SPLA leadership had the support of Northern parties and was serious in pursuing what the majority of Southern Sudanese wanted – self-determination. Winning the support of locals meant increased control over resources; the SPLA came very close to being the embodiment of Olson’s stationary bandits. The SPLA’s behavior during this period is largely, though not completely, contractual. Therefore the Coercive Outcome is given a score of “0.25”.

The SPLA became the sole extractor of resources in the South not only through the alliance with Northern political forces, but also by facilitating the access to international aid for Southerners. The SPLA increased and maintained dominance over resources by ensuring that financial transactions were filtered through the rebel group via the relief arm of the group. Though nominally independent, the relief wing of the SPLA – the SRRA, which had a responsibility of distributing food to needy Southerners
in the liberated zones – as a part of the rebel group would “skim off” food and distribute to soldiers instead (Rolandsen 2005). This was not surprising seeing how most of the SRRA personnel were SPLA officers drawn from the security unit (Duffield 1995; Johnson 1994). The SRRA operated on two different levels, a central level and a local one. The former concerned itself with interactions with foreign NGOs and OLS. The latter focused on issues on the ground and was maintained by officers stationed within SPLA liberated zones. The SPLA solidified its position as sole legitimate force in the South when, in 1999, the SRRA issued a *Memorandum of Understanding* that essentially announced that the rebel group possessed the same authority as the GoS in dealing with aid organizations operating in areas under its control. It was further decided that in order for these agencies to operate in the Southern rebel-held areas, they had to agree to the group’s terms (Rolandsen 2005).

By the start of the third SPLA case, SLPA3, the group found itself with a monopoly over the extraction of resources and thus had no rivals. The Rival score of “0” reflects this state. The group’s Need for Resources had also decreased, as it became assured of its receipt of Western resources as well as local support and is scored at “0.25”. The sources of these materials are, again, Western donors that require attention to international norms of democracy, as well as local civilians. Thus, the use of illicit resources has a score of “0”. As related in the text, SPLA3’s behavior toward civilians is fully contractual. It is no longer faced with competition for resources through

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20 The “need” variable is never scored at “0”. The reason for this is clear: the need for resources does not disappear for rebel groups, nor any group for that matter. In this study, the lowest score for Need possible is “0.25”.
rivalry, and can thus attend to the required behavior of Western donors. The score is “0” for Coercive Outcome.

*The Role of Rivals*

The setbacks that the SPLA experienced during the early 1990s, in particular the increasing competition for resources and support following the split of 1991, forced the group to re-examine its strategy. Towards the end of the 1990s, Nuer commanders and soldiers returned to the rebel group (Rolandsen 2005). In January 2002, Machar and Garang signed a peace agreement between the SPDF and the SPLA. The agreement appeared to further SPLA interests with a merger of the two groups under the name SPLM/SPLA. It also confirmed the SPLA’s objectives as the fight for a united secular democratic “New Sudan” during an interim period, leading to self-determination for the South and other marginalized areas. The agreement officially ended hostilities between the two rebel groups and called for several technical committees to be established in order to integrate military forces, political and governance structures so that the combined unit could intensify the struggle against the North. This merger was a major blow to the GoS tactic of “divide and rule” and further enhanced the SPLA’s physical strength as well as its image both in the South among civilians and throughout the international community. With the reintegration of Machar and the SPDF into the rebel group, the SPLA’s rivals decreased, and it was able to attain a nearly complete monopoly over the Southern regions of Sudan.

Duffield and others have written that the SRRA was “completely under the control of the SPLA leadership (Duffield 1995, 98). African Rights also confirms this:
The SRRA officials were all named from amongst the soldiers anyway… They received no salary and usually no instruction from the head office. Without supplies, they had nothing to do except other military duties. If aid did not materialize, the first human needs to be served would naturally tend to be those close to the army. (African Rights 1997, 88-89)

The group was able to make money by participating in several of these economic activities that were occurring within its liberated zones, an example of which was the buying back of slaves from tribal militias. The history of slavery in Sudan goes back centuries. During the most recent civil war there, slave raids directed by tribal militia against civilian Dinka populations raised the awareness of several religious and human rights groups. Investigation by these organizations found that those selling individuals back were not the only ones profiting from the practice. Some local SPLA authorities in the South were found to be participating in fraudulent buy-backs, as transactions for the freeing of some slaves were achieved not through Arab middlemen but through SPLA soldiers posing as Arab middlemen. The SPLA was able to funnel all slave redemption activities through its administrative offices in the South after Garang wrote several foreign organizations engaged in slave buy-backs to demand that these religious organizations and human rights groups channel their activities through the SRRA, an activity similar to the one the Eritreans and Tigrayans pioneered in the 1980s (Human Rights Watch 2002). The SPLA were able to exploit the monopoly over local resources to gain the confidence of NGO outsiders. Such strategies are not new and have been noted in prior studies. For example, during the conflict between Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government during the 1980s, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) developed fake NGOs to channel
foreign aid into their organizations. However, they only did so once they were certain that they could control the distribution of services (if not all communities on the ground) and use it as a tool to affect followers and make the Ethiopian government look “non-humanitarian” (DeMars 1993).

The SPLA’s heightened legitimacy in the South and among the international community helped it become an acceptable interlocutor in US pressure on Khartoum to be party to the Machakos Protocol of 2002, the first of the peace talks between the rebel group and the GoS. On the surface, the rebel group created a Weberian, rational-legal authority structure that not only ensured society’s protection from external foes, but that guaranteed internal order and security were a consistent part of daily life. Some of the dominance that the SPLA obtained in the late 1990s and into 2000 was the result of informal politics enabling Garang and the elite within the rebel group to maintain a firm grip on the leadership. Informal politics in Africa refers to the predisposition for a tight-knit relationship between politics and economics, a remnant of colonialism where politics dominated and became even more prominent in the post-colonial era. In much of post-colonial Africa, social and economic progress resulted from political developments rather than the path that many European countries took which saw capitalist development spur social and economic advancement. In Sudan, as in many former colonies, political shortcuts to development were sought, which moved some politicians to embark on impressive state-building projects where the purpose was to ensure the continued existence of the state and to fight new forms of colonialism. Where under capitalism politics functions as a last resort for the interests of powerful
elites, in many developing countries the two spheres are combined and have never reached a level of relative autonomy from one another (Holm 1998). This linkage between the political and the economic is present and identifiable within the SPLA. In some places the rebel group adopted a neutral role as mediator in community affairs, while in other liberated regions there was little local participation or representation in the structures of administration. This led many SPLA commanders to create their own “fiefdoms”. While the international community perceived the existence of an emulatory institutionalization of political structures, the SPLA merely copied the preferences of its foreign patrons, which reinforced its monopoly.

During the 1990s, the SPLA learned how to integrate itself into international and local structures to retain a monopoly of over resources in the region. Though the SPLA touted democratic structural reforms, much of this was merely wall-dressing, for the rebel group and its institutions remained firmly under Garang’s control. During interviews in Sudan and Kenya, several individuals repeatedly and openly stated that the democratic institutions of the SPLA, much like the civil society structures, appeared to be independent but in reality were not (Muriel and Dhel 2003). The newly created NEC, for example, possessed limited political power; commanders who may have proven to be rivals to Garang found themselves stripped of effective power upon appointment to the NEC. Garang furthered his monopoly of control within the leadership of the rebel group by habitually elevating subordinates to positions of power and then discarding them before they could create their own bases of power. “You need to make dummy appointments” to satiate the desires of some individuals, Garang was once
quoted as saying (Garang 1996). Several individuals in different locations testified to this. One man, the Chairman of the Nuer community living in Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya claimed that “the man in the uniform still [received] the lion’s share” of the benefits from the democratic structures (Moses 2001). Another Southerner in the town of Nimule claimed the SPLA was still very much a military movement, despite the formal separation of the military and the political wings in 1994 and the internationalization of the group’s democratic intentions. The SPLA, he said, often interfered in Nimule’s judicial system (Oloya 2001). These statements are but a few that were communicated to the author regarding the rebel group’s military grip on the South shortly after 2000, and it attests to the manipulation the leadership in regard to the local political environment.

One significant incident that reinforced the level of personal domination Garang had over the SPLA (and consequently the area) and perhaps the fear that this would slip from his hands was the 1999 dissolution of the National Leadership Council (NLC). In December 1999, Garang, who possessed the power to call this governing body to session, dismissed the entire council. The following month, in an act that violated resolution 5.2.0 of the Watershed that deemed the NLC to be the highest legislative and decision-making body of the rebel group, Garang dissolved the council, stripping it of its powers and declaring that its duties were to be assumed by a newly developed Leadership Council (LC). The new LC would act as the highest legislative, administrative and military body in Southern Sudan. In a letter sent to SPLA officials, Garang wrote:
I Comdr/Dr John Garang de Mabior, chairman and C-in-C, SPLM/SPLA, issue the following order: 1) the NEC is here dissolved with effect from 7th January 2000, and all NEC secretaries and deputy secretaries are here relieved of their duties…2) the former NEC secretariats shall be restructured and reconstituted under seven commissions…3) an SPLM Leadership Council (SPLM-LC) is here formed with effect from 07/01/2000, and it shall be the highest political organ of the movement under which the reconstituted NEC shall fall…4) the titles of regional governor and deputy governor are here abolished…and all regional governors and deputy governors are here relieved of their duties…(Garang 2000).

This action on the part of the commander-in-chief of the SPLA solidified his control over the movement while at the same time putting forth a picture of the group as democratizers with the Southern interests at heart. It also allowed him to legitimately eliminate potential rivals. Therefore, with the help of the international community (in the form of donor assistance, capacity-building activities, and overall concurrence on the rights of the South to secede from the oppressive Northern regime), the SPLA, under Garang’s authoritarian rule, was able to consolidate its monopoly over local populations upon entering the 21st century.

The development of formal democratic institutions, even if it is done superficially, appears to be antithetical to the growing dominance of one group. Indeed, for a time the SPLA leadership found itself in a classic dilemma for the group claimed to be democratizing and while still carrying on a military regime engaged in war, Southern Sudanese civilians began to expect further participatory rights in administering the South. Concerned with the perception of being a functioning legitimate authority while choosing to develop democratic structures, the SPLA found itself confronted with the fact that liberalization contradicts the hierarchical nature of an insurgency. One can liken the situation to that of a state attempting to increase control, yet is confronted with
strongmen – local ethnic or political party leaders who hold significant amounts of political support. In the presence of these strongmen, states find that they can marshal only a limited amount of political support. Leaders find that they must have strong state agencies to substantiate their own strategies of survival in the midst of growing civil strength. However, the state must also mobilize enough support from the population so that these agencies do not threaten the leaders’ political survival. Here, then, is the paradox: political mobilization cannot be achieved without having established channels to the local populations to induce political support; strong agencies are necessary in the first place (Migdal 1988).

In the case of the SPLA, to the extent to which the leadership was successful in its monopoly of control, it found itself obliged to administer to the civilians living in the liberated zones. Once a liberation group becomes involved in extracting resources, distributing goods and services and settling disputes, it creates interests that can tell against war (Tilly 1990). This appeared to be the case with the SPLA, which found that if it was to dictate behavior and mobilize local populations without resorting to coercive measures that were reprehensible in the eyes of the international community it had to deliver the components for viable strategies of survival and even development to Southern Sudanese populations. However, the SPLA leadership made sure it had its finger on the pulse of events in the South. During the period 1994-2000, the SPLA used the wartime situation to justify its interference in civilian matters and to justify channeling resources into the military effort (Rolandsen 2005). Thus by integrating itself into the democratic structures the rebel group could retain control over the management of the
South. This is not to imply that the SPLA did not display a semblance of concern for the local populations. On the contrary, because foreign donors highlighted the welfare of civilians, this matter became a common part of the SPLA rhetoric and even in its behavior following the NC. In this sense, democratization killed two birds with one stone: it increased the already rising support that the SPLA was obtaining among locals and it demonstrated to donors and the West that it was reforming its ways and adopting what was the norm – democracy. However, this reform would not have been accomplished if the SPLA was not confident in its ability to control local population and the flow of resources, that is, if the SPLA had not been able to integrate itself into the structures it established.

*Foreign Resources and the Role of Democratization*

Democratization has seen a surge of influence over the last several decades. Following WWII, democratization was a common tool of foreign policy, though it truly gained strength following the end of the Cold War when it became the project of numerous states and international donor agencies. The result was an increase in interventionist pressure on developing countries. Therefore, while it is correct to say that the norm of democratization has been constant throughout the history of the SPLA, it is clear that the norm became stronger starting in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The varying force of democratization is highlighted by the changing relationship of the SPLA with its backers. One former SPLA soldier and Southern Sudanese commissioner described the group’s experience during the Cold War era when it was
supported by communist-backed Ethiopia. During the Cold War, he said, while the SPLA had “more reliable” foreign partners, there was little if any debate when its communist backers told the rebel group to do things a certain way. During the Cold War, if the communists wanted something done, there was a quick reaction and it was completed, as the SPLA had few options for foreign backing to reliance on Mengistu during the 1980s. Now issues are not automatically acted upon without question. Today, topics and actions are debated in the rebel group (Former Rumbek County Commissioner 2003). Furthermore, international factors affected the timing of events. The very fact that Mengistu had resources and was willing to provide support shaped the approximate time that the SPLA coalesced. This, combined with the fact that there was considerable resentment towards the North among Southerners, meant that the SPLA leadership could easily mobilize people (Kok 2003).

Norms of democratization facilitated the attainment and maintenance of the SPLA’s monopoly on control toward the beginning of the 21st century. Following the events of September 11th, 2001, the Southern Sudanese cause was moved even further up the ladder of international priorities for the sake of global security. Sudan had been placed on the US list of states supporting terrorism when it was uncovered that the NIF regime had given Osama bin Laden and other marked “terrorists” refuge between 1991 and 1996. With US-imposed economic sanctions against it, the country and its internal issues moved into the international spotlight (Holt and Daly 2005; O’Ballance 2000). The effect in Southern Sudan was of some importance to the SPLA, as the post-9-11 environment placed the rebel group on the side fighting supporters of “evil-doers”. This
was confirmed by two SPLA commanders in the liberated town of Rumbek. One man remarked that 9-11 increased the West’s empathy for the Southern Sudanese (Muriel and Dhel 2003). Khartoum’s established support from Islamic states and international organizations made the North a natural (and at this time acceptable) enemy to the US, one of the SPLA’s largest supporters. The SPLA used democracy after 9-11 to its benefit, acquiring further aid from Western countries and raising awareness of its cause.

The SPLA also succeeded in convincing the international community to recognize its right to secede from Sudan and create a new state. The provision in the peace agreement for a referendum in 2011, which will include the option of complete independence, is a remarkable achievement on the part of this organization. One factor that made a difference in the group’s ability to dominate Southern regions was the attention it received following its communist Ethiopian alliance. The ability to wage war was easier after the end of 1999 than it was initially due in part to the increase in access to resources, which itself was partly a result of the “new war on terror” that placed Khartoum’s actions under greater scrutiny. While Cold War-era support was not by any means unappreciated, the South’s cause during this time was nearly unknown to the international community. The subsuming of local conflicts into ideological Cold War battles was in some respects the effect of politics during the 1980s, which often overshadowed the grievances of conflicts being fought out in proxy wars.

The varying strength of democratization over the 20th century did impact the formation of the SPLA, as well as its ability to carry out operations. The presence of international donor organizations and the formation of OLS, for example, played a key
role in shaping the type of policy the rebel group would later adopt. For example, following an incident in 1992 when several aid workers were killed in Eastern Equatoria, the withdrawal of organizations helped the warring parties to commit themselves to human rights protocols (Rolandsen 2005). Yet the link between this norm and the behavior of the rebel group vis-à-vis local populations is not a direct one. While democratization grew in popularity and outright international acceptance (even expectation) following the collapse of the Soviet Union, one would more easily argue that it does a better job explaining the group’s resource capacity and adopted ideology. The international norm of democratization merely frames the environment within which a rebel group operates. To say that international norms act as causal mechanisms in rebel group behavior in relation to civilians deprives these groups of the autonomy they possess. In fact, it was absence of rivals and the subsequent control over resource extraction that gave the SPLA the capacity to use norms as power. This explains the shift in SPLA behavior in 1994 and not in 1991 when Mengistu fell.

3.4. Conclusion

The superficial and more integral changes the SPLA made between 1991 and the signing of the peace agreement with the North in 2005 were dramatic considering the Southern environment, the history of factionalizing, and the ideological and personal differences among elites within the rebel group. The SPLA improved its human rights record, increased its level of legitimacy both locally among Southerners and internationally among states and donor agencies, and in general reduced the levels of coercion. They did so in a highly volatile and ever-transformative environment. Yet, the
international pressure to adopt democratic norms would not have factored into the equation if rivals had remained. To conclude that these changes were the result of the international force of democratization is rather like seeing the forest without acknowledging the existence of the trees. It was the ability to obtain a nearly complete monopoly on resource extraction in the Southern part of Sudan – as indicated by eventual decline in rivals – that allowed the group to develop local institutions and structures of governance. Had the SPLA not had a monopoly of resource extraction in the South, the type of norm present in the region would not have mattered; the group would have remained coercive because of the competition over resources.

The SPLA case indicates several important points that are tangential to the significance of rebel group monopoly. First, even if democracy is a veneer in a rebel group, sooner or later people in the local and the international environments will expect it. Once this option becomes an expectation of local communities, the reaction of the rebel group can go either one of two ways. First, the rebel group will no longer perceive the community of civilians as a mine of resources. Instead, civilians will come to be viewed as rivals in the range of control over civilians and the region. However, if the rebels can retain their monopoly of control, as the SPLA did, levels of violence are likely to level off and may decrease. Furthermore, if the rebel group can maintain such control, it is likely to consider the appeals for democratization. This type of democracy can be identified as “dependent democracy,” a type of democratic governance where the level of democracy is dependent upon the level of control held by the ruling party or group much like South Korea during the 1980s when authoritarians knew that enough
opposition in power would not fundamentally change the system or threaten the power of the old elite.

This leads to the second important point that arises from this case: the quality of the state is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in determining rebel group behavior. The fact that the Sudanese state was consistently oppressive gave the SPLA the impetus to act less coercively toward civilians because the rebels did not have to fear that communities would become co-opted into the regime’s political strategies due to the state’s provision of political channels for participation. In fact, as was demonstrated by Machar and the ever-evolving SPLA-Nasir, elements of the state’s opposition do get co-opted by regimes, but it is not the result of the state’s provision of modes of participation. Rather, it is the elite element that gets co-opted by regimes.

What this means is that in any democratic movement where the state is consistently oppressive, rebel groups should have less to fear from community cooptation. What groups like the SPLA should fear is elite cooptation. In the early years of the SPLA, with the presence of rivals and facing a clear dissatisfaction with his objective and leadership style, Garang found it difficult to maintain a firm grip over all elements of the movement. This meant that the SPLA was not assured a monopoly over the Southern regions. Thus Sudan’s divide-and-rule tactic had much the same effect on SPLA elite as a democratizing Sudan would have on elite factionalization. However, the former was the superior option since it gave the SPLA more leverage to cozy up to foreigners who shared hostilities to Khartoum and help convince foreigners to provide services for which the SPLA could claim local credit. As a result, we saw coercive tactics emerge
out of the group. As more rival factions emerged and engaged in the conflict, the SPLA’s dominance in the South decreased further and levels of violence against civilians (i.e. as reported in human rights reports) rose even further; it was the presence or absence of rivals in the region that directly impacted the SPLA’s tactics. Likewise, the international norm of democratization provided a different framework with which to express its objectives – one which the SPLA realized could harvest it an abundance of resources. The group, quite rationally, seized upon this opportunity, particularly when it became clear the Southern Sudanese populations expected the delivery of democracy. However, again, this norm was not the determining factor that led the group to lessen violence against civilians. As we saw in this chapter, in those instances when the SPLA leadership’s control was threatened, individuals were often treated as though they had no rights (as in the case of the SPLA’s restriction of locals in traveling to a peace conference) or in the worst case when “potentially threatening” members of the movement were killed. The contemporary international environment provides rebel groups with a framework from which to operate. It is the ability to become the sole extractor of resources and thus control the movements of individuals, resources, and donor agencies that gives rebels the impetus to lessen their strong-arm tactics against civilians.
CHAPTER FOUR

There and Back Again: The Ongoing Transformations of the PKK

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

- Antonio Gramsci

Selections from the Prison Notebooks

Dilan is a member of the PKK, the ethnic Kurdish rebel group that has been at war with the Turkish state since the early 1980s. She recalls the repressive nature of the state in response to the growth of the PKK. During secondary school, she says, state forces detained and tortured her because she was a PKK sympathizer. She lost one brother to the conflict between the Turks and the Turkish Kurds, and two of her sisters joined her as a PKK rebel soldier in Northern Iraq where the group makes its base. Dilan is at ease discussing such things with the author, making every effort to explain the rebels’ position on the war. She goes to great length to make the author feel at home in this rebel camp. The reception is surprising, considering the multiple warnings about the rebel group broadcast by American and Turkish officials. Absent is the violent nature that is rumored to characterize the PKK. No terror-inducing force here. Rather, the author watches as PKK soldiers break bread and tend to community duties in the camp.

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21 When explaining that she would contact and interview members of the PKK, the author was told by a prominent Turkish scholar that the rebels were “animals” and would inflict serious harm upon her.
4.0 Introduction

The convivial image of local cadres described above is at odds with the fractional and often violent images of the PKK portrayed in the media. Today, the rebel group is perceived to be returning to its violent beginnings when it attacked the civilians it claimed to represent. The divergence between situations “on the ground” as experienced by the author and the characterization of the group’s leadership under Abdullah Öcalan illustrates the state of ambiguity in which the PKK currently finds itself. This uncertainty among the group as to its future and its disunity with other pro-Kurdish groups in Turkey make for increasingly violent, coercive behavior. This can be understood by tracing the PKK’s origins and evolution.

The group’s formative years play out much like that of the SPLA’s, with high levels of coercion exhibited by soldiers and numerous records of human rights abuses amidst serious factional rivalries. However, unlike the SPLA in the previous chapter, the PKK has undergone more than one shift in behavior toward civilians, and these changes continue today. The transformations, from ultra-violent nationalist movement to democratic representative of the Turkey’s Kurdish population, to a fractious organization distinguish this group from the others discussed in this study. More so than for other rebel groups the state in this study undergoes a political transformation in terms of the uses of coercion in its relationships with local communities. The PKK subsequently has responded to this change in state character. Therefore, this case highlights the relationship between state uses of coercion and insurgent group behavior toward local communities. It also shows the unintended effects that reforming state policies can have
toward local communities; this study explains how the increasingly democratic nature of Turkish politics provides incentives for PKK agents to respond by pursuing a more coercive strategy.

The PKK represents an “extreme case” in the sense that it shifts its behavior multiple times. The variation explored across groups within this study is encapsulated within this one case study (Gerring 2007). The PKK is particularly significant because it showcases the association between these changes and the evolution of state uses of coercion in Turkey. It demonstrates that the state can be a rival for resources. Like the SPLA and the FARC, the explanation for the PKK’s changes rests in the presence or absence of significant rivals – states, factions and rival insurgencies - to resources.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the evolution of the PKK is discussed beginning with a description of the environment from which the rebel group sprang. It highlights the changes that the rebels exhibited toward Turkish Kurds. Following this is an examination of several indicators that point to a rupture in the unified veneer of the PKK. In recent years, indicators point to the possibility that the leadership of the rebel group is factionalizing. Such indicators include the departure of the group’s leader’s own brother. This occurs alongside increasingly coercive behavior toward Kurdish civilians in Turkey – the point at which the PKK made an effort to depart from during the 1990s. After a discussion of the PKK’s finances and the level of need the group has exhibited over its thirty-year existence, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the roles of states and the different types of political and material resources that they control as major influences on insurgent behavior toward local populations.
4.1 Background

Like the SPLA, social, economic and political divisions within core bases of support shape the dynamics of the PKK. The group claims to represent ethnic Kurds in Turkey, most of who occupy an area known to them as Northern Kurdistan, and which is officially Southeastern Turkey. The estimated 20 million Kurds in the Middle East are among the world’s largest ethnic minority group without a state, spanning at least four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (see Map 4.1). This dispersion reflects the diversity of the Kurdish population: Kurds speak different languages and practice different religions, for example, Kurds in Turkey speak a dialect of Kurdish called Kurmanci, while those in Northern Iraq speak Sorani. There also exist several Kurdish sub-dialects, including Gorani, Zazaki, Feyli, Kermanshahi and Laki. Despite the fact that scholars characterize the difference between Sorani and Kurmanci as different as English and German, others argue that their sub-dialect status under one language represents the unity of the Kurds (Kreyenbroek 1992). However, in her fieldwork the author found that the two dialects enhanced the differences between Kurds more than it united them. This illustrates one of the many ways in which Kurdish populations today are more distinct than they are cohesive.

Ethnic Kurds in Turkey as a group have been poorer and have lived in an environment of insecurity\textsuperscript{22} compared to other citizens of the country. Over 65% of Turkey’s Kurdish population lives in the eastern region, one of the poorest areas of the

\textsuperscript{22} For more on this general topic, see (Hutchinson and Smith 1996). For a discussion of how insecurity affected the Kurdish ethnic movement and vice versa, see (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999)
country with a strong agricultural base. Differences between this part of Turkey and the western areas dominated by ethnic Turks are glaring. During the 1990s, the western region’s per-capita gross national product was $2000 (US), compared to the East’s $700 (US). The Western portion of the country’s infant mortality rate was 43, the eastern region’s was 60; the west’s illiteracy rate was 14, the east’s was 26; the western

Map 4.1 Kurdistan

Source: (Kokhaviv Publications 2003)

Kurdish insurgents have been a regular feature of the Turkish landscape since the 1920s, although other communal divisions have been important. Just a few of these groups include the Armenians and the Hatay, as well as those who speak Lazi and Arabic (Smith/Kocamahhul 2001).
region’s estimated number of health professionals per 1,000 people was 3.2, while in
the east it was 2.\textsuperscript{24} This environment is characterized by insecure access to land,
income, education, health, possessions and state resources (İçduygu, Romano, and
Sirkeci 1999).

Kurds in Turkey also struggle over cultural autonomy, the use of their own
language, schooling and cultural discourse. For more than two decades, the
government instituted a state of emergency in the eastern region; an estimated 35,000
people were rounded up and killed between the early 1980s and the late 1990s; schools
were closed in 3,000 villages leaving 1.5 million children without primary education;
thousands of villages were evacuated and millions were forced to leave the region.\textsuperscript{25}

Unlike the SPLA, the PKK is largely an ethno-nationalist rebel group. One would
assume that such a group would be more unified and more willing to attain the support
of local Kurdish populations. However, the group’s claim to represent a specific
segment of a state’s population does not spare it from the brutality often associated with
other rebel groups’ relations with civilians. The PKK has been called “the most violent,
radical, and successful Kurdish movement to emerge in Turkey in years” (Gunter 1990,
57). Why would a group that at once needs the support and resources of its fellow
ethnic minority members and the sympathies of the international community act on a
strategy of illicit terror towards these same civilians? Furthermore, why did the Turkish

\textsuperscript{24} This data is based on estimates by İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci (1999), obtained from the State
Institute of Statistics.

\textsuperscript{25} A variety of statistics on the situation in southeastern Turkey are often provided by different sources.
See (Criss 1995) and (Beriker-Atiyas 1997).
Kurds see a decrease in the level of violence perpetrated by the PKK, only to have coercion increase once again?

4.2 The Formation of the PKK

The Kurdish issue is not merely an “ethnic problem,” or an “economic” one. Nor is it an issue of “separatist terror.” Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has a long history (Barkey 1993; van Bruinessen 1992; Entessar 1989; McDowell 2004; Robins 1993). The issue of Turkey’s Kurds was pushed into the international arena in 1920 by the Allied Powers of World War I when the Treaty of Sevres was signed. Section III, Articles 62-64 called for the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region in Southeastern Turkey that would eventually obtain complete independence. However, this treaty was superseded by another signed in 1923 when Allied Powers and Kemalist Ankara signed the Treaty of Lausanne, rendering Sevres null and void this came in the wake of the Turkish counteroffensive against Greek invaders in the country’s western region, reflecting the international community’s recognition that the nationalist Turkish forces had the sovereign right to create their own national policy. Lausanne confirmed Turkey’s annexation of what would have been Kurdistan. While the treaty contained a clause that addressed the protection of minorities, this clause extended to non-Muslim minorities; it made no mention of ethnic Kurds within Turkey’s borders. The Kurds, therefore, were

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26 The dominant Turkish official and academic view has labeled the Kurdish issue as “separatist terror against the integrity of the Turkish state” (Criss 1995), though this is considered by some scholars to be a simplistic and narrow view of the situation (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999).
27 Kemalism is the ideology that constitutes the ground rules for state nationalism in Turkey.
28 Approximately ninety-nine percent of Turkey’s population professes to be followers of Islam. The government recognizes three minority religious communities – Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews – and counts the rest of the population as Muslim, although other non-Muslim communities exist (CIA 2007).
not afforded special status allowing state forces to begin a program of assimilation (Nezan 1997).

In the wake of independence in 1923, Turkey instituted a social organization program highlighting Turkish nationalism, including a focus on the country’s ethnic and cultural roots. Kurds were not excluded outright from participating in politics, and were permitted to represent themselves at the 1920-1922 Turkish Grand National Assemblies (Watts 1999). Article 88 of the 1924 constitution prepared the foundation for a potentially inclusive understanding of national identity by acknowledging the existence of ethnic variety. “With regards to citizenship,” it states, “everyone in Turkey is called a Turk without discrimination on the basis of religion or race” (Turkish Constitution 1924/28, 62-63). However, Turkish nationalism took shape in the face of a deeply entrenched fear of minorities, a characteristic not uncommon to newly formed heterogeneous states (Gellner 1983; Chatterjee 1993). Under the principle of milliyetçilik (nationalism), open demonstrations of Kurdish identity (or any minority for that matter) were strongly discouraged (Zurcher 1993). In 1924, for example, the government banned all schools, organizations and publications that were Kurdish, along with religious fraternities. The first Turkish Assembly, which included 72 representatives from Kurdistan, was dissolved as well.

The eventual evolution toward a civic sense of nationalism was pre-empted by the 1925 Kurdish-led Shaykh Said Rebellion and the length to which Turkey went to repress it (Watts 1999). Uprisings during the 1920s and 1930s led the government to further restrict Kurdish rights. The notion of protecting the republic’s territorial integrity
through ethnic cohesion became preeminent (Watts 1999). The government placed a ban on the use of the Kurdish language in 1924. To demonstrate how these policies were implemented, an official in the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SPTK) related the following story concerning its attempt to publish a Kurdish-Turkish journal, *Roja Welat*, during the mid-1970s: “When our friends applied for permission they were told by the police, ‘you cannot publish a Kurdish paper. If you do, we will cut your heads off…You can publish in English, French, or even in Bengali or Vietnamese if you like. But not in Kurdish” (Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan 1984). Citizens also were forbidden from listening to Kurdish radio and TV programs on foreign broadcasts, singing in Kurdish and selling Kurdish cassettes and records. Those who registered their child’s name with the government had to use Turkish names (Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan 1985). The ban on Kurdish traditional costume, which dated from 1924, was strictly enforced after the military coup of 1980. In the ultimate denial of a separate identity, the Turkish government began referring to Kurds as “mountain Turks.”

With the death of Ataturk in 1938, the rule prohibiting official references to Kurds as a distinct community remained intact. The assimilation of linguistic minorities became official government policy (Kinzer 2006a). Since this time, the Kurdish regions of Turkey – primarily the southeastern parts of Anatolia (see Map 4.2) have been under nearly continuous military or semi-military control (McDowell 1992).

In response to the government’s denial of a separate Kurdish cultural and political identity, Kurdish activists during the 1960s and 1970s looked to radical movements to develop a common cause. Kurdish activism took several forms, some
more radical than others. The character of Turkey’s political system, regarding Kurdish demands in particular, encouraged the development of a Kurdish movement that was highly radicalized. Many of these groups operated outside of the state as well as within (Romano 2006), which explains the PKK’s early links to Syria as well as Kurdish cells in Europe. During the summer of 1967 there were massive student demonstrations in 19 Kurdish cities and towns including 25,000 protestors in the southeastern city of Diyarbakir. One set of activists formed an ethnic Kurdish organization called the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (KDPT). While part of the KDPT’s political platform was proportional representation of Kurds in Turkey’s parliament, it also included a more controversial element – that of demarcating “Kurdistan” with Kurdish as the official language and an exclusive government bureaucracy (Kutschera 1994), a move that verged on secession.

Map 4.2 Turkey

Source: (University of Texas Libraries 2007)
Kurdish activism also manifested itself in the form of Revolutionary Culture Centers of the East by Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara and Istanbul. Attention to culture was a direct response to the policy of assimilation by the Turkish state. During the early 1960s Kurdish children were sent to boarding schools in large villages where speaking Kurdish was prohibited (Kutschera 1994). According to one scholar, “The 1970s and early 1980s was a period of ferment, in which Kurdish left nationalist formations experienced serious fractionalization” (Kutschera 1994, 13). Turkey’s distress at a rising Kurdish nationalism grew when, in March 1970, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq came to an agreement of autonomy with Baghdad. Kurdish repression in Turkey increased as the government outlawed Turkish leftist groups that focused more on Kurdish economic marginalization, including the Socialist Party of Kurdistan as well as a group known as Rizgari (Liberation).

The PKK was a radical offshoot that sprung out of the Culture Centers of the 1960s, mixing nationalism with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Founded by a group of university students in 1974 as the Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education, this group called for a democratic, united Kurdistan and saw itself as acting as the “vanguard of the global socialist movement” (PKK 1995). The main objective of the group was to create a greater Kurdistan that combined all Kurds in all states into one nation that it would accomplish by establishing a northern Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. In 1977, several of the group’s leaders met in Diyarbakir29 and

29 Diyarbakir is the southeastern city in Turkey often considered to be the capital of Turkish Kurds.
produced a draft of the revolutionary PKK program. The program claimed that the Kurdish revolution consisted of two main features. The first aimed to establish an independent Kurdish state. The latter aspect of the revolution involved eliminating the “feudal and comprador exploitation, tribalism, religious sectarianism and the slave-like dependence of women” (PKK 1983), which manifested itself in conflicts against armed militias of feudal landlords in the southeast. The group known as the PKK officially was establish in 1978.

The PKK differed from other groups that developed during this period of radicalism. For example, it placed a great deal of emphasis on armed struggle (Kutschera 1994) and thus did not cooperate with other Kurdish groups most of which focused on addressing concern through nonviolent channels. The PKK acted on the principle that “all those not with us are against us”. Hence, the PKK opposed all other Kurdish organizations and activists, and railed against what it believed to be their minimalist goals (Barkey 1998). The effect of such rivalry was further factionalizing and increasing coercion. For example, in 1977, Haki Karaer – a founding member of the PKK – was killed in Gazientep by a Kurdish group called Isterkasor (“Red Star”). The impact was such that the Gazientep branch broke away from the group and founded Tekosin. Several of Tekosin’s leaders were found executed in subsequent years. Further conflicts arose against other Kurdish groups as Devrimci Halkin Birligi (Revolutionary Unity of the People), the Kalkin Kurtulusu (Liberation of the People), and the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (DDKD) (Gunter 1990), which only served to embed the antagonism between the PKK and other Kurdish organizations.
Abdullah Öcalan, one of the PKK’s founders, quickly became a central figure in the rebel group. The group centered on his leadership in many ways, and the PKK’s ruthlessness reflected his attitude. The organization became known popularly as “Apocus,” or “Followers of Apo,” Öcalan’s nickname — a word that also means uncle, or, in Kurdish, “holy figure.” Öcalan was a charismatic figure, “fast-taking and quick-thinking” (Bulloch and Morris 1992, 168), often given to exaggeration. At one point he claimed to be the leader of 20 million Kurds in Turkey, though at the time many were opposed to his extremist views and preferred to place their support with more democratic Kurdish parties. Henri Barkey, a well-known scholar of the Kurds maintains that the PKK is very much Öcalan’s creation (Barkey 1998, 40). Like the SPLA leader, John Garang, Öcalan was a part of the intellectual elite as a student in Ankara where the group that was to become the PKK took shape. This contributed to his inability to identify with most agrarian-based Kurds. Thus the PKK formed in the same way as many radical groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Its leadership emerged out of small groups of university students and elite intellectuals claiming to represent a broad population, though its membership was not reflective of that group. This is a problem that besets many insurgencies that arose from this era, and presents a main challenge to them: How can the narrowly constructed leadership gain the allegiance and material support of this wider population? The SPLA found them with the same dilemma, which led the group to much discord and splintering, which further increased coercion. As we will see in Chapter Five, as a peasant-based rebel group the FARC initially was united
with Colombian *campesinos* and thus the group displayed greater contractual relations with locals initially.

*The Evolution of the Political and Military Arms of the PKK*

Following the Turkish military coup of 1980, the PKK retreated to Syria where it founded a military wing for its organization called the Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army (ARGK). The rebels operated in small bands, using bases in Syria and Northern Iraq to stage ground attacks inside Turkey. Yet the move to Syria not only sparked military action, it also spurred a political reaction in the group. Shortly after this move to Syria, the PKK held its first congress at the Lebanese-Syrian border. Meanwhile, the group expanded its contacts to Western Europe with Kurdish groups in exile (Gunter 1990).

Exile to Syria demonstrates the role that the state can have in shaping the rebel group context. State repression forced PKK activists to seek out foreign territory and backers from which to launch the liberation of their homeland. In the process, the rebels had to adapt to the needs of their hosts to attract their support, much like the SPLA did in Ethiopia and later when it adopted the democratic norms of Western donors. On the face of it, this harsh environment of state repression and the PKK’s marginalization back home should have promoted unity within the group. The rebels who are most successful in attracting outside support are those who have the best chance of success inside Turkey, success being an ability to attract the support of the target Kurdish population. This, in turn, would make the rebels better allies for their foreign backers, providing them additional access to resources and defense against rivals. Kurds in Turkey had to

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30 The author was told in interviews with PKK soldiers that they also received training in Greece.
be convinced that these activists and fighters truly were viable alternatives that were preferable to the state in which they lived.

A second PKK congress was held in 1982. One outcome of this meeting was a greater clarification of the group’s political initiative. The group declared a political program made up of three steps which the PKK would follow. The three stages of the struggle were identified in classic Maoist fashion as (1) strategic defense, (2) balance of forces, and (3) strategic attack period. The first phase of the program would involve armed propaganda activities, including attacks against state collaborators and the build-up to precede an armed movement. The second phase consisted of the designation of liberated zones where the PKK could base itself and communicate with the Turkish radical left in an effort to prepare armed forces for large-scale guerrilla war. The final stage of the political program would involve a full scale offensive and the abandonment of active defense, which in the end would lead to a full scale popular uprising in southeastern Turkey (Gunter 1990).

Despite the apparent consensus within the PKK surrounding its politics, the congress also brought about further alienation of the rebels from Kurdish groups. For example, Öcalan alienated several of the original members of the Central Committee, and one of his opponents was imprisoned, tortured and coerced into signing an admission of immoral conduct and eventually executed by the rebel group (van Bruinessen 1988). By purging the PKK of dissenters, Öcalan could consolidate power and embed his position of leadership within the organization.
Öcalan was not only making a name for himself and his organization among Kurdish circles inside Turkey, he also sought to increase his dominance of the group by looking to Kurds outside of Turkey. During the 1980s, the PKK allied with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) operating in Northern Iraq. The KDP, founded in 1946 by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had over 10,000 peshmergas or fighters. The alliance with Barzani, then, was advantageous for the PKK as it secured more soldiers to fight if needed. Under the agreement between the PKK and the KDP, the two groups committed to fight “imperialism” and to cooperate with various other revolutionary forces in the area in order to develop new alliances and strengthen forces (Briefing 1988). However, this alliance did not dissuade Öcalan from questioning the strength and support of members in his own group, leading him to carry out several purges during this period in the PKK’s history. Several of the individuals involved in this action were tortured, forced to confess as traitors, and eventually executed (Gunter 1990). The PKK’s violent tactics led the KDP to sever its alliance with the rebels in 1987. The PKK’s violent tactics against women and children, as well as members of the KDP itself, was the impetus for this break in friendly relations. In a statement dated May 1987, the KDP denounced the PKK, referring to its tactics as “terrorist operations within the country and abroad and their actions to liquidate human beings…The mentality behind such action is against humanity and democracy and is not in line with the national liberation of Kurdistan” (Briefing 1988). Öcalan’s response was to highlight the need for authority and control in the group and he declared that there would be no concessions, citing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an example of
centralization. “We believe that today in Kurdistan, the movement should be based on discipline…and central control” (1989, 20). This created further rivals for the PKK while at the same time cutting off resource options. Competition for resources was thus at a premium and coercion increased.

The PKK responded to the pressure of popular interests by creating a Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE). Formed in 1995 in The Hague, the KPE claimed to be the authoritative representative of Kurds. This body represented the first step in the creation of a national parliament. Its goal was to return from exile to Kurdistan and set up a Kurdish national parliament (Kutschera 1995). While it denied acting as an instrument of the PKK, most of the KPE members were sympathetic to the rebels and many belonged to the armed group. In fact, the PKK’s political wing, the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) was reported to be an important element of the KPE (Barkey 1998). The KPE, along with the ERNK and the congresses it held, were arguably ineffective. Like the structures developed by the SPLA during its first few years of reform, the institutions developed by the PKK were largely voice boxes for its leadership. The PKK remained an authoritarian organization under the control of one man. However, unlike the SPLA, the PKK did not have Western donors pressuring it to adopt democratic reform, using money and resources as incentives. Whereas the SPLA evolved into a repository for development monies from countries like the US, the PKK lacked the big-donor support. Turkey was allied with the US because it had been the only democratic country in that region for several decades and thus had acted as a democratic blockade to the Middle East. The U.S. proclaimed the PKK to be a group of terrorists. Thus, the
rebel group operated with limited means, largely outside of its country while facing significant internal and external rivals. The result of such a challenging environment was a high level of violence against civilians.

Violence

Much of the scholarship concerning the PKK’s earliest years refers to untargeted coercion against local populations where the group operated. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared that the state was ready to begin dialogue on the Kurdish issue and that Turkey recognized its “Kurdish reality,” one source writes that the PKK feared such a political process would take place without its involvement and thus marginalize the rebel group. In response the group launched a number of “bloody actions designed to remind others that nothing could be accomplished without PKK participation” (Nezan 1997, 61).

One of the PKK’s strategies was to target village guards. Turkey established the village guards, a force of some 50,000, to fight the PKK after the group launched its armed campaign in the early 1980s (DozaMe.org 2004). The PKK often killed village guards and their families (McDowell 1992) en masse (Barkey 1998) and justified such behavior. As part of the class struggle that many radicals believed was embedded within the conflict. Arguably the violence the PKK carried out against its own people was based on such societal divisions. “[M]uch of the PKK’s violence was directed against the haves in the name of the have-nots” (van Bruinessen 1988, 42). This meant that for some Kurds, the PKK was a soldier for the disenfranchised (Imset 1992). But these societal divisions were not as the PKK preferred them to be seen. In fact, some would-
be supporters saw the PKK as the oppressive elite, a reflection of the group’s origins in university intellectuals. This aspect of the conflict was reiterated during field interviews. During one such interaction in Northern Iraq, the author was told that civilians who criticized the movement perceived rebel group members to be elites. The individual further highlighted this sentiment when she said those who criticized the group were largely uneducated villagers (Sirin 2004). Once again, this highlights the importance of the group’s origins as a student-based organization.

Whether or not the PKK defined its struggle in terms of class or secession, the real target was the state. This initial strategy, defined as “revolutionary revenge,” affected all levels of Kurdish society inside Turkey. The group targeted civilians who accepted protection or benefits from the Turkish state as well as Kurds who worked with these Turkish institutions (PKK 1985). In the group’s own words, revolutionary revenge “defines almost everyone not supporting the PKK as a target for revenge” (PKK 1985, 236). Sahin Donmez, who later left the rebel group and became an informer for the government of Turkey, explained that “the best method to spread Marxist-Leninist ideology was ‘armed propaganda’” (Briefing 1988). It is clear that the group – or its leadership – viewed violence as a prerequisite to achieving Kurdish aims. In an example of this perspective within the PKK, the group wrote that

action [was] preferred over political reflection…violence…will in Kurdistan not only be the midwife assisting in the delivery [of a new society] but will create everything anew. Revolutionary violence has to play this role in Kurdistan, and it will, we say, assume the form of revolutionary revenge. (PKK 1985, 236)
While gendarmerie posts and military convoys were often targets of this revolutionary violence, the PKK became notorious for its treatment of civilians. Rape of civilians was not uncommon. During an attack in the southeastern Turkish city of Mardin, 16 children and eight women were killed. This event was labeled “...the worst massacre ever committed by the Kurdish insurgents fighting an undeclared war against the Turkish Republic” (Briefing 1988, 10). PKK also kidnapped or killed Turkish teachers in the southeastern part of Turkey and burned hundreds of rural schools in order to show that the group could be effective in challenging mainstream Turkish institutions and to widen the cleavage between Kurds and Turks. Such a strategy was also designed to win the support of the local populations. This strategy showed that “support” from the local population required that they be left with no other alternative. The PKK’s leadership realized that the real key to its success lay in dominating the lives of locals and monopolizing their access to resources. If the PKK could chase out their state enemy, they could then replace the state in its relations with the civilian population — providing them with protection and services—even if using highly coercive means to force local people to side with them instead of Turkish state institutions. In this respect, the PKK strategy looked much more like a racketeer’s effort to sell protection. “State-building” (or replacing the state with an insurgency that wanted to create a new state) thus came to resemble the “state-building as organized crime” famously described in Tilly’s work (Tilly 1985), though in this instance the state-builder has to convince locals to reject what might have been a viable and less coercive existing alternative rather than coercing civilians into doing so.
Rebel groups engage in strategies wherein they prod the state into retaliation against communities that state officials perceive to be rebel supporters. Such a move represents a propaganda victory for rebels who can then claim that their view of the repressive nature of the state is accurate and that locals need rebels to provide protection against the violence that their presence ultimately brings. This is precisely what occurred, as Turkish security forces increased their repressive measures against Kurds within their borders. This strategy thus uses the insurgent’s coercion to leverage the reactive behavior of the much more powerful state. The strategy the Kurds have employed is referred to as *foco*. The *foco* theory of revolution was advocated by Ché Guevara and Régis Debray. According to this line of thought, rather than awaiting the conditions for revolution, popular forces could create them. The countryside, they argued, was the proper place for revolutionary activity (Debray 1967; Guevara 1985).

The aggressive strategy the PKK employed during its formative years was not novel. It can be seem more recently in insurgents’ strategies against the US army in Iraq. Local rebels benefit from heavy-handed action of soldiers against local civilians. Using women and children in attacks causes soldiers to treat such categories of civilians suspiciously, which plays a role in convincing people that the US and Iraqi armies cannot protect them. On a global scale, groups like al Qaeda can claim that US treatment of Iraqi civilians simply reveals the true nature of US power; that it is anti-Muslim and is not serious about protecting civilians, much less promoting democracy. The important point here is that rebels use coercion against local people less to
intimidate them into supporting them and more to create an environment in which a powerful state is pushed into its own coercive strategy.

Yet many Turkish Kurds began to resent the PKK’s violent strategies, viewing them as “brutal, reckless, and irresponsible” (Gunter 1990, 63). As an insurgent group, the PKK depended in part on the support of local populations for food and shelter (Barkey 1998). However, its coercive practices did not easily inspire generosity on the part of local Kurds, and the group often resorted to demanding food, shelter and other resources from civilians in remote villages. Refusal was met with the execution of the headman of the village, or the murder of the families of these local leaders. At other times peasants were taken prisoner, and young men were forced to join the PKK to boost its numbers of soldiers (Bulloch and Morris 1992, 184). Thus, while resources came from the local populations in the early years, most of it was extracted coercively.

Despite the overwhelming number of reports on violence and brutality committed by the PKK, Turkish sources highlight that the rebels made less coercive gestures toward some Kurdish settlements. For example, because the number of doctors in isolated villages is few, “the PKK…[brought] in a doctor and look after the villagers—at times giving them medicine for free…The result in villages of this sort can be nothing but sympathy” (Briefing 1988, 8). However, such reports of less coercive PKK behavior – at least during the 1980s – are few. Conscious, then, of the need for allies, the PKK called for all Turkish Kurds for havakiri (action unity). Pro-Kurdish groups such as Rizgari and Kawa, however, rejected the offer on the basis of the overtly violent tactics
used by the group against civilians. With several other Kurdish organizations, they created an alliance against the PKK.

Not surprisingly, the PKK’s coercive strategy created divisions within the organization. Several individuals within the group denounced its civilian attacks and subsequently defected (Briefing 1988). Huseyim Yildirim, a Kurdish lawyer living in Sweden and the spokesman for the PKK in Europe for several years, wanted to create a less violent rival group to the PKK that did not target civilians (Will the pkk be a regional issue? 1988, 11). Yildirim argued at one point that “after the party [was] relieved from Apo, the armed struggle [would] start again. But this time women and children [would] not be selected as targets” (Pkk: The european breakup 1988, 11).

4.3 Change

As detailed above, the early years of the PKK coincided with intense Turkish repression and martial law following the military coup of 1980. The armed focus of the Kurdish struggle during the early 1980s (with the launch of PKK attacks from Syria and Iraq) provoked Turkish security forces to increase repressive measures against the Kurds. “It provided the army with an excuse to obtain the means for its modernization and, especially, to finally carry out the great nationalist plan of ‘dispersion and assimilation of the Kurds’ through depopulation and devastation of Kurdistan” (Nezan 1997, 58). This began a new era in the group’s evolution, shaping its treatment of civilians and its unity, and providing Turkey’s Kurds with a new identity.
Unification under the PKK

Despite the overwhelmingly violent beginnings of the group, the foundation of the PKK helped create an identity within Kurdish society (Male PKK soldiers 2004). The group’s popularity among young Kurds grew despite the violence that it had provoked. At its inception, the group was made up of no more than 50 poorly armed youth, though it “rapidly attracted hundreds and then thousands of young Kurds, who were convinced that the Turkish state would acknowledge the Kurdish national phenomenon only if forced to do so with weapons” (Nezan 1997, 57). This may demonstrate that some sectors of society, based upon age, do not reject the use of violence. Youth are important in this regard as many have “less to lose” in the sense that they are not as concerned about issues such as family. As described above, the PKK began as a student-led organization and quickly attracted additional young Kurdish activists. Hypothetically, under different origins, the internal composition if the rebel group may have been different, thus giving ruse to a leadership with field experience that was not part of the original elite educated core. This also may have shaped how they appealed for popular support. In the following chapter on the FARC, we see a group that had such origins and thus initially was able to respond directly to the needs of local peasant farmers in Colombia, garnering support among the local civilians in the process.

Kurds experienced political changes, too, as they faced violence from the PKK and Turkish state. During the early 1990s, numerous Kurdish political and social organizations formed without any attempt to remain underground. The October 1991 elections were the first to see a genuine Kurdish bloc participate. Several deputies
elected on the Social Democratic ticket broke away from the party and joined the *Halkin Emek Partisi* (HEP) or the People’s Labor Party, an organization that formed in 1990. HEP consisted of a mix of radical and traditional activists (Kutschera 1994) and, as a group, was outspoken in its support of Kurdish political and cultural rights (Watts 1999). While several HEP members had ties to the PKK, others sided with more accommodating social democrats and nationalists (Kutschera 1994). Despite this ostensible balance in the politics of its members, the HEP created concern among Turkish officials, raising fear that it was acting as a mouthpiece for the rebels (Watts 1999). The HEP’s founders were indicted for inciting separatist propaganda and in July 1993, the Turkish Courts outlawed the party (Kutschera 1994). It disbanded in 1994 (Watts 1999).

In anticipation of repression, several HEP deputies had resigned to form an additional Kurdish political party. This organization, called the Party of Democracy (DEP) had explicit ties to the PKK. The Turkish government soon dealt with the DEP as well by lifting the immunity from prosecution of those members elected to parliament and arresting and charging them with crimes against the state (Kutschera 1994). The DEP re-emerged soon after as another political organization called the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP). This party achieved political gains when it participated in the 1995 and 1999 national elections. Such political participation signified that a distinct Kurdish political “house” had been established within Turkey’s political system (Watts
Yet like the fate of the DEP, HADEP was banned by the state as well for its alleged assistance to the PKK. In its place was established the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP). It has been acknowledged that DEHAP and the PKK are, if not one in the same, then closely linked (Patton 2003). In 2005, the group announced its merger with a political organization formed by former parliamentarian Leyla Zana, the Democratic Society Party (DTP).

The unification under the PKK that occurred during the 1990s reflected popular revulsion to the state security forces’ repressive measures. Though large numbers of Kurdish activists initially were content to compete for political power within existing state institutions, the political and armed activity of the Kurds, both violent and non-violent, during the 1980s and early 1990s posed a severe threat to Turkish nationalism. As a result, the Turkish armed forces intensified their targeting and repression of Kurdish organizations, including those that chose to follow a non-violent approach to resolving the Kurdish issue. Turkish armed forces decimated Kurdish parties, forcing many of them to disband.

The repression of the 1980s, both in numbers of persons seized and imprisoned and in the extent of systematic torture, was far worse than before...The regime thus cleared the way for the PKK. (Kutschera 1994, 13)

The state’s arrest of several Kurdish parliamentarians in 1994, including activist Layla Zana, further heightened the sense of injustice enacted by Turkey toward minorities and helped bring rival groups and potential supporters into the PKK’s camp. Zana was

31 Watts argues that from this period on there existed a struggle among Turkish politicians over how to treat the issue of Kurdish identity politics. Mainstream politicians struggled between what appeared to be a genuine desire for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue and party and popular pressure to toe the traditional state platform of nationalism (Watts 1999, 644).
imprisoned for speaking Kurdish in Parliament after taking the parliamentary oath, and for her political actions, which were considered subversive to Turkish unity.\footnote{Zana was awarded the 1995 Sakharov Prize by the European Parliament, though she was unable to collect it until her release from prison in 2004.}

With political avenues blocked, many of these organizations disbanded and gave their support to the PKK. Thus several of the PKK’s original rivals were folded into the group. This paved the way for a contractual relationship between insurgents and a wide popular base of Turkish Kurds. Initially, the PKK had fought armed militias serving large landlords in Kurdish areas of Turkey as well as splinter groups and Kurdish political parties (Gunter 1990). However, as the state’s coercion toward ethnic Kurds increased the number of significant rivals among the Kurdish ethnic parties dwindled. This situation appeared to legitimate Öcalan’s strategy of tight central control, making it appear as though the PKK’s use of violence was proportional and appropriate as battle lines now divided Kurds from the state.

\textit{Contractual Behavior}

The loss of significant rivals during the 1990s dovetailed with statements from Öcalan regarding a change in the PKK’s original tactics in handling civilians. According to the rebel leader, the group had realized that the killing of innocent civilians was self-defeating (Briefing 1989). During times of war, one rebel soldier explained, there is a need for a hierarchy to be successful in fighting. When the war ended, she said, referring to ceasefires in 1993 and 1995 (Bozarslan 1996) “we could see the harm of a hierarchy” (Newroz 2004). In an interview with a reporter from the independent Turkish newspaper, \textit{Milliyet}, Öcalan downplayed the PKK’s earlier tactics claiming the civilian
massacres committed by the rebels had been an “organizational mistake” (The case of the 'Apo' interview 1988, 17-18). During the 1990s, while the group’s rivals dissipated, he appeared to be moving away from a focus on ideology, which dominated the group’s early rhetoric, towards more realism and balance (Barkey 1998). The attack at the Sirnak Coal Mine in May 1989 demonstrates the beginning of PKK’s shifting behavior. Before the Turkish military had taken control of the region, the government allowed local communities take coal from the mine at night. Once the military moved in, however, such nighttime activities were punished with beatings and the destruction of animals used to haul away the fuel. The PKK struck when several villagers were at the mine. After delivering a propaganda speech, the rebels destroyed several of the coal company’s automobiles. None of the members of the local population was killed (Gunter 1990).

Further changes within the PKK manifested themselves in internal reforms (Dilan 2004). Several rebel soldiers interviewed said the group became more open to internal criticism during the 1990s. Members of the formal leadership taught others to learn about the organization of the group. Leadership became increasingly inclusive, with ordinary Kurds able to move up the ranks and join the leadership (Newroz 2004). The aim was to make Kurds active in the decision-making. There were changes to the “structure” or “openness” in the organization. One PKK soldier remarked that the PKK made mistakes in the past. For example, the group did not educate people about health, or culture … only about politics (Media 2004). Many people in the past had lived according to what the PKK defined as feudal society. Women, for example, did not have
the same status as men. According to one soldier, the PKK facilitated the development of a women’s army, which was founded in 1994 (Sirin 2004). The PKK, said another soldier, was a group where females could “exist independently” (Newroz 2004). “Everyone should have his or her own voice in the party,” (Media 2004) one soldier said.

According to some, these changes were in part a response to the attention the PKK was receiving from outsiders (Media 2004). As one rebel soldier claimed, the PKK attained an awareness of the international environment. The PKK began to look at the world with a broader understanding (Dilan 2004). While it may appear as though the PKK, then, was attentive to external perceptions of the group, and thus influenced by international norms, there are other explanations for this behavior. Had the group not “opened” to western norms, the PKK arguably would have lost its Iraq base in the late 1980s and been forced to move back Turkey. This would have left the rebels with fewer options in terms of how they treated locals. In the context of this study’s model, though, it appears the PKK pays heed to norms when it is in their interests to do so in terms of their domestic strategy and when they can do so and maintain a monopoly over the extraction of resources.

Nevertheless, the proclaimed openness of the PKK has been disputed. A doctor working in a rebel camp claimed that civilians were still intimidated by the rebels. It was for this reason, for example, that civilians did not regularly visit the local PKK health center. People, she said, have been raised in such a way as to put the rebels on a pedestal. Sometimes, she continued, people did not speak up, fearing retribution when criticizing the rebel group. It appears, in fact, that the group has remained very
hierarchic. According to one soldier, there are individuals within the leadership of the group who want to remain in power to protect their own interests (Roleda 2004). Similar dynamics were displayed within the SPLA leadership when Southerners as well as foreigners began pushing for democratic reform within the rebel group. Despite the internal rivalries, the PKK was awarded a greater sense of legitimacy among Turkish Kurds as well as international groups during the 1990s. It went from being referred to as a violent group to “our organization” by Kurds. This has been noted by the author in visits to several Kurdish towns, as well as by others (Kinzer 2006b).

The Arrest of Öcalan and its Aftermath

The PKK reached its height of unity and popularity during the late 1990s – a time when it faced little in the way of significant rivals. Figure 4.1 illustrates the trend of one-sided violence perpetrated by the PKK against civilians in Turkey (Kurdish and Turkish) between 1989 and 1999. The statistics reflect the analysis presented here, namely that the PKK’s coercion peaked during the 1990s and tapered off by 1999.

This popularity among Kurds as well as the international community drew ire from the Turkish government. By the late 1990s, seven arrest warrants for Öcalan had been issued by the Turkish Courts and he was wanted by Interpol. He was accused of forming an armed group to destroy the integrity of Turkey and of initiating terrorist activities that resulted in numerous deaths. After being expelled from long-time supporter Syria in 1998, he sought asylum unsuccessfully in several European countries. In February 1999, Öcalan traveled to Kenya where the Greek ambassador
agreed to house him. This, safe-house was short-lived and the next day Kenyan officials escorted him to Nairobi’s airport where he was put on an aircraft and subsequently arrested by Turkish representatives. Following the capture and sentencing of Öcalan in 1999 the group once again experienced a period of transformation (Trilsch and Ruth 2006, 180).

In Turkey, Öcalan was incarcerated on the island of Imralı as the sole inmate of a high-security prison. The only communication the leader had (and continues to have) is through his lawyers. The Ankara State Security Court found Öcalan guilty of carrying out secessionist activities and sentenced him to death. This sentence was widely challenged by Kurdish and non-Kurdish communities alike as well as international
organizations, and several foreign governments.\textsuperscript{33} Rebel group and political party reactions to the sentence varied, from demands for more violence against the Turkish state, to an international campaign for Öcalan’s release. In the meantime, the PKK declared it would continue its violence. “[W]ithout discrimination, every kind of violence is justified and legitimate. Every military or civilian institution, establishment, or personality that develops hostility against our people,” the group continued, “is a target for the Kurdish people” (World Media Watch 1999).

Meanwhile, in Europe, Kurdish protesters demonstrated at the Greek and Kenyan embassies, in some instances taking diplomats hostage or setting themselves ablaze. In Geneva, 30 to 40 protesters occupied the main United Nations building, and in Zurich and Bern, demonstrators occupied Greek diplomatic buildings (CNN 1999b). Switzerland warned that an execution could unleash a new wave of violence around the continent, while in Italy, the leader of the ruling coalition’s biggest party urged immediate action be taken to save Öcalan. "We believe this death sentence delivered by the Turkish court against Öcalan is both absurd and very grave," said Walter Veltroni, chairman of Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema’s Democrats of the Left party. Veltroni added that the sentence could create serious complications to Turkey’s relationship with the rest of Europe. The British government also claimed it would lobby for the ruling to be overturned. It was thought that Turkey would commute the death sentence because

\textsuperscript{33} This sentence was largely symbolic as Turkey had, since 1984, maintained a moratorium on executions and in 2002 the death penalty was abolished during peacetime. The European Court of Human Rights has claimed that there were several violations of the Öcalan’s right to a fair trial (Trilsch and Ruth 2006, 180). The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2005 that his trial was deemed unfair, as he did not have access to lawyers. However, the Council of Europe ruled in February 2007 that Öcalan was not entitled to a retrial, citing it as “unnecessary.”
it did not want to jeopardize its chances for EU membership (CNN 1999a). As expected, the Turkish Courts commuted his death sentence in 2002 to life imprisonment (Trilsch and Ruth 2006, 180). These protests took place in the context of several delays in Turkey’s negotiations with the European Union over its eventual accession. To become a member of the European Union, Turkey would have to perform according to a variety of institutional and political standards. Most important for this study is the demand that Turkey’s government extend cultural and political rights to its ethnic and linguistic minorities.

It appears from this international outcry that the PKK has major incentives to continue its internal democratization. A locally responsive and popular insurgent movement seeming to campaign for “minority rights” can reap considerable political goodwill, which can translate into material support, as illustrated by the SPLA and its surge in foreign support when it called the international community’s attention to the rights of Southern Sudanese. Meanwhile, the Turkish government would continue to face pressure to moderate its response to these insurgents to prove its credentials as a candidate for EU accession.

Öcalan’s response from prison stressed a need for reform. From his cell, Öcalan proclaimed to Kurds that the PKK would forego the previous objective of a separate Kurdish state. With this “peace initiative,” he ordered all members of the PKK to desist from violence and to engage in dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. This was viewed by many as a gesture to persuade Turkey to allow the PKK into its political arena. The sudden change in heart by the PKK leader underscored a dilemma for the
group. A wave of demonstrations by Kurdish communities in Turkey and around the world took place. Not only was there a feeling of betrayal among many Kurdish communities, there was also a general atmosphere of confusion amidst the group and its supporters. Turkish state actions were contradictory too. Large-scale arrests of Kurdish activists in Turkey and a bombing campaign by radical Kurds throughout the country lent further fuel to disorganization and rupture within the rebel group.

What ensued were years of disunity and confusion within the PKK, which arguably continues to this day. In early 2000, at a meeting of the PKK Congress, members declared their support for Öcalan’s initiative and maintained that the rebel group would use only political means to achieve its objective of greater rights for Kurds in Turkey. In line with this new initiative, at the group’s 8th Party Congress in 2002, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and announced its commitment to non-violence in support of Kurdish rights. This group only lasted until 2003 when it changed its name once again to the Kurdistan People’s Congress or Kongra-Gel, a body meant to “coordinate civil society” (Sirin 2004). In a show of the group’s new state of disunity and confusion, KONGRA-GEL claimed at once to promote peaceful intentions, while at the same time it continued attacks in “self-defense” and refused to disarm. While KONGRA-GEL denies that it is connected to the PKK, Kurds and non-Kurds alike believe this is not the case. The constant re-labeling, more importantly, points to the internal disorder of the organization. Just as greater legitimacy came with contractual behavior in the SPLA, the loss of legitimacy in the PKK was accompanied by coercion.
Öcalan’s capture and sentencing and his subsequent orders from prison led to a loss of legitimacy of the group by Kurds. The events of 1999 not only psychologically disarmed Kurds, but led to the dismantling of institutions developed by the PKK. Öcalan continued to lead the group strategically – rather than merely ideologically or philosophically – from prison, an act that further weakened the PKK due to his blurred ability to judge appropriate tactics on a daily basis. He communicated mainly through his lawyers, and because of this his decisions were often highly impractical. This signifies how much of the movement, its daily operation and more importantly its survival, had become dependent on Öcalan (KurdishMedia.com 2004).

It soon appeared that Turkey’s government had used the capture of Öcalan and partial political opening to divide the PKK. This created a serious dilemma for the PKK. The group's remaining leaders either could adapt to the political openings that were occurring throughout Turkey, but in doing so, they would have to compete with other groups for political power and risk losing its position as the main representative of ethnic Kurds in the country. In another option, the PKK could revert to the earlier strategy of trying to provoke retaliation from Turkish security forces. The solution, a Kurdish activist suggested, would be for Turkey’s Kurds to distance themselves from the PKK and Kongra-Gel and their “narrow left-wing beliefs” and instead “take the middle road” (KurdishMedia.com 2004). This dilemma underscores the problem of democratization of the rebel environment. This provokes fears of a loss of control over people and resources, an aspect we saw occur in the leadership of the SPLA when the group began to adopt the façade of democratic institutions. Meanwhile, the brief PKK opening
in the early 1990s occurred in a context where PKK leaders had reason to be more certain that their organization would be the main beneficiary of increased political participation, a sort of “captured democracy” that would not challenge the core PKK goal of seizing political power.

4.4 Financing the PKK

The PKK has enjoyed a mixture of resources from local communities as well as illicit commerce. As described earlier, coercion characterized the group’s earliest mode of extraction, as many of its resources in the 1980s came from looting of local villages, while other sources of financing came from the overseas drug trade and money laundering. However, after the group became more contractual in the 1990s, the sources of support became much more of a mixture of illicit and legitimate resources from locals and overseas.

Legitimate sources

During the early 1990s, the PKK’s political wing operating in Europe was legitimate with above-ground social, cultural and political organizations existing in tandem with a parallel underground structure (Stein 1994, 86). Within Western Europe, where much of the Turkish Kurdish Diaspora settled, the PKK set up an organizational structure headed by a European Central Committee with headquarters in Cologne and Brussels as well as national organizations in Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, Italy and the Scandinavian countries (Barkey 1998, 38; Stein 1994, 91). This structure facilitated the collection of funds through sales of publications, solicited contributions and cultural events (Turkish ministry of foreign
affairs), which went to support PKK activities. The European arm was particularly active in raising money within immigrant communities in Germany. Here they amassed resources from the community through the collection of voluntary donations and “taxes” on individual salaries and business earnings\textsuperscript{34} (Adamson 2005, 40). Additionally, the PKK also raised revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization (Turkish ministry of foreign affairs).

The PKK received nonmaterial support from countries in the region such as safe-haven protection (Casteel 2003). Syria and Greece (Rubin and Kirisci 2001), Iran (Nachmani 2003), the Soviet Union (Cornell 2001) and Denmark all provided support in some form. The latter reportedly allowed Kurdish satellite television stations such as ROJ-TV to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey in violation of Turkish broadcasting law. This station continues to operate. These media outlets were often linked to the PKK (Schleifer 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that The Netherlands and Belgium supported the PKK by allowing the group’s training camps to function on their respective territories. In November 1998, the Hanover police claimed that three children trained by the PKK for rebel warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium (Global March 1999). Other support came in more auspicious forms. The PKK also had ties, for example, with influential persons such as the wife of former French president, Danielle Mitterrand (Olson 1996). Such direct ties to foreign dignitaries afforded the rebel group some legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{34} The Assembly of Turkish American Associations refers to such resources as “aids” extracted from merchants in the area using intimidation. This, of course, would mean that such finances were illicit.
However, much of the PKK’s attempts at legitimate fundraising outside of Turkey were unsuccessful. Small-business owners in the Diaspora had limited resources, and there was no large-scale ethnic Kurdish international business network of the scale of the Greek, Lebanese or Chinese businesses that historically provided resources for other rebel groups. Except for some isolated individuals, little progress was made along the path of forming Kurdish corporations and large companies (Kaya 2000). Thus, legitimate or legal sources of funding were limited.

Illicit sources

Considerable financial support has come from funds collected through money-laundering (BBC News 2007), drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and extortion (Adamson 2005; van Bruinessen 1998). The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that the PKK was (and possibly continues to be) involved in taxing drug shipments and protection of drug traffickers throughout Southeastern Turkey (Hutchinson 2002). Furthermore, organized crime is present among the Kurdish Diaspora, facilitating extortion, drug smuggling, and money laundering activities to gather funds for the rebels’ procurement of weapons and ammunition. In a State Department report, the PKK is described as controlling the European drug cartel, smuggling narcotics from Southeast Asia and the Middle East to Europe (Assembly of Turkish American Associations). This provided the group with extensive networks and ties to illicit resources.

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35 Paul Collier argues that Diaspora play an important role. He maintains that they produce a six-fold increase in the likelihood of rebellions (Collier 2000a, 14).
After the 1980 coup, many Turkish citizens, including members of the PKK, began immigrating to Europe. This gradually created a supply of human capital for the PKK to use in the continent. Historically, Turkey has been a key trans-shipment point for drug trafficking because of its desirable geographic location connecting Europe to Asia. In 1994, European narcotics specialists estimate that 60-70% of Europe's heroin passed through Istanbul. In addition, Tuncay Yilmaz, leader of the anti-narcotics unit of the Turkish National Police in Ankara, maintains that the PKK plays a dominant role in the country’s narcotics-smuggling industry. Most of the heroin coming from Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, for example, traverses Turkey on its way to Western Europe. Police in Italy, Holland, Germany, and Scandinavia have investigated and uncovered the PKK's involvement in drug and arms smuggling in those nations since 1993. Trends in police seizures of heroin and other drugs within Turkey illustrate the significance of the drug trafficking problem. Heroin seizures in Turkey increased from 1,894 pounds in 1990 to 1.6 tons in 1994. Other areas of drug trafficking have been marked by similar gains. During 1993-1994, an average of 21 tons of hashish was seized annually in addition to 2.7 tons of morphine. These figures are significant in light of the PKK’s use of narcotics for supporting its campaign. These incidents tie the PKK to illegal drug trafficking and link the group to drug trading as early as 1984 (the same year the PKK officially began attacks on Turkey). Not only is the rebel group involved in transporting narcotics, it has also extended its role into the production and marketing of drugs. The PKK has grown into a full-service business coordinating the production, use, and transportation of illegal drugs, particularly in Western Europe (Federation of American
Scientists). The amount of money generated from this illegal activity amounts to hundreds of millions of US dollars (Assembly of Turkish American Associations).

Turkish officials are quick to connect drug smuggling to the PKK, though this theory is often disregarded by those who would prefer to rule out the possibility of an ideological motive. Some European intelligence officers blame Turkey for attempting to associate drug smuggling with the PKK in order to support a negative image of the group. Despite these hypotheses, however, evidence pointing to the connection of the PKK to illicit resources continues to surface. In February 2007, thirteen Turkish Kurds suspected of being PKK members were arrested on suspicion of money-laundering in Paris (BBC News 2007).

4.5 Tears in the Fabric

This section explores recent internal divisions and the increasing disunity within the PKK as well as a rise in rivals outside of the organization, both violent and non-violent.

Splintering Within

Since Öcalan’s arrest in 1999, several instances highlight the internal divisions within the PKK, demonstrating that the group was not as unified internally as it once was (Kinzer 2006b). This, in turn, has left many wondering if the PKK is returning to its original, more coercive behavior. In 2004, rumors circulated that a split in the PKK leadership had occurred culminating in the expulsion of three veteran soldiers, including Osman Öcalan, Abdullah’s brother. The chairman of the organization, Zubeyir Aydar shrugged off the possibility of an internal power struggle, though others within the rebel
group claimed it was a grave concern. “The party has reached a critical juncture,” one source within the rebel group claimed. “Eighty percent of younger members want change speeded up. These resignations were a coup by older leaders unwilling to give up power and the leftist, anti-imperialist ideology they were brought up with” (Birch 2004).

Indeed, in July 2004, Osman Öcalan left and formed the Democratic Peace Initiative (Partiya Welatpareza Demokratik),36 which maintained that it wanted to work in peaceful ways for Kurdish rights and provide democratization throughout Turkey. Another group of former PKK members told Kurdish Media that they had no option but to leave the rebel group. “After Mr. Osman Öcalan and the others left the organization, we [tried] to democratize the organization from within in keeping with international democratic norms. Unfortunately, our efforts and the patience we expanded were in vain”. This source went on to explain that the rebel group was not changing according to what it dictated – that Kongra-Gel would be a democratic institution and work with other Kurdish organizations. Instead, left-wing individuals, he claimed, were taking control of the group (Yılmaz 2004). These disagreements within the PKK resulted in its division into three groups: the largest led by Cemil Bayık and including Kongra-Gel’s president Zubeyir Aydar. The second biggest group included Apo’s brother, Osman, and the third group, which continues to support Abdullah Öcalan. This factionalizing coincided with the discovery of the body of a former PKK member near a camp in Northern Iraq. This specific incident occurred after a squad, supposedly acting on Öcalan’s orders to

36 Also referred to as the Patriotic Democratic Party (PWD).
“liquidate breakaway dissidents,” was intercepted by Iraqi police near the scene of the crime (KurdishMedia.com 2004).

Several factors contributed to this splintering, not the least of which was the capture and arrest of Öcalan and his subsequent statements that were in alignment with Turkish policy. The US intervention in Iraq also creates historical opportunities for Northern Iraqis, the population of which is overwhelmingly Kurdish. These opportunities include the formation of a federal Kurdish state, which is not only a landmark for Kurds in Iraq, it is a positive sign for Kurds in surrounding countries who saw it as a common gain for the Kurdish liberation and an encouraging element in the overall solution of the Kurdish issue (Partiya Welatpareza Demokratik 2004). Thus, real progress in the Turkish political arena and the appearance of a federal Southern Kurdistan posed a threat to the jailed PKK leader. Sirac Bilgin, the former spokesperson for the PKK, explains in a letter to the Kurdish people that the divisions were also responses to events in Northern Iraq. In his 2004 letter, Bilgin, who had recently left the PKK over a disagreement with the group’s leadership, said Öcalan and the PKK, as well as its affiliated institutions such as Kongra-Gel, would try to sabotage independence at the federal stage, claiming that such a structure in southern Kurdistan would lead to more and longer wars in the Middle East. Several of the recent PKK dissidents publicly criticized this stance because it went against the goal of an eventual Kurdish state (Bilgin 2004).

As Bilgin explained, the splinter group led by Öcalan’s brother, Osman, was working to create a nonviolent political arena in which to address Kurdish issues. This
move posed a threat to Öcalan because, under such circumstances, he would lose the role he played in maintaining relations with the Turkish state. Öcalan continued to lead the PKK from prison while simultaneously attempting to acquiesce to the positions of the Turkish government, as evidenced by his 1999 declaration that amended the goal the rebel group had held since its creation – that of an independent Kurdistan. Therefore, the period in which Öcalan found his position as figurehead for the Kurds threatened, in which Osman Öcalan attempted to intervene in the activities of the PKK both in its bases in Northern Iraq and in its activities in Europe, the Turkish government worked in many ways that helped the jailed leader. According to Bilgin, “the Turkish state provided every kind of opportunity in order to make Abdullah Öcalan’s speeches to be communicated without any restrictions” (Bilgin 2004, 2) Öcalan was able to broadcast his position against Kurds who supported federalism in Southern Kurdistan (Bilgin 2004).

If a federal Kurdish State is set up first in Iraq and then in Turkey, we will see Turkey being swallowed up by bloody fighting. Turkey will not accept this…We will not be the slaves or the sacrificial lambs of nationalism…Jalal Talabani has mobilized these [fake Kurdish nationalists] against Turkey. He has a plan; after a Kurdish federation in Iraq is established, he will come to Turkey to set up a new Kurdish federation there…I have been struggling against [Kurdish] nationalism since 1992. The Turkish state has recently started to understand this. (Bilgin 2004, 2)

This letter reveals the environment of mutual reinforcement that Öcalan and the Turkish government had established. Why would Turkey facilitate Öcalan’s communication to the PKK and the Kurds? Turkish officials discovered that the recent factionalizing of the PKK would cause them to lose a handle on Kurdish communities. The person they
could control was the one they had in an isolated island prison. Thus, officials helped Öcalan in order to rein in the political activities of the various pro-Kurdish organizations that had arisen. The seemingly puzzling question, though, was why would Öcalan denounce Kurdish independence? Why was he not in favor of Kurdish federalism in Iraq? The reason is clear, especially when we look at the SPLA. Garang, the SPLA leader, did not want to forfeit his position in the rebel group once it began democratizing. Likewise, Öcalan does not want to lose his grip of power in the PKK.

From prison, Öcalan has few options and effectively demoralizes PKK rebels, rendering the group irrelevant to many Kurds in Turkey (Zaman 2004a). Like many leaders who find their positions of power threatened, Öcalan attempted to manipulate security concerns to solidify his position within the rebel group and to extract resources from Kurdish society in the form of popular support. By speaking out against other Kurdish groups, he tried to entice people to unite with the group, which would further legitimate his continued role as leader of the PKK.

With the group becoming increasingly irrelevant to local Kurds who find they can participate more effectively in political life, the PKK will increase its levels of coercion against Kurdish civilians. It is the fear of irrelevance that gives the PKK a strategic interest in promoting an environment of insecurity, and it does so by using ethnicity as a tool. “Ethnic entrepreneurs then attempt to interpret events and the environment of insecurity to their constituents in ethnic terms, blaming the situation on ‘Turkish suppression and disregard of Kurds’” (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999, 999). “Anti-Kurdish hardliners in Turkey feel that a climate of fear and denial of a ‘Kurdish reality’
will ‘keep more people in line’ (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999, 1000). The PKK it appears operates on the belief that such a climate will ethnically politicize more Kurds and move them to align with the opposition. This environment of insecurity then promotes radicalization, engendering increased insecurity as Turkey responds with more repression. This supposition supports one of the theories revealed in this study – that the nature and capabilities of the state are critical for shaping rebel responses to local communities. If options to operate from within the Turkish political system are continually suppressed, more Kurds may pursue extra-system strategies (Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999). Indeed this appears to be what the PKK was doing in June 2004 when it ended its ceasefire. By the time the PKK announced another ceasefire in 2006 it was too late and the call for an end to hostilities was rejected by Turkey’s head of state, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

These events illustrate the democratic strategies the PKK pursued vis-à-vis civilians when its leadership was confident that they controlled the extraction of resources – when they did not have significant rivals in resource extraction. This allowed the PKK to control the course of political developments. Thus the pressures from overseas to democratize after the end of the Cold War may have had an effect, but it is more likely that this effect was stronger on the PKK’s Turkish government foes. The government needed to democratize after the late 1990s because it wanted to convince European governments to allow the country to join the EU. The PKK democratized in the early 1990s because the Turkish state still behaved in a repressive and violent manner against Kurdish communities. This resulted in a limiting of options for Kurds
who wanted reform, and helped reassure the leadership that it could retain a monopoly over resource extraction. As Turkey’s politics liberalized, the PKK moved in the other direction. Here we see the response to the threat when new political spaces outside of PKK control are unlocked, followed by PKK behavior that evolved counter to what one would expect if international norms were the driving force of change in the strategies of these non-state armed actors.

The matter of illicit resources is important as well. Here we see that the democratic opening within the group could occur in the context of reliance on overseas illicit commerce. Generally, this “rent-seeking” would be expected to provide incentives for the insurgents to ignore local political demands. However, the rebels went ahead and accepted more political participation. By 2000, however, the PKK performs closer to expectation according to the “resource curse” explanation of armed group (and state) behavior. Yet the evidence outlined above indicates that this association may not be causal. Again, the internal group dynamics of over resource extraction and the subsequent political space emerges as more important than does the individual material interests of members of the group.

New Groups, New Rivals?

The development of splinter groups has not been the lone factor contributing to a crisis within the PKK of late. The rebels face rival hardliners in Turkey as well. In August 2004, several weeks after calling off a five-year unilateral ceasefire with Ankara, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) emerged, claiming responsibility for the bombing of two hotels in Istanbul (Agence France-Presse 2005). The same group claimed
responsibility for at least 20 attacks (DozaMe.org 2006a) including several in the main Kurdish city of Diyarbakir (BBC News 2006). Nihat Ali Ozcan, a terrorism expert based in Ankara, maintains that TAK and other emerging armed Kurdish groups are products of a loose hierarchy within the PKK attempting to demonstrate that its organization continues to thrive. "They kept silent for almost a year to achieve legitimacy during Turkey’s E.U. bid, but now they need these attacks to keep the troubled organization intact," he said (Arsu 2005). In a similar vein, the Turkish government claims that TAK is a cover for PKK attacks on civilian targets (Agence France-Presse 2005). The PKK, however, continually denies any affiliation with the group.

Another group dating back to the nascent days of the PKK resurfaced and entered the conflict’s dynamic. The Turkish Revenge Brigade (*Turk Intikam Tugayi* or TIT), a Turkish ultra-nationalist terrorist group, gained notoriety during the political clashes between left and right-wing groups in Turkey and Kurdistan during the 1970s. TIT is believed to be responsible for over 1,000 deaths during this period. Following the military coup of 1980, the group was scattered and most of its members were arrested during the first sweep by the new military command. The members were later released and integrated with Turkish military intelligence agency, assisting with underground operations against Kurdish political and cultural figures during the Kurdish insurgency in the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s. After maintaining a low profile, the group is now believed to be one of many subsections of the gang collectively known as “Atabeyler.” This gang’s existence, which is allegedly acknowledged in the halls of Anakara, was unearthed by the Turkish AKP administration after an attack on the
Turkish Council of State in May 2006. When a Turkish judge was killed and four other judges were wounded (DozaMe.org 2006b).

A group that has added itself to the mass of pro-Kurdish oriented organizations in Turkey is the DTP. In October 2004, Leyla Zana and several former Kurdish parliament members announced the creation of a new political party. The DTP would focus on developing a peaceful solution to resolving the conflict between Kurds and Turkey, much like several Kurdish political parties attempted to do in the 1970s and early 1980s before disbanding. “We former MPs…want to serve democracy and peace,” Zana said. “For this reason we are launching the popular democratic party” (Agence France-Presse 2004; Anadolu Agency 2004). The party claims to support Turkey’s EU membership process while working for increased cultural and political rights to Kurds. As mentioned in preceding pages, other Kurdish parties, including DEHAP have joined this organization (Zaman 2004b), a move the PKK may view as a threat to its resource base.

**Turkey and the EU**

Threats to the PKK’s resource base inside Turkey – namely in the form of popular support – does not only reside in the development of other Kurdish organizations, but in the state as well. Turkey made tentative steps toward reform when it lifted the ban on publishing Kurdish language programs and broadcasting in Kurdish (Bulloch and Morris 1992). In 1999, Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in 1999 jump-started a further state reforms, many targeting the Kurdish community. This further opened the door to a decline in PKK legitimacy. That is to say, the state facilitated a
decline in PKK support. “The EU reform process is weakening Öcalan’s grip,” said Hasim Hasimi, a former Kurdish lawmaker. “The EU has robbed him of his role as the Kurds' sole protector” (Zaman 2004a).

Despite these efforts, some Kurdish officials claim the EU-inspired reforms in Turkey are largely charades designed to get closer to membership. To emphasize the point, Kurdish Mayor Osman Baydemir in Diyarbakir was hit with two court cases in 2004 for welcoming citizens at a local rally in Kurdish (Zaman 2004a). Further evidence of Turkey’s reluctance to reform has been captured by Reporters without Borders, an international organization working for expanding and ensuring the freedom of the press confirmed that reporters working in Turkey are often censored. The subjects most often censored are those involving the army and the Kurds (CNW 2004). A Turkish reporter, for example, was detained for interviewing Kurdish rebels in the mountains between Iraq and Turkey (Onderoglu 20 October 2004). In spite of the reluctance by the state to engage in reform, events support the thesis that state reform can lead to increased coercion. Similar patterns in response to government reform can be seen in Peru’s Sendero Luminoso. Peru’s democratization provoked a more violent response from this leftist rebel group during the 1980s and 1990s (Ron 2001).

4.6 Analysis

The PKK experienced intense rivalry during its nascent years. In fact, such rivalry existed outside the organization as well as within it. During the second party congress held in 1982 in Syria, differences of opinions surfaced for the first time. Some of the militants, who established and worked for the survival of the party, left the organization.
Some of these reportedly were murdered or arrested by the PKK leadership (Assembly of Turkish American Associations). However, once Turkey stepped up its repression of Kurds (partially as a response to the revolutionary activity of which the PKK was a part), the number of significant rivals decreased and the PKK’s behavior toward Kurdish civilians became contractual. During the 1990s, throughout several ceasefires and despite continual state repression, the group remained contractual. However, following 1999, splintering of the leadership surfaced, hardliners emerged, and the group began to show signs of deteriorating into its original strategies of civilian mistreatment.

The PKK have been described as falling somewhere along a continuum of transnational social movements and networks of violence and crime. Not only have they exhibited, in this study’s definition, coercive behavior toward Kurds, the PKK has simultaneously promoted a political agenda. During the early 1990s, as explicated above, the group began to provide public goods and state-like services such as policing, membership and identity to fellow Turkish Kurds marginalized within the Turkish state (Adamson 2005, 37). Yet following the capture of Öcalan, evidence of internal disharmony arose. There is evidence of increasingly coercive behavior being displayed by elements of the organization. Internal power struggles sparked factionalizing of the rebel group, increasing the chances that significant rivals will develop. These shifts in behavior seem to have coincided with the enacting of several cultural reforms by the Turkish state, which have granted Kurds in Turkey freedoms previously prohibited. While it seems Kurdish unity is splintering within the organization and many of its activities have been declared illegal by European governments, the PKK continues to
receive a steady supply of resources from both illicit and legitimate industries outside of Turkey (BBC News 2007).

Moreover, it appears that as Turkey’s politics becomes more open to the political demands of moderates in Kurdish communities, splinter groups of the PKK become more violent. Their evolution begins to resemble the trajectories of rebel groups in liberal democracies elsewhere. The political opening in Ireland and Britain to the Irish Republican Army’s supporters brought a large measure of local groups’ rights, but it also spawned rejectionist groups such as the Real IRA. The Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader Meinhoff Gang in West Germany in the 1970s also had to operate in a democratic setting. In these instances, these groups simply were not appealing to their target communities compared to what states could offer. Like the PKK in the 1980s and its fragments again in the 2000s, their strategies focused on provoking retaliation against communities of would-be supporters. In sum, it appears that democratic politics in these states weakens broad-based insurgencies. Less expected is the tendency to end up with very violent, almost cult-like insurgents organized around remnants of supporters.

Analyzing the PKK using QCA

Using the data collected and analyzed in subsequent sections, we can divide the history of the PKK into three distinct time periods: PKK1 from 1978 to the late 1980s; PKK2 from the early 1990s to 1999 and the arrest and sentencing of Öcalan; and PKK3 from the immediate aftermath of Öcalan’s sentencing to the present. PKK1 begins with the group’s formal institutionalization to the late 1980s, when the group had clearly
changed its strategy. This era is characterized with heavy rivalry among Turkish Kurds, though with a low level of need that can be explained by the resources coming from both inside and outside Turkey through illicit means. The second case (PKK2) begins in the early 1990s. With increasing repression of Turkish Kurds, Kurdish political parties disband, many aligning with the PKK. Several Kurdish parliamentarians are jailed. This heightens the Kurdish cause both inside and outside of Turkey. During this time, the leadership declares that the PKK tactics of the past were misguided, and the group begins to decrease its targeting of civilians. Rivalry disappears and the rebels proclaim a change in their treatment of civilians. Need remains relatively constant as resources continue to flow from both legitimate sources inside the country and from illicit sources in the Middle East and Europe. This period ended with the capture, jailing and sentencing of Öcalan.

The group’s final period (PKK3) begins in 2000. During this period, Öcalan foregoes the PKK’s original objective of a separate Kurdish state, which many perceive to be traitorous and a direct influence of his jailors. The group begins to fragment as dissent among leaders in the PKK surface. Öcalan’s brother leaves the rebels, and further disagreements result in the formation of two break-away groups. The PKK begins to move back toward the coercive side of the continuum. These three periods and the presence or absence of the relevant variables are represented in Table 4.1 where a score of “1” means the variable is present and a score of “0” represents absence.
Table 4.1 Crisp-Set Representation of PKK Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PKK1 1978-late 1980s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2 – early 1990s-1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3 – 2000-present</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By recoding the variable scores using the fuzzy sets (using a five-scale measurement), we can more explicitly describe the conditions during these three cases that make up the PKK. Table 4.2 provides the scores.

Table 4.2 Fuzzy-Set Representation of PKK Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the text as a reference, we can draw clear links between the data and these fuzzy-set scores. As discussed above, the PKK was plagued with intense rivalry in its earliest years and thus has a score of “1.0” (“fully in”). As noted by some, one of the weapons at the hands of the Turkish government was during the group’s nascent years and the rivalry in the early years between the PKK and other Kurdish groups. “The ruthlessness with which the PKK operated, their policy of revenge killings, not only against those who opposed them but also against those who merely failed to help, did much to alienate the local people” (Bulloch and Morris 1992, 185-6). Concerning the “need” variable, the group is given a score of “0.5” (“neither in nor out”) (and indeed this
score is consistent throughout the three PKK cases). The reasoning behind this cusp-like score is that during the group’s development, an intense and sudden change in the need for resources never occurred. Unlike SPLA3, which experienced a tremendous decline in need due to the intense support from western donors and governments, the PKK’s need for resources has remained consistent. The group, because of the presence of rivals, was limited to extracting from illicit resources. What resources it did get from local Kurdish communities (non-illicit resources), because of its coercive relationship with noncombatants was most likely extracted through looting, an act that constitutes the use of illicit resources in this study. Therefore, the use of illicit resources is strong in PKK1 and is scored as “1.0”. The outcome, as outlined in the history of the rebel group, is the strongest score of coercive behavior toward civilians – “1.0”.

During the timeframe of PKK2, the group underwent a number of behavior and institutional changes. One of the major contributors to this transformation is the dissipation of rivals. As the state stepped up its repression of Kurdish groups, both violent and non-violent, the PKK gained increasing support and became unified under Öcalan. However, it is likely that the PKK was not completely rid of rivals, neither in the form of dissenters nor in non-violent Kurdish groups that disagreed with the group’s violent tactics. Thus, the presence of rivals is given a low score of “0.25” (“more out than in”). Because the group had less rivals during this time, it also had more local support. This follows Olson’s state-building logic where groups ruling an area will extract resources more efficiently from local populations with increasingly contractual behavior – by providing goods and services in return for resources. However, the PKK continued
to obtain resources from illicit means, most likely because the profit made from such activities as money laundering and drug trafficking could not be discounted. The type of resources then receives a mid-range score of “0.5” (“neither in nor out”). However, the absence of rivals, combined with these variables gives us an outcome score of “0.25” – that is, a low score on coercion. In other words, PKK2’s behavior toward noncombatants was largely contractual.

In the case of PKK3, the rebel group copes with the reactions and consequences to the arrest and sentencing of Öcalan. As described in the preceding pages, this event marked the group’s splintering: several leaders broke away to start new groups and openly denounced Öcalan as he continued to lead the group from prison. Further, internal conflict broke out concerning the status of Kurds in Northern Iraq. The most significant developments affecting the presence of rivals in PKK3 are the reforms enacted by the Turkish government. As the country began making motions to join the EU, it followed suit with democratic reforms that focused on the Kurdish issue. This means that the state, which had formally been known as the sole oppressor of Turkish Kurds, began acting (to a very limited degree) as Kurdish protector. Thus Turkey became a rival to the PKK, pulling away resources in the form of popular support from the rebel group. To confirm this, several Kurdish civilians interviewed in Diyarbakir noted that they (and leaders of civil society) are trying to distance themselves from the PKK (Diker 2004; Nebahat 2004).

Nonetheless, many Kurds continue to identify with and support the PKK. In a statement before the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the European Parliament,
Mehdi Zana, husband of human rights activist and former parliamentarian Layla Zana and served eleven years in a Turkish prison claimed that the while the PKK resort to violence to achieve their objectives, they have “great popular support” (Zana 1992). Hence, the “rival” variable is scored at “0.5”. Because during this period the PKK is very clearly relegated to operating out of bases in Northern Iraq and on the border between this country and Turkey, it lacks civilian sources for support. Furthermore, the internal rivalry begins to sap Kurdish morale and brings questions to the minds of many Turkish Kurds regarding the legitimacy of the rebel group. Hence, the type of resource is scored at “0.75” (“more in than out”) meaning the resources are more illicit than not.

The Role of the State

The state plays an important role in determining the recent behavior of the PKK. When, in its early history, the group fought a coercive Turkish state it could appeal to local Kurdish communities whom the state repressed. When a state is perceived to be more coercive than a rebel group, the group is likely to fill the gap in services to local communities, as was displayed in the case of SPLA2 and SPLA3. This is especially true when the state is corrupt and cannot control predations of its own agents or when it adopts a counterinsurgency strategy that punishes local communities for rebel presence, as occurred in Kurdish communities. This makes it “easier” in a sense for rebel groups to be providers of security, even if they are not extremely effective at doing so.

However, once a state begins to reform (move toward the contractual end of the spectrum of behavior) rebels will find support from host communities declining and will
resort to *more coercive tactics* in their treatment of noncombatants. We see this occur in the splintering of the PKK following 1999. Thus we see an increase in coercive behavior in PKK3. This means that in a reforming state, those that heed democratic norms are more likely to see an increase in coercion behavior by rebel groups against noncombatants. At first glance, this appears counterintuitive. Supporters of international norms of human rights and democracy, for example, lead us to believe that policies in these directions are good for a state’s citizenry. Yet, as the PKK reveals, state reform can actually *increase* the levels of coercion that local populations experience, even though such reforms are directed at these same populations. This can be explained by the new status of “rival” the state acquires once it begins to reform. In reforming, the state attracts popular support away from rebels in the form of a more open society.

It appears that Turkey’s security forces and the PKK mutually reinforce one another, adding a further dimension to this rebel group’s story. “Without the PKK and its exactions, the army could not justify its control of the society, and without the terrible military repression in Kurdistan, the PKK would have a hard time surviving and recruiting among the Kurds” (Nezan 1997, 59). Thus it seems reasonable to claim that the level of repression by the state can be proportionate to the support for insurgent groups. However, this ratio of repression to support is mediated by the rise of Kurdish civil society and the inability of the PKK to maintain dominance over Turkish Kurdistan. That is, if civil society expands in Turkey, it will act as a threat to PKK much like it did to the SPLA when Southern Sudanese civil society began demanding democratic institutions. If faced with the decision to support either an illegal armed group (with
limited resources and limited mobility) or a legitimate state that has access not only to
domestic but also international resources, local populations will choose the state. By
taking away resources from the rebel group the state becomes another competitor. This
means Öcalan is likely to oppose EU membership because it means greater democracy
in Turkey and further loss of PKK support as Turkish Kurds shift collaboration to the
state. As a press release from PWD explains, strengthening democracy within Turkey
will result from the process of EU membership (Partiya Welatpareza Demokratik 2004).
The result would not only be the sidelining of state-supported Kemalism and its
marginalizing characteristics, EU membership would also alienate the PKK, as many
Kurds who are tired of violence would view the group as an obstacle to Turkey’s popular
democratic reforms. When democracy becomes a policy of the state against which a
rebels are likely to be blamed for local mayhem. Thus rebels may not
really transform their behavior. Instead, local people change their perceptions of the
rebels. This still supports the above statement that the nature and capabilities of the
state are critical for shaping rebel responses to local communities.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates several important aspects about rebel group behavior
toward civilians. The PKK shows us that a rebel group can undergo more than one
transformation, and can in fact return to somewhere near its original behavior.
Furthermore, the state plays an important role in contextualizing rebel group behavior. It
can, for instance, act as a facilitator for increasing rebel group support by repressing
local communities that the group represents. However, the state can also act as a rival
for resources as shown in the effects of Turkish reforms. Methodologically, the analysis of the data shows the important differences between fuzzy-set and crisp-set analysis. If we were to rely on the crisp-set scores, which are dichotomous, we would miss much of the nuance and degrees of variation recorded by fuzzy-set representations. Finally, just as we saw during the SPLA’s political development during the late 1990s and early 21st century, rebel group leadership can demonstrate reluctance in letting go of power in the face of democratic reforms.
CHAPTER FIVE

From Jekyll to Hyde: Rivals and Resources in the Transformation of the FARC

_When two elephants fight, what suffers is the grass._

– African Proverb

Carmen sits with her visitor, dressed in long sleeves despite the intense heat. She tells the story of how, in years past, when the FARC – _las guerrillas_ – moved into the area of Montes de María, there wasn’t any trouble. When they would come in from the countryside and into the village markets, she says, “We would see the guerrillas and they would not bother the people.” Within the past decade, though, the FARC – like the SPLA and the PKK in previous chapters – changed its tactics toward local populations. Unlike the SPLA and the PKK, however, this Colombian peasant-based rebel group became more violent rather than less coercive or contractual in its behavior. As Carmen recounts,

> In 2002 the guerrillas took my son and since then I have not known what has become of him…I know that they took him because the Red Cross told a chief that the guerrillas had him and also some workers said that the guerrillas took him to use as a servant. (Carmen 2006)

When she is asked to explain this radical change in behavior displayed by the rebels toward civilians, Carmen simply states that the FARC was not as violent before the paramilitaries arrived in the region.
5.0 Introduction

The FARC began as a mediating force in rural Colombian protecting peasant communities in the southeastern region of the country. The FARC maximized its legitimacy among its targeted membership by providing such basic services for peasants such as protection against the harsh policies of some large landowners and education in exchange for food and taxes. The group was even known for investigating human rights abuses perpetrated by its own cadres against the local communities it served. At the end of the 1980s, the group, despite its involvement in illicit resource extraction from the drug industry, continued for a time to have a contractual relationship with locals. The group even came close to modeling itself as an alternative to the central government in specific regions when the government agreed to create a demilitarized zone – *zona de despeje* – for the FARC in 1998, a geographically defined setting for the evolution of further peace talks between the group and the government. However, by the late 1990s throughout much of the countryside, the FARC had become extremely coercive in its treatment of the rural population it had previously protected. What explains this dramatic shift in behavior toward noncombatants? Does the *types* of resources – in this case drug trafficking – determine the type of behavior, an argument that parallels Weinstein’s (2006) thesis? As we have seen from previous chapters, illicit economies are not always correlated with the nature of insurgent behavior. This also is the case in this instance. This chapter delves deeper into an explanation for changing behavior as it examines how this particular rebel group transformed in the opposite direction as the SPLA and the PKK, from coercive to contractual. Moreover, this change
occurred at relatively similar periods of time and under the same international environment that saw changes in opposite directions among other insurgent groups considered in this study. Despite the different circumstances and the opposite direction in which the FARC changed, the reason for its transformation – like the two cases prior to it – rests in the same causal mechanism as found in the case of the SPLA: the presence of rivals for political power, from among officials and armies of states, from target communities, and from within the insurgent group itself.

There is no dearth in literature on the FARC. Much of the scholarly analyses of this rebel group can be found in historical accounts of Colombia. Safford and Palacios (2002) provide one of the broadest contemporary accounts of this country’s economic, political and social history. Bushnell’s (1993) looks specifically at the 19th and 20th centuries of this country. A comprehensive history of the violence in Colombia is found in the edited volumes by Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Umaña Luna. These works analyze La Violencia (1948-1958), during which an estimated 200,000 people were killed, as a social process (Guzman Campos, Fals Borda, and Luna 1962, 1964) Sánchez and Aguilera, Memoria de un país en Guerra (Memories of a country at war) (Sánchez Gómez and Aguilera 2001) also contribute analyses to this violent period. Works that provide a more specific analysis of the violence in Colombia include the edited volume by Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sanchez (1992) called Violence in Colombia. Richani (2002) argues that the causes for the country’s protracted civil war are found in the intersection of political, economic and military factors. Colombian scholars and those who have lived and worked in the region for several years, including
Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramón (2002) provide detailed and intimate accounts of the FARC’s formation and ideologies. Ramon Ortiz (2002) details the development of the FARC through an examination of post-Cold War rebel movements. Journalists also provide valuable accounts, as these are often the individuals with the most access to groups like the FARC. One notable study is Steven Dudley’s work (2003), which provides a comprehensive if biased account of the FARC’s political development and eventual decimation, as well as an intimate look at the group’s individuals and ideologies. Guillermoprieto provides a more objective account in her focus on the problematic relationship between the Colombian government and the various armed actors in the country and the U.S.’s role in this interplay (Guillermoprieto 2001). Many of the studies of the coca industry and the subsequent economic and political dynamic created between the guerrillas, the paras and the state focus on policies. Murillo (2004) provides one of the more objective policy analyses and examines the impact of U.S. policies on the country’s internal affairs. A work that examines the nexus of history, the rebels and the cultivation of coca is Jaramillo, Mora, and Cubides (1986).

There is a substantial literature on the nature of Colombian politics and the international relationships established during and after the Cold War, and how these factors influenced the growth of the rebel groups in the country. Clara Nieto (2003) and Peter Smith (2000) focus on U.S. foreign policy toward this area of the world during the Cold War. The former documents U.S. actions and aggression in Latin America from the Nixon administration through to the Clinton years (Nieto 2003). Smith studies the history
of U.S. and Latin American relations and the force behind the phases of U.S. decision-making policies through an international systems lens (Smith 2000).

While these analyses and overviews contribute to this chapter’s inquiry, they also provide a basis from which to differentiate the approach here. Explanations that focus on economic incentives and broad global structural factors offer counterpoints to the analysis at hand in this chapter. This chapter will trace the process of the FARC’s transformation and by doing so will demonstrate the multiple events and factors that led to its more recent, coercive behavior toward the very population it first set out to protect. These other factors are important in this political evolution of Colombian rebels. However, as the evidence below shows, the competition for political resources and the subsequent control over target communities emerges as the mediating factor that shapes how these other variables influence the changes in behavior of insurgents.

5.1 “A Project of Exclusion”

Colombian officials tout their country as being the longest lasting democracy in Latin America (Murillo 2004). It is also one of the few countries in Latin American with nearly consistent positive economic growth since the 1940s (Murillo 2004; Richani 2002). Colombia avoided much of the debt crisis that affected the region during the 1970s and 1980s. Some scholars claim this political stability reflects the durability of the country’s political party system. The historical dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties has lent Colombian politics an air of certainty (Bushnell 1993).

Despite these durable democratic institutions, Colombia has the most inequitable distribution of wealth in the Western Hemisphere next to Brazil (Murillo 2004). Between
60 and 68 percent of the country’s population lived at or below the poverty line in 2004. Rural poverty levels rise as high as 85 percent. The country is also strongly divided along ethnic and racial lines, which is not surprising, given that there are at least 84 different indigenous groups throughout the country and that these groups make up less than five percent of the population. The deep social divisions are reflected in the proportion of individuals of European descent living in urban areas versus those that are classified as *campesinos* or farmers. These divisions helped lead to the formation of the FARC and the longest lasting civil conflict on the continent. This conflict has displaced two to three million people and has been responsible for more than 40,000 deaths since 1999 alone, most of them civilian. In recent years, local indigenous communities have been increasingly targeted by the various armed groups, which appear to favor action against civilians rather than direct military confrontation (UNHCR 2006).

*Class struggle and land reform*

Like the SPLA, the sources of conflict in Colombia lie largely in the country’s historical inequalities. Spanish colonialism left indelible social and political structures in this Latin American country that set the scene for generations of disparity. The class divisions were in part shaped by topography and further reinforced by political divides and the patterns of Spanish conquest. For example, beginning under colonialism, a peasant population thrived in the agricultural sectors of the country in the East, while in the West along the Caribbean coast the area was shaped largely by the legacies of the slave-colonizer relationship in the arrival of West African slaves (see Map 5.1). While struggling for independence from the Spanish, two major political sectors emerged as a
result of political fragmentation. Many historians depict the emergence of these political factions – what would become the Conservative and Liberal parties – as a sequel to an earlier conflict between liberals and Bolivarians in 1826-1830. It was the civil war from 1840-1842, however, that created a nearly irresolvable rift between the moderates, which founded a coalition with the Bolivarians, and the Liberals who sought to exclude the latter (Safford and Palacios 2002). While the conflict between the parties was largely ideological, the crux of this conflict meant the development of a deep division within Colombian politics and society. Though Colombia obtained its independence from Spain in 1810, self-determination did not end the inequities among the various sectors of society. Conflicts emerged between clergy, a historically Conservative and powerful part of Colombian society, and the university-educated liberals. The military also came into conflict with these liberal civilians (Safford and Palacios 2002). The conflict between the parties involved the struggle for land as well. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Colombian government began a major land reform effort, furthering the acquisition of public lands and designed to stimulate the development of small and medium-sized farms. The privatization of public land was facilitated by the subservience of local government officials to large landowners. When the Colombian government passed legislation in 1874 and again in 1882 that aimed to reform public land policy urging settlers to resist the misappropriation by large landowners, many of these pioneers petitioned the government to protect them from the growth of latifundios – the great landed estates. These reforms represented a response to improvements in transportation and technology, which had led to an increase in demand for agricultural
products in the industrialized world (LeGrand 1992). Agricultural resources took a more important position in the foreign markets during the 1850s. Prior to this time, minerals – particularly gold (Safford and Palacios 2002) - had been the center of exports. By the end of the 19th century, coffee had become one of the country’s largest agricultural exports and the quantity of coffee haciendas numbered in the hundreds. These large estates were located largely in Northern Santander, Santander, Cundinamarca, Tolima
and southwestern areas of Antioquia. This led to a period of confrontations between collective groups of settlers and the landowners and their allies, and set the stage for further battles between the two dominant political parties.

The land reforms benefited large estate owners against the interests of peasant farmer. To facilitate the huge local and global demand for agricultural products, large landowners needed a greater labor force. One of the quickest methods of obtaining a large labor pool was through land seizures or asserting rights of private property on those peasants living on the land (LeGrand 1992). The large estate owners – *hacendados* – planted crops primarily on land for which they had titles, some originating in the colonial period. Their possession of titles meant that these landowners were creating a frontier of closed resources, as opposed to one of open resources, whereby merely occupying the land entitled one to ownership (Safford and Palacios 2002). Thus, many of these peasants became tenant farmers the effect of which was the alienation of territory for public domain and led to the growth of disgruntled would-be small landholders (Bergquist 1992).

Much of this peasant labor force initially lived in the highland regions far from areas where export agriculture was cultivated. The land reform effort, which led to private land tenure, forced these people to migrate from the highlands to lower elevations for work. This created a smallholder sector in the midlands and lowlands made up largely of peasants. These individuals traveled to “frontier regions” – unsettled public lands – to farm to earn money in the cash economy became homesteaders. Settling of these public lands in the mid- and low-level regions still created problems for
large estate owners who relied on hired labor. Migrating peasants were less willing to accept work as wage laborers when they had access to public land. Large landowners sought to resolve this problem by enacting enclosures (LeGrand 1992). As Barrington Moore argued in his classic work, enclosures allowed for the commercialization of agriculture while eroding peasant property (Moore 1966). Enclosures in Colombia meant the privatization of property by a small percentage of society and tied labor to these large estates. Property titles were not, at this time, functional in Colombia. By law, frontier settlers were allowed to claim title to land that they farmed. However many of those who worked smaller plots of land could not afford the costs of surveying and thus could not acquire titles. Moreover, the land that the estate owners chose to enclose or privatize was not public land in the sense that it was unoccupied. Such land was in fact occupied largely by peasant farmers who did not have the resources to fight for the land through legal channels (LeGrand 1992).

Colombia’s illegal privatization of public land extended to several sectors of society. Merchants and politicians often appropriated land through patronage networks. “The cumulative effect was to block the peasants from access to the most desirable land, thus encouraging them to sell their labor power” (LeGrand 1992, 35). Government reports during this time confirm this. One congressional committee reporting in 1882 claimed, “it is generally through the dispossession of the poor settlers that rich people acquire large landholdings…Many…obtain immense extensions of territory which they hoard with the sole purpose of excluding settlers from those areas or else reducing them to serf-like conditions” (AC 1992). The Municipal Council of Cauca’s letter in 1907
was quite clear about the meaning and effects of these land acquisitions: “In Cauca, the majority of the *hacendados* have taken over vast zones of public lands…which they neither work themselves nor allow others to work. By monopolizing the land, they aim only to undermine the position of the independent cultivators so as to form from their ranks groups of dependent laborers” (ANCB 1907).

While the agricultural boom strengthened the large landowners’ hold on state politics, the majority of the Colombian people who worked the land found themselves shut out of the benefits. Thus the potential “coffee middle class”, the would-be sturdy foundation for Colombian democracy and economic prosperity initially envisioned in the reforms, did not find itself much better off than it had been prior to the agricultural boom. A survey during the mid-1930s in several coffee regions found that average farm families numbered seven members, all of whom lived and slept in a single room; all lacked running water and 97% were without proper latrines (Safford and Palacios 2002). Agrarian conflict became a common occurrence. Between 1875 and 1930, over 450 conflicts\(^37\) occurred in the frontier regions. The agrarian struggle that eventually gave rise to FARC and other armed groups had commenced.

Changes in the political system during the late 1920s provided *campesinos* with the outlet through which to channel their animosity and to renew their struggles against the large landowners. In 1926, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that the only method by which to distinguish private from public land was with an original land title. Most peasants were aware that the estate owners had appropriated land illegally and

possessed no such title. Therefore, many peasants declared the land they occupied as their own.

*La Violencia and the Precursors to the FARC*

While land reform issues ignited violence in the rural areas, politics in Bogotá saw the two dominant political parties at odds with one another. The Conservatives historically were identified with large landowners and the Catholic Church; the Liberals as reform-minded, though also reflecting economic interests. In 1930, a split in the Conservative party facilitated the Liberal party’s capture of the executive branch, ending a half-century of Conservative political dominance. The Liberal party deprived the Conservatives of central control and patronage networks on the local level. For four presidential periods, from 1930-1946, the “Liberal Republic” alternated between moderates and radicals. The result was a wave of state centralization and direct intervention in the economy. For example, many ruling statesmen of this period such as Eduardo Santos advocated for the social function of property, a philosophy that many conservatives found alarmingly radical, bordering on “communist”. In 1932, an agrarian reform proposal began to develop in government whereby public lands would be able to be obtained by individuals merely by working the land.\(^{38}\) The social agenda instituted and supported by many Liberals during this period thus met with staunch resistance and increased the tension between Conservative and Liberal partisans (Manwaring 2002). These tensions finally erupted as *La Violencia*.

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\(^{38}\) However, the force behind this proposal lost steam and, instead, in 1936 a law supporting large landowners was passed (Safford and Palacios 2002).
The beginning of *La Violencia* is associated with the April 1948 assassination of Populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Gaitán’s populist movement emerged amidst the urban growth and economic inflation of the 1940s. These conditions provided him with propitious conditions for mass mobilization (Safford and Palacios 2002, 317). Gaitán’s organization, *La Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria* (Morad), advocated economic redistribution, which threatened the social political and economic structure that ruling elites and their allies had created. Morad condemned “the exaggerated maldistribution of wealth in the country as well as the concentration of political power in the hands of a miniscule oligarchy” (Sánchez 1992, 77). Gaitán’s assassination in Bogotá launched two weeks of social and political protest in the capital, which quickly spread throughout the rural regions (Sánchez 1992). As rural violence increased, an estimated 20,000 Liberal and Conservative partisans armed themselves and set out to settle old political scores. Not only was land fought over, so was political power, since power at the local level was key to acquiring land. From the period 1948-1966, *La Violencia* was responsible for over 200,000 deaths (Fluherty 1956; Hanratty and Meditz 1990). A scholar describes these two weeks:

…prisoners imprisoned or executed their guards; those individuals previously persecuted now exercised power in many localities; judges incited subversion; pulpits were silenced and priests either imprisoned, held incommunicado, or killed (principally in Tolima and Cundinamarca); peasants invaded haciendas, expropriated cattle, and gave orders to landowners…(Sánchez 1992, 83)

Order was eventually restored in the capital and the elite oligarchy that had ruled Colombia once again took control of the country. Leaders soon took measures to
ensure that what had taken place in Bogotá would not occur in the rest of the country (Sánchez 1992). Conservatives ensured that militant workers were fired, and purge and imprisoned union leaders, attacking the use of the strike as a legitimate form of protest. Historian Mary Roldán describes the general harassment of workers and state employees in Antioquia. Conservative authorities, for example, emphasized the popular insurrections that were occurring in some towns and claimed this was proof of a Communist plot to seize control of Colombia (Roldán 2002, 71). The clergy made implicit measures of support for the killing of those involved in the uprisings following April 1948. Violence advanced into regions such as Tolima, Valle del Cauca, and Viejo Caldas.

As violence overtook the countryside, conflict between the dominant parties continued in the urban areas. Liberal politicians refused to accept defeat where the party had previously control while Conservatives, who had dominated the army, politicized the armed forces and replaced Liberal officers whenever possible as they turned the armed forces into partisan political instruments (Bailey 1967). It soon became clear that bipartisan cooperation in resolving the country-wide conflict was not possible, a premise that was made real when the Liberal party left the Cabinet of the National Union in June 1949.

Many scholars look at these two decades in Colombia and highlight one aspect: the barbarity of the period. One author describes this period as “a nihilistic or self-destructive re-creation of the colossal orgy of power” (Sánchez and Meertens 2001, xv). While relative order was eventually restored in urban areas, the countryside became an
environment of chaos, a reflection of the partisan conflict. Yet the violence that
developed in *el campo* was a part of several distinct developments that impacted the
formation of the FARC. The most evident process was the increased use state-
sanctioned terror. Torture, murder, and agrarian intimidation such as scorched earth
policy were common. Conflicts were often resolved through killing by those who used
their political affiliations to claim the assistance or complicity of the local authorities.
*Pájaros* (murderers) had extensive networks of protection and were often rewarded
according to the importance of their victims (Sánchez 1992).

> The extreme modality of this process was, of course, murder. Extreme not only for the number of victims but also because of the indescribable torture that surrounded these murders and marked for life the entire generation that witnessed them …Conflicts – between neighbors, between rural laborers and employers, between squatters and landlords…were resolved in bloodshed by those who, by virtue of their political affiliation, could count on the complicity of the authorities. (Sánchez 1992, 88-9)

Guerrilla resistance emerged during this violence as the leadership of the Liberal
party was unable to stop the increasing terror. These groups were the offspring of
peasant self-defense leagues that had identified with leftist political parties such as
Morad and the *Partido Comunista de Colombia* or Colombian Communist Party (PCC),
a group that emerged out of the Revolutionary Socialist Party of the 1920s. Word of
guerrilla struggle spread during the years of the violence as displaced persons migrated
to regions where these groups were centered, especially in Tolima. Peasants arrived
from elsewhere to fight for the Liberal doctrine along with Communist peasants. Many of
these peasants were the founding members of the FARC, including its leaders Manuel Marulanda Vélez (*Tirofijo* or “Sure-shot”).

During the 1960s, self-defense leagues spoke freely of war against the State. The guerrilla centers became refuges and soon became a barrier to the imposition of state authority. These groups were not only the means of resistance of the State, but they often acted as parallels to it. Initially, the Colombian State was too weak militarily in guerrilla areas to address rebellion. In the State’s absence, these groups set up parallel government structures, providing food, security and other sources of social support to local populations. Self-defense communities became linked to the communist presence in nearby countries such as Cuba and which had existed during the earliest years of the violence. Marxist rhetoric appeared in the rhetoric and strategy of many of these rebel groups. They were highly organized, with codes of revolutionary morality that enforced the respect of women, children and the elderly, as well as laws that prohibited torture and scorched-earth policies. Women had a key role in areas of resistance, serving as lookouts for peasant fighters in Southeastern Antioquia, for example (Sánchez 1992). These groups represented the rural poor and the excluded, those who were targets of state-directed violence. In establishing these ties to local populations, these groups (from which the FARC sprang) set the foundation for peasant-based support for the future rebel objectives. The FARC ensured its differentiation from “bandits” – groups that it claimed committed acts against the local populations (Matta Aldana 1999).

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39 In Latin America there is much more of a sense of distinction between the state and the government. The state is equivalent to the political system; policy however is made by the government, those who govern the state.
By 1952, these guerrillas had become a viable threat to the government and the military. In one case, a guerrilla commander and his soldiers destroyed an entire Colombian army column of one hundred men (Sánchez 1992). Key guerrilla leaders approached their governing body, the Liberal Directorate, with a choice: either help the guerrillas by leading a general revolt against the government, the military and the ruling Conservative party, or else they would do so on their own. They then convened a Conference attended by the country’s most important guerrilla groups. This came to be known as the First National Conference of the Popular Movement of National Liberation. Its national coordinating commission facilitated the organization of a judicial system and allocated duties to civil and military commanders as well as public officials. It guaranteed civil rights, established conditions and limits to land use, and began establishing agricultural colonies that it claimed belong to the Revolution. As one scholar on the era claims, “The law of the llano was, in effect, the most complete democratic project proposed by the armed movement to counter the fascistic project of Gómez’s Constituent Assembly” (Sánchez 1992, 95). The llanos during the period of La Violencia refers to the plains of the eastern slope of the Eastern Cordillera, Casanare and Meta, Sumapaz, the Antioqueño regions of Urrao, the Lower Cauca, and the Middle Magdalena, to Tolima. After the departments of Nariño, the Santanders, Boyacá, and the Cauca Valley were pacified during the 1950s, violence moved to this area of the country (Safford and Palacios 2002).

A third key aspect of La Violencia was the breakdown of social order. This affected the structure of property holding in rural areas, as thousands of peasants
abandoned their land or were forced to sell it to flee or as a result of extortion. Landless groups migrated to distant colonization zones or urban areas. Other displaced peasants joined self-defense leagues-turned guerrilla or rebel groups. Large landholders in areas of violence and displacement could (and often did) take over peasant lands, as did a new group of shopkeepers and merchants. However, the large estate owners had more options and many also moved to urban areas to wait for the situation in the countryside to improve (Sánchez 1992).

On December 1, 1957 a caretaker government led by a military junta oversaw a plebiscite that established what came to be known as the National Front. The National Front was the result of a 1956 pact wherein the Liberals and the Conservatives agreed to form a bipartisan government. The plebiscite meant that the two parties would share political power by alternating the presidency and sharing multi-level government positions, a long-term pact of power-sharing. Sanchez interprets this development as a new phase of La Violencia rather than its end. The Violence, he claims, was a multidimensional and ambiguous process resembling both a 19th-century type civil war and a peasant revolution. La Violencia resists categorization as a social rebellion because demands for social reform were largely absent (Sánchez and Meertens 2001). When a fissure in the Conservative Party appeared and a military junta was formed in 1957, Conservatives and Liberals, realized they needed a rigid agreement between the two parties. In July 1957 they drew up Pact of Sitges, which instituted parity in Congress and the Cabinet for a period of twelve years. Under this National Front the parties received mutual political guarantees; the party leaders deemed no viable alternative
existed to a constitutionally mandated agreement for equally shared power in Colombia (Hartlyn 1988, 56-63). However, the inauguration of the National Front, which in theory was meant to be a negotiation out of the previous years of terror, in fact launched a new phase of the violence (Sánchez 1992).

5.2 The Evolution of the FARC

This section traces the formation of FARC along with other rebel organizations in the country. It also examines the significance of the 1984 Uribe Agreement, which facilitated the legalization of the FARC’s political strategy – the Patriotic Union, and proceeds to detail this party’s subsequent decimation by political rivals. Finally, I explain how the shutting of this political path for the FARC led them to greatly enhance its military capabilities with the help of resources from the drug trade.

The FARC forms

The National Front instituted a limited democracy, one that was founded on exclusive bipartisan monopoly of the government, the autonomy of the military in the management of public order, and the centralization of state decisions in the executive office rather than in congress (Pizarro 1992). This resulted in intense military aggression under Guillermo León Valencia from 1962-1966 against the renegade peasant regions. The FARC’s roots lie in the peasant self-defense organizations of the 1930s.

At the beginning of the thirties, the agricultural workers who put into effect the Communist slogan of “the revolutionary taking of the land” by occupying the large estates and establishing agricultural settlements on public lands in several departments, employed self-defense to protect their conquests …Self-defense organizations, such as the

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40 For more on this period of Colombian history, see (Dix 1967).
“Guardia Roja,” the “Correo Rojo,” the Litigation Commissions effectively combined three fronts of struggle: defense against aggression, using arms if necessary; solidarity; and the search for “legal” solutions. (Modesto Campos 1975, 3)

The Communist party, working mainly in rural regions of Cundinamarca and Tolima organized self-defense groups in regions under attack. In 1955 under the Rojas Pinilla administration, the government stepped up violence in the Communist-influenced regions. The state responded to an alleged existence of “sixteen independent republics” (as these groups called themselves) and in 1964 began attacks. Militants from the zones that were affected by these state military offensives held a meeting in 1964 and began calling themselves the “Southern Bloc.” Two years later, at the 2nd National Conference of Guerrilla groups, the FARC was born (Pizarro 1992). The peasant leagues of the 1950s, operating in fixed areas became an armed movement that combined agrarian reform experiments with the organization and military experience of the Communist Party (Arenas 1985; FARC 1993).

As Murillo highlights, “nobody has held the exclusive franchise on political violence and the use of terror against civilians” (Murillo 2004, 44). Inspired by the leftist thought that infused Latin America during this period of Cold War rivalry, the FARC was not the only armed group to consolidate during this time. Two types of rebel groups developed during this era: agrarian communist and foquista (Pizarro 1992). Many of these groups were influenced by the Cuban Revolution and thus indoctrinated the local populations and communities from which they developed networks of resources. The National Liberation Army (ELN) officially formed in 1962, and began operating with minor terrorist acts in urban area but gained strength with bases in the rural regions of
Santander and Antioquia during the 1970s. The ELN traditionally operated in Aruaca, a department near the Colombian border with Venezuela in the northeast. The M-19 also developed during this period. This group, formed in 1974, was based primarily in urban areas and followed the example of the Montoneros in Argentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. After the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979, the M-19 reoriented its strategy toward the rural sectors. The group’s demise came shortly after it seized the Palace of Justice in 1985, an act that resulted in a strong reaction of Colombian armed force and the subsequent death numerous civilians, government officials and the group’s leadership. The M-19 was soon forced to demobilize (Safford and Palacios 2002).

The FARC Establishes Political Legitimacy

Some scholars of guerrilla movements organized during the 1960s point to insurgencies in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil as models that the Colombian groups sought to follow (Mario 2006). In contrast to the vanguard *foquista* guerrillas, inspired by Guevara and the Cuban revolution and starting among urban educated classes, the FARC had its origins in the peasantry and operated within an agrarian-communist framework. The FARC looked less to Cuba as it developed during its initial years in response to local situations where rural workers and small landholders came together to defend themselves against violence from the military and large landowners. Thus, the FARC began as a part of regional structure of social warfare, which highlighted individual as well as collective survival. As peasants cooperated for their

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41 See Safford and Palacios (2002) for more on the ELN and smaller and less-successful groups.
mutual defense, the FARC’s goal included the transformation of the State through political, economic, and social proposals that demand a broad system of protection for the lower classes (Ortiz 2002). Their intent was to mobilize the disaffected and the dispossessed population to form an alternative society (Manwaring 2002). The FARC relied on local resources – resources from the community – which shaped its responsive character in these years. The group’s relatively small to moderate size and its deep roots in its areas of operation meant that it did not need many resources to run this small group and that it had relatively easy access to resources in the peasant communities. According to Dudley (2004), the FARC became a ready replacement for the Colombian government particularly in frontier areas where the Colombian government had a slight presence. In areas where coca became the primary agricultural crop raised, the FARC established both a police and a judicial system. The state’s weakness where the FARC formed meant that it could act as the legitimate organizing body for peasants. For example, one of the FARC’s duties was to defend colonos and protect the subsistence economy of the peasants. According to one scholar, the group policed areas and investigated criminal activity and weapons possession. The rebel group also adjudicated disputes and social conflicts. The FARC polices areas under its control by investigating criminal activity and weapons possession. The rebel group was also reported to adjudicate disputes and social conflicts (Richani 2002). Alongside the Communist Party and agrarian organizations, the FARC became part of a structure of local power (Pizarro 1992). The FARC also focused on working with communities to create cooperatives and provide political education to the peasants (Mario 2006).
According to one man who joined the rebel group as a university student said FARC commanders saw his intellectual talents and made him a teacher.

They soon got him a small chalkboard, which he carried around with him wherever he went. When they stopped to rest...he would take the board out to give the peasant soldiers mini-lessons in math, science, English, and anything else he could remember from college. He also organized soldiers to perform plays and write poetry. (Dudley 2004, 62)

For these services, FARC imposed what the group called “progressive income tax.” According to Richani (2002), many poorer peasants were exempt from paying this tax. The rebel group also raised money by levying a tax on beer. The revenues were used to support schools and local community projects. Elected committees of locals oversaw the disbursement of the taxes collected. “The guerrillas punished drunks, adulterers, and murderers. They also protected villagers from aggressive drug traffickers and forbade the use of dangerously addictive coca derivatives. The FARC was becoming a virtual state…” (Dudley 2004, 52). It is thus clear that when the FARC began its foray into extracting resources from the drug industry, it was able to maintain – at least for a time – its contractual relationship with the local populations it represented in spite of its activities in this economic sector that is associated with rent-seeking and violence against local communities. The FARC also garnered attention and support in other countries. One high-level FARC official stated that some foreign governments have allowed the rebels to open political offices in their countries. Places such as Spain, Argentina, Mexico and Chile, among others helped the FARC in various ways (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002, 160).
While the FARC’s behavior and rhetoric was, in the earlier years, aligned with Marxism and Socialism, the group’s leadership made it clear that the forms of these political philosophies from Europe were not particularly replicable in Latin America, and in Colombia in particular. Rather, the FARC wanted to use socialist experiences of the Soviet Union and Cuba as a guideline but to develop their own system of governance (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002). Such declarations were also early warning signs that the FARC wanted independence from the PCC.

As evidenced by the history above and the data collected in the field (see figure 5.1 below), it is clear that the FARC limited violence and coercion against peasants during its earlier years. As will be explained in following pages, the rebel group even attempted to remain in a contractual relationship with peasant populations when it entered the drug industry. As FARC support grew, the group menaced the ruling parties. The FARC also made moves to become independent of the PCC. According to Dudley (2004) this was one reason for the FARC’s kidnapping industry. There is some indication that the FARC was kidnapping and holding people, in particular ranchers and large farmers, from early on in its history. However at the time it was doing so discriminately --- there was a financial strategy behind it. While such resources may be perceived to be illicit, they were at a lower level than the indiscriminate kidnapping that occurred in later years, and only targeted people who the insurgents and most of their supporters considered to be ideologically legitimate targets. Again, during the group’s formative years, much of its resources came from the local populations in which it operated in. Kidnapping has a long history in Colombia. During La Violencia, guerrillas
and bandits kidnapped people to pressure political rivals and to secure financing. The ELN and the M-19 ransomed business executives and wealthy landowners in order to extract hefty payments. Thus, to secure its independence and to further strengthen its movement, the FARC began to resort to kidnapping as well. The FARC was notorious for kidnapping Colombian state officials and others working with the Colombian state. One of the FARC’s first victims, for example, was a diplomat. Soon the group’s “retentions” included large estate owners and businesspeople. Though the PCC condemned such acts, the FARC formalized the practice of kidnapping for political reasons at its 6th Conference in 1978. The money from this strategy allowed the group to expand – even into urban areas.

As the FARC grew and began re-focusing its strategies, it posed a larger challenge to the state. The fact that powerful elites were at an ever-increasing risk of being kidnapped meant that state officials risked losing their patrons. Hence, the state began to heighten its counterinsurgency efforts. Following a harsh military campaign against Communist Party and the FARC in the early 1980s, President Betancur made efforts to explore a peace between the government and the rebels. The result was the 1984 Uribe Agreement, named after the municipality where it was signed. This marked a path for a ceasefire and the initiation of a peace process. The FARC agreed to condemn kidnapping, blackmail and terrorism, while Betancur promised that the state was willing to make continuous efforts to improve the education, health and employment levels for all Colombians (Dudley 2004). The Uribe Agreement gave the FARC a modicum of legitimacy by the Colombian government and allowed the group to
reorganize its political structure. Leaders of the group were recognized by the state as political actors, a status they had not been afforded under the PCC. One of the major effects of this agreement was the alienation of the PCC, for the FARC had not included the Party in its negotiations with the government (Dudley 2004). The divide between the PCC and the rebels was further widened when, as an effect of the agreement, the FARC formed a political wing called the Patriotic Union or *La Unión Patriótica* (International Crisis Group). This move was viewed by some in the PCC as a betrayal, as it signified the joining of mainstream capitalist politics and the loss of the socialist ideal upon which the group had founded itself. However, many more within the FARC saw the move as a political strategy, one that would allow the rebels to address peasant grievances not through violence but through negotiation and political processes.

The legitimacy accorded to the FARC by the Colombian state gave it the impetus to institute its political strategy and soon it extended its influence in urban areas of the country under the banner of the UP (*Unión Patriótica*). The party officially formed in 1985 by leaders Marulanda, Jacobo Arenas, Raúl Reyes, Alfonso Cano, Jaime Guaraca, and Timochenco and was made up of FARC, PCC and other left-wing representatives. This important step signified a turn in political events. With the creation of the UP the FARC appeared to enter mainstream politics. According to high-level commander Simon Trinidad, the formation of the UP was important because it allowed the group to draw up a strategic plan. Prior to this, he said, there had been plans drawn up regarding the group’s strategy to take power, but the strategic plan now defined in more detail the FARC’s tactics and military strategy (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon
2002, 115). Much of this expansion sprang from the Seventh Conference of the FARC of 1982 where the group’s leadership, under strategist Jacobo Arenas, decided to end the rebels’ isolation and move into the cities. For the first time in the history of the organization, the FARC produced a broad political plan to formulate a military strategy that would lead them to the capture of power. This would be done by combining military action with other strategies (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002) such as the creation of urban cells or an ejército del pueblo (army of the people) (Dudley 2004). The FARC became the FARC-EP.

The FARC entered the cities through the UP, establishing what it called Juntas Patrióticas – “solidarity cells” – small groups of followers who linked with organizing unions, student groups, and peasant leagues. Working for the UP, these cells were established to be specifically visible, advertising the rebel group’s ideas, organizing political rallies and recruiting new members. The rebels soon attracted another section of the urban class – students (Mario 2006). Those who joined the cells went into the barrios, talked to people about the problems they had, and thus gathered information on the political and social stances of the peasantry in the cities. As one FARC soldier explained, following the signing of the Uribe Agreement, he was ordered to begin creating patriotic cells supporting the UP. This soldier’s particular front toured villages and held meetings about the new political party.

…some locals were too frightened to speak to the rebels. At one house, I had to chase down an entire family that had scampered out the back door. At another small farm, I had to slowly approach a scared peasant farmer and offer him a smoke. The elderly man’s hand shook as he reached for the cigarette. ‘Don’t worry,’ I said, ‘We’re not here to collect a fee; we’re not
Between 1984 and 1988, the UP was quite successful. For example, the group did well at the polls, and several UP mayors were elected in FARC areas. As one UP member described, “We achieved the highest number of votes ever for a leftist party. We got more congressional reps than ever before. In less than a year, the UP got two leaders who had a national profile…” (Dudley 2004, 94). In 1986, the UP participated in elections, and obtained 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions, won 9 seats in the House and 6 seats in the Colombian senate. UP president Bernardo Jaramillo won a seat in the senate in 1990. The party in record time organized the Colombian left (the guerrillas, the popular forces, progressives and democrats, and regional sectors of the liberal and conservative parties). One important move accomplished, the UP was able to break the bipartisan consensus embodied in the two main political parties. However, such a move was threatening to the Colombian ruling parties. This provoked a violent reaction in more militaristic sectors of the Colombian oligarchy (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002, 116). It appeared that the UP’s time had expired.

Just as the UP entered the political arena – with impact – so did it leave politics. Between 1986 and 1990 more than 4,000 members of the UP and the Communist Party were assassinated (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002). The party’s first president, Jaime Pardo, was brutally murdered in 1987. That same year, 111 militants were known to have been killed. The following year the number rose to nearly 300. One large landowner alone in 1989 had 400 UP militants murdered. In the midst of grand successes, such as the election of 16 mayors and the 1990 election to the Colombian
senate, party members were quickly disappearing. When Bernardo Jaramillo took over as UP president following the death of Pardo, he was asked by one journalist how he thought he would die. “They’re going to kill me,” he responded without hesitation, “on any corner, at any moment. It could even be in my house. I know they’re going to kill me” (Dudley 2004, 128). During this time the government attempted to distance itself from the numerous assassinations and the decimation of the UP by saying it was the sole responsibility of the major drug traffickers, many of whom had begun to employ defense groups in the wake of FARC taxation and kidnappings (Restrepo 2001).

Following Bernardo Jaramillo’s death, there was a massive exodus from the Patriotic Union and it soon became clear that the party had been crushed (Dudley 2006). The annihilation of the UP signified the shutting of the political door for the FARC (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002), and gave those within the group the justification to focus more on the military strategy. In order to do this, it needed to drastically expand its resource base. The drug industry, which the FARC had already been involved in, gave the rebels resources in a relatively short period of time. As one Colombian military commander explained, the role of coca explains the consolidation of FARC fronts in Meta, Guaviare, and Caquetá. They gradually moved to frontier areas such as North Santander, Putumayo, and Urabá (Villamarin Pulido 1996). Some claim – and there is justification behind this – that the FARC moved fairly early to Urabá after consolidating in the Meta in order to have a complete corridor to the Caribbean for trafficking.

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42 Some claim that this is what FARC wanted. A defunct UP would show Colombians that only military insurrection would transform the country. A former UP member, “We [the UP] were the sacrificial battalion so [the FARC] could justify their war...We were the disposable ones” (Dudley 2004, 95).
purposes. The amount of resources the group extracted from local communities through contractual means was not enough to support this military expansion. The FARC needed more than the support of the people (Human rights lawyer 2006). The FARC thus became more heavily invested in the drug trade, going from collector of rents to trafficker. This process allowed the group to expand its arsenal and the number of fronts throughout the country (Dudley 2004). Map 5.2 depicts FARC the predominant areas of FARC operations in 2001. This includes the FARC’s demilitarized zone, or *zona de despeje*. By 2002, the Colombian government withdrew its support of a FARC demilitarized zone, and armed forces returned to the area. This state policy came on the heels of the US Congress’ approval of Plan Colombia.

*Coca, Los Campesinos and the FARC: The Intersection*

While the drug industry blossomed during the 1980s, the industry was not new to Colombia. Historians and others have noted the presence of coca and its importance as a cash crop since the 1500s (Priest 2006; Safford and Palacios 2002). Marijuana became the main cash crop during the 1970s in Colombia following a crisis in the cotton market. In fact, marijuana plantations received technical support from U.S. agronomists (Betancourt and Garcia 1994). Many large landowners shifted to producing marijuana and by 1974, nearly 80% of farmers in the area known as Guajira grew marijuana. The production and trafficking of cocaine moved heavily into Colombia when the U.S. put pressure on Bolivia and Peru to eradicate coca that had been grown there for centuries.
Cocaine production and trafficking began before the FARC was deeply involved in politics through the UP. This began to gather steam when the Colombian economy took a downturn. With the increase in industrial exports and manufactured goods along
with higher export taxes, Colombia’s major agricultural money-maker – coffee – declined. This agricultural depression especially affected peasant farmers. Many of them turned to growing coca. As Colombian became an important producer of coca, more and more peasants who had originally cultivated other crops moved to outlying regions of the country where the coca leaf was grown. “Workers who had lost their jobs because of commercial liberalization or because of the declining prices of coffee, wheat, or barley also found employment on the drug frontier” (Safford and Palacios 2002, 316). While some moved to the coca frontier attracted by the opportunity, others came to Meta, Caquetá and Putumayo because of insufficient land elsewhere. For these migrants coca was the most lucrative crop at this time. The rebel group soon realized that – with its desire to expand its military forces – it could no longer ignore such an expeditious source of funding. The rebels officially became involved in the industry in 1982 when, at the 7th Conference of the FARC, they resolved to establish ties with the cocaine trade. At the time the rebel group claimed that it would provide them with the resources necessary to create a “true democracy” (Jane's Information Group 2001; Kovaleski 1999; Leech 2000; Molano 2000).

As has been emphasized in the preceding pages, the FARC’s involvement with the drug industry initially was as collector of rents. Moreover, the “official” nature of its collective decision to do this highlights the organized and self-regulated character of its behavior. These were not competitive warlords, driven by desires of personal gain to get involved in drug trafficking. In the richest coca-producing regions, the FARC secured a stable economic foundation for the peasant by regulating market relations and prices.
As more traffickers flooded into the region, the FARC struck a deal with them – pay taxes and the rebels would leave business alone. The FARC taxed all parts of the business. They taxed each cocaine shipment, the protection of each shipment, another tax for use of the jungle to establish a lab, and still another to use the land as a runway to take the product out (Dudley 2004). The group forced the narco-traffickers to pay the peasants the market price of coca leaves, and they provided financial and technical assistance and protection to colonos (Marks 2001). FARC commander Yazid Arteta claimed that the group urged peasants to set aside portion of their land for raising food and to keep only a section of the land for growing coca (Richani 2002).43 Where the FARC influence was strongest, it protected the peasant economy by battling the large landowners and what it labeled the “narco-bourgeoisie,” prohibiting them from expanding their holdings at the expense of the colonos (Gonzalez et al. 1998). With such market stability and protection, the FARC made it possible for those living within the subsistence economy to join international markets with little personal economic disorder compared with the experience of those who were subjected to the legal economy’s market forces (Human rights lawyer 2006; Richani 2002). The economic circumstances of the peasants, the increase in weaponry due to the influx of funding from taxes, and the weakness of the state in these regions played an important role in determining the place the rebels had in these zones. Their economic and military strength allowed the FARC to secure positions of power in the rural regions.

They extended services in the areas of credit, education

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43 Richani reported that he interviewed Arteta, one of the highest ranking FARC commanders in captivity. See Richani (2002) Appendix, p.174.
health, justice, registry, public works and ecological and cultural program. Consequently, the insurrectionaries not only were the recognized local government but also were a civilizing agent in an environment that otherwise would have been, as one local priest put it, a “veritable vortex.” (Molano 1992, 214)

Richani (2002) implies that the group was nearly forced to join the coca trade because the peasants turned to it as a result of the downturn in the agriculture sector and the structural adjustments placed on them for legal crops. In protecting its peasant base of support, the FARC was obliged to support the peasants’ shift to illicit agriculture as a supplementary income. Thus, in his interpretation, the FARC – with its limited resources – still needed to manage peasants in areas under its control. According to Richani, this in turn transformed the dynamic of the conflict, adding dimensions of organized crime and getting the government and self-defense forces involved. Richani points to these factors as the cause for the increase in the war’s violence.

Others argue that the FARC, under orders from the Communist Party, initially denounced drug trafficking (Dudley 2004). However, when the group began to break away from the Party, it needed the income from coca to finance its expanded military strategy. The group’s involvement in the coca-producing and trafficking industry facilitated a huge growth in its forces from approximately 2,000 in 1982 to more than 18,000 soldiers by 2001 (Rabassa and Chalk 2001). These interpretations could both be correct for the two views are not necessarily incompatible. The FARC’s estimated budget for expanding its force to 18,000 was approximately $56 million (Vargas 1994), enabling it to go from 27 fronts in 1989 to 60 fronts by 1999 (FARC 1989). Dudley (2006) claimed that members of the FARC purposely chose the military and drug route
as opposed to the political one because it would be more lucrative. “The political thing
didn’t work,” Dudley told the author, “war works.” However, the argument put forth in this
project implies that despite the nature of a few in the leadership of the organization, the
behavior exhibited in recent years by the rebels is a result not of these few “greedy”
members but of external forces – namely the presence of significant rivals, be they
other rebel groups, the military or the local community organizations or the state. In the
same interview, Dudley seemed to imply as much when he said “the FARC is like an
animal stuck in a corner” (Dudley 2006).

As described earlier, the FARC formally declared its involvement in the drug
industry in 1982. During the 1980s, the group developed a deep involvement in this
trade. Narco-traffickers establishing niches in the FARC-controlled areas settled under
the influence of the rebel group. The government, under pressure from foreigners to
eradicate the trafficking of coca, first fought the drug industry. The drug industry in turn
looked to the rebels for security (Mario 2006). They were obliged to accept rebel
conditions. These conditions included a monopoly of arms by the FARC and of course
the payment of taxes, which meant the acceptance of rebel authority in the region
(Molano 1992). However, the agreement between the FARC and the cartels soon
turned sour as leaders in the drug trade became weary of paying rising protection taxes
(Dudley 2004). Furthermore, as the FARC presence grew in areas such as Montes de
Maria in the north of the country, they began to kidnap drug traffickers and large
landowners. However, during the 1980s the FARC began to kidnap the relatives of drug
traffickers. In response the traffickers created and financed a group called MAS –
Muerto a los Secuestreros (Death to Kidnappers). Working closely with the military, MAS struck back at the rebels and anyone suspected of associating or sympathizing with them (Guillermoprieto 2001). MAS and other similar groups grew into what became the paramilitary forces, which have worked with the Colombian armed forces to fight the rebels (Human rights lawyer 2006).

5.3 Las Paras and the FARC

The origin of paramilitary groups in Colombia dates back to 1965 and 1968 when Decree 3398 and then Law 48 provided for the legal basis for the creation of civil defense organizations. These laws sprang from the Cold War counterinsurgency doctrines employed by the U.S. in its School of the Americas, which required a mixture of military, paramilitary, political, psychological, and economic resources to fight insurgent groups. Like many Latin American countries allied with the U.S. during the Cold War, Colombia incorporated this doctrine into its national military strategies.

The growth of the paramilitaries (paras) during the 1980s was an outcome of the Colombian military, ranchers, landowners, and drug traffickers’ counter-insurgency strategy during the Betancur administration. The decisions of these various parties to take up arms demonstrated the lack of state capacity in the rural regions during this period. It also suggests fear on the part of the drug-traffickers and landowners that the FARC’s involvement in the drug industry was threatening not only the cartel’s profits, but the individual profits of state and military officials as well (Molano 1992). The paras were organized to stop them. Paramilitary units developed in several departments of the country. Several units were led by Fidel and (later) Carlos Castaño whose motivations
were not purely financial. These two brothers wanted to exact revenge for the kidnapping and murder of their father by the FARC family (Richani 2002).\textsuperscript{44} The paramilitaries enjoyed the support and training of various western states, including Israel and the U.S. However, most of their resources came from the narco-traffickers who were in a prime position to direct these groups because of their relative autonomy and financial independence from the central government (Richani 2002).

Paramilitaries have worked in collusion with the Colombian military, local government officials and the police, who have been listed on their payroll. Evidence of this appears in testimonies of local civilians and NGO leaders to the author and has been further confirmed by news reports and human rights groups. A Human Rights Watch report maintains that military officers were on the payroll of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and received salaries based on rank (Human Rights Watch 2001c). In 2006, several members of Colombia’s Congress were implicated as having ties to the paramilitaries (Forero 2006). During numerous interviews by the author in October 2006 individuals displaced by the war stated that they feared reporting their circumstances to local authorities because police and other officials were under the control of the paras. Human rights organizations confirm this and it is reported in the U.N. State of the World’s Refugees 2006. Many displaced do not register for fear of being attacked, stigmatized or displaced again (UNHCR 2006). The collusion between the Colombian military and the paras has been well-established. In 1995, for example, the Castaño units issued a manifesto that declared their support of the military in their

\textsuperscript{44} For an account of the development of paramilitaries in Cordoba and Uraba, see (Garcia 1996; Ramirez Tabon 1997).
fight against the rebels. The document stated that the paramilitaries received logistical and material support from the armed forces along with some large landowners, cattle ranchers and businesses (Richani 2002, note 28, page 194) “Many high-ranking military officers are collaborating and fomenting paramilitarism” one scholar writes (Richani 2002, 103). This collaboration has a clear rationale. With the paramilitaries doing the “dirty work” it would make it possible for the military to disclaim responsibility. As long as the paramilitaries fight the Colombian state’s enemy, there is little interest for the military in battling the rebels themselves. The armed forces have followed with a clear statement of disapproval at these links. Captain Garcia –Marquez, the newly appointed head of the Navy in Cartagena reiterated this. “The AUC,” he said, “was legal originally, but it degenerated. Any person in the military with connections to the AUC is thus illegal” (Garcia-Marquez 2006).

Fueled by a vast source of resources, the AUC set out to extinguish the guerrilla threat in the country. The AUC is made up of semi-autonomous self-defense groups with regional alliances, although some argue that there is a central authority that plans national coordinated strategies against groups such as the FARC (Manwaring 2002).45 During the late 1980s, these units spread around the countryside. In 1987, the minister of government claimed that there were at least 140 AUC units (Safford and Palacios 2002). In 1996, Castaño claimed the AUC included 2,000 armed fighters (Human Rights Watch 2001c). By 2000 he claimed the number had risen to 11,2000, an increase of

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45 The line between AUC and paramilitary is not distinct. In the paramilitary demobilization process of late, all the groups are referred alternately as both AUC and paras. As it was explained to the author, when the AUC ceases to protect a group of landowners or drug traffickers and joins the Colombian armed forces, it is then that it becomes the paramilitary (Interview with author 2006a).
460% in only four years (Arizmendi 2000). In 2001 they were estimated to have an armed presence in 40% of Colombian municipalities and it is reported that over 70% of their resources comes from the drug industry (Safford 2006).

Paramilitaries infiltrate local functionaries, bribe them and subordinate them to their own plans (Rangel 2005). They influence politics using violence and intimidation and by replacing local officials (Manwaring 2002). They also station themselves throughout the rural areas to maintain control over those going in and out of areas. Forces acting under the moniker “AUC” maintain numerous bases and roadblocks throughout the Colombian countryside.

They move with apparent ease. They employ faxes, the Internet, sport utility vehicles and pick-up trucks, radios, helicopters, laptops, and cellular and satellite telephones to disseminate threats, identify targets, prepare death lists, and coordinate massacres (Human Rights Watch 2001c, 15).

Like the FARC, the paras aim to expand their control of local governments throughout the country. However, unlike the rebels, the paramilitaries espouse no political or social ideology other than to protect incumbent political power. These groups’ common goal is to stop the guerrillas (with a particular focus on the FARC) from developing its politico-military project (Rangel 2005). Soon after the entrance of the paras into the Colombian conflict, it became clear that these counter-insurgency groups did not aim merely to annihilate the FARC. Rather, as one author writes, they wanted “to kill the entire idea that the enemy could exist” (Dudley 2004).

The impact of the paras has been extensive, both for Colombian rural society and for the rebels. The paramilitaries have reportedly killed more than two times as
many civilians in attacks as have the rebels, and more than three fourths of these killings were conducted during massacres (Restrepo et al. 2005). In February 2001, in the village of Chengue, the paramilitaries marched into the village and pulled the men into the main square. “Then, one by one, they killed the men by crushing their heads with heavy stones and a sledgehammer” (Wilson 2001, 14). Between 1998 and 2002 the paramilitaries became one of the most well-stocked and largest non-state armed groups in the world. They use US-made weapons such as the AR-15 assault rifle and the M60 machine gun. They have been able to accumulate large amounts of ammunition and have demonstrated correspondingly low firing discipline (Spagat 2007).

The AUC entered into peace talks with the government in July 2003, under the pretext that it would disarm over the coming years. However, rather than decreasing, the paramilitaries have grown in strength (McDermott 2002). Furthermore, they have evidence that paramilitary groups continue to form in areas where demobilization has taken place (Center for International Policy 2006). Their finances, the majority from the trafficking of drugs, have also increased sharply. One explanation for this is that prior to the negotiated amnesty, the paras exported massive quantities of stockpiled cocaine, knowing that what was sold prior to the start of the amnesty with the government would be pardoned (Mondragon 2007). However, much of this has gone unheeded by the Colombian government. Another reason for the huge rise in paramilitary forces in recent years has been the links to the Colombian military and the financing by business interests and large landowners who are tired of the threats the FARC have imposed (McDermott 2002). One of the greatest potential sources of paramilitary funding is a
U.S.-backed anti-terrorist, anti-drug campaign known as “Plan Colombia.” This plan, established in 1999 under the Clinton administration, is a “pro-democracy” drug-war package from the U.S. to Colombia with the main objective to fight drug trafficking. Funds from the package were largely dedicated to strengthening the armed services, the main source of support for the paramilitaries throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Aviles 2006, 401). With the money earmarked for Plan Colombia, the George W. Bush administration expanded the package’s goal to defeating the rebels. The Bush administration justified this component by calling it a method of fighting “narco-terrorism” (Mondragon 2007). Since 2000, nearly $4.7 billion has been given to Colombia to fund the war on terror and drugs. Much of this money goes to bolster the Colombian military in its fight against the rebels. However, with links between the military and the paras clearly established, it is inevitable that some of thus money finds its way into AUC hands. Foreign companies operating in Colombia also contribute to the funding of the paramilitaries. For example, the Cincinnati-based Chiquita, the banana producer, admitted to paying illegal armed groups in Colombia for security purposes. US court documents indicate that the justice department had known about the Chiquita-paramilitary link since April 2003, yet the banana growers had been able to continue payments for another ten months (Al Jazeera 2007).

The paramilitaries’ political power has been reflected in the 2005 “Justice and Peace Law,” passed by the Colombian government, which – after earlier failed attempts at demobilizing – called once more for these groups’ to hand in their weapons. This agreement between the AUC and the government places time limits on prosecuting
individuals, pronounces lighter sentences to those paramilitaries than are charged in court, and blocks extradition for those who are wanted by the US. This law was backed by the Bush administration despite the numerous extradition requests that were pending with the US Justice Department, and which were made void. This left paramilitary drug traders immune while FARC leaders continued to be extradited and charged in the US on trafficking charges. The *para* immunity increased the militia’s strength, heightening the level of competition between them and the rebels.

*The FARC Shifts Behavior toward Noncombatants*

With the arrival of the paramilitary forces and the added complexity this lent to the conflict, something in the dynamic was bound to change. During the late 1990s, the FARC began to shift its tactics in dealing with the local populations. This transformation in behavior took place around the time that the SPLA in Southern Sudan and the PKK in Turkey shifted its treatment of locals from coercive to contractual. Meanwhile, the FARC, the strategy went from contractual to increasingly coercive.

Information in human rights reports and data collected by the author in the field confirm that major changes occurred in the FARC’s treatment of noncombatants. In 2000 several human rights groups reported that the FARC killed 496 civilians nationwide (*Centro de Investigacion y Educacion Popular* 2001), employing methods that resulted in avoidable civilian casualties. Witnesses reported that in March 1999, the FARC left a town in Antioquia in virtual ruin and were responsible for numerous human casualties. According to witnesses, 21 police were executed by the FARC, several of whom had sought medical assistance at a local hospital (*Human Rights Watch* 2000).
Researchers at the CERAC in Bogotá confirm that the FARC engaged in a wide variety of activities, including the intimidation of civilians. In 2003 and 2004, the rebels surpassed the paramilitaries in this (NGO representatives 2006; Priest 2006; Restrepo et al. 2005). Figure 5.1 displays data collected on one-sided violence perpetrated by the FARC between 1994 and 2005. While the numbers are estimates, and thus are quite low, the figure demonstrates the relative pattern of behavior the group has exhibited toward civilians. As this chapter has suggested, the FARC has displayed increasingly coercive behavior toward civilians. The FARC has been responsible for repeated breaches of international humanitarian law, including killing civilians and kidnapping. For example, in June of 2004, the FARC killed 34 coca gatherers in the Northern Department of Santander (Amnesty International 2005). The FARC has dismissed such claims, arguing that international humanitarian law is “a bourgeois concept” (Human Rights Watch 2000).

Not only have the FARC increased their coercive behavior toward local populations, they have done so indiscriminately and disproportionately. On September 19, 2004 four civilians were reportedly killed and 17 others were injured, including 10 children, when the FARC detonated a mine and opened fire on a civilian vehicle in the San Carlos Municipality in Antioquia (Amnesty International 2005). According to one witness in a local village, the paramilitaries and the FARC took turns committing

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46 These include Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 covers internal armed conflicts. Protocol II applies when forces in such an internal conflict are situated under a central command, exercise control over an area such that they can execute sustained and coordinated military operations, and forces that have the ability to implement Protocol II (Human Rights Watch 2001b).
massacres to “see who was the best artist” (Human rights lawyer 2006). The FARC, one farmer said, traveled through villages and towns, burning and killing people, without even the use of guns (Campesino 2006). In the early years, one local claimed, the FARC were comparable to a state, protecting people. However, as the group began to gain power, it got caught in the dynamic of war (Human rights lawyer 2006). It is this “dynamic” – namely the presence of paramilitary forces and the subsequent threat to the FARC’s resources and survival – that has transformed the group’s behavior toward local populations.
The FARC has not only transformed its direct behavior toward those it is purports to represent, it also changed its former juridical process involving the way misconduct is handled. As opposed to the FARC’s former persecution of misconduct, particularly in interactions with civilians, several civilians indicated that this was no longer put into practice. Furthermore, the FARC reportedly does not allow independent judges or prosecutors, and has rigid control over the local media in the areas under their command (Policzer 2005). FARC officials scrutinize these judges’ actions, and impose control in areas in which they operate through kidnappings or assassinations (Kirk 2001).

Members of the FARC have, in the past, denounced the forced recruitment of children for use in soldiering. According to Article 38 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is a violation of human rights to recruit children less than 15 years of age (United Nations 1989). Victims of the FARC have been forcibly recruited as well. In 2000, the office of the Public Advocate reported 16 cases of missing persons, either forcibly recruited, killed by the FARC, or forced to flee from their homes (Human Rights Watch 2000). The guerrillas, as well as the paramilitaries, use children in urban areas as informants. For example, gang members in a particularly poor area of Cartagena called La Popa are paid by the rebels to be informants. The ages of these individuals range from 14 to 22 years of age (NGO representative 2006; Interview with author 2006b). A 2006 news article claims that children as young as eight-years-old continue to be recruited by the rebels. Children, it states, are occasionally forced to join the ranks of the rebels, but some are attracted to the status
of wearing a uniform and carrying a weapon. Female children suffer the most abuse, with over half reporting that they are raped or forced to have sexual relations with other soldiers, often commanders. Furthermore, like the conflicts of Western Africa, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, these children are used to carry out violent acts, including killing, mutilation and torture (McDermott 2006). However, the FARC has attested to its voluntary nature. “The FARC-EP is comprised of combatants that consciously join the armed struggle” (Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramon 2002, 75).

The FARC’s kidnapping patterns have also shifted. Whereas before the rebels targeted high-level Colombian officials, diplomats and industry specialists such as oil workers, they are increasingly indiscriminate about whom they take, as evidenced by the story at the beginning of this chapter (Carmen 2006). The FARC has established a pattern of kidnapping civilians suspected of supporting the paras. According to Human Rights Watch, these abductions vary from those carried out for purely financial reasons in that they are usually not broadcast or made known (Human Rights Watch 2001b).

5.5 Explaining the FARC’s Transformation

What is behind the dramatic transformation in the FARC’s treatment of noncombatants? Some suggest that the FARC’s turn in behavior is due to the illicit industry (drugs) in which it became involved. With the arrival of increased coca cultivation in the 1990s, much of it taxed by guerrillas, Putumayo had become an important strategic and financial bulwark for the FARC-EP that paramilitaries sought to
make their own (CINEP 2000; Human Rights Watch 2001c). In this sense, the change seen in the FARC is a result of the type of industry it became invested in – the drug trade. As one local civilian told the author, the guerrillas have become profit-oriented, and those that joined during the later years did so merely for money. This statement supports Weinstein’s (2006) argument. The incentives to join the FARC today would mean that rebel soldiers fight for material reasons rather than ideological ones. Weinstein falls short, however, in explaining the earlier shift in behavior of the rebels toward civilians because his theory views resources to be constant. In the case of the FARC, resources clearly changed over time. One aspect that coincides with Weinstein’s thesis is that when the paramilitaries began to offer more money to their soldiers, many of these individuals who had joined for the economic incentives defected to the AUC (Confidential source 2006). According to Weinstein’s thesis, the coercive behavior displayed by the FARC is a reflection of attracting these opportunists. These individuals begin to shape the group’s strategies. However, the data presented in this study characterizes the FARC as the most hierarchically organized groups among the cases presented here. It would be unlikely that the entire group would change its tactics as a result of opportunists. Furthermore, these individuals would soon leave the FARC and go elsewhere since the AUC offers so much more.

Some (see Restrepo 2005) maintain that the FARC’s behavior stems from its increasing desperation. Researchers in Colombia maintain that “the increasing number

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47 According to the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Putumayo has Colombia’s largest registered number of plots dedicated to the cultivation of coca (Human Rights Watch 2001c; Vicepresidencia de la República 2000).
of civilian injuries from bombs and mines reveals a progressively more indiscriminate, terrorizing FARC” (Restrepo et al. 2005, 18), one that reveals that the rebel group is desperate. Others claim it is a lack of communication with locals that has caused this shift in the FARC’s behavior. The people have less communication with the FARC now and so the people are not aware of their intentions. People do not want to be seen communicating with the guerrillas in fear of retribution from the paras (Mario 2006) and vice versa. However, neither of these claims fully explains the rebels’ behavior toward noncombatants. The former is not a systematic statement that explains the rebel group’s behavior, nor does it explain why the FARC is more desperate today than it was years ago when they did not have either the manpower or the resources to carry out their activities. The latter – the lack of communication – does not account for the increase in technology in recent years and the improvement in communication the rebels have at their disposal such as cell phones, satellite phones, internet, etc. These were not available at the FARC’s inception and if anything would increase the group’s ability to communicate with locals. Furthermore, as the FARC is spread out, increasing their fronts and resource bases, one would expect that they would be in even more contact with locals.

It is the fear of retribution among civilians that points to a serious threat to the FARC resource base and survival. This threat is the paramilitaries. With the decision to expand its military strategy, particularly following the annihilation of the UP and its political ventures, the FARC was struck with an immediate need for a higher level of resources than it had been receiving merely by taxing peasants. It thus faced an
effective counterinsurgency strategy on the part of the paras, especially the AUC. This meant that it had to contend quite strongly for the support of local people. The violence enacted by the paras was effective at preventing supporters from acting on their loyalties, and forced the FARC to find other ways of asserting political primacy in these areas. Hence, the FARC entered into the drug industry and – for a time – was able to maintain their contractual relationship with the local peasant populations. As indicated in the preceding pages, the rebels continued to look after the civilians, protecting them and their crops from drug-traffickers, making sure peasants set aside some of their agricultural lots for subsistence farming. However, now that peasants could not freely support the FARC, these resources had to be sought through other channels. The point here is that it is not illicit drug trafficking that caused the FARC to change its behavior. Instead, it is that these resources had to be sought in competition with other armed groups in the area. FARC could no longer take advantage of a relative absence of state authority to set up a parallel political structure. Now the state – or more accurately, the social groups that were dominant parts of a ruling elite coalition – contended directly for power in these places. This happened when FARC became a viable threat to many of the large landowners, who included the cartels. The incidence of kidnapping increased among these high-profile individuals, and furthermore the rebels threatened those individuals involved in the drug trade by taking profits. As those involved also included state officials, elites and business owners with substantial political power, these groups colluded for a way to get rid of the FARC. It was for this purpose that the AUC was born and soon grew in strength. It was at this time that the FARC began to change its
behavior toward civilians. The addition of the paramilitaries acted as the causal mechanism for the FARC’s transformation from contractual to coercive.

Why, with the onset of a substantial rival, did the FARC become highly coercive toward noncombatants? First, with rivals such as the paramilitaries, the FARC’s thinking shifted to the short-term; not only were they trying to achieve their military objectives, but with the onset of the paras the rebels’ survival moved to the forefront of its concerns. Resources were needed as quickly as possible, peasants were no longer in positions to supply them willingly (or at least without excessive coercion or fear of retribution from outsiders) and the fastest way to acquire resources – particularly if a group is only considering the short-term – is to take them forcibly. This explains why several civilians interviewed described the FARC’s more recent behavior as “indiscriminate”. As one local told the author, the FARC is coercive when it loses the upper hand (Dudley 2006), which is consistent with the pattern that we have seen in previous cases in this study. This was demonstrated in the events that occurred in the village of ____ in 2000. The author interviewed several of the village members who had been victim to numerous atrocities at the hands of both the paras and the FARC. At the time of the interview, people were slowly returning to the village. Only the men – the heads of six families – had returned to farm the land full-time. The women and children remained in the nearest city in fear of the return of the rebels or the paramilitaries and the landmines laid down by both groups of armed actors (Campesino 2006). According to one member of this village, the guerrilla presence in the area decreased because the paras left. The FARC first came to the area in 1995, he recalled. The rebels, he said,
were disciplined and actually helped the villagers. They had a discourse that was characteristically helpful. After a time, the guerrillas stopped investigating human rights abuses; they no longer bothered to find out who was on what side of the war; they just killed without asking questions. The change, the man explains, is due to the presence of the paramilitaries. The presence of the paras made it necessary for the FARC to defend itself and its resources (Campesino 2006). A woman from the same region said much the same. The FARC, in the mid-1990s in Montes de Maria, were disciplined. The group investigated human rights abuses. Things changed, however, when the paramilitaries arrived. As she sees it, the FARC uses people in the war. The two main groups fight and the locals are caught in the middle (Pastora Maria 2006). A local priest stated that when the paramilitaries moved into the northern departments, one could distinguish between the different armed actors because they had different modes of operandi. Now, he continued, the various groups are looking more similar (Priest 2006).

The case of the FARC, however, points to a nuance in this theory of coercive behavior and rival existence. If the presence of rivals is what instigates coercive behavior toward noncombatants, why did the FARC not become coercive with the presence of other groups such as the ELN and the M-19 in the 1960s and 1970s? Upon first glance, this appears to be a counterfactual, though by referring to the case study, the reasons for this behavior become clearer. It appears that in this case, the differences and similarities between these various groups did not initiate an intense rivalry. The ELN, the M-19 and the FARC were all fighting the same enemy – the Colombian state – and hence did not clash ideologically. Also, these three groups did
not begin in the same regions of the country. The M-19 was based largely in urban areas and the ELN began in the northeastern region. The FARC first developed a base in Tolima. Thus they did not compete to control the political allegiances and resources of the same individuals or communities.

It also appears that the three rebel groups had an unwritten agreement to maintain their boundaries, which probably was very important in terms of limiting intra-insurgent fighting and factional splits. In Aruaca, a region in the north of the country, the locals claimed to have seen the ELN moving in and out of villages. As one local stated, the villagers were not bothered by the rebels and the group even organized water cooperatives (Carmen 2006). In the 1990s the FARC moved in and while there were some minor conflicts, there was nothing that severely affected the locals. There appears, then, to have been at a minimum coordination and at a maximum cooperation between these groups preceding the 1990s, which begs the question: why would rebel groups cooperate with one another? This question necessitates further study and additional pages, as it suggests further areas for rebel group research.

From 1999-2000, the paramilitaries began to move into the region and subsequently violence against civilians increased. The FARC and the ELN now engage in armed conflict with one another, an occurrence that one local civilian claims is not normal (Confidential source 2006). In the past, if there was a problem between the groups, the rebels worked it out and did not involve the locals (Pastora Maria 2006). It also is likely that this cooperation between groups contained faction splits within the groups, as clearly delineated spheres would have decreased chances that adventurous
commanders could call upon rival groups to support them in their ambitions within a particular insurgency. Thus one did not see the kinds of factional splits associated with more coercive strategies vis-à-vis locals that appeared in the SPLA and PKK cases.

While the action in this causal process lies mainly in the onset of the paramilitaries, the need for and type of resources the FARC extracted also played a role in the course of the group’s transformation. Clearly the need for resources impacted the FARC’s strategy, particularly following the extinction of the UP. As figure above demonstrates, this led the group to a very specific and highly profitable industry that allowed them to acquire resources swiftly. The drug industry is an illicit one; it is an environment with its own norms that is more prone to acts of violence than other types of extraction. While it was not the involvement in the drug industry per say that affected the type of behavior the FARC engaged in, it did affect the type and strength of the other actors involved. It was the arrival of the paramilitaries that was mechanism for change for the FARC.

**Analyzing the FARC using QCA**

With the data collected in the field and the analysis performed through the process tracing above, we can separate the FARC in to three periods of time: FARC1 begins with its formation in 1966. As evidenced by the empirical data, this was a time when the FARC had little rivals in the sense that they alone extracted resources from the peasants they represented. While other movements like the ELN and the M-19 operated around this time, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, evidence points to low levels of coercion as a result of their interactions. Also at this time, resources were
extracted mainly from the local communities from whom the FARC drew support. The FARC’s level of need during this period did not change significantly; it was in its earliest stages and relied largely on resources from the peasant population. While it was indeed an armed group, it did address the politics of its goals, particularly while partnered with the PCC. FARC1 ended with the annihilation of the political party, the UP. FARC2 begins with the expansion in its military strategy. This necessitated a large amount of resources, and thus need increased exponentially. The FARC took advantage of the financial windfall that drug trafficking brought to many of the areas they controlled. This period is relatively short, and though marked by the absence of significant rivals, it ends with the entrance of the paramilitaries. The third case, FARC3, begins here. The paramilitaries, with support from both the Colombian government and the cartels and large landowners, expand their forces and increase their weapons capabilities. This creates a situation of strong rivalry between the FARC and the paras. FARC3’s need for resources remains high as it tackles its expansion and finds it must fight a strong opponent. Monies and resources from the drug industry bring in the most support for this.

Table 5.1 Crisp-Set Representation of FARC Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARC1: 1966 – annihilation of UP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2: Late 1980s – formation of AUC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3: Presence of AUC – today</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By recoding the variables with fuzzy-set scores, however, the subtle differences between variables and cases become apparent. These were hidden within the dichotomous scoring of the crisp-sets.

Table 5.2 Fuzzy-Set Representation of FARC Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARC1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we recall from the chapter, the early FARC, FARC1, had few if any rivals and is scored at “0”. While several other revolutionary groups developed during this time, they did so in areas far away. There was no great need for resources because, with few rivals and thus a developing contractual relationship with the locals, the early years of the FARC saw a steady supply of materials and soldiers from supporting peasant communities. Resources, then, were not illicit and given a “0” for this variable. This is not to suggest that resources were not scarce. Rather, it refers to the amount of resources needed at the time and the strategic behavior of the group. There is always some need for resources, though because there was no great change in FARC1’s strategy (no political or military expansion in the early years) the need was not great, and the variable is scored at “0.25”.

FARC2’s contractual outcome of “0.25” reflects the rebel group’s behavior during the brief period when it became involved in the drug industry, mainly through taxing
cartel owners and other traffickers, and before the paramilitaries were a viable threat. The group’s need for resources had quickly increased following the adoption of a more military-focused strategy, which explains the score of “1.0” for this variable. While use of illicit resources is scored at “1.0”, the FARC was able to remain contractual specifically because the paras had not fully developed; the FARC’s resource pool was not yet severely threatened. The large landowners and drug traffickers, however, were quickly becoming frustrated with the rebel group’s practices, and thus signify a minor threat – one that, as the text relates, developed into a major rival in the form of the paras. “Rivals” is therefore given a score of “0.25”. By examining the empirical data, however, we can see here that there may be a relationship between the type of resources and the onset of rivals. The illicit nature of drug trafficking is more likely than other types of resource extraction to create competition due to the large amounts of money that can be made. The competition created by the FARC once it joined the trafficking industry spurred a response from cartel owners and other Colombian elites that took the form of the AUC. It was in turn this rivalry that moved the FARC to adopt more coercive behavior. The group could no longer retain its contractual relationship with locals because its resources were being threatened. As a result, the FARC’s time horizons changed to the short-term. In such circumstances, when a rebel group has short-term time horizons and is under attack from rival groups, the most efficient and quickest way to obtain resources is by force.

The last case of the FARC, FARC3, shows the most coercive point in the group’s history. Not only are the paramilitaries a severe threat to the group’s resource pool, the
other rebel groups such as the ELN pose minor threats. The presence of rivals is therefore a “1.0”. Need for resources remains high, though it is given a score of “0.75” because while intense competition for resources exists, there has not been a sudden shift in strategy that necessitates a major influx of materials. FARC almost explicitly uses illicit resources, either from forcibly taking resources from locals or through the drug industry. This variable is also scored at “1.0”. The group’s behavior is highly coercive – a “1.0”.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how one rebel group shifted its behavior toward civilians from being highly contractual, to ending up extremely coercive. The analysis of the text and the three separate cases that make up the FARC reveals several key points. First, in this chapter we find a change in the “use of illicit resources” variable. Unlike other studies (Weinstein 2006) where resources are held constant, here we see that the role this variable plays in shaping insurgents’ strategies can actually shift over time. That is to say, insurgents shift time horizons not according to the difficulty or ease of claiming resources, but rather according to whether they have political space to maintain a monopoly on resource extraction with relative ease or have to compete desperately to do this. This lends my version of the “resource” argument that incorporates the monopoly over resource extraction and the subsequent political control more leverage. It also indicates that some insurgents start with a predisposition to pursue political and ideological goals, but can be forced away from this path. Moreover, the changing patterns of behavior in this and other cases suggest that illicit resource
trafficking is not necessarily an obstacle to shifting toward a more contractual path, provided the shift in effort required to assert that the monopoly over resources shifts, too. As shown in the previous chapter, the PKK was able to shift to more friendly relations with locals while exploiting illicit types of resources.

This chapter has shows that groups can – at least for a time – operate contractually with locals while using illicit resources, though in some cases this does not seem to be a lasting condition. Where we saw in the PKK cases, the group was relatively consistent in its exploitation of illicit resources to fund its operation and did, for several years, maintain a contractual relationship with other Kurds. However the FARC was not able to maintain its contractual relationship with locals while at the same time managing the threat from the paramilitary forces.

Finally, the FARC displays what at first appears to be an anomaly – the existence of several groups not displaying coercive behavior and operating at the same. Specifically, the ELN, the M19, and the FARC began during a similar period of time and operated throughout the country. Later, at times, these groups came into contact with one another, though they remained for the most part contractual toward local communities. This raises the issue that the type of group may matter, for it seems some groups can at the most cooperate, and at a minimum operate in the same areas without exhibiting coercion toward civilians. What does this mean? Do groups fighting the same enemy necessarily exhibit less coercive behavior when in the same regions? Is ideology a factor? Or is it merely the fact that these groups are not extracting from the same pool of resources. One needs to look to see if they are extracting from the same resource
pool. If they are not, this further supports my argument. It may also point to the existence of different types of groups – and that their threat levels towards others can change over time.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Contemporary insurgents appear to be an especially self-interested lot. Massive refugee flows in recent conflicts suggest that they are more prone to loot communities than they are to mobilize followers and administer liberated zones.

Reno 2004

It really is significant that even two years in there hasn’t been anything like any kind of political ideology or political spokesman or political wing emerging. It really is a nihilistic insurgency.

…there’s a name for these guys: Losers.

Steven Metz and Anthony James Joes as quoted in The New York Times, 2005 discussing insurgents in Iraq

6.0 Contemporary Rebel Behavior

The thuggish depiction of contemporary rebel groups foresees looting, rape, and summary execution as the future norm of rebel treatment of civilians. Yet it is rare throughout history to find the absence of looting and other evidence of personal gain in the conduct of war (Kalyvas 2001). This study shows that rebels can create contractual relations with civilians wherein they provide security and public goods and strengthen indigenous institutions. Furthermore, rebel groups, like states, can have a variety of relationships with civilians that shift over time. The argument maintained throughout this study is that control over resource extraction as indicated by the presence or absence of rivals is the condition that determines the type of relationship rebels develop with local populations.
The significance of economic power then lays in its ability to shape the behavior of actors who strive to create and maintain sources of strength. This is a novel argument. Many scholars who consider the impact of resources in conflicts see them primarily as the source of self-interested behavior. As Weinstein points out, “opportunistic rebels” emerge when resources provide incentives for people with short time horizons to join rebellions. This crowds out what he calls “activist rebels” who are more likely to take into account the interests of civilians. But because the opportunists are able to get resources with which to buy guns, rebels who spend time propagating their political message fall victim to the opportunists’ greed (Weinstein 2006). The preceding chapters, however, demonstrate that rebel groups that find new resources do not behave uniformly, nor does their behavior necessarily shift in the same direction. It is the monopoly over resources that matters. Well-endowed rebels are able to behave more like old-fashioned liberation groups, administering areas under their control and even taking into account the interests of their “citizens,” provided they are secure in their monopoly over resource extraction. Instead of resources, it is the degree of competition that rebel groups face that factors most into their behavior.

The method used to analyze relationships in society has been a great debate among political scientists and other analysts of power relations. Quantitative scholars laud their use of positivist methods as being more generalizable, while qualitative scholars emphasize their in-depth knowledge of case studies that some accuse their quantitatively oriented colleagues of glossing over. This dissertation tries to bridge this gap by employing case study analysis in the form of process tracing as well as diversity-
oriented approaches. Diversity-oriented approaches such as QCA analyses that involve the use of crisp and fuzzy sets go beyond the breach between qualitative case-oriented approaches and quantitative variable-oriented ones.

The crisp-set and fuzzy-set analyses employed here represent the positions in the trade-off between complexity and generality, where case-oriented research supports the view that all cases are representations of a particular condition or meaning; all cases are different. The variable-oriented approach emphasizes general law-like relationships between conditions, or from a strictly nomothetic perspective, it does not treat cases simply as variables (Skaaning 2005). Rather, the nine cases are treated as wholes – that is, the different parts are defined in relation to one another. Such a perspective suggests that by changing a significant part of a case, the nature of the case as a whole is potentially transformed (Ragin 2000, 39). The diversity oriented approaches also share the view that causation is conjunctural. In other words, by employing QCA analyses I do not claim that the same causal conditions operate similarly across cases. The impact of one condition may depend on the presence or absence of other causal conditions. Furthermore, several varying conditions may satisfy a general causal requirement (Ragin 2000, 40). As such, the method is able to analyze whether a certain outcome (e.g., coercive behavior) is brought about by dissimilar and/or conjunctural causes (e.g., presence of rivals and illicit resources or presence of rivals and a need for resources). In other words, by considering differences in both degree and kind, we can compare apples to oranges. In the cases examined here, the
monopolization of resources is basic to the political strategies used to amass power, though the strategies are variable (Earle 1997).

6.1 A Crisp-Set Analysis

This section provides a crisp-set analysis of the nine cases. As explained in the introduction to this dissertation, crisp-set analyses use dichotomous scoring (0 or 1) to indicate absence or presence of a condition and outcome. Table 6.1 shows the summary of the crisp-set scores from the in-depth case studies. Notice in this table the significant role that “presence of rivals” plays. Every case with a negative outcome score (0) also has an absence of rivals. That is, “rivals” is the only condition that changes consistently in the cases in correspondence with a shift in the outcome.

Table 6.1 Summary of Crisp-set Representations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals (R)</th>
<th>Need for Resources (N)</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources (I)</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians (CV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This indicates that control over resource extraction is an important causal variable. The “need for resources” variable does not change in the crisp-set property space at all. The “use of illicit resources” does change, though not in accord with the presence of
coercion. However, what is revealed for this variable is that every time there is an absence of illicit resources, there is also an absence of coercive behavior. However, because there are cases where there is an absence of coercive behavior and the presence of illicit resources (PKK2 and FARC2), we cannot make the claim that extracting illicit resources is usually a causal condition of coercive behavior.

The crisp-set representation has highlighted for us the two cases (PKK2 and FARC2) where there is a presence of illicit resource extraction yet there is an absence of coercive behavior. In order to understand why this is the case, we must refer to the in-depth case studies. In these specific cases, the groups adjust to a significant change in tactics. For FARC2, the rebel group adapts to its participation in the drug industry while maintaining a contractual relationship with local communities. It has just transformed its focus from the political in the form of the UP, to the military. With PKK2, we find the Kurdish rebels newly transformed into a contractual group while maintaining its ties to illicit commerce. With the Turkish state cracking down on Kurdish groups, this gives the PKK’s popular support newfound intensity.

How Rebel Groups Become Coercive

When the property space is summarized in regard to the coercive behavior outcome, we see that coercion is recorded in only one configuration:

\[ CV = RNI \]
The coercion configuration involves only the *presence* of the three variables. The logical opposite of the coercion configuration or complement refers to all instances where the rebel group does not display coercive treatment of civilians. The complement is as follows:

\[ cv = rNi + rNI \]

Thus there are two types of situations that appear to be equally likely to change behavior from coercive to non-coercive (contractual). The results in this analysis suggest that coercive groups are likely to be affected by the absence of rivals combined with presence of a need for resources and the absence of extracting illicit resources or by merely the absence of rivals and the presence of a need for resources. This also means that rebel groups that are coercive toward civilians are unaffected by the occurrence of extraction of illicit resources alone. When we compare the configurations for the two outcomes, we see that the sole occurrence of a shift from the presence of rivals to the absence of rivals is sufficient to make a coercive group transform into a contractual one. Because need remains constant, it is dropped from consideration, though as we have seen in the presentation of empirical data in previous chapters, need *does* have an impact on the strategies that rebel groups choose. The FARC, for example, chose to enter the drug trade because of a significant increase in the need for resources as a result of the UP’s demise. The interesting point of these configurations above is that the variable use of illicit resources (I) is often used in frameworks of
contemporary conflict analyses. Indeed, many scholars and policymakers consider the type of resources to be a major impetus for nastier rebel group behavior. The presence of rivals is usually not considered.

The two causal configurations for contractual behavior (rNi or rNI) can induce contractual behavior. This indicates equifinality meaning there is more than one pathway capable of producing similar outcomes (see diagram 6.1). Either one of the two causal configurations is sufficient to produce contractual behavior in rebel groups.

**Figure 6.1 From Naughty to Nice**

\[
\begin{align*}
CV & \quad \text{cv (contractual)} \\
RNI & \quad rNi \quad rNI \\
& \quad rN
\end{align*}
\]

However, the first combination (rNi) corresponds to three out of the five configurations in our contractual transformations (SPLA2, SPLA3 and FARC1) while the second configuration (rNI) corresponds to only two of the five cases (PKK2 and FARC2). It would be a worthwhile venture to research other cases to uncover whether the first combination appears more often than the second. A causal combination, which is observed more often, holds more substantive relevance for political decision-making (Clement 2007).

As Diagram 6.1 indicates, \(cv = rNi + rNI\) can be reduced further to \(rN\), which can be reduced further to “\(r\)” if we consider that need remains constant throughout all cases.
and thus can be dropped. The absence of rivals appears to be the only necessary cause for the transformation to contractual behavior. This variable therefore is worthy of the attention of policy-makers as a tool for mitigating violence in conflicts. However, it appears that the presence of rivals is not sufficient to induce coercive behavior alone; it affects rebel groups only when it is taken in conjunction with other variables.

The conclusion of this crisp set analysis is that the priority to rebel groups is survival. The importance of the presence or absence of rivals, including the state and other rebel groups or factions indicates the significance of the monopoly over extraction of resources. Possessing such dominance over resources means the group also controls resource distribution, which leads to more effective control over fighters and their behavior toward civilians. The concern for survival, though, becomes preeminent when rivals emerge on the scene. With rivals, competition for resources increases and time horizons shift to the short-term. As competition becomes increasingly intense, coercion becomes more predominant because it allows these groups to extract resources quickly.

Why the need for a swift collection of resources? The groups are concerned not merely with the collection of goods to fund their war – but with acquiring the resources to survive and limit outside challenges or incentives for their own members to defect. As the evidence in this dissertation indicates, it does not matter what kind of resources the group extracts – they can be resources that require the groups to abide by international norms of democracy, or they can be resources associated with illicit commerce that characteristically spur violence. What is most critical to rebel groups is having a
monopoly over the resources so that their survival is not threatened. During the early stages of the transformative process, three variables appear to bear equal weight: the presence of rivals, the need for resources and the extraction of illicit resources. To drive a rebel group into the actual transformation from coercive to contractual behavior, it takes a joint effort of two or three causes. Note that my analysis does not dispense with the observations of others that resources can exert a pull on the behavior of rebels. Instead, I put the effect of resources on behavior in the broader context of these other political concerns of rebel groups. The circumstances in which rebels find themselves are more important than the availability and nature of resources.

In all configurations, though, the absence of the rival variable (r) plays a central role. Whatever the combination, a shift in the presence of rivals will almost always be necessary to drive the rebel group into adopting contractual tactics. The need for resources appears to be irrelevant here because it does not change in the process from coercive to contractual. However, there are two combinations for the rebel group to adopt to become contractual – it can either have an absence of rivals and the absence of illicit resource extraction with need OR a group can have an absence of rivals and use illicit resources. The variable that does the heavy lifting is rivals. Again, this is an interesting point since much of the recent conflict literature revolves around the type of resources used to fund these groups, overlooking the presence or absence of rivals.

48 Using the qualifier “almost always” reflects the uncertainty that comes with testing a small-n.
6.2 Fuzzy-set analysis: Testing for Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

The principle behind fuzzy-set analysis is to scale membership scores to permit partial (fuzzy) membership in sets. As opposed to crisp-set analysis, it addresses the various degrees to which different cases belong to a set (Ragin 2000). Fuzzy-set analysis builds on the crisp-set use of Boolean algebra and allows us to consider the degree of membership within a category. Table 6.2 is a summary of the fuzzy-set scores provided in the case studies. By using what is called the “subset principle,” fuzzy-set analysis allows us to establish whether certain variables are necessary and/or sufficient to produce the outcome.

Table 6.2 Summary of Fuzzy-set Representation of Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>Need for Resources</th>
<th>Use of Illicit Resources</th>
<th>Coercive Behavior Toward Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>.25 [0]</td>
<td>.75 [1]</td>
<td>.5 [0]</td>
<td>.25 [0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA3</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
<td>.25 [1]</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>.25 [0]</td>
<td>.5 [1]</td>
<td>.50 [1]</td>
<td>.25 [0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC1</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
<td>.25 [1]</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
<td>0 [0]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in [brackets] represent the original crisp-set scores.

For example, a condition (e.g., use of illicit resources) is necessary for an outcome (e.g., coercive behavior) if its score is consistently higher than or equal to the outcome. This indicates that the outcome is a subset of the condition and thus, given a reasonable theoretical foundation, the variable should be regarded as necessary for the
outcome to occur. We must test each individual condition against the outcome for each case, along with its negation. With necessity, the outcome is a subset of the condition because the presence of the condition by itself does not guarantee the outcome. In contrast, a condition is sufficient for an outcome to occur if its score is lower than or equal to the outcome. This means that the condition is a subset of the outcome (Skaaning 2005, 11-12) because while the specific condition is sufficient to cause the outcome, there may be other pathways (conditions) that lead to it as well. Notice in Table 6.2 how, in comparison to the crisp-set scores in brackets, the fuzzy-set scores add additional variance and degrees of membership in the conditions and outcome.

By determining necessity and sufficiency, we test whether the findings revealed in the qualitative analysis in the preceding chapters are indeed accurate. Again, when testing for necessity, the membership scores in the conditions must be consistently greater than or equal to the score of the outcome \((x \geq y)\). We focus on the positive cases, that is, those that do not have a membership of “0” for the outcome in Table 6.2. We do this because negative cases skew our analysis by biasing our results. We want to look for instances where the causal condition is greater than or equal to the outcome. If the outcome is zero, the score on the causal condition will always be greater than or equal to it, and thus we will end up with a systematic bias. Therefore cases such as SPLA3 and FARC1 are not included in the following tables. We test both the original and the negation of the conditions to see if the absence of the condition is necessary for the outcome to occur as well. Tables (6.3 and 6.4) represent the tests of necessity for the need variable. Note that in these tables, “1” and “0” in the fourth column do not
represent presence or absence. Rather they represent whether the condition being tested for necessity works or not. A negative score anywhere in this fourth column indicates the condition is not necessary. The following two tables show the test of necessity for “need for resources”. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that neither the presence nor absence of need is necessary for a rebel group’s transformation to coercive behavior.

Table 6.3 Assessing Necessity of “Need” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>N ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 Assessing Necessity of “need” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>n ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 shows that the “use of illicit resources” variable also is not a necessary condition for coercive behavior. However, as the outcome columns shows, there is only
one score of a negative case, SPLA1. A single negative case is not a strong indication that a condition is not necessary. We would like to see several. Further confirmation of this variable requires testing a larger sample of cases. Therefore, we cannot be completely confident about this condition and its finding of non-necessity. Table 6.6 tells us that the absence of “use of illicit resources” is also not necessary to bring about a change to coercive behavior in rebel groups.

Table 6.5 Assessing Necessity of “Illicit Resource” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Illicit Resources</th>
<th>I ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6 Assessing Necessity of “illicit resource” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Illicit resources</th>
<th>I ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three cases that report a “1.0” in Table 6.7 in both the outcome and the condition (SPLA1, PKK1 and FARC3) do not have leverage because they will always be
consistent with the hypothesis. As Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate, the presence of rivals (R) is necessary for coercive behavior in rebel groups. The former shows that the presence of rivals is not only necessary but that it is also sufficient because each score in column 2 has the same score in column 3. Table 6.8 demonstrates that the absence of rivals (r) is not necessary. While this second test may seem redundant, it is important to conduct nonetheless. If we were to find that the absence of rivals was necessary for coercive behavior, it would indicate an inaccuracy or mistake in our data. The second table acts as a check on the first finding of necessity.

Table 6.7 Assessing Necessity of “Rival” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Presence of Rivals</th>
<th>R ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8 Assessing Necessity of “rival” Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>rivals¹</th>
<th>r ≥ Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPLA1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We do not need to test for joint necessity (configurations of the variables) because conditions cannot be jointly necessary. Each condition is singularly necessary. Now we turn to the test for sufficiency. When testing whether a condition is sufficient to produce an outcome, we find the instances of the causal condition that are a subset of the outcome. We derive the membership scores in the causal expressions using the principles of negation (subtracting membership scores from 1) and intersection (finding the minimum). That is, first we subtract the original fuzzy-set scores for the conditions from 1.0 to get the negation of the conditions (columns 2-7). Then we find the minimum score in the configurations (columns 8-15). For a variable to be considered sufficient, it must be consistently less than or equal to the outcome score \(x \leq y\). Table 6.9 shows the fuzzy-set scores for sufficiency. Comparing scores in columns 2-15 (the causal conditions, including the configurations of variables) with column 16 (the outcome) reveals that columns 2 and 8-11 are uniformly less than or equal to the outcome scores that are reported in column 16. The test for sufficiency shows that membership in the set of coercive behavior is facilitated by the presence of rivals alone or by any of the four combinations that contain the presence of rivals; in other words, in addition to the necessary and sufficient cause identified earlier (presence of rivals), coercive behavior is almost always caused by the following configurations. Note that the “~” is used to indicate negation.

(column 8) presence of rivals \(\cdot\) need for resources \(\cdot\) use of illicit resources, (RNI)
(column 9) presence of rivals \(\cdot\) need for resources \(\cdot\) \(~use of illicit resources\) (RNi)
(column 10) presence of rivals \(\cdot\) \(~need for resources\) \(\cdot\) use of illicit resources, (Rni)
(column 11) presence of rivals \(\cdot\) \(~need for resources\) \(\cdot\) \(~use of illicit resources\), (Rni)
Table 6.9: Sufficient Conditions for Producing Coercive Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPLA1</th>
<th>SPLA2</th>
<th>SPLA3</th>
<th>PKK1</th>
<th>PKK2</th>
<th>PKK3</th>
<th>FARC1</th>
<th>FARC2</th>
<th>FARC3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shaded results indicate sufficiency.
Notice, however, that the configurations can be reduced:

\[
\text{RNI} + \text{RNI} + \text{RnI} + \text{Rni} = \\
\text{RN} (i + I) + \text{Rn} (i + I) = \\
\text{RN} + \text{Rn} = \\
\text{R} (N + n) = \\
\text{R}
\]

This tells us that “R” or the presence of rivals is the decisive condition; R is doing all of the work in these configurations. It does not matter if the other conditions are in the configurations; as long as “R” is present we will see coercive behavior.\(^\text{49}\)

6.3 A Theory of Rebel Group Behavior

Having examined the three conditions, we turn toward the main issue: why do rebel groups under the same international environment and relatively similar periods of time undergo contrasting changes with regard to how they treat civilians? That is, why do some groups become coercive while others become contractual? As this studied has demonstrated, a need for resources and the use of illicit resources is not enough to spur a group to adopt coercive behavior, important though these conditions are as contributors to the outcome, nor are international norms. In chapter 3 I demonstrated that international norms of democracy are insufficient to singularly motivate the transformation to contractual behavior even when these norms are accompanied by foreign aid. In chapter 5 I tried to show that illicit resources do not necessarily drive specific types of behavior, as demonstrated by FARC2 and their contractual relationship with civilians while investing in the coca-growing and taxing industry. In chapters 3 and 4 I probed the unique features of the SPLA and the PKK, emphasizing how the

\(^{49}\) In other words, the variables other than “R” are not INUS causes. They are not included in the category of insufficient and non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient causes.
respective leader of each group was reticent to give up control of organizational institutions in the face of democratization. This section pulls together the multiple pieces of my argument and through references to the case studies and preceding fuzzy-set analysis, establishes the conditions for shifts to coercive and contractual behavior.

Before proceeding, however, we should revisit some of the alternative views on rebel group behavior. By noting their insufficiencies we can discard some of the previous theories. In most alternative explanations, the inability to account for change is the primary limitation.

*New Wars*

One line of thought argues that contemporary armed groups are akin to criminal syndicates. This argument encompasses a range of scholarship. New wars are perceived to be populated with participants who no longer fight for an ideology. They are driven by their self-interested quest for resources; resources that are more readily available as a consequence of the expansion of global markets and the decline of state capacities to regulate commerce (Beckett 2005). These conflicts are characterized by high levels of civilian predation linked to patronage-based politics led by warlords who employ a strategy of state collapse to entrench their positions of power in society. Conflict enhances material opportunities for such types of leaders who use disorder to guard their positions (Reno 2004a). Yet the analysis of the SPLA indicates that groups do not necessarily have to rely on criminal activities to fund new forms of warfare. Groups do not necessarily rely on illicit power structures to fund their conflicts. The SPLA turned to foreign donors and Western governments for material support in its
struggle against the GoS. Furthermore, FARC2 demonstrates that a group can be involved in the extraction of illicit resources while remaining contractual with local populations. And while some of the new wars scholars maintain that contemporary conflicts have little if any central control (Holsti 1996), the SPLA and the FARC challenge this theory.

*The Material Endowments Effect*

The resource debate has had a huge impact on the conflict literature. Some scholars link opportunities for material endowments to the existence of for-profit or not-for-profit rebel groups (Collier and Hoeflller 2001, 17). Tilly implied as much in earlier works. For him, the type of resources determines the type of extraction. The expansion of Prussia with its huge tracts of land and scattered populations of peasants was accomplished using coercive extraction. An area populated with merchants and traders use capital-intensive measures to retain control. And while Tilly maintains that a mixture of capital and coercive strategies is best for successful state building, what remains is a fixed quality to resources. Tilly assumes that the type of resources and the type of behavior exerted to control populations remain unchanged. However, the FARC demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. The FARC shifted its resource endowments for the peasantry to illicit commerce. This is where the importance of the “need” variable comes into play and further highlights the significance of using fuzzy-set analysis. The crisp-set analysis in Table 6.1 shows us that “need” is not central to insurgent group behavior. That is, it gives need a fixed quality. All groups, all the time, demonstrate a need for resources. This is the nature of conflict – all parties need
resources. However, the fuzzy-set analysis above shows us that there are varying degrees of need. When the FARC changed its tactics after the demise of the UP, its need increased ten-fold as demonstrated in Table 6.2.

A recent line of thought maintains that the type of incentives (e.g., material, “lootable” resources such as diamonds or foreign aid) determine the type of recruits a group acquires. This, in turn, determines the type of behavior a rebel group will display in respect to civilians. In conflicts where there are immediate benefits, groups will acquire recruits that are unlikely to be invested in local communities and thus will behave in a coercive fashion (Weinstein 2006). Yet several of the cases in the present study challenge this notion. The PKK was supported with illicit resources early on, yet was able to transform its behavior and consciously adopt changes in its treatment of local Kurds while still extracting such endowments. The SPLA could have kidnapped foreign aid workers and looted their stores much like the LRA in Northern Uganda did, yet they chose not to. Here the role that norms play is unmistakable. When the SPLA acquired the monopoly on resource extraction and distribution in the South (when rivals disappeared), it was willing to abide by the requirements of Western donors.

Weinstein’s theory foregoes the micro-politics of rebel groups. Furthermore, his theory does not account for shifts in resource endowments. Rather, resources remain fixed in his account for rebel behavior.

*Explaining Transformations: The SPLA, the PKK, and the FARC*

Central to the type of behavior we see groups use is the monopoly over resource extraction, as indicated by the presence or absence of rivals. While others have argued
that the key factor for rebel groups is control over territory (Kalyvas 2006), this study goes further, focusing on how groups obtain control in the first place. Resources are the key to survival and when other actors enter the scene, competition for resources increases. We see this in the cases of the FARC and the PKK. We also see the importance of resources when the SPLA changes doctrine and begins to market itself as a democratic movement to garner resources. The group was willing to change its entire ideology and objective in order to maintain its existence. In the case of the PKK, much of the group’s strength comes from popular support. Öcalan needs the support of Turkey’s ethnic Kurds to maintain the existence of the group. This has been threatened with the advent of democratic reforms in Turkey and the dissent among PKK members who wish to pursue nonviolent options. Thus, in the absence of large amounts of economic resources such as foreign aid and taxes, people, too, can become a resource.

The test for sufficiency shows that the one consistent condition across the sufficient cases is the presence of rivals. This supports the case study findings that the monopoly over resource extraction plays a decisive role in determining rebel group behavior toward civilians. In all cases presented here, where significant rivals are present, the rebel groups adopt coercive behavior.

The results also indicate that need is not a significant factor in determining rebel group behavior though it can shape the environment in which these actors operate. It can lead rebels along a path they would not have taken otherwise. A change in need may reflect a change in strategic thinking, as in the case of the FARC and its turn
towards military expansion. By adopting a more aggressive military campaign, the FARC needed to raise capital rapidly; the group’s need for resources increased dramatically over a relatively short period of time. This, however, did not cause the group to become coercive toward locals. Rather, need for resources led the FARC to get involved in the lucrative drug industry. This in turn created a rivalry in the industry and the cartel owners began funding the AUC. It was the presence of the paras – the lack of a monopoly over resource extraction – that shifted the FARC’s behavior.

While the findings here take some of the potency out of the link between resources and actors’ behavior in today’s conflicts, we do find that resources are not unimportant. The important point is that resources (or the lack thereof) do not themselves cause specific types of behavior. They merely act as a conduit for achieving this goal. Rather, the power lies in the impending threat of resource depletion that accompanies the presence of significant rivals. Without a monopoly on resource extraction, this threat remains.

6.4 Further findings

The analysis of rebel group behavior toward noncombatants reveals other findings. For example, this study demonstrates that if rebels can, they will adapt to external norms, provided it does not weaken their control such that rival organizations will arise to challenge their monopoly over resource extraction. While some rebel groups will disregard international norms of democracy and state-building, using increasingly coercive tactics in their dealings with noncombatants, other groups will tolerate reciprocity if they can retain power over locals; they will become more democratic, but
only insofar as they can benefit in their local struggle. In other words, in some instances many of these violent organizations choose to behave as states-in-waiting in a more classic sense. This argument diverges greatly from the recent Collier versus Kaldor debate. This dissertation proposes that it is not about acquiring the most resources or becoming the wealthiest rebel group, it is about gaining power that comes from having a monopoly over resources. This power is about survival. Thus, this analysis corresponds to the older state-building tradition of study: the predatory rebel groups of today are similar to the institutional state-building failures of early modern Europe. As Tilly noted of that period, there were far more failures than there were successes. Perhaps this accounts for the perception of a novel phenomenon of new wars. But instead, it is just that history forgets all of the failures of the past, while today’s failures draw considerable media attention and thus only seem to be a trend for the future.

*The Effect of State-building Norms on Rebel Groups*

As this dissertation has shown, efforts to democratize the politics in conflict zones can have unexpected and unwelcome effects. It also can accomplish what is intended. Knowing which outcome will occur is an important contribution of this study. But a more pressing question remains. Do global norms make people more or less vulnerable as a whole in rebel held areas generally? Just as in Tilly’s early modern Europe, the ability to create new states is a difficult task in the current international environment, and involves considerable amounts of violence. However, early European state-builders were not forced to conform to a diplomatically sanctioned model in their state-building activities. The lucky and savvier ones were able to evolve into more
protective armed groups. Contemporary would-be state-builders are guided and influenced by international norms that require mutual acceptance of existing international frontiers and a basic respect for human rights from the outset (Krasner 1999). State territories have been determined by international agreement, as in the case of many African countries that were born out of the Congress of Berlin and continued through the process of decolonization. Constitutive norms create new actors, interests and categories of action. State-building is one of the most powerful constitutive norms that survive today. Self-determination is a central claim to the state-building norm both in historical terms and in a contemporary framework, though the execution of this goal has shifted radically over the last century. This means that not just any rebel group can create a state. Rather, these groups have to fight to establish their control over an existing state if they want the international community to legally recognize them. Thus anti-colonial and anti-apartheid rebel groups were able to acquire international supporters because they were heirs to existing territories. International support for these groups was contingent upon their acceptance of these norms. In a rare coincidence of interest between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, both superpowers were extremely reluctant to aid separatist or irredentist groups. The result then has been that there was no legal means by which a ruler could lose territory of a state due to incompetence or even incapacity to fight off a superior force. Boundary change is, instead, a matter of international legal bodies. Somalia, for example, remains a recognized state though it has not had a formal government since 1991. The result is often a combination of external dependency and internal institutional weakness. Foreign
patronage permits rulers to pursue two projects: use of foreign patronage to finance their own networks of clients, and to provide benefits to wider constituencies of supporters (Jackson 1990).

Having established that rebel groups are state-builders and as such would provide public goods like security, the definition of community boundaries, and at least a minimal sense of law and order, it follows that they would abide by international norms, just as states do. It is counterproductive for rebels to be coercive toward local communities if the goal is to become a state in the actual places that they control. It is possible that in the past these groups had to fight others that exercised a monopoly over resources before them for the loyalties (or fear) of the population. Once they had achieved something closer to a monopoly on resources, the rebel groups could be more contractual in their “liberated zones,” a contemporary term for a state-like realm that does not enjoy outside recognition. This seemingly reformed behavior was contingent on the global community’s acceptance and enforcement of the principle that the rebel group would inherit colonial or apartheid regimes’ states. This meant that they were able to reap the rewards of outside patronage, even if they did not succeed in capturing the capital. It was sufficient to be recognized as a state-in-waiting and even wait for foreign governments to help press the final victory through diplomatic mediation. But the contemporary rebel group that merely controls a section of a country will not receive this degree of recognition or channeling of resources, as there is no hope that they can become sovereigns of their own states unless they capture the capital.
It would seem that this situation should give rebel groups less incentive to take into account the interests of local people. There is no reward for a well-run “liberated zone”. Instead, they should loot local people to get resources for the desperate sprint to the capital and international recognition that will follow. But the imposition of democratic norms of rebels, usually with the intention of luring them into negotiations with their foes should help change these incentives. But as I have shown above, this promise of negotiations and less conflictual relations with state enemies can weaken a rebel group’s monopoly over violence in their areas of control. Yet, in other situations it does not, and as the SPLA showed, the group can pose as democrats and receive their reward.

Several 20th century norms of state-building have guided rebel groups in more state-like directions. During the Cold War, many armed groups aligned themselves with European Marxists. This was a convenient mobilizing framework that stressed political control and hierarchies and offered rebels and other armed non-state actors the prospect of winning aid from the Soviet Union. However, post-World War II norms of state-building also hemmed in rebel groups during the Cold War. Desperate for supporters, these groups were forced to adopt existing ideologies that appealed to patrons and that worked for these non-state armed actors internally. Marxism-Leninism was somewhat “vogue” during this period in history and were the ideology guiding revolutionary elite helping to determine the outcome of these internal challenges to states (Colburn 1994). Furthermore, existing norms of sovereignty bring considerable resources to incumbent regimes outside the political and strategic practices of the Cold
War that previously supported rulers of administratively weak states. This shift causes rulers and their partners to rely on the growing role of sovereignty as a tool for guaranteeing contracts, further reinforcing existing borders. Such states have what is called “negative” or “juridical” sovereignty. Sovereignty is ascribed to them by other states, despite the fact they do not possess “positive” sovereignty derived from effective control over their territory (Clapham 1996). While this offers some comfort to incumbent regimes, it poses formidable obstacles to armed groups that would create new states or that merely struggle against existing ones (Reno 2004b). Following the end of the Cold War, rebels discovered that these ideologies no longer garnered them the same levels of resources they had received in the past and thus they were forced to change their ideological foci.

Since post-colonial independence, rebel groups have had to capture the existing country’s capital if they wished to acquire international recognition; the key to insurgent success, some argued, was no longer the ability to wage protracted warfare, but instead as the capacity to move rapidly onto a capital city after establishing a base (Young 1996). Therefore, rebels could not ignore the state, nor could the state afford to ignore rebels. In the past, it may have been sufficient for rebel groups to merely take over part of a state, convincing outsiders to recognize them. In the contemporary international environment, however, norms against violent separatism make this a non-viable option.

However, more and more today the topic of norms concerns not only sovereignty, but human rights and democracy. Norms of sovereignty made it difficult for even contractual rebel groups to gain international acceptance. Currently, human rights
norms are beginning to play just as big a role in international acceptance as sovereignty has done in the past. Turkey, for example, has learned this lesson in its bid for membership to the EU. The EU members have demonstrated a severe concern over Turkey’s human rights record, and have indicated that the country must improve its treatment of minorities before it is welcomed into the organization. The closest earlier parallel to the evolving post-1989 human right norms would be global support for anti-criminal and anti-apartheid rebels because these particular groups extolled the values of these norms against odious state regimes. This process has wider implications for the future of the state and the power of sovereignty. It implies that non-state actors have a bigger role in the future of state-building than they did in the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly groups such as rebels that are cracking sovereignty’s veneer. This would return the world of rebels to something like the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid past. It would pose the possibility of decertifying poorly performing regimes and shifting international support instead to better behaved rebels. It is possible that the norms of the Cold War era are being outdone by the wave of democracy and the values it brings.

*Norms Affecting Rebels, Rebels Affecting Norms*

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers have emphasized the influence that international norms have had in both global and local arenas. Some of the work produced from this endeavor has focused on the shifting pressures of outsiders to adopt more democratic internal structures in return for material and diplomatic support. If this is the case, the “fourth wave” of democratization can be said to extend to rebel
groups.\textsuperscript{50} This study reveals that norms appear to have a greater immediate impact on the behavior of local communities who may use “democracy” and the external resources and political support that comes with it as a tool to force reforming rebels to develop reciprocal, state-like relations with them (Metelits 2004). In this context, the present study fits into the “outside pressure to democratize” niche. However, it also finds that despite the apparent bias in applying and using norms by state leaders – weak and strong alike – rebel groups also are able to use norms to garner their own sources of support. This study suggests that just as norms can restrict actors, they also provide insurgents with additional avenues for gaining political and material resources. The constraints that norms embody can be turned against state foes, as occurred in the case of the SPLA, which used the GoS’s characterization as a fundamental Islamist regime that harbored terrorists to conform to strictures of norms. This translated into aid from donors such as the USAID and several European countries interested in advancing adherence to particular norms. Thus, norms are open to multiple interpretations, and non-state actors accept this diversity of behavior to the extent that ostensible weaker actors such as rebel groups address other political interests such as the creation or preservation of order. Ironically, rebel groups that exercise local domination may therefore become “better” democratizers in the eyes of the international community precisely because they use this control to maintain order through the rigging

\textsuperscript{50} Scholars such as Samuel Huntington have identified three waves of democratization in the post-Westphalian world. It has been suggested that there is an additional and more recent fourth wave that is quite distinct from the previous three. Among the three waves of democratization, one can observe a bottom-up process in the establishment of political institutions. The fourth wave is markedly different in that a liberal/representative democracy is imposed from above – namely by a superpower, regardless of the historical, cultural, social and economic factors rooted in the target state.
of institutional processes. This, in the eyes of many foreign bodies, is preferable to the chaos and threats associated with competing rival insurgencies.

Rebel groups will abide by international norms of democracy if the norms do not hinder their ability to maintain a monopoly on resource extraction and if they find it in their best interest to do so. The SPLA did so because they lost Ethiopian support, but this happened at about the same time that international support for democratic reform in rebel-held areas had become to be a more salient option. The number of significant rivals the group had decreased after a serious faction split ended in 1994, and the rebel group gained a monopoly on resources. Thus, while the need for resources was great after the end of the Cold War, the group began adopting democratic requirements of foreign donors because they could – they were not dealing with competing rivals. With this newly gained monopoly, the SPLA, recognizing its need for resources after Mengistu’s fall, turned its focus onto foreign donors. By 1994, it could enhance its attractiveness to outsiders as it initiated a “democratic” transition. Had the group not had a monopoly – had there existed significant rivals for resources – the SPLA would most likely not have adopted a democratic stance. The business of survival among significant competitors in a region with scarce resources would have driven the SPLA to coercive behavior such as looting. Democratic reciprocity will be extended when the group in power feels it will not be threatened by significant rivals.

*Democratization and the Trouble with Entrenched Leaders*

Scholars of democratization have found it common for leaders to institutionalize authoritarian control within democratic countries (Gibson 2005). These leaders develop
institutionalized ties linking their exercise of authoritarian control over locals with the national democratic polity. Local institutional forms of control thus appear compatible with national political institutions. There are also alternatives to the parochialization of power such as bureaucratic control (Stoner-Weiss 1997). Such entrenchment has been noted in Zimbabwe, where Mugabe controls all aspects of political life and continually changes the legal codes to fit his designs to stay in office. This process of state-building is characteristic of elites constructing institutions of power. V.O. Key noted in his study of the authoritarian political system in the US South that power was assembled through the single party system (Key 1949).

As the study of rebel group behavior indicates, leadership entrenchment is not unique to states – it also occurs in states-in-waiting. For example, the SPLA adopted the role of “national party” with ease because it eventually served as the legitimate actor in the region, as enacted by the agreement between the international NGOs who wanted access to Southern populations. In fact, states will even facilitate rebel leader entrenchment if it suits the government’s purposes. Öcalan was able to maintain his position as head of the PKK from a prison cell with the help of the Turkish government. Turkey worked with the rebel leader to maintain control of the country’s Kurdish population, and in so doing facilitated Öcalan’s retention of power. Thus the behavior of rebel groups – state builders – highlights how intertwined the democratization and state-building literatures are despite the fact that such linkages often are not emphasized.

*The State’s Role in the Rebel-Civilian Dynamic*
A further corollary to these findings is that the quality of the state (coercive versus contractual or reforming) can affect the behavior of rebel groups toward civilian populations. The behavior that a government exhibits toward a specific population of civilians can have an impact on the number of rivals that exist for the rebel group purported to represent these individuals, thus affecting the group’s ability to maintain a monopoly over resource extraction. The nature of a national government in its relations to its citizens is significant in determining the degree of rebel group control over extraction from local communities and thus the level of violence these groups inflict upon civilian populations.

Rebel groups facing coercive states are better able to appeal to outsiders with real or contrived reform programs that reduce coercion of local communities and are more likely to adopt international demands for democratic internal governance. Furthermore, such a group can extract resources more efficiently from local communities. Rebel groups that are even minimally less coercive than a repressive state have something to offer locals – public goods, often in the form of security from the agents of a coercive and extractive state. The more contractual the behavior of the rebel group in relation to noncombatants, the more efficiently it can extract resources. Likewise, by engaging in contractual behavior, the rebel group can acquire additional resources from external, democratic norm-supporting actors, as explained above. As long as the state is demonstrably more coercive than the rebel group, something which rebel groups are often keen to explain to local people in areas where they operate, this dynamic persists. As demonstrated by PKK tactics, rebel groups can try to coerce
counterinsurgency behavior out of the state through violence and terrorist tactics. Yet the central role that the monopoly of resource extraction plays does not waiver; a rebel group with a monopoly on resources will behave in a less violent or contractual manner only when it is confident that it can manipulate the implementation of “democratic reforms” in ways that will enhance its monopoly over resource extraction and its subsequent distribution.

However, rebels will behave contractually only in conditions where they are confident they can manipulate the implementation of such “democratic reforms” in ways that will help maintain or increase their monopoly over local resource extraction and will not threaten the survival of an incumbent leadership in power. Nevertheless, rebels take the chance that outsiders will not view them as the dominant rebel group, but this is not much of a risk if the incumbent leaders think that they can suppress any upstarts or outside rivals. If their monopolization of host communities declines, rebels risk this being interpreted as possessing diminished prospects for manipulating international actors; they fear that opportunists might use this weakness to stage their own rise to prominence. Thus rebels find themselves in a situation of realpolitik typical of states in centuries past; poor performance is met with a lack of interest or aggression on the part of outsiders, while effective control on the ground forces them to take account of local groups’ interests. But unlike the early modern period, this cannot occur in a context where there is real competition. Tilly’s armed groups had to care about local people because they needed these people to produce resources that could be used to fight off internal and external enemies. Now, unless these enemies are at a considerable arms’
length and pose little threat, competition has the negative effect of causing rebel groups to become more repressive toward local people. This situation also causes one to suspect that most democratizing rebels will be more likely to try to fake their liberalization as they will not be as desperate as their early modern counterparts. Unlike English or Dutch governments, they will not face the sorts of crises of control that resulted in real sharing of power with productive groups in their societies. Instead, that sort of crisis of control will bring greater predation and coercion. This sort of consequence of democratic reform has been noted in post-communist countries.

Hellman claims that reforms are expected to make things worse before they get better, a sort of J-curve based on the distribution of costs and benefits of reform. Furthermore, like our entrenched rebel leaders described above who are reluctant to grant civilians participation in local governance, Hellman has found that those who support reform in many post-communist societies will attempt to block certain advances in the reform process that they view as threatening to their advantages in the market (Hellman 1998, 204). The similarities between these individuals and rebel leaders who do not wish to relinquish their positions of power calls for further study.

Furthermore, once a state begins to reform, its access to resources actually increases as internal and external avenues to resources opens. This provides states with even more capability to defeat the rebels, as now it not only has the backing of foreign democratic countries, but popular support where once it did not exist. Foreign democratic governments and institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank are likely to reward such reforming behavior in order to ensure that the state remains moving in a
contractual direction. For example, foreign representatives will lower sanctions, increasing the availability of resources and the flow of development into the country.

While, the treatment of a state’s policies and its consequences for local social forces is not a new topic of study, historically it has been directed toward the effects of a government’s institutional design. David Meyer examines the United States’ structure of political opportunity and its consequences for social protest movements. He notes that the Madisonian ease of access to government institutions for outsider groups that characterizes the U.S. government’s policymaking strategies fragments, co-opt and dissolves dissident movements (Meyer 1993). However, Meyers’ case is less about the type of authority a state uses then it is about the impacts formal institutions have on the strength of social protest movements. Again, this emphasizes the connection between state-building and democratization and justifies increased focus on the link for understanding contemporary state-building.

Within the “new wars” and “resource wars” literature there are varying degrees of explicit recognition that the weakness of state institutions matters. One can extrapolate from this the broader proposition that the nature of state ties to local communities is important. States that marginalize communities while oppressing them may spawn different kinds of rebel groups than will states that marginalize communities while selectively co-opting people in those same communities. The latter will likely generate groups that would have reason to be more violent in those communities because they have to force local people to make choices about whom they support and who they betray to others. This is a basic point made over time by several scholars. Fanon
maintains that at a certain point in the history of anti-colonial struggles, government repressions encouraged the colonized to participate in violent struggle (Fanon 1982). Kitson asserts this point, for example, in his memoir of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (Kitson 1960), while Kriger emphasizes the importance of government coercion and repression in relation to the linkage between popular support and rebel violence in her account of Zimbabwean guerrillas (Kriger 1992). The literature also indicates that rebels enact strategies that intensify government repression because it will hasten the mobilization of local populations. In this dynamic, the state is made to look like the least favorable option for local communities. Marighella, the Brazilian insurgent leader, presumed that attacks on government installations would provoke the central Brazilian regime to retaliate with repressive measures (Sarkesian 1975). When these repressive measures are enacted upon local populations, popular support for rebel groups is likely to increase. In a more contemporary context, this underlines the importance of the relationship between local populations and rebel groups in trying to explain the apparent passivity among the Iraqi population in relation to the insurgency inflicting violence on US and Iraqi troops, as well as civilians (Ford 2005). While there is a large counterinsurgency literature on degrees of state “niceness” and insurgency, this study goes a step further and considers how state policy affects the behavior of rebels. Therefore, the degree of state presence or absence (and if presence, the nature of it) are important factors shaping insurgent behavior.

By extension, the US military’s “hearts and minds” strategy in Iraq will likely increase the violence of insurgents in proportion to the threat that it poses to them in
controlling local people. It may be more important to assert a more exclusive control over resources (here, people and territory), even if this is done with considerable violence. Thus one sees a difference in counter-insurgency doctrine. Ethiopian and Ugandan armies fighting in Somalia in 2007 are far less reluctant to commit acts of violence against civilians in their pursuit of control over Mogadishu than are their western backers. They explain that this violence in the short-term is the price that has to be paid to clear the city of Islamic Court Union and clan insurgents. Their assumption is that people in these areas will support their armies in spite of this violence, as they will not have the have the choice forced upon them of which group to support (or to avoid) (Reno forthcoming). The monopoly over violence will provide a more secure environment to monitor and protect local people. This observation is sure to be controversial, and has considerable implications for the current US strategy in Iraq that tries to minimize the application of violence, perhaps as much for an international audience as an Iraqi one.

One may argue the point that when a rebel group has control over resource extraction, it can do what it chooses because there is no third party to stop it from employing violence to extract resources. Yet, this does not appear to be the case. As North (1981) argues in his description of the contractual relationship between the serf and the lord during the European feudal era, the lord does have certain constraints placed upon him in regard to the tactics used to extract labor from serfs. The scarcity of labor prior to the 1500s meant that lords were frequently in competition over serfs. As a
result, the lord had an incentive to abide by the contractual agreements, which included protection from outside invaders. If they did not, serfs would flee (North 1981).

Interestingly, the state seems to be the only “player” in this dynamic that can choose to compete for resources and ultimately for control. The state can enter the dynamic as a competitor, and does so if it is reforming and has the potential to offer something better than what the insurgents are offering. However, rebel groups are forced to do nothing but compete, whereas the state can choose to enter or leave it at will. The early years of the FARC, however, demonstrate that tentative cooperation among rebel groups is possible. This has wider implications for policies of mitigating violence, especially in post-conflict communities.

Contemporary State-building

Is the creation of new states at an end? That is, is the state the form that all political bodies strive to achieve? From this study we see that competition causes war which – as Tilly has established – can lead to state-building. However, we have fewer competitors today and a diminishing number of conflicts. What does this mean for the future of state building? State building is an ongoing, evolving process. The evidence provided in this study points to a change in the state-building process. Tilly claims that violence is good for state-building because it forces rulers to extract resources to maintain armies. People then make demands on rulers and develop a reciprocal relationship. The state, for Tilly, comes from warfare and protection. Yet the study of rebel group behavior highlights the missing antecedent in Tilly’s explanation. What

51 See www.sipri.org
creates violence or war in the first place? That is, if war makes states, what makes war? This study argues that the answer is a competition for a monopoly over resource extraction. This highlights the issue that it is not that rebels do not want to build states; rebels cannot build states as they please today. They must capture an existing state.

This raises a question: Are rebel groups that do not capture a capital doomed to become predatory as it is inevitable that they cannot persist in their little enclaves forever as unrecognized governments. Or will these groups dissolve into a coalition government as they are drawn into negotiations? If the latter is true, the less radical groups will become political parties. The radical ones, however, are more likely not to compromise, and unless they capture the capital, there is little hope for them to achieve their objectives. Overall, this dynamic would enforce homogeneity on what gets created as a result of warfare, as what would have been viable experiments in centuries past now gets marginalized as it cannot get anyone to recognize it.

It appears that today’s wars are not creating states. Instead, contemporary conflicts create disorder and failed states. The cases of Somalia and Iraq attest to this. The norms of sovereignty and democracy are transforming state building into something different. Regime building has been added to the mixture as a result of norms. State building refers to the development of Weberian institutions based on rationality, charisma and tradition; state building is about the rules of the game. Regime building, however, concerns the norms and values involved. What type of regime will a state have? Today, the overwhelming answer to this question is “democracy”. International actors are concerned more with regime building. How? Following the logic of
competition presented in this theory, it follows that a world that sees less competition
(less rivals – more reliance on diplomacy) would also see less war. Less war means
less state building. This explains the predominant focus on regime building.

By maintaining a distinction between regime building and state building, the
conflicts that rebel groups engage in become increasingly comprehensible. The FARC
is engaged in regime building – they do not want a separate state, but instead their goal
is to change the order of politics to the type of values and norms that lead the
government. The war in Iraq has a similar goal, yet by not demarcating the distinction
between creating new rules and creating new norms for a country, chaos has ensued.
The PKK declared an official shift in its goal from state building to regime building after
the capture of its leader, a move that was more in line with contemporary international
politics. The inability to resolve this conflict may be linked to continuous diverging views
on what it is the PKK has set out to accomplish. Some, like the PKK rebels in Northern
Iraq, continue to operate in a state building mode, while others who have broken away
from the group and challenge Öcalan’s leadership are in line with regime building. The
SPLA, interestingly enough, shifted its mode of thinking from one of regime building to
state building, and much to the surprise of Khartoum has been supported in this
decision. The fact that there is scheduled to be a vote on self-determination for the
South represents a complete contradiction of the international norms of today. This
inconsistency in policy is demonstrated clearly when comparing US intervention and
regime building in Iraq with US support of state building in Southern Sudan. This
appears to suggest that state building may still have some life in it yet.
6.5 Conclusion

This study demonstrates the importance the presence of rivals has in shaping rebel group treatment of noncombatants. In the three groups examined here the presence of rivals is likely to lead to coercive behavior toward civilians. However, in some cases such as the FARC, when looking at its relationship with groups such as the ELN and M-19, these organizations do not necessarily compete for resources, and therefore co-exist. Furthermore, the contractual relationship between rebels and their potential constituents is preferable, though it can be side-lined by rival groups.

The findings herein also show the effects that democratic norms can have on rebel group behavior. In viewing rebel groups as nascent state-builders, we expect these groups to behave according to the dominant international norms to enhance their legitimacy and gather more resources, thus enabling them to achieve their objectives. Governments – at least on paper – adhere to certain standards in the treatment of their citizens. They have also accepted that other governments and international institutions may hold them to these standards. Studies reveal, for example, that a state’s human rights performance significantly determines the amount of aid the country received. Those states with poor human rights records received less U.S. bilateral economic aid than those with better records (Apodaca 1999). Rebel groups that abuse local populations will not acquire resources and support than will groups who treat locals in a contractarian manner. The caveat here is the ability to operate without the presence of significant rivals. The SPLA demonstrated this finding, choosing to establish democratic
institutions and garner further Western assistance. Had these rebels faced rivals during SPLA2 and SPLA3, the group would have rejected democratic norms.

This study further reveals that rebel groups provide appeal to local communities which the state treats coercively. This is especially true when the state is corrupt and cannot control predations of its own agents or when it adopts a counterinsurgency strategy that punishes local communities for rebel presence, as has been the case in Kurdish communities in Turkey. This makes it easier for rebel groups to act as providers of security, even if they are not very effective in this role. Furthermore, rebel groups facing coercive states are better able to appeal to outsiders with real or contrived reform programs that reduce coercion of local communities and are more likely to adopt international demands for democratic internal governance.

In line with this logic, however, we also discover that rebel groups can face situations of realpolitik. Rebels will abide by international norms only in conditions where they are confident they can manipulate the implementation of such “democratic reforms” in ways that will secure their monopolization of resources among local communities. If their monopoly of resources is threatened, rebels risk being viewed as possessing diminished prospects for manipulating international actors. Typical of states in centuries past, poor performance is met with a lack of interest or aggression on the part of outsiders, while monopolization of resources on the ground forces rebels to take account of local groups’ interests. When a state begins to reform (move toward the contractarian end of the spectrum of behavior) rebels will find their resources under threat and will resort to more coercive tactics in their treatment of noncombatants. This
appears to be counterintuitive because supporters of international norms of human rights and democracy lead us to believe that reforming policies are good for a state’s citizens. Yet here we see that such norms can actually be detrimental to civilians in the short-term.

This study makes a key contribution to the social movement literature. In examining the importance of rivals and the effects they can have in shaping rebel group treatment of local populations, this study takes to task those scholars who argue that ideology plays a key role in motivating insurgent behavior. In making this point, it brings into question those arguments that privilege resources as the main mechanism of rebel behavior. For policymakers, this may suggest that ideology is not as significant as having enough resources.
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